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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the reasons why Stalin purged his Red Army during 1937-38 at the 
same time as World War was looming. This gutting of the officer corps created huge 
turmoil inside the Red Army and affected at the very least 35,000 army leaders, 
resulting in thousands of discharges, arrests and executions. Previous explanations of 
the military purge have typically concentrated on Stalin’s relationship with his military 
elite and how he supposedly believed they would become a block to his expanding 
power. Framed as the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’, after its most famous victim, the military 
purge is most commonly depicted as merely the extension of Stalin’s advancing lust for 
total power into the Red Army. This thesis will show that such accounts are 
unsupported and inadequate and will provide a new explanation of the military purge. 
This thesis will show that Stalin did not attack his army elite in order to increase his 
power, but this was a last minute action made from a position of weakness. Taking the 
formation of the Red Army in early 1918 as its starting point, this thesis will argue that 
the key to understanding Stalin’s attack on the officer corps in 1937 is to understand 
how the military was perceived as susceptible to subversion. From its very formation 
the Red Army was seen as a target of ‘enemies’, ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and was 
regarded as vulnerable to infiltration. Over a period of twenty years the army faced an 
array of exaggerated and imaginary threats. Stalin was plagued by nagging doubts about 
the reliability of his forces, from mass instability in the lower ranks to supposed 
disloyalty in the military elite. By 1937 these perceived threats had culimated in a spy 
scare and it was this that finally forced Stalin to crack down on the Red Army.  
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Terminology and Transliteration 
 
In transliterating from Russian to English this thesis uses the Library of Congress 
system. The only exception made is the transliteration of ‘Trotsky’, rather than 
‘Trotskii’, as the former is most common. As this thesis covers a twenty-year period 
from 1917, rather than frequently alternate between the changing names of the Soviet 
political police, for example Cheka, GPU, OGPU and NKVD, for simplicity, ‘political 
police’ is used when possible.  
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Introduction 
 
On 11 June 1937 a closed military court passed sentences of execution on several of the 
Red Army’s most talented and experienced officers. Charged with membership of a 
‘military-fascist plot’, working with the Nazis and planning to overthrow the Bolshevik 
government, all were immediately executed after the trial. The executions of Marshal 
Mikhail Tukhachevskii and the senior officers, Iona Iakir, Ieronim Uborevich, Boris 
Feldman, Robert Eideman, Avgust Kork, Vitalii Primakov and Vitovt Putna caused 
international scandal. Tukhachevskii in particular was world-renowned. He was a Civil-
War hero and the Red Army’s key strategist. The arrests did not stop at the June 
military trial and almost immediately a large wave of arrests expanded throughout the 
officer corps as more fellow ‘conspirators’ were drawn into the ‘military-fascist plot’. 
This attack on the military cost it dearly. Alongside the execution of some of the Red 
Army’s most senior officers, during the next two years over thirty thousand army 
leaders were discharged from the ranks, thousands arrested and many executed.1 This 
decapitation of the military is still commonly pointed to by historians as contributing to 
its poor performance in the opening years of the Second World War.2    
Yet, the reason why Stalin lashed out at his military in such an extreme manner 
remains a mystery. What is certain is that there was no genuine conspiracy within the 
Red Army. It has long been known that the basis of the ‘military-fascist plot’ was 
fabricated and crafted by the Soviet political police using forced confessions.3 
Consequently, there have been numerous attempts to explain this attack on the Red 
Army from its very aftermath, but still no adequate or convincing explanation has been 
presented about why Stalin would gut his officer corps during 1937-38. The most 
common interpretation sees Stalin launch a pre-planned ‘military purge’ against his 
army in 1937 as part of his domination through terror.4 But this explanation has serious 
                                                
1 Roger Reese, ‘The Impact of the Great Purge on the Red Army: Wrestling with Hard Numbers’ The 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 19. 1-3 (1992), 71-90 (p. 72). 
2 See for example, Sergei Minakov, Stalin i zagovor generalov (Moscow: Eksmo, 2005), p. 712. 
3 After Stalin’s death a rehabilitation process of the victims of the military purge took place. In January 
1957 the Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court rehabilitated the senior officers who had been 
named as the key conspirators in the ‘military-fascist plot’. During the 1950s and 1960s hundreds of 
officers and soldiers were steadily rehabilitated. See ‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi 
voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiia TsK, 4 (1989), 42-73 (pp. 62-73). 
4 From a large body of work, see for example, Erich Wollenberg, The Red Army (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1938); Leonard Shapiro, ‘The Great Purge’ in The Soviet Army, ed. by. B. H. Liddell Hart 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957); John A. Armstrong, The Politics of Totalitarianism: The 
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flaws. If the consolidation of power was the main object of such a military purge, Stalin 
picked a terrible time to do this. By 1937 it was clear that the Second World War was 
on the horizon and Soviet defence spending was rising rapidly in response. Why would 
Stalin build with one hand and destroy with the other? Why prepare for war but at the 
same time weaken the Red Army? In conducting this military purge Stalin risked 
undermining his army at the very moment he needed it to be powerful. This potentially 
put the entire Soviet Union in danger as Stalin would be forced to fight a war with a 
weakened military.  
Thus, on the surface, this attack on the Red Army appears to be an irrational act 
and does not sit comfortably with an explanation focusing on Stalin’s desire for greater 
power. As such, this thesis will offer a new interpretation of this military purge and one 
which seeks to explain precisely why Stalin felt that such a great risk needed to be 
taken. This thesis will argue that Stalin launched a wave of repression against the Red 
Army not to further consolidate his power, but that he did this reluctantly and from a 
position of weakness. By mid-1937, in conditions of looming world war, Stalin 
perceived the military to be unreliable and widely infilitrated by ‘enemies’ and foreign 
agents. In response, he was compelled to crack down on the army to root out the 
‘enemies’ he believed were hidden in the ranks. Soon an expanding wave of discharges 
and arrests ripped through the Red Army. This quickly got out of control as the lower 
ranks responded to calls from the party and army leadership to help search out 
‘enemies’ by sending in thousands of denunciations. As such, it was Stalin’s false 
perception in 1937 that his army was unreliable that is crucial to understanding the 
military purge. This thesis will show how and why Stalin came to incorrectly believe his 
army was so heavily compromised by 1937, but before doing so, a short 
                                                                                                                                          
Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present (New York: Random House, 1961); John 
Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941 (London: Macmillan, 
1962); Edgar O’Ballance, The Red Army (London: Faber and Faber, 1964); Roman Kolkowicz, The 
Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Malcolm 
Mackintosh,  Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces (London: Secker & Warburg, 1967); Paul 
W. Blackstock, ‘The Tukhachevsky Affair’, Russian Review, 28 (April, 1969), 171-190; Robert 
Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties (London: Macmillan, 1968) ; Adam Ulam, 
Stalin: The Man and his Era (New York: Viking Press, 1974); Vitaly Rapoport and Iuri Alexeev, High 
Treason: Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918-1938 (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 
1985); Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: Norton, 
1990); Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991); 
Shimon Naveh, ‘Tukhachesky’ in Stalin’s Generals, ed. by Harold Shukman (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1993), pp. 255-274; Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet 
National Security, 1917-1992 (London: Cornell University Press, 1993); Earl F. Ziemke, The Red Army 
1918-1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to US Ally (London, Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2004). 
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historiographical survey of previous accounts of the military purge will show why very 
few of these have been convincing. 
The first attempts to provide a rationale for why Stalin attacked his army came 
from foreign observers and within the contemporary press as soon as the executions 
from the June 1937 military trial were announced. With little access to reliable 
information these immediate responses were understandably speculative. For instance, 
The Manchester Guardian speculated that Stalin had acted in response to a genuine 
military conspiracy within the Red Army.5 Other newspapers were not so definitive, but 
acknowledged Stalin’s ambitions for power.6 A number of early historical works also 
gave similar conclusions to those of the contemporary press. Writing in the late 1930s, 
the writer, communist and former Red Army officer, Erich Wollenberg, saw the military 
purge as a part of Stalin’s elimination of any possible challenge to his authority.7 The 
idea that Stalin had forestalled a genuine military plot also continued to be publicised 
into the 1940s. Well-known commentators such as the New York Times journalist 
Walter Duranty, who was based in Moscow for much of the 1930s, argued that there 
had been a genuine military conspiracy in the Red Army.8 In all, certain unifying 
themes appear in early accounts of the military purge: Stalin’s desire for power, his 
willingness to take extreme measures to safeguard this, and speculations about a 
possible military conspiracy. 
Early interpretations of the military purge did not alter greatly by the 1960s-70s 
and appeared in more developed forms in works on the Great Terror and the Red Army. 
During the Cold War the repression in the military during the Terror was most 
commonly depicted as an extension of Stalin’s increasing desire for greater power and 
control into the Red Army. The historians John Erickson, Robert Conquest, Adam Ulam 
and Roman Kolkowicz saw the military purge in a similar light. This was part of 
Stalin’s escalation of repression in order to increase his power, but also to neutralise a 
                                                
5 ‘The Purge of the Eight Russian Generals’, The Manchester Guardian, 3 July 1937, p. 16.  
6 See for example, ‘Many Doubts Rise in Russia on Guilt of Eight Generals’, The New York Times, 26 
June 1937, p. 1. See other contemporary accounts such as from the American ambassador Joseph E. 
Davies who also believed that there had been a genuine coup attempt from the army officers, Joseph E. 
Davies, Mission to Moscow, 2 vols (London: Gollancz, 1942), I, p. 111. 
7 Wollenberg, p. 224.  
8 See Duranty’s memoir, USSR: The Story of Soviet Russia (Melbourne: Hamish Hamilton, 1945), p. 222. 
Duranty is well-known as having been a Soviet sympathiser. That he explained the arrests of 
Tukhachevskii and the other senior officers as a response to a genuine military conspiracy, rather than 
suspect Stalin’s own culpability, is unsurprising. See Sally J. Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist: Walter Duranty, 
the New York Times’s Man in Moscow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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potential threat.9 According to these accounts, Stalin purged the miliary because he 
believed that certain members from the army leadership, primarily Tukhachevskii, 
would become a block to his expanding power and political hegemony. The Red Army 
needed to be subdued if Stalin was going to achieve total dominance. Consequently, the 
military purge was often linked to the growth of Stalin’s cult of personality and his 
abuse of power.10 Alongside this common central argument, the Cold War accounts 
tended to examine the military purge on a very narrow basis, referring to it as the 
‘Tukhachevskii Affair’, after its most famous victim. However, this restricted any 
analysis of the repression in the army to the relationship between Stalin and his military 
elite. A serious consideration of the experiences of the lower ranks during the purge was 
typically neglected.  
In addition, common to nearly all Cold War accounts of the military purge is a 
story about a fabricated dossier of evidence which Stalin supposedly used to incriminate 
the senior officers. This dossier allegedly contained manufactured materials showing 
that some leading officers were planning a coup with German assistance. This story 
exists in several variations and in some cases there is no physical dossier of ‘evidence’ 
and only verbal disinformation. For example, in one common version, Stalin ordered the 
creation of fabricated ‘evidence’ to provide a credible pretext for eliminating the 
members of the army leadership he believed stood in the way of his goal of total power. 
The Soviet political police then dutifully have the necessary incriminating dossier 
created in 1937.11 In the another version of the story, which is less common, Stalin is 
depicted as being duped by German intelligence agents, who fabricate the dossier and 
have this sent to the Soviet Union in an attempt to provoke Stalin into attacking his own 
military.12 The main protagonists in most versions are the Czechoslovakian President, 
Eduard Benes, the head of the German intelligence agency, Reinhard Heydrich, and the 
Russian White émigré and Soviet double-agent, Nikolai Skoblin. Benes’s role was an 
intermediary who was supposedly fooled into passing the disinformation about the Red 
Army officers to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, which was then reported to Stalin. 
Benes claimed in his memoirs that he found out about plans for an alleged military coup 
                                                
9 See Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 465; Conquest, pp. 201-235; Ulam, pp. 457-458; 
Kolkowicz, pp. 56-59. See also Shapiro, p. 71. 
10 See for example, Iuri Petrov, Partiinoe stroitel’stvo v sovetskoi armii i flote, 1918-1961 (Moscow: 
Voenizdat, 1964), p. 298. 
11 See for example, Conquest, pp. 218-219. 
12 For details on this version of the dossier story, see Igor Lukes, ‘The Tukhachevsky Affair and President 
Edvard Benes’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 7. 3 (1996), 505-529 (p. 508). 
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in the Soviet Union second-hand through Count Trauttmannsdorff, one of Hitler’s high 
officials. Apparently Trauttmannsdorff had accidently disclosed the existence of secret 
negotiations between Hitler and Tukhachevskii and spoken about an ‘anti-Stalin clique’ 
within the Soviet Union.13 Benes’s account has been used as evidence showing the 
intrigue by either the Soviet political police or by German intelligence in duping him 
into delivering the disinformation against the Red Army to Stalin. Heydrich’s role was 
supposedly working with Skoblin in fabricating the necessary documents against the 
members of Red Army elite. Specifically, Skoblin is often depicted as convincing 
Heydrich about developing plans for a military coup by some senior Red Army officers. 
Heydrich apparently agreed to fabricate the necessary materials for transmission to the 
Soviet Union having sensed an opportunity to provoke Stalin into weakening his own 
army.14 
The dossier story is full of intrigue and conspiracy. If it had not been for Nikita 
Khrushchev’s acknowledgment of the story in the early 1960s, it probably would not 
have been given much credibility by historians.15 However, despite how common the 
dossier story is in the literature on the military purge, whichever way it is presented, 
there is no reason to believe it. The story derives from unreliable memoirs, often those 
of political police defectors which have been long discredited.16 Other key accounts, 
                                                
13 Eduard Benes, Memoirs of Dr Eduard Benes: From Munich to New War and New Victory (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1954), p. 47. The same version of events can be seen in Winston Churchill, The Second 
World War, 6 vols (London: Cassell, 1949), I, pp. 258-259. 
14 See for example, Victor Alexandrov, The Tukhachevsky Affair (London: Macdonald, 1963), p. 190. 
There are some particularly unconvincing accounts about why Stalin would purge the military which 
develop the dossier story even further. One particularly doubtful version is the story that some prominent 
officers, including Tukhachevskii, discovered that Stalin had been an Okhrana agent before the October 
Revolution and then planned to depose him. Apparently, in response Stalin had the dossier fabricated to 
incriminate the officers first. However, there is no reliable evidence that Stalin had ever been an Okhrana 
agent. For this version, see Roman Brackman, The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life (London: 
Frank Cass, 2001). 
15 The Stalin Dictatorship: Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ and Other Documents, ed. by T. H. Rigby 
(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968), p. 99. Khrushchev’s explanation of the military purge blamed 
German intelligence for supposedly supplying the dossier of ‘evidence’ against the high command. In this 
way Khrushchev could still lay blame with Stalin for purging the army, but responsibility was also placed 
on the German government. Thus, for Khrushchev, it was Stalin’s suspicious personality and German 
intrigues against the regime that led to the execution of the Soviet Union’s military heroes and neither the 
Soviet system nor its ideology were in any way responsible.  
16 The key memoir accounts are from NKVD defectors, including Walter Krivitskii, Aleksandr Orlov, and 
the German intelligence agent Walter Shellenberg. For criticism of Krivitskii and Orlov see Matthew 
Lenoe, ‘Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does it Matter?’, The Journal of Modern History, 74. 2 (2002), 352-
380; J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 211-220. For criticism of Schellenberg and other 
common memoir accounts, see ‘M. N. Tukhachevskii i “voenno-fashistskii zagovor”’, Voenno-
istoricheskii arkhiv, 2 (1998), 3-123 (pp. 3-6).  
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such Benes’s memoir, have also been proved false.17 Indeed, there is nothing at all to 
suggest that the dossier story has any basis in reality. Aside from the problems with the 
existing sources, there is a complete absence of any other reliable evidence. After the 
opening of the Russian archives in the early 1990s, no single piece of documentary 
evidence has ever been found in support of the story. Furthermore, the materials that are 
now accessible do not point towards the existence of the fabricated dossier either. For 
example, just before the June 1937 military trial Stalin met with the Red Army’s most 
senior officers to discuss the exposed ‘military plot’. The transcript of this meeting is 
now available and throughout the entire four-day session there is not a single mention of 
this dossier of incriminating evidence. In addition, it was never used at the June military 
trial itself.18 This is remarkable if the dossier really was the key piece of evidence 
against Tukhachevskii and the other officers. Why would Stalin go to such lengths to 
have incriminating evidence fabricated with the precise aim of giving the executions 
credibility, if he never publicised it or seemingly even used it? The same can be said for 
the other variation of the story where Stalin is duped by German intelligence. If the 
evidence was so convincing, why were the rest of the Red Army elite not told about it? 
The poor source base and lack of evidence for the dossier story mean few today take it 
seriously. 
It must also be emphasised that these Cold War accounts of the military purge 
are inseparable from the dominant trend in historiography of the Great Terror at this 
time. In the 1960s and 1970s the Great Terror was depicted by historians as little more 
than a brutal consolidation of power. Stalin was seen as the master planner who 
methodically executed all who stood in his way.19 The military purge was regarded as 
merely an extension of this process into the Red Army. However, as detailed above, 
there are immediate problems with this view of the military purge. Would Stalin really 
endanger his own position and the security of the Soviet Union by executing some of 
the most talented individuals in the military and arrest thousands of officers in 
conditions of looming war just to achieve personal dominance over the armed forces? A 
further question is how Stalin would find himself in such a position, if he was such a 
meticulous planner, of having promoted to the highest ranks people who he did not fully 
                                                
17 See Lukes, pp. 505-529.  
18 See Voennyi sovet pri narodnom komissare oborony SSSR: 1-4 iiunia 1937 goda: dokumenty i 
materialy, ed. K. M. Anderson and others (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008). That the dossier was not used 
during the military trial has been known for a long time, but strangely did not arouse many suspicions 
about its authenticity from some historians, see Conquest, pp. 222-223. 
19 The best known example of this argument can be seen in Conquest, The Great Terror. 
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trust? If Stalin’s aim was absolute control, why were the careers of Tukhachevskii and 
the other officers advanced to high seniority?  
Serious questions were raised against previous accounts of the military purge by 
historians reassessing the dominant view of the Great Terror during the 1980s and early 
1990s. Notably, Arch Getty viewed the military purge as a problematic historical 
episode with a lack of convincing evidence.20 Getty questioned how pre-planned the 
military purge had actually been. In highlighting the series of events leading up to the 
June 1937 trial, Getty argued that these were not as expected if Stalin had meticulously 
arranged the execution of the senior officers. For example, despite suspicions that had 
begun to circle Tukhachevskii from early May 1937, it took a month for Stalin to decide 
on a course of action. In the first instance Tukhachevskii was only demoted from the 
deputy People’s Commissar for Defence to command the less prestigious Volga 
Military District (PriVO).21 As Gábor Rittersporn commented, ‘this was hardly the usual 
treatment of dangerous conspirators’.22 If Stalin saw Tukhachevskii as a threat to his 
power, if he was a marked man, and if there was accumulating incriminating ‘evidence’ 
against him, it makes little sense not to arrest him immediately. 
With the release of a huge amount of previously inaccessible documents from 
the Russian archives in the early 1990s more focused studies on the Red Army during 
the Terror quickly emerged. With the declassification of internal army, party and 
political police materials, it was possible for the first time to gain a fuller understanding 
of the impact of repression in the Red Army during 1937-38. Importantly, this newer 
work cast further doubts over earlier accounts of the military purge and particularly how 
this had been framed as the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’.  For example, from a perspective of 
political and social history Roger Reese showed that a practice of purging (chistki) had 
already been established in the army throughout the 1920s and 1930s. These purges 
aimed to improve ideological conformity in the ranks and remove those deemed to be 
‘class aliens’ and ‘socially-harmful elements’.23 Reese elaborated that during the Terror, 
the mass denunciations so important in driving forward the search for ‘enemies of the 
                                                
20 Getty, Origins of the Great Purges, p. 168. 
21 Ibid., p. 167. 
22 Gábor Rittersporn, Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political 
Conflicts in the USSR, 1933-1953 (Chur, Reading: Harwood, 1991), p. 140. 
23 Reese, ‘The Red Army and the Great Purges’ in Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, ed. by Getty and 
Roberta T. Manning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 198-214 (p. 203). This 
distinction between chistki and the repression in the Terror was first seen in the work of Getty, see 
Origins of the Great Purges, pp. 38-57. 
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people’, spread quickly throughout the Red Army. Reese argued this was because, ‘the 
rank and file were conditioned through chistki to see class enemies and wreckers in all 
walks of life’.24 Thus, an established internal practice of army purging transformed into 
a vehicle of mass denunciation in 1937-38. In this way Reese placed an important focus 
on the lower ranks and how ordinary soldiers responded to the call to root out ‘enemies 
of the people’. Reese’s work took the emphasis away from viewing the military purge 
as the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’ and showed that the response of the Red Army as a whole 
to the ‘exposure’ of a ‘military conspiracy’ in the army leadership is crucial to 
understanding why the military purge of 1937-38 reached such a large scale.  
Oleg Suvenirov similarly traced the roots of the military purge before 1937 and 
looked beyond than the narrow focus of the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’. Suvenirov provided 
a detailed documentation of repression within the military from the early 1930s in his 
book, Tragediia RKKA 1937-1938. For example, he showed that before 1937 the Red 
Army experienced the arrests of political oppositionists, it faced great turmoil during the 
years of the collectivisation of agriculture, and there were a numerous alleged 
‘counterrevolutionary’ groups ‘revealed’ by the political police before 1937. Spies had 
also been frequently ‘exposed’ in the Red Army.25 Suvenirov also highlighted the 
impact on the Red Army of the key events which escalated the political repression 
inside the Bolshevik Party, such as the murder of the Leningrad party boss, Sergei 
Kirov, in December 1934. Suvenirov estimated that a wave of tens or hundreds of 
military arrests followed the murder.26 In addition, Suvenirov focused on the role played 
in the military purge by People’s Commissar for Defence, Kliment Voroshilov. Indeed, 
all high-ranking military arrests needed his approval from 1934, thus he was directly 
implicated in the repression. The military purge cannot be fully understood without a 
strong consideration of Voroshilov’s role.27 Consequently, Suvenirov demonstrated that 
there is an important pre-history to the military purge of 1937-38, that the Red Army 
was responsive to the changing political currents in the party before the outbreak of the 
Terror and that it faced the same types of fabricated charges as other Soviet institutions. 
The military purge was far more than the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’ and must be seen in 
the context of the broader growing political repression in the 1930s. 
                                                
24 Reese, ‘The Red Army and the Great Purges’, p. 211. 
25 Oleg Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 1937-1938 (Moscow: Terra, 1998), pp. 45-59. 
26 Ibid., p. 51. 
27 Ibid., pp. 71, 95-98. 
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Another major contributor to our understanding of the military purge is Sergei 
Minakov, who has written extensively on the subject from a perspective of civil-military 
relations.28 Minakov examines the military purge with a broad view, taking elements of 
his account back to the 1917 Revolution. However, he still refocuses attention to a 
significant extent back towards Tukhachevskii and his allies in the army elite. Important 
to Minakov’s interpretation of the military purge is what he sees as the encroachment 
into politics by an alliance of senior officers, including Tukhachevskii, who were 
unhappy with the direction of army modernisation and who focused their discontent on 
the head of the Red Army, Voroshilov. Minakov argues this alliance of senior officers 
wanted to remove Voroshilov, and that Stalin saw this as a serious threat. Minakov 
presents this as evidence of a possible ‘plot’ within the military elite. Thus, even though 
the ‘military-fascist plot’ which formed the basis of the 1937-38 military purge was 
fabricated by the political police and there were no genuine plans for a military coup, 
according to Minakov, there was still some conspiratorial activity from several senior 
officers who wanted Voroshilov out of the way.  
Where this argument suffers, however, is in a weak grounding in evidence, 
much of which is circumstantial. There is also a big difference between an alliance of 
senior officers hostile to their superior, and genuine conspiratorial plans to force him 
out.29 What Minakov does describe more successfully is how different groups saw 
Tukhachevskii as an object of suspicion. From the early 1920s there were numerous 
rumours surrounding Tukhachevskii about his supposed disloyalty. He was often 
perceived as a ‘Russian Bonaparte’ outside of the Soviet Union, an image particularly 
common within White émigré circles holding out hope for a future military coup. As 
Minakov has shown, the political police received rumours and other hearsay pointing to 
Tukhachevskii’s alleged ambitions for power and disloyalty from a very early stage in 
                                                
28 Minakov, Stalin i zagovor generalov; Za otvorotom marshalskoi shineli (Orel: Orelizdat, 1999); 
Sovetskaia voennaia elita 20-kh godov: sostav, evoliutsiia, sotsiokul’turnye osobennosti i politicheskaia 
rol’ (Orel: Orelizdat, 2000); Stalin i ego marshal (Moscow: Iauza; Eksmo, 2004); 1937. zagovor byl! 
(Moscow: Iauza; Eksmo, 2010). 
29 Minakov’s latest book, 1937. zagovor byl!, has a misleading title. Minakov does not definitively argue 
that there was a genuine military plot and plans for a coup, and notes there is a lack of convincing 
evidence, see p. 289. For criticism of Minakov overestimating the significance of alliances in the army 
elite, see Vladimir Khaustov and Lennart Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD i repressii 1936-1938 gg. (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN, 2010), p. 17. Much of Minakov’s support for the alleged plans to remove Voroshilov include 
repeated references to memoirs and sources from after the ‘military-fascist plot’ had been ‘exposed’ in 
1937, such as the transcript of the Military Soviet which met in early June 1937 to discuss the ‘military 
conspiracy’. Minakov does not account for very real possibility that those present at this particular 
Military Soviet may have presented any informal alliances within the military elite in a more 
‘conspiratorial’ light in view of the very recently ‘exposed’ ‘military plot’. 
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his career.30 Importantly, it is very likely that what were regarded as merely rumours 
before the mid-1930s were taken more seriously during the Terror. Minakov’s work is 
important in demonstrating how certain senior officers were continual objects of 
suspicion and how rumours about their disloyalty never abated. 
Other recent works of note are Aleksandr Pechenkin’s study based on the 
Military Soviet of June 1937, a meeting which was hastily convened after the 
‘exposure’ of the ‘military-fascist plot’.31 What is striking about this Military Soviet is 
that it is clear that not all present knew the details of the ‘military plot’. The exact 
details were disputed and some members reacted with what reads like a genuine sense 
of shock that some of those who were regarded as loyal officers were in reality 
dangerous conspirators. Nikolai Cherushev’s work has also greatly contributed to our 
knowledge of the military purge. In working with the interrogation transcripts of 
arrested officers Cherushev shows how military ‘conspiracy’ was linked together. He 
closely details the alleged connections made between the arrested ‘conspirators’ and the 
common accusations. Importantly, this process was not without contradictions. 
Cherushev has also firmly rebutted those who still maintain that there was a genuine 
military plot, a view not uncommon today.32 Finally, Iuliia Kantor, while still 
maintaining a reasonably tight focus on Tukhachevskii, has produced important work 
exploring the links between the Red Army elite and the German Army.33 This 
connection was particularly significant. One of the main charges against the senior 
officers at the closed trial in June 1937 was espionage for Germany. The ‘military-
fascist plot’ was certainly fabricated, but the political police had material to work with. 
However, despite this new level of detail about the military purge, still no 
credible or convincing explanation has been offered for why Stalin would attack his 
army at the same time as he knew war was approaching. Reese and Suvenirov explored 
the dynamics of the purge process in the army, showing that the tide of denunciations 
could not have been wholly directed by Stalin, and that there is an important pre-history 
                                                
30 Minakov, Stalin i zagovor generalov, pp. 71-97. 
31 Aleksandr Pechenkin, Stalin i voennyi sovet (Moscow: Vserossiiskii zaochnyi finansovo-
ekonomicheskii institut, 2007). 
32 See Cherushev, 1937 god, byl li zagovor voennykh? (Moscow: Veche, 2007). The argument that there 
was a genuine military conspiracy has been surprising persistent, particularly so in Russian popular 
books. There are some more academic texts which also still maintain that a military plot was genuine, 
despite a lack of convincing evidence. See for example, Valentin Leskov, Stalin i zagovor 
Tukhachevskogo (Moscow: Veche, 2003). 
33 Iuliia Kantor, Voina i mir Mikhaila Tukhachevskogo (Moscow: Ogonek, 2005); Zakliataia druzhba: 
sekretnoe sotrudnichestvo SSSR i Germanii v 1920-1930-e godi (Saint Petersburg: Piter, 2009). 
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of repression in the military prior to 1937, but neither point to why such a large wave of 
arrests began in June 1937. Reese only speculates about Stalin’s possible desire to 
subjugate the army and Suvenirov did not come to any firm conclusions.34 Pechenkin 
also does not convincingly argue why the military purge was initiated and falls back to 
an argument focusing on Stalin’s desire for loyal officers.35 While Kantor has 
discovered many very useful archival documents and has shown the importance of the 
link between the German Army and the Red Army elite, she returns to the established 
view that Stalin closely directed the Terror and purged the military as part of a process 
to remove any opposition to his power. Kantor argues that Stalin ‘saw Tukhachevskii as 
an enemy of his system’, he was loyal, but not unconditionally so. According to Kantor, 
the connection between the Red Army and Germany was important in giving Stalin the 
opportunity to remove Tukhachevskii.36 Cherushev agrees with Kantor’s assessment in 
his latest work on the military purge.37 Minakov does provide a different explanation of 
the military purge, but his argument that Stalin acted in response to the encroachment 
into politics by some senior officers looking to unseat Voroshilov is unconvincing. 
Despite Tukhachevskii being the subject of numerous rumours about his disloyalty, 
there is nothing to suggest that there were any organised plans to remove Voroshilov 
from the army leadership. In addition, Minakov’s explanation certainly does not account 
for why the military purge later affected over 35,000 army leaders and not just the main 
‘conspirators’ apparently plotting Voroshilov’s downfall. Finally, despite arguing that 
members of the Red Army elite encroached into Soviet party politics, Minakov 
surprisingly ignores the importance of the growing political repression inside the 
Bolshevik Party during the 1930s to the military purge in 1937-38. He does not consider 
the impact of key political events such as the Kirov assassination or how the arrests of 
former political oppositionists and the emergence of a perceived conspiracy inside the 
party, a defining feature of the Great Terror, manifested inside the Red Army. 
Thus no credible case has been made for why Stalin gutted the military in 1937-
38. Previous accounts either make no judgment or merely allude to Stalin’s drive for 
power and his desire to crush any possible opposition. In this respect, there has been 
little development from the interpretations of the 1950s-60s about why Stalin attacked 
                                                
34 Reese, ‘The Red Army and the Great Purges’, p. 212. 
35 For criticism of Pechenkin, see Samuelson and Khaustov, p. 17. 
36 Kantor, Zakliataia druzhba, p. 295. 
37 Cherushev, p. 570. For further criticisms of Cherushev’s earlier work, see Khaustov and Samuelson, p. 
16; Aleksandr Zdanovich, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti i krasnaia armiia (Moscow: Kuchkovo 
pole, 2008), pp. 32-33, 106. 
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his army in such an extreme manner just before the outbreak of war. Yet, the objections 
against an explanation focusing on Stalin’s desires for greater power remain the same 
and the extent to which the military purge was carefully pre-planned has already been 
seriously questioned.  
Why there has been so little development in explaining Stalin’s purge of the Red 
Army is partly attributable to the lack of engagement by historians writing on the 
subject with recent research on the Great Terror. Beyond Reese’s research, accounts of 
the military purge rarely engage with the large body of work on the Terror published 
since the opening of the Russian archives. As such, a chief aim of this thesis is to set an 
examination of the military purge alongside new research on the Great Terror. This will 
not only firmly move this analysis of the military purge beyond the restrictions of the 
‘Tukhachevskii Affair’ but will provide a much more thorough account of how the 
repression in the Red Army was influenced by wider political violence within the Soviet 
state and society. Importantly, this approach will also show how the purge of the army 
contributed to the momentum of the Great Terror itself. The military purge was a crucial 
part of the Terror and must be analysed in the context of what we now know about the 
phenomenon. 
The debates about the origins of the Great Terror and the forces behind state 
violence during the Stalin period have been transformed over the past twenty years 
through access to previously classified archival sources. Since the opening of the 
archives in the early 1990s, the accounts of the Great Terror that dominated the post-
war era, which, as noted above, directly influenced Cold War accounts of the military 
purge, have been shown to be narrow and incomplete. During the 1950s-60s post-war 
historians and political scientists typically examined the Great Terror from the 
perspective of political history. They variously depicted Stalin using state violence in 
order to overcome resistance to revolutionary change, as a means to increase his 
personal control over the Soviet Union, or simply as a consequence of his alleged 
paranoid personality. While some historians and political theorists saw state violence as 
inherent within the Soviet system, those writing during the 1950s-60s typically focused 
solely on Stalin’s intentions and actions during the Great Terror at the expense of an 
analysis of wider Soviet society.38 
                                                
38 Notable post-war scholarship on the Stalinist regime includes the work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who 
saw terror as inherent in the functioning of the Stalinist system. Brzezinski argued that in the absence of 
any real opposition, the regime relied on a system of purging to remove opposition to its power and also 
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Before the archives fully opened, this dominant Cold War narrative had already 
been challenged by a group of historians examining previously neglected aspects of the 
Terror. Writing in the late 1970s, the social historian Sheila Fitzpatrick took the 
emphasis away from high politics and explored the role of wider society in the 
formation of the Stalinist system.39 Later in the 1990s, and alongside several other 
historians, Fitzpatrick directly challenged how the Great Terror had been framed by 
totalitarian scholars, showing that this was a far more complex phenomenon than just 
state repression directed from ‘above’. Fitzpatrick highlighted a range of social tensions 
which led ordinary Soviet citizens to actively participate in the Terror and denounce one 
another to the authorities. These social tensions were so strong that once the Terror 
began it took on a momentum of its own. Similarly, in his study of the industrial city 
Magnitogorsk, Stephen Kotkin explored how the pressures of everyday life under the 
Stalinist regime helped engender a flurry of denunciations from ordinary people to the 
authorities during 1937-38.40  
Writing in the mid-1980s, Getty argued in a seminal work that internal structural 
pressures within the Soviet system, rather than Stalin’s desire for more power and 
control, were the primary cause of the Terror. Using previously underused sources, such 
                                                                                                                                          
filter out less capable party members, see The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). See also Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). That terror was 
essential to sustaining a totalitarian system of rule and used to eliminate traces of real and hypothetical 
opposition was an argument advanced by the political theorist Hannah Arendt, see The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958) Other historians writing during the Cold War, such as 
Conquest, took a different view and rather than place emphasis on terror as a inherent reality in the soviet 
system, he placed responsibility individually on Stalin for the scale of the state violence during the 1930s 
and focused on supposed defects in the dictator’s personality. Conquest depicted Stalin as obsessed with 
gaining power no matter what the cost, see Conquest. A similar view was advanced by Ulam. The view 
that Stalin had supposedly been ‘sickly suspicious’, suffering from ‘mania’ and obsessed with power was 
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such as Conquest, see The Stalin Dictatorship, ed. by Rigby. For a more recent work that attempts to 
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39 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1978). Fitzpatrick argued that during the 1920s high levels of social mobility enabled ordinary workers 
and peasants to seize senior positions in the party and government. However, according to Fitzpatrick, 
this new elite was resistant to further revolutionary change, providing a foundation for a conservative 
Stalinist system. 
40 See Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as 
Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). For other recent work exploring popular 
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as materials from the Smolensk archive and contemporary newspapers and journals, 
Getty highlighted strained relations between centre and regional party bosses which he 
argued provided the spark for the Terror. Frustrated by their recalcitrance, the regime 
encouraged criticism of local leaders from lower level party members in 1937, a process 
that soon spiralled out of control when it became intertwined with official party rhetoric 
about hidden ‘enemies’ of the people. Getty presented the Great Terror as a reactive 
process caused by a loss of control, rather than being carefully premeditated.41 
Similarly, Rittersporn also highlighted the importance of internal systemic pressures and 
argued that a struggle between the party and state, between the elite and the workers, 
prompted the regime to turn to repression to manage the system.42  
The work of this group of historians firmly shifted the emphasis away from 
Stalin the individual and towards Soviet society and the party-state system and there are 
several continuities in approach in this examination of the military purge. Firstly, how 
the Red Army rank-and-file responded to the ‘exposure’ of the ‘military-fascist plot’ 
will be explored below. This thesis will show that even though the military had a much 
stronger sense of hierarchy and discipline than wider Soviet society, the response from 
the troops to the urgent calls from the regime to root out hidden ‘conspirators’ and 
‘enemies’ during 1937-38 created a similar level of turmoil and disorientation in the 
ranks. As with the rest of the Terror, the military purge took on a momentum of its 
own.43 Secondly, tensions between the regime and the army commanders will also be 
examined. As will be detailed below, a number of commanders resisted the regime’s 
calls to ‘expose’ ‘enemies’ within their units during the 1930s. Like the party bosses, 
some officers had a direct interest in evading the regime’s orders. 
However, a major distinction to historians such as Getty and Rittersporn is that 
this research demonstrates that Stalin initiated the purge of the Red Army not as means 
to manage a dysfunctional Soviet system, or that this was an unforeseen consequence of 
this attempt. It will argue that Stalin purged the army because he misperceived it as 
posing a serious security threat. It will explore precisely why Stalin saw a serious 
danger from his military and how he came to believe that there was no other option but 
to unleash a mass purge. Indeed, even though historians such as Getty, Rittersporn and 
                                                
41 Getty, Origins of the Great Purges. For similar arguments, see James R. Harris, The Great Urals: 
Regionalism and the Evolution of the Soviet System (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999); 
Goldman, Terror and Democracy. 
42 Rittersporn. 
43 Reese is alone in having studied how the Red Army rank-and-file responded to the Terror in ‘The Red 
Army and the Great Purges’. 
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Fitzpatrick demonstrated that the dominant post-war account was reductive, there is still 
little consensus about Stalin’s motivations for initiating the Great Terror or why he used 
state violence so frequently. While the increasing rate in the discovery of new archival 
documents throughout the 1990s has allowed more nuanced accounts of the Terror, this 
has also created many more unanswered questions. For instance, new strands of 
research into Soviet culture and society, foreign policy, and the influence of ideology 
and intelligence on the behaviour of the regime, have created new controversies without 
settling the older arguments about why the Terror began and what its purpose was. This 
examination of the military purge has particular relevance to new debates about the 
influence of ideology on the use of state violence and how intelligence drove 
perceptions of threat. It is from this approach that this thesis will help reveal the key 
motivations behind the Great Terror. 
The opening of the archives coincided with a growing interest in the social and 
cultural history of the Stalin period. This has not only enriched how we understand the 
dynamic between state and society in pushing forward state violence, but has 
demonstrated the strength of ideology in the Soviet Union during the 1920s-30s. For 
instance, Jochen Hellbeck and Igal Halfin have explored the influence of ideology 
within Soviet society, particularly among the intelligentsia. They show how some party 
members actually embraced the Great Terror and rationalised the arrests occurring 
around them. For those most ideologically dedicated to the communist cause, the Great 
Terror was an essential part of the socialist experiment and necessary for remoulding 
society. Many sincerely believed that hidden capitalist ‘enemies’ in Soviet society were 
a very real threat.44  
Furthermore, new archival documents such as private correspondence between 
Stalin and members of his close circle have refocused attentions onto the Bolshevik elite 
and shown the strength of ideology within the upper circles of the party. Indeed, these 
materials have revealed that Stalin frequently used Marxist language outside of his 
public speeches.45 It now appears that Stalin did not just conceal a desire for power 
within Marxist rhetoric, as argued by some Cold War historians.46 He seems to have 
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viewed the world through a Marxist framework and appears to have been ideologically 
committed.47 Several historians have already begun to explore the influence of ideology 
on the regime’s domestic policies. For instance, David Priestland has argued that 
ideology was the prime force behind state violence. According to Priestland, the regime 
zigzagged between different mobilising ideologies during the 1920-30s and the Great 
Terror was the result of the ascendency of a destabilising populist ideology promoting 
revolutionary purity.48  
In contrast, rather than examine ideology as a popular mobilisation strategy, 
other historians have focused specifically on the regime’s ideological hostility to 
capitalism. For instance, in his study on the Communist International, William Chase 
explored how the Stalinist regime endorsed various different conspiracy theories, 
notably those detailing that fascist agents were infiltrating into Soviet state and working 
alongside hidden party ‘double-dealers’. As Chase demonstrates, it seems that Stalin 
and his close circle genuinely believed that the capitalist world was engaged in a vast 
conspiracy to bring down the Soviet Union. Similarly, James Harris has argued that the 
Bolsheviks’ endorsement of the ideology of capitalist encirclement combined with a 
stream of inaccurate and misread intelligence left the Stalinist regime convinced that a 
major war was approaching for most of the interwar period. The regime was highly 
concerned that foreign agents were infiltrating into the country and making early 
preparations for an invasion. According to these historians, Stalin’s consistent 
misperception of these threats was a primary force behind the Great Terror.49 
This thesis further explores ideology and perception through examining how 
Stalin perceived the security of the Red Army. As such, a large focus in this thesis is on 
the Bolshevik Party elite. Taking 1917 as a starting point it will show that the Bolshevik 
regime had an uneasy relationship with its standing army from its very formation in 
early 1918. Maintaining a standing army (rather than a more ideologically acceptable 
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people’s militia) clashed with the Bolshevik’s principles and many party members never 
fully reconciled to its existence. Alongside this ideological hostility, the Red Army was 
regarded as a target of foreign agents and other domestic ‘counterrevolutionaries’ 
during 1920s-30s. The military was seen as vulnerable to infiltration and displaying 
alarming security weaknesses that the regime believed capitalist countries would seize 
upon. The Red Army was regarded as a prime target for agents from a hostile capitalist 
coalition. However, the perception of these dangers was consistently greater than their 
reality and the Stalinist regime saw more ‘enemies’ than really existed. As shown 
below, as world war crept closer during the 1930s, party and political police attentions 
increasingly turned towards the recognised security weaknesses in the Red Army. This 
represented an important step towards the military purge, which was eventually sparked 
by a very large spy scare in 1937.  
In this respect, this analysis of the military purge demonstrates that Stalin’s 
misperception of threats and his ideological hostility to the capitalist world are crucial to 
understanding state violence during the Great Terror. It will argue that Stalin perceived 
threats within the Red Army that did not exist and that he attacked it during 1937-38 
from a position of vulnerability and misperception, rather than of confidence and 
strength. Despite war approaching, Stalin purged the organisation he relied upon the 
most because he misperceived the military as posing a serious threat to his own power 
and to the stability of the regime. Thus, while Stalin undoubtedly wanted to preserve his 
power, and this remains an important motivation behind the Great Terror, it is necessary 
to understand what threats he believed put this at risk. 
New documents from the Russian archives have also allowed analysis of the 
mass operations, which began in the summer of 1937 and resulted in the arrests and 
executions of thousands of innocent civilians by list. These operations were unexamined 
before the opening of the archives but they were responsible for the majority of the 
victims of the Great Terror.50 Indeed, a number of historians now argue that to fully 
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understand the Great Terror the main focus of any analysis should not be on how the 
repression unfolded within the Bolshevik Party during the mid-1930s, but instead on the 
links between the larger mass operations of 1937-38 and earlier large-scale policing 
operations, such as the collectivisation and dekulakisation drives of the late 1920s to 
early 1930s. These historians argue that the mass operations of the Great Terror 
represent a return to previous policing practices. The argument follows that Stalin 
deployed mass operations during the Great Terror in the belief that he needed to secure 
the Soviet Union in the face of approaching war and thus wanted to remove any 
‘unreliable elements’ from the population. To achieve this Stalin ordered a new round 
of mass operations. In this sense, the mass operations of the Great Terror did not evolve 
from the repression in the Bolshevik Party in 1937, but had a much earlier precedent.51 
Furthermore, several historians now argue that the mass operations give renewed 
support to the argument that the Great Terror was premeditated and carefully 
orchestrated by Stalin, and used primarily to secure his power and control. This 
represents a partial revival of the Cold War account of the Terror.52 Indeed, it is clear 
that Stalin ordered the mass operations and that these were carefully planned. A large 
number of new archival documents also show his close involvement during the 
escalation of state violence during the 1930s. If anything, declassified archival materials 
have reaffirmed Stalin’s decisive influence in the orchestration of the Great Terror.53  
Yet, even though it is now undisputed that Stalin ordered the mass operations, it 
is still far from clear why he did this and there is little consensus in the literature. For 
instance, the argument that the mass operations were launched in response to the future 
threat of war has been questioned, as there was no pressing international danger to the 
Soviet Union during summer 1937. Some historians have highlighted domestic factors 
to explain the mass operations. Getty argues that these were launched because the 
regime saw an urgent internal threat. According to Getty, the regime feared that the 
level of anti-soviet opposition within the countryside (broadly from ‘anti-soviet 
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elements’ and kulaks released from the labour camps) had grown significantly during 
1937. Thus, Stalin used mass policing tactics in response to what he considered a 
genuine internal threat to the regime.54  
This thesis will both advance a new explanation of the mass operations and 
reconcile previous conflicting accounts. Indeed, it is a great omission that the military 
purge is ignored in research on the mass operations as it reveals their most likely 
motive. Stalin’s purge of the army was launched in mid-June 1937, only weeks before 
the initiation of the mass operations. As detailed below, the military purge was sparked 
by the regime’s misperception that the Red Army had been widely infiltrated by foreign 
agents. This research argues that following the beginning of the purge, Stalin then 
moved to secure wider society from the same danger of a fifth column by deploying the 
mass operations. As such, while the fear of a future war provided an important 
motivation for Stalin to conduct the mass operations, it was the more immediate threat 
of a perceived fifth column within the Red Army that first drove the military purge in 
June 1937 and had a decisive influence on the launch of the mass operations only weeks 
after. 
In this respect, it is unlikely that the mass operations were planned long in 
advance. This research argues that they were launched in reaction to the regime’s 
sudden and mistaken fear that foreign agents had infiltrated deeply into the military and 
Soviet society. The regime launched the mass operations from a similar position of 
vulnerability and misperception as it did the military purge. Even though the mass 
operations were clearly initiated and brought to an end by Stalin, they more reflect a 
deep level of insecurity rather a high level of totalitarian control.55 
 Finally, the military purge also links the repression in the Bolshevik Party to the 
mass operations. The framing of the Terror as noted remains subject to debate in the 
literature, particularly after the discovery of the mass operations. This thesis argues that 
                                                
54 Ibid., pp. 468-481. 
55 Khlevniuk has argued that Stalin launched the mass operations proactively from a position of strength 
and control. He knew that war was approaching and that a potential fifth column in the population needed 
to be removed, but there was no element of panic in his response. According to Khlevniuk, as in the 
earlier repression in the party, Stalin tightly controlled the mass operations and ended these when they 
had achieved their goals. In this respect, Stalin showed himself to be a strong totalitarian dictator firmly in 
control of events, see Master of the House. By showing that the military purge was initiated because of a 
large spy scare, this thesis challenges this view of the mass operations. It will argue that the regime was 
caught unaware by the scale of the spy ‘infiltration’ in the Red Army and that the military purge was a 
reluctant last minute response. This was initiated from a position of vulnerability and not confidence. In 
this sense, while this research supports those such as Khlevniuk in showing that the foreign threat was an 
important motive for the mass operations and is inseparable from the perceived ‘fifth column’, it argues 
that the mass operations were primarily defensive and reactive. 
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the political repression in the Bolshevik Party was not an entirely discrete process from 
the mass operations. As shown below, the military purge was directly linked to the 
earlier repression in the Bolshevik Party during 1936, which then became a decisive 
factor in the launch of the mass operations. In this way, the military purge transformed 
the scale and targets of the Great Terror and pushed the repression against former 
oppositionists in the party towards ordinary Soviet citizens. The political repression in 
the Bolshevik Party thus remains central to understanding the mass operations.  
 But more broadly, beyond the Terror, this examination of the military purge will 
add to our understanding of Stalinist politics and society. Specifically, this thesis 
furthers our understanding of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian state. It will show how 
the Stalinist regime created an environment where individual pasts were never 
forgotten. The regime was totalitarian in its attempt to keep a very close track of those it 
perceived to be potential ‘enemies’ and the political police kept a large number of secret 
files on alleged ‘subversive’ activity. These attempts to keep track of ‘suspicious’ 
individuals in the Red Army can be seen immediately from 1918 as the regime 
reluctantly reconciled to having to maintain a standing army. Indeed, there were many 
officers in the Red Army who had stains on their records, whether this was previous 
service in the White armies during the Civil War or close contact with German officers. 
Importantly, these blemishes were not forgotten. 
However, such surveillance could never be close to being absolute and the 
regime could never entirely confident that those working under it were loyal citizens or 
secret ‘enemies’. Because the regime endorsed conspiracy theories describing the 
infiltration of the Soviet Union by hidden ‘enemies’ and foreign agents, these broader 
uncertainties about the loyalty of certain individuals and segments of the Soviet 
population contributed to outbreaks of state violence during the 1920s-30s. During the 
Great Terror particularly, an uncertainty about who was loyal and who was an ‘enemy’ 
contributed to the destabilisation of the Soviet state. The regime arrested anyone with 
the slightest incrimination or connection to somebody already arrested. In this respect, 
this thesis argues that the roots of the Great Terror can be seen more clearly from the 
Revolution than is often given credit for in the literature.56 This does not just apply to 
                                                
56 This is not exclusively the case, and some historians have studied the roots of Bolshevik state violence 
before 1917. See Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1941-
1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).  
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the Red Army, and the regime’s anxieties about the loyalty of its military are likely to 
have been replicated in other spheres of the state.  
The Stalinist regime was thus totalitarian in its attempt to monitor any form of 
perceived subversive activity in an effort to gauge the loyalty of the population, but its 
failure to do this comprehensively, or to a degree which gave it confidence, left it 
feeling vulnerable. When internal crises and spy scares erupted within the state, as 
happened in 1937 within the Red Army, Stalin lashed out and attacked his main power 
bases. Stalin came to believe that there were ‘enemies’ infiltrated deeply within state 
and society, but he could not be sure about exactly who was loyal or a ‘double-dealer’.  
In this sense, the Stalinist state was fragile during the interwar and vulnerable to Stalin’s 
tendency to undermine his own power. 
 
♦ 
 
A range of different primary sources have been used in this study on the military purge. 
These include archival documents, published speeches, contemporary newspapers and 
recently published document collections. In addition, as a central aim of this thesis is to 
examine the military purge in reference to recent work on the Stalin period and the 
Great Terror, a large secondary literature has been referred to. This includes studies on 
the Terror, the Stalinist political and economic systems, the political police, the 
intelligence services and examinations of Soviet foreign policy. The Red Army was 
closely integrated to the Bolshevik Party and had close links to other institutions in the 
Soviet state. Consequently, any analysis of the military purge must be made in reference 
to what we now know about these other institutions since the opening of the Russian 
archives. 
 The archival materials for this thesis are drawn primarily from the Russian State 
Military Archive (RGVA) and the Russian State Archive of Socio-political History 
(RGASPI). However, even though both archives are accessible to foreign researchers, 
many important documents remain classified. This is particularly the case for large parts 
of Stalin’s personal papers and a great number of classified political police materials, 
both of which would help illuminate the immediate events leading up to the start of the 
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military purge in June 1937.57 However, despite ongoing archival restrictions, a large 
body of available declassified materials (especially within the RGVA, many of which 
have been underused by historians) allows this thesis to advance an entirely new 
explanation of the military purge. Some of these underutilised sources include reports 
on the internal cohesion of the Red Army, stenograms of military speeches, internal 
army orders, crime statistics and the correspondence of the military elite.  
Archival documents were selected to achieve a number of aims. Certain 
materials such as arrest statistics and reports on army criminality and loyalty have been 
used to test the extent that what we now know about the wider Great Terror holds true 
for the repression in the Red Army. This is particularly the case in terms of the 
fluctuating arrest trends at different points during the 1930s. For instance, when arrests 
for supposed espionage became far more widespread during late 1936, this thesis shows 
that this was also the case in the military. As noted, there is very little examination in 
the current literature on the links between the repression in the military and within other 
sectors of the Soviet state. The selection of archival documents in this thesis 
demonstrates that the repression in the Red Army frequently followed a similar path to 
the repression in other Soviet institutions. 
However, certain collections of archival documents, particularly military 
intelligence reports, reports from the Political Administration of the Red Army (PUR) 
concerning army reliability and military orders detailing internal security questions, are 
used throughout this research to demonstrate that the Red Army did not just reflect 
broader arrest trends during the 1930s, but had its own particular internal and external 
threats which dated back to its formation in 1918. Through studying the personal 
materials and correspondence of Stalin and other senior members of the Soviet elite, 
particularly those of the head of the Red Army Kliment Voroshilov, this thesis will 
show which of these perceived threats was seen as the most dangerous for the military 
at different points during the 1920s-30s. In doing so, it will demonstrate, in contrast to 
previous accounts, that the military purge had much deeper roots than just the Terror 
years of the 1930s. The Bolshevik regime’s longer term relationship with its standing 
army is central to understanding why it was purged.  
                                                
57 For discussions from the 1990s about the problems of researching in the Russian archives, many of 
which continue to exist today, notably secrecy, privileged access and the poor quality of some documents 
and facilities, see R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era (Basingstoke: Macmillan, in association 
with Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, 1997), pp. 90-114. See 
also a similar discussion in Slavic Review, 52. 1 (1993), 87-106. 
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 A greater concentration of archival documents are used in chapters three to five 
which cover the period from the late 1920s to the end of the Great Terror. As will be 
shown below, the late 1920s was the point when the regime began to have serious 
doubts about the reliability of the Red Army. It was subject to mass discharges and 
arrests for the first time. In this sense, the late 1920s to early 1930s represent a tipping 
point in terms of the repression in the military and the regime’s growing concerns about 
its reliability. Therefore, a larger concentration of archival documents has been used to 
closely chart how these concerns about military reliability later manifested in a mass 
purge during the Terror. Chapters one and two are foundation chapters which show that 
the roots of the military purge and the Bolshevik regime’s uneasy relationship with a 
standing army date back to the formation of the Red Army in 1918. 
There are several potential problems and questions concerning the reliability of 
Soviet sources and their use in this thesis which must be addressed. As noted above, 
even though the declassification process within most of the Russian archives is 
continuing, there remain significant gaps. But adding to the problems of secrecy, Soviet 
documents can rarely be taken at face value. Indeed, the Stalinist regime kept control 
over its subordinates by using fear and violence, and this affected how information was 
collected and communicated. For example, a fear of revealing mistakes led different 
Soviet institutions to massage statistics and distort the conclusions of opinion surveys. 
How information was reported to the regime often depended on the standpoint of a 
particular institution and what they had to lose or gain. This thesis uses surveys of the 
loyalty (or the so-called ‘mood’) of the rank-and-file soldiers, compiled by PUR, the 
Political Police and Military Intelligence. It also uses crime statistics compiled by these 
bodies. As shown below, each organisation could produce quite divergent results. 
Indeed, PUR were responsible for the political education of the rank-and-file and so 
tended to emphasise army loyalty. PUR would not want to be seen as failing in their 
primary role and face a reprimand. Yet in contrast, the political police primarily 
searched to ‘expose’ ‘enemies’ above anything else. They were more inclined towards 
alarmism about the ‘enemies’ that had supposedly infiltrated the ranks and their 
estimations of army loyalty clashed with that of PUR. Fear and institutional interest 
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distorted reports on the perceived stability and reliability of the military and means that 
each organisation’s statistics cannot be taken at face value.58  
To counter such problems efforts have been made to find mutually supporting 
reports and statistics from different organisations to limit the effect of distorted 
information. In addition, examining institutional reports alongside the personal 
correspondence of the Soviet elite demonstrates which institution, whether PUR or the 
political police, managed to gain the backing of the regime. Of course, the regime was 
not a reliable judge of the true reality of army reliability, but showing which institution 
Stalin sided with does help distinguish which institutions were exaggerating or 
downplaying problems in the ranks. Indeed, Stalin at times makes this explicitly clear. 
Furthermore, examining different appraisals of army reliability is not only used as a 
means to minimise the effect of distorted source material, but is a central aim of this 
thesis. Analysing conflicting estimations of army reliability takes precedence in this 
research over establishing the true reality of the threat to the regime from its military. It 
is very clear that the ‘military-fascist plot’ was an imagined conspiracy, thus analysing 
how one perception of military reliability gained currency over another is essential to 
understanding how and why such a conspiracy could gain traction within the Soviet 
regime during the 1920s-30s. 
Similarly, biases are not just present from those who attempted to monitor 
military reliability, but also exist within the private letters written by ordinary soldiers. 
This thesis examines letters from the rank-and-file which were collected by PUR and 
the political police as one means to appraise the loyalty of the military. The late 1920s 
                                                
58 Andrea Graziosi highlights further problems with Soviet surveys of popular moods, particularly those 
conducted within the rural populations. Graziosi notes that these surveys often targeted crude and easily 
classified categories, such as the kulak, seredniak and bedniak, rather than engage with the real 
complexities of local opinion. This standardisation of categories meant that popular opinion surveys 
lacked nuance and leaned towards conformity. This tendency can equally be seen in surveys of army 
loyalty, notably during the collectivisation years. In this respect, such reports on popular opinion also 
reveal how different institutions tended to present popular discontent; for instance in ascribing this to the 
influence of kulaks, rather than attempting to understand legitimate popular grievances. This tendency in 
the Red Army will be discussed below. See Graziosi, ‘The New Soviet Archival Sources: Hypotheses for 
a Critical Assessment’, Cahiers du Monde Russe, 40. 1-2 (1999), 34-36. For similar comments, see Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, ‘Sources on the Social History of the 1930s: Overview and Critique’, in A Researcher’s 
Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History in the 1930s, ed. by Sheila Fitzpatrick and Lynne Viola 
(London: Sharpes, 1990), pp. 1-25. For a more detailed discussion of reliability questions relating to 
Soviet economic statistics and reports, and the influence of institutional interest, see Stephen G. 
Wheatcroft and R. W. Davies, ‘The Crooked Mirror of Soviet Economic Statistics’ in The Economic 
Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, ed. by R. W. Davies et al (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 24-37. See also Lewis H. Siegelbaum, ‘Guide to Document Series on 
Industrialization’ in A Researcher’s Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History in the 1930s, ed. by 
Fitzpatrick and Viola, pp. 133-145. 
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and early 1930s, the time of the collectivisation and dekulakisation drives, was a period 
of intense interest in soldiers’ letters. This thesis uses these letters in order to try and 
understand how the soldiers reacted to collectivisation and dekulakisation and to what 
extent this contributed to the military as being perceived as unstable. However, it would 
have been clear to most soldiers when writing their private letters that these could be 
intercepted and this must have influenced their content. In most cases, it is reasonable to 
assume that this knowledge would moderate any tone of dissent. As the regime relied 
upon these letters as one means to assess the ‘mood’ of the rank-and-file, it is unlikely 
that they would get an accurate picture of how the soldiers were responding to 
collectivisation. Equally, a historian today cannot gauge the true feeling of the soldiers 
towards collectivisation from reading these letters alone or uncritically. It is probable 
that the level of discontent in the rank-and-file was stronger than the soldiers’ letters 
indicate. As such, other sources, such as arrest and discharge statistics have been used to 
provide a more complete picture of the level of turmoil in the ranks during the late 
1920s-30s.  
This thesis also uses another type of letter from ordinary soldiers and officers, 
denunciations, in order to gain a fuller picture of how the military purge spread through 
the Red Army after June 1937. However, these documents must too be qualified. Letters 
of denunciations were more often than not directly solicited by the regime and were 
rarely spontaneous. Thus, they cannot be judged solely as reflecting the private attitudes 
of the denouncer. Denunciations also reflect the pressures put on individual soldiers to 
search out ‘enemies’ and to protect their own positions by appearing ‘vigilant’. In this 
sense, denunciations cannot be used uncritically to demonstrate the extent that ordinary 
soldiers sincerely believed in the ‘military-fascist plot’ and used on this basis to explain 
why it gathered such momentum over 1937-38. This thesis recognises that 
denunciations reveal the power dynamic between state and society and show how 
ordinary people could feel pressured into taking an active part in prolonging waves of 
state violence. Any analysis of denunciations cannot be separated from the totalitarian 
regime which actively encouraged them.59 
The issue of how the perceived ‘conspiracy’ of the ‘military-fascist plot’ 
emerged during 1936-37 and then gained traction over the next two years raises 
                                                
59 For a discussion on this theme but more specifically relating to the solicitation of letters by the regime 
and letter-writing to Soviet newspapers, see Matthew E. Lenoe, ‘Letter-Writing and the State. Reader 
Correspondence with Newspapers as a Source for Early Soviet History’, Cahiers du Monde Russe, 40. 1-
2 (1999), 139-169.  
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questions over other types of sources used in this thesis. Specifically, political police 
interrogation transcripts and reports on confessions are some of the sources used in this 
research to show at which points the Red Army was identified as compromised by 
‘enemies’ and how different conspiracies mutated over time. However, the use of these 
sources must also be qualified. As James Harris has noted, there is a risk in assuming 
that such transcripts are nothing but fabrications by the political police and are useful 
for little more than seeing the ideas imposed on victims by their interrogators.60 
Therefore, the ‘military-fascist plot’ was nothing more than an invention of the political 
police. However, interrogation transcripts reveal far more than just the mindset of the 
political police. Undoubtedly confessions were beaten from those arrested, but when 
examined in conjunction with other sources, interrogation transcripts can reveal how 
reasonably innocuous events, such as a meeting of former oppositionists or a person 
having a connection to a foreign country, could be exaggerated into a ‘conspiracy’ by 
the political police. The charges against many senior officers in the supposed ‘military-
fascist plot’ did not come from nowhere and were not merely inventions of the political 
police. The charges were exaggerated and inflated, but usually based on real events 
which were then perceived as a ‘conspiracy’. It is in this sense that interrogation 
transcripts must be used alongside other documents to show how the political police 
stitched together a ‘conspiracy’ from real events. As this thesis demonstrates, even 
though there was no real conspiracy in the Red Army, by 1937 the political police had a 
great amount of material to work with in creating the ‘military-fascist plot’. 
Another type of source used in this thesis with particular reliability problems are 
collections of published speeches from the Soviet era. These have been used in showing 
the type of image of the Red Army that senior members of the military elite, such as 
Voroshilov, tried to present to the Soviet public. Indeed, it is almost certain that such 
published speeches were carefully edited for popular consumption. Military successes 
were exaggerated for a popular audience, while any failures were minimised or absent 
altogether. But this does not mean that such documents have no value as sources. It is 
still possible to read between the lines of published speeches, to look for absences in 
content and see how problems in the military were publicly ignored or downplayed. 
Furthermore, working with original or draft versions of speeches held in the archives, 
alongside those presented publicly but never published, helps to identify more carefully 
                                                
60 Harris, The Great Urals, pp. 217-218. 
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the image of the Red Army that the military elite presented to the Soviet population and 
reveal what elements were missing. 
Finally, the use of personal correspondence between members of the Soviet elite 
in this thesis presents specific problems relating to reliability. As noted above, a wealth 
of documents from the Russian archives has refocused attentions back onto the Soviet 
elite, and a large focus of this thesis is on the upper party and army circles. Documents 
such as private correspondence are central to trying to understand the motivations of 
key actors in instigating the military purge. However, this approach is not without 
limitations. Indeed, it is impossible to know precisely what individuals like Stalin and 
Voroshilov were thinking at given times and their exact intentions. While sources such 
as Stalin’s private correspondence are crucial in understanding the military purge, these 
documents can only ever tell one part of the story. Firstly, the personal papers of senior 
Bolsheviks held in the archives have been arranged by archivists. Thus, simply reading 
through these papers in the given order does not give a full insight into thought 
processes. There is no guarantee that all of the documents in an archived personal 
collection would have necessarily been privately archived alongside each other by the 
senior party figures themselves. In this respect, it is difficult accurately ascertain the 
importance attached to individual documents.61 In addition, the archives only hold 
documents that Stalin and his close circle chose not to destroy. It is impossible to know 
the content of the correspondence and reports that Stalin read and decided not to 
archive. Furthermore, senior members of the Bolshevik Party only tended to write to 
each other when one of them was outside of Moscow. We do not have records of 
telephone conversations, over which many important issues were certainly discussed. 
As Oleg Khlevniuk notes, an improved telephone service from 1936 is part of the 
reason why the amount of personal correspondence in the archives decreases at this 
time.62 In this sense, reporting the documents that are now available will never allow a 
full picture of Stalin’s intentions or those of other senior Bolsheviks. 
It is also very difficult to know whether a certain order or pronouncement made 
in private correspondence was sincere or made to suit a hidden agenda. The Stalinist 
state ruled through fear and violence and as such there was a powerful necessity to 
conform. By the early 1930s there were very few open political challenges to Stalin’s 
opinion. This tendency to conform is undoubtedly reflected in personal correspondence 
                                                
61 Graziosi, ‘The New Soviet Archival Sources’, p. 23. 
62 Oleg Khlevniuk, Master of the House, p. xxv. 
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and any examination of such sources must take into account how letters were carefully 
crafted and phrased not to raise Stalin’s ire. Furthermore, even party members 
corresponding among themselves had to be careful about the language they used. 
Denunciations of party members for displaying alleged dissenting ideas were common. 
As such, such letters cannot be read at face value and a certain speculation about the 
subtext or hidden intentions is necessary.63 Similarly, this thesis also uses stenograms of 
military meetings such as the Military Soviet which suffer from the same problems of 
cloaked language. As in private correspondence, within a public meeting there would 
have been a strong pressure to conform and phrase speeches very carefully. Again, it is 
necessary to try and read between the lines of such documents and at times speculate on 
certain individuals’ true feelings and opinions. However, it is just as important to 
understand the type of image one speaker was trying to present to another within both 
personal correspondence and during meetings.64  
These problems with using sources such as private letters and transcripts of 
meetings are related to the difficulties associated with studying political history more 
broadly. When senior figures in a government are the object of historical analysis, an 
attempt must be made to determine their private thoughts, intentions and motivations as 
much as possible. As archival documents will never provide a complete account of a 
person’s private thoughts, some level of speculation is necessary. Without doing so, 
political history would remain flat and one-dimensional. Soviet political history presents 
additional challenges as many archival documents are written in a way to mask true 
intent or to conform to the majority. However, such an event as the military purge can 
only be explained through attempting to understand the motivations of senior actors in 
the Soviet regime, particularly Stalin’s. The thesis thus acknowledges that a certain 
level of speculation is necessary and has attempted to put forward a view of the 
mindsets of key political figures that fits best with the available documentary record.  
 
This thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter one examines the formation of 
the Red Army in early 1918 and its performance during the Civil War. This chapter will 
show that the Red Army was immediately identified as a perceived target of 
                                                
63 For a brief discussion of the impulse to conform see Grasiozi, ‘The New Soviet Archival Sources’, 36-
37. 
64 For a related brief discussion about Soviet sources and studying the Bolsheviks’ perception of the 
world, rather than its true reality, see Getty and Naumov, The Road to Terror, pp. 26-27. Getty notes that 
it is less important to ascertain whether a Stalinist sincerely believed what they said or wrote, but the 
impression they wanted to give to others. 
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‘counterrevolutionaries’ and ‘enemies’ by the Bolshevik Party leadership and the 
political police. It was also plagued by frequent uprisings and rebellions in the lower 
ranks. Chapter two will focus on the post-Civil War period until the early 1930s, 
showing that even though the conflict was now concluded, the perceived threats to the 
Red Army continued to cause serious concerns about its reliability. However, the 
perceptions of these threats could be larger than their reality. Chapter three will examine 
a tipping point for Red Army, when a large alleged military conspiracy was ‘exposed’ 
in the higher ranks in the early 1930s at the same time as the rank-and-file was in 
turmoil due to hostility towards collectivisation. This was a period of crisis in the army 
which reinforced its perceived vulnerability to subversion. Chapter four will explore the 
early to mid-1930s, a period which is seen as a lull in repression in the Red Army. 
However, this chapter will show that from the early 1930s to the summer of 1936 the 
Red Army experienced several serious underlying problems with its political reliability 
and continued to be perceived as a vulnerable target. Lastly, chapter five will detail the 
long chain of events from the summer of 1936 to the initiation of the military purge in 
mid-1937 and its chaotic aftermath. This chapter will show how a perception that the 
Red Army was unreliable came to a head, and why this finally compelled Stalin to enact 
a purge. 
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Chapter One: The Red Army in Civil War 
 
 
During the Russian Revolution the Bolsheviks brought an end to the old Imperial Army, 
finally dismantling the power base that had been instrumental in keeping the Romanov 
Dynasty in power. After a long decline, the demobilisation of the Imperial Army was 
symbolic of how the Bolsheviks were attempting to reorganise Russia on revolutionary 
lines. Standing armies were not necessary in the new communist Russia. However, soon 
Lenin was confronted with the need to form his own army to defend the revolution. As 
this chapter will show, Lenin was forced into maintaining a large regular army, as not 
only was the First World War still ongoing, but a new approaching Civil War demanded 
this. Lenin and the Bolsheviks were quickly given an important formative lesson about 
the need to protect their fragile revolution from serious threats. Lenin soon realised that 
a regular army was indispensible if the revolution was going to survive and any hopes 
of forming a military on utopian lines were overridden. However, the formation of a 
new ‘socialist’ army was not easy. The Bolsheviks lacked the basic military experience 
necessary to create a serious force and relied on ex-officers from the demobilised 
Imperial Army. As War Commissar Leon Trotsky was forced to staff the new officer 
corps with potentially unreliable former Imperial officers, many in the party, and 
particularly the Soviet political police, were concerned that these so-called ‘military 
specialists’ could be used as agents by the hostile White forces. High-profile military 
specialist betrayals did not help inspire trust in the recruited ex-Imperial officers. In this 
respect, this chapter will also show that the Civil War gave the Bolsheviks their first 
experience of how their new Red Army could be subverted. The conflict marked the 
beginning of a long history of the Red Army as a perceived target of ‘enemies’ and 
‘counterrevolutionaries’. In addition, this chapter will demonstrate that concerns about 
reliability were not confined to the officer corps, but applied to the broader rank-and-
file. The new Red Army was largely a peasant force and frequent mutinies and 
rebellions had an adverse effect on its stability. Lastly, this chapter will argue that the 
newly formed political police and the party members who fought in the Civil War took 
lasting lessons from the conflict. For the political police, the Civil War marked the point 
when its leadership realised that protecting the Red Army from ‘enemies’ would 
become a permanent task. For the party members involved in combat and who later 
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became the Bolshevik elite, the Civil War was a time when alliances were made and 
nascent power groups formed. The alliances forged between Stalin and his Civil War 
comrades on the battlefield only strengthened after the close of the conflict.  
 
The Creation of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army 
 
 
Following the collapse of the Provisional Government and the seizure of power by 
Lenin and the Bolshevik Party in October 1917, the new regime could not afford to be 
complacent. The revolution faced serious and immediate challenges to its survival. The 
most pressing was the continued war with Germany which had not been brought to an 
end with the revolution, despite the Bolsheviks’ declaration of peace as soon as they 
attained power. An armistice was signed in December 1917 and peace negotiations were 
initiated with German representatives at Brest-Litovsk in Belorussia, but these proved 
disastrous for Lenin. The Germans put forward enormous territorial demands, so large 
that they were initially rejected. Trotsky attempted to remove Russia from the conflict 
with the unusual formulation of ‘no war, no peace’, but this proved unacceptable to the 
German government and its forces renewed their advance on 18 February 1918. Lenin 
now had no choice but to accept the German terms and he urged his party to do so, even 
at the large territorial cost.1 The renewed German offensive forced the signing of the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty only weeks later on 3 March and the Bolsheviks conceded a huge 
amount of territory, including Finland, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states. The Brest-
Litovsk Treaty caused uproar from certain sections of the party, but there really had 
been no choice but to concede.2 Lenin did not have a suitably powerful army to defend 
the revolution. In the face of renewed German aggression he was powerless. The 
Bolsheviks were a revolutionary party and had not planned on needing a regular 
standing army. This had not figured in their plans before the revolution. Instead, Lenin 
had expected the Bolshevik seizure of power to spark world revolution which would not 
only provide security, but bring the war to a close. When this world revolution did not 
happen, and after negotiations with Germany broke down, Lenin knew he was in a tight 
                                                
1 David Stone, ‘The Russian Civil War, 1917-1921’ in The Military History of the Soviet Union, ed. by R. 
Higham and F. W. Kagan (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 13-34 (p. 16). 
2 Some of the most vocal hostility to Brest-Litovsk came from the ‘left communists’, who believed that 
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spot. He was entangled in war without an adequate means of defence. Indeed, during 
1917 the Imperial Army had been in turmoil. It was slowly dismantled throughout that 
year and heavily weakened through mutinies. The last draft of the Imperial Army was in 
February 1917 and in the summer units began to rebel. The response at the time from 
the then Minister of War, General A. P. Verkhovskii, was to shrink the army. 
Furthermore, following the October Revolution there was also a revolution within the 
army. Systems of command and discipline were abolished and soldiers’ committees 
were formed.3 In November the Bolsheviks published the ‘Declaration of the Rights of 
Soldiers’ which democratised command positions and a gradual demobilisation decree 
was promulgated.4  
Admittedly, the Bolsheviks were not without some form of defence even after 
dismantling the Imperial Army, but this was no match for the German Army. Groups of 
‘Red Guard’ detachments had spontaneously formed throughout 1917, composed of 
worker volunteers committed to defending the revolution. But the Red Guards not only 
lacked military skill and training, but were numerically very small. Their first test 
against the German Army at the battle of Narva in February 1918 proved a disaster.5 In 
addition, following the revolution Lenin had realised that some form of military defence 
was necessary, having been conscious of the danger of a break-down in armistice 
negotiations.6 As such, beyond the Red Guards detachments, from December 1917 the 
Bolsheviks began to examine more substantial forms of military organisation, but those 
deemed appropriate for a new revolutionary regime. In the first instance, they 
considered using remnants of the Imperial Army while a territorial militia was brought 
up to strength.7 Many party members regarded a people’s militia as the ideal means of 
defence, with citizens completing military training around their normal everyday work. 
But the very high levels of desertion from the Imperial Army necessitated moving 
towards creating wholly new volunteer units from the dwindling Imperial Army, and 
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thus, a new socialist army would be established.8 The most important characteristic of 
this new socialist army was that it would be a ‘people’s army’. A draft decree from 
early December 1917 from the new Military Affairs Commissariat described the 
features of the Bolsheviks’ preferred type of force: ‘a free army of armed citizens, an 
army of workers and peasants with broad self-government of elected soldiers’ 
organisations’.9 Any new army would be based on class principles and reject hierarchy, 
a democratisation seen as a way of ensuring the promotion of those deemed reliable into 
command positions and a rejection of the old Tsarist officer caste.10 From early January 
1918 preliminary moves were made towards forming this new ‘socialist’ army, taking 
as its basis the existing Red Guard detachments and soldiers’ committees. On 15 
January the establishment of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA) was 
announced by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.11 This was a 
military based on the principles of voluntarism and ‘comradely respect’.12 However, 
even with the founding of this new socialist army, its collated volunteer forces were still 
very weak in comparison to the power of the German Army. The resulting units were 
small and irregularly organised.13 On 1 April the Red Army only numbered 153,679 
soldiers.14 Thus, as soon as the Germans had renewed their offensive the Bolsheviks 
were forced to sign the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.   
The failure at Brest-Litovsk was a lesson in realism. It showed that without a 
strong regular standing army the Bolshevik regime would not survive. In response, the 
new socialist Red Army would have to undergo a transformation. The strengthening of 
the Red Army and its evolution into a traditional standing force during the early stages 
of the Civil War was the first step in the Bolshevik Party’s reluctant dependence on a 
large military. But the German offensive was not the only threat to the fragile Bolshevik 
government. Even with a heavy peace now agreed with Germany, the survival of the 
revolution faced further challenges. Civil War was now upon Russia. Shortly after 
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signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty a new danger emerged from southern Russia, the 
‘Volunteer Army’.15 This was the first of several arrangements of reactionary military 
forces of Imperial officers determined to fight what they regarded as an illegitimate 
seizure of power. Known collectively as the ‘Whites’, these forces were the chief threat 
during the Civil War. 
    
Civil War and the ‘Military Specialists’ 
 
 
The danger from the newly assembled White forces further pushed the transformation 
of the new Red Army into a regular standing army. The first White threat came from the 
south with the mobilisation of forces in Kuban in southern Russia by the White 
Generals Piotr Krasnov and Anton Denikin. This formed the Volunteer Army, the first 
anti-Bolshevik force.16 Subsequent White leaders included Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, 
who mustered forces from Siberia, General Nikolai Iudenich who attacked from the 
northeast, and lastly Baron Piotr Wrangel, again from the south. The threat from the 
remnants of the Imperial forces was not new. Before the revolution, General Lavr 
Kornilov (at the time the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army), had led a failed 
coup attempt in August 1917. But the threat from the newly assembled White forces 
was more dangerous, even though they were fragmented. The Whites dwarfed the new 
Red Army in terms of military skill as they included large numbers of former Imperial 
officers. In addition, during the early stages of the Civil War the Bolsheviks’ 
disorganised forces suffered heavy defeats in May and June 1918 against Cossack and 
Czech units which pressed the urgency for serious military reform.17 The approaching 
Civil War required that the Red Army be reorganised and strengthened to counter the 
numerous threats arrayed against the Bolsheviks, but solutions to army weaknesses 
proved to be controversial. 
One of the main problems with maintaining a regular standing army was how 
this clashed with the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary ideals. Standing armies were seen as an 
anathema. They were regarded as the key supports of capitalist powers and the Imperial 
Army was seen as a holdover from the capitalist era. From Peter the Great, the Russian 
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Army had a long history of interfering in politics and assisting domestic coups.18 For the 
Bolsheviks a standing army posed the risk of counterrevolution, a danger recently made 
clear by Kornilov’s attempted coup. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks viewed their 
revolution in the context of other revolutions and were particularly conscious of the fate 
of the French Revolution and the dangers of dictatorship. If a powerful standing army 
was created, would the October Revolution eventually meet the same fate? All these 
concerns pointed to the risks of relying too heavily on a regular army and the proposal 
faced stern criticism. But any fears needed to be compromised if the revolution was 
going to survive. Lenin knew that a traditional army was indispensible. At the Fifth 
Congress of Soviets on 5 July 1918 he remarked about the impossibility of a regular 
Imperialist force being beaten by ‘guerrilla detachments’. Lenin described this 
suggestion as laughable.19  
There were further challenges in strengthening the Red Army aside from 
overcoming matters of principle. As War Commissar, Leon Trotsky faced a series of 
practical difficulties in creating a powerful force.20 Trotsky knew that for the Red Army 
to be successful in combat only very recently abandoned practices would need to be 
reinstated. Thus hierarchy, discipline and conscription, the latter introduced in mid-
1918, now became key features of the Red Army.21 The practice of electing officers was 
officially abolished in March and April.22 By May 1918 Soviet territory was being 
carved up into military districts. At the same time, the Bolsheviks suffered another 
defeat in summer 1918 when Kazan’ fell to the Whites who were now closing in on 
Moscow. Strengthening the Red Army could be the only response and reforms needed 
to be implemented quickly. By July 1918, the creation of regular army units was 
sanctioned by Fifth Congress of Soviets.23 On 1 March military leadership was 
centralised under a new Supreme Military Soviet, which gave way on 2 September to 
the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR). The RVSR took over 
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direction of the Red Army and exercised centralised control and executive power.24 This 
centralisation of power was far removed from how many in the Bolshevik Party had 
viewed a workers’ army. The initial volunteer Red Army was founded on the principle 
of political class discipline, rather than traditional military discipline.25 But it was now 
military discipline which would come to define the Red Army.26    
The most serious practical problem Trotsky faced was the lack of military 
experience in the army. The great wealth of military knowledge lay with the White 
forces and the new Red Army was poorly trained and ill disciplined. Yet, the only way 
to improve the level of military experience was to enlist former Imperial officers. Not 
all had gone over to the Whites and many Imperial officers were willing to work with 
the Bolsheviks, even if only to defend Russia from the German Army. The policy of 
using these officers, who became known as ‘military specialists’, was one of Trotsky’s 
most important legacies to the Red Army. It affected how its reliability was later 
perceived far more than Trotsky could have anticipated at the time. Military specialists 
were quickly enlisted with an agreement made on their service on 31 March 1918.27 
Due to their military experience they came to dominate the higher ranks and this was 
partly why they were so controversial. During 1918, seventy-five percent of all Red 
Amy officers were from the Imperial Army, and of the twenty officers on the key fronts 
during 1918-20, sixteen were military specialists.28 By the end of the Civil War military 
specialists accounted for over thirty percent of the officer corps with many occupying 
the highest positions.29 Indeed, the position of Commander-in-Chief was first given to a 
military specialist, Mikhail Murav’ev, who had been a Lieutenant Colonel in the 
Imperial Army.30 Nothing could have been more indicative of the brisk return to 
hierarchy and discipline in the military than Murav’ev’s appointment. But the 
Bolsheviks did not have a choice. Referring to military specialists on 18 November 
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1919, Lenin remarked: ‘If we do not take them into service and they were not forced to 
serve us, we would not be able to create an army.’31 
Lenin’s comment about ‘forcing’ military specialists into service demonstrates 
why their use was so controversial. The recruitment of military specialists may have 
begun quickly, but it was not easy. In general terms, mobilising ordinary soldiers for the 
new Red Army proved very difficult. There was little enthusiasm in the wider 
population for signing-up to defend the revolution. Recruiting military specialists was 
just as discouraging. Initially, relatively few military specialists voluntarily came 
forward to serve. Only 8000 enlisted in the early months of 1918. In response, during 
the summer the Bolsheviks requisitioned all former officers living in Bolshevik 
controlled territory.32 Understandably, many of these conscripts were hardly 
enthusiastic supporters of the new regime. Only a minority of military specialists sided 
with the Bolsheviks immediately by joining the party. The majority became members 
only after the Civil War, indicating that many were not ready to side with the 
Bolsheviks until there was absolutely no other choice.33 Indeed, much of the hostility 
towards military specialists stemmed from a view that they were outsiders and not 
committed to the revolution. Trotsky himself was aware that military specialists were 
potentially unreliable. In 1923 he wrote:  
 
Of the old officer corps there remained with us either the more idealistic men, who 
understood or at least sensed the meaning of the new epoch (these were, of course, a 
very small minority), or the pen-pushers, inert, without initiative, men who lacked the 
energy to go over to the Whites: finally, there were not a few active counter-
revolutionaries, whom events had caught unawares.34  
 
Trotsky wrote earlier in July 1918 that this latter group needed to be ‘combated and 
exterminated’.35  
In order to prevent betrayals by military specialists Trotsky arranged certain 
safeguards. Attempts were made to register all military specialists from mid-1918 and in 
December Trotsky ordered that only those who had families within Soviet territory were 
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permitted to hold important army positions.36 If a military specialist did betray the 
Bolsheviks, their family would also be the target of reprisal.37 In addition, each military 
specialist was flanked by a political commissar. Normally this was a member of the 
party who counter-signed every order given out by the military specialist officer, thus 
establishing a system of dual-command. The political commissars were coordinated by 
the Political Administration of the Red Army (PUR), created in May 1919. The 
commissars watched the specialists for signs of betrayal and were responsible for 
political reliability, while the military specialists controlled military affairs.38 However, 
this policy was not without problems. There were not enough political commissars in 
1918 and the policy of dual-command was unpopular with the military specialists who 
tried to have it abolished on the grounds that it was impractical.39 But as much as 
Trotsky appreciated the potential danger from military specialists, he also defended 
them from what he saw as unjustified persecution. For instance, in an article from 
December 1918 Trotsky wrote:  
 
Rejecting the services of military specialists on the grounds that individual officers have 
played the traitor would be like driving out all the engineers and all the higher 
technicians from the railways on the grounds that there are not a few artful saboteurs 
among them.40  
 
While Trotsky acknowledged that some military specialists would betray the 
Bolsheviks, and that many were less than enthusiastic about joining the Red Army, like 
Lenin, he understood that the army would not succeed without their assistance.  
It must be emphasised that military specialists themselves were not a uniform 
group. A number were drawn from the upper ranks of the former Imperial Army, from 
the old General Staff, but there were also junior and non-commissioned officers. Many 
of the latter developed successful military careers following the Civil War and were 
often more receptive to the new Bolshevik regime. Mikhail Tukhachevskii is a good 
example. He joined the Red Army in early 1918 having previously served in the 
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Imperial Army as a junior officer.41 Tukhachevskii was born into a line of nobility in 
Smolensk and his father was a landlord, but despite this black mark he rose to 
prominence during the Civil War. Tukhachevskii also gained notoriety through his 
frequent escapes from German prisoner of war camps during the First World War.42 
After returning to his regiment in October 1917 Tukhachevskii was elected a company 
commander in December, but his unit was later disbanded. He joined the Red Army in 
April 1918 and quickly gained a reputation as a successful military leader, proving his 
ability on the eastern front as 1st Army commander.43 He joined the Bolshevik Party 
relatively early on in April 1918. Tukhachevskii represented the ideal military specialist 
in that he was willing to break with the past. Indeed, he had no admiration for the skills 
of the older military specialists in the new conditions of a civil war. For instance, in a 
report sent to Trotsky’s deputy, Efraim Sklianskii, Tukhachevskii offered a very 
negative opinion of the old officer corps: ‘In its large part it was created from people 
who had received limited military training, completely cowed and devoid of any 
initiative.’44 Tukhachevskii argued that the younger officers were actually better 
prepared to understand modern military science and doctrine, and that the older military 
specialists’ knowledge was outdated to the demands of civil war combat.45 
Tukhachevskii also saw the older generation as ideologically unsuitable for the Red 
Army, writing that: ‘Our old officers are completely ignorant of the bases of Marxism, 
cannot and do not want to understand the class struggle and the need and inevitability of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat.’46 Tukhachevskii wanted young and revolutionary-
minded officers more suited to serving the Bolshevik dictatorship to be advanced 
through the army. Tukhachevskii was a critic of the system of dual command and 
wanted instead unified command (edinonachalie), with officers being trained to conduct 
political work in the place of the political commissar. But despite this, he was a very 
good asset for the Bolsheviks. Tukhachevskii was young, energetic, talented, and had 
no desire to maintain what he saw as outdated military strategies and conventions.47 
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Such qualities made certain that Tukhachevskii would quickly advance through the 
army hierarchy.48 
Yet, there were few military specialists like Tukhachevskii. Trotsky believed 
that the majority were either unenthusiastic about the new regime, or more seriously, 
there were some genuine ‘counterrevolutionaries’. Indeed, throughout the Civil War 
there were numerous mutinies by military specialists and desertions to the Whites. One 
of the most high-profile betrayals was the mutiny of Murav’ev, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Red Army and commander of the eastern front. Murav’ev led a mutiny 
against the Bolsheviks in July 1918 when he refused to fight the Czechoslovakian 
Legion after they themselves had mutinied. The Czech Legion had sided with the 
Bolsheviks during the revolution but rebelled in May 1918 when the Bolsheviks tried to 
disarm them as they were travelling on the Trans-Siberian Railway. A subsequent revolt 
set off of a much wider uprising.49 Murav’ev was killed the day after his mutiny, and so 
it was hardly a success, but his defection was very high-profile and demonstrated the 
dangers of using military specialists at the apex of the Red Army. The revolt also 
contributed to the loss of the Volga city of Simbirsk to the Komuch, the Socialist-
Revolutionaries’ democratic counterrevolutionary government.50 Murav’ev’s revolt thus 
had a significant impact. Betrayals and mutinies by military specialists would continue 
throughout the Civil War, never giving the opportunity for those loyal military 
specialists such as Tukhachevskii to lose the stigma attached to the pre-revolutionary 
officers.51  
 
Fear and Prejudices of Military Specialists 
 
 
Betrayals by military specialists were obviously very serious, primarily as the mutineers 
usually held command positions. In addition, a former Imperial officer was more likely 
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to have the resources, ability and opportunities to organise espionage networks in the 
Red Army which could feed information to the White forces.52 However, despite this, 
there is much to suggest that the perception of the danger to the Red Army from 
treasonous military specialists was greater than its reality. This was for a number of 
reasons. Betrayals by military specialists had more impact than those of ordinary 
soldiers, primarily as they occupied the higher ranks. But the former Imperial officers 
were already the objects of suspicion and seen as outsiders. When a military specialist 
did commit treason, this would reinforce and confirm previously held suspicions about 
the military specialists’ disloyalty as an entire group. Such prejudices and suspicions 
about military specialists can be seen in a complaint made by Ioakhim Vatsetis to Lenin 
in April 1919. Vatsetis himself was an ex-Imperial Colonel who became the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army after Murav’ev’s death. In his letter to Lenin, 
Vatsetis complained about the hostility towards members of the General Staff from 
some political commissars:  
 
Both in print, and in the speeches of demagogues speaking to a huge concourse of 
people, phrases still appear persistently which are insulting for those working on the 
General Staff. From all sides accusations pour out that they have their price, that they 
are counterrevolutionaries or saboteurs. Former officers who are serving on our General 
Staff do not deserve this unjust attitude…Every commissar had his secret desire to catch 
our staff officers out in some counterrevolutionary attitude or treachery.  
 
Vatsetis argued that such working conditions provided no protections against 
‘unfounded arrest’.53 In this respect, he was remarkably prescient. Only three months 
later Vatsetis was incriminated as a ‘counterrevolutionary’. Thus, it seems that military 
specialists were often unjustly labelled as disloyal, even though they were not the only 
people in the army to mutiny or desert. General desertion levels from the Red Army 
were extremely high during the Civil War and ordinary rank-and-file soldiers can hardly 
be described as reliable.54 In addition, as Orlando Figes has shown, from 3 August to 12 
November 1919 there were sixty military specialist deserters from the Red Army to the 
enemy and another sixty who deserted from combat. However, the same period saw 373 
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non-specialist officers desert to the enemy and 416 flee from battle.55 This is a 
significant difference and suggests that military specialists were less prone to desertion 
than the communist ‘red commanders’, and perhaps more reliable. However, as the 
impact of military specialist betrayals and desertions was so much more than that of 
ordinary soldiers, and combined with already existing class prejudices, irrespective of 
the comparable figures, military specialists would always be regarded with greater 
suspicion. For many they represented the class enemy working within the Red Army 
and this was a difficult perception to shift. Indeed, the military specialists’ case was not 
helped by very high-profile nature of some of the incriminations. The accusation that 
Vatsetis was a ‘counterrevolutionary’ is a good example. Like Murav’ev, Vatsetis was 
very senior in the Red Army. From July 1918, he commanded the troops on the eastern 
front and was named first Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army in September. In July 
1919 Vatsetis was incriminated as a member of a military conspiracy with alleged links 
to Denikin and Kolchak.56 However, the case quickly collapsed when a subsequent 
investigation found no link between Vatsetis and the White forces.57 Despite this, the 
case provided another reminder that military specialists at the apex of the Red Army 
could potentially betray the Bolsheviks. This would reinforce suspicions against them as 
an entire group. Importantly, the Vatsetis case also shows the ease that accusations of 
treachery could be levelled at senior officers in the Red Army. No military specialist 
was safe from false incrimination, not even the most senior officers. 
How military specialists were perceived is also inseparable from attitudes 
towards Trotsky as War Commissar. Trotsky was a leading member of the Bolshevik 
Party, but he was not without his critics. As War Commissar, he drew specific criticisms 
over his leadership of the Red Army in its crucial period of transformation. Indeed, 
Trotsky was a dominating presence in military affairs. He held the post of War 
Commissar while other key positions in the RVSR were filled with his supporters.58 
Consequently, any criticisms about the Red Army tended to be levelled at Trotsky 
directly. The Red Army’s transformation into a regular standing army provoked 
particular hostility. It was seen as a move backwards. For instance, Trotsky’s advocacy 
of strict discipline and his notorious order of execution for desertions were regarded as 
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characteristic of the Tsarist era and were deeply unpopular for many in the party. Some 
made clear their refusal to carry out executions for desertions.59 One of the most cited 
episodes that drew widespread criticism of Trotsky was the execution of a political 
commissar, a certain Panteleev, for the desertion of his regiment from the battle of 
Kazan’ in August 1918.60 To his critics the Panteleev case represented Trotsky’s push 
for discipline at any cost and was used to defend the political commissars from what 
were seen as overbearing military specialist officers.61 In this respect, the Panteleev case 
once again fed into the perceived uneven influence between military specialists and 
political commissars. The latter being seen as dispensable, whereas the outsider military 
specialists were dominating the upper ranks.62 The Panteleev case caused Trotsky 
significant political damage. He acquired a reputation for harsh punishments and further 
doubts were raised about the direction that the new Red Army was heading.63 This was 
despite the fact that execution for desertion was actually very rare (the huge numbers of 
desertions from the army made this punishment impossible to consistently apply). But 
Trotsky’s opponents seized on the opportunity the case provided and used it to launch 
an attack on military specialists.64  
In a similar sense, how military specialists were perceived was also influenced 
by power politics within the Bolshevik Party. Despite having Lenin’s support, the use of 
military specialists in the Red Army was firmly identified as Trotsky’s policy. This 
provided his political opponents the opportunity to channel wider hostilities towards 
military specialists when challenging him. This happened during the ‘Tsaritsyn Affair’ 
in mid-1918. Tsaritsyn was on the western bank of the Volga on the southern front, and 
here a group of party members, including Stalin, forced out their military specialist 
commander, Pavel Sytin, an ex-General from the Imperial Army. Stalin arrived in 
Tsaritsyn in June 1918 on business unrelated to the military. His role was to improve 
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food supplies and manage grain shipments from the North Caucasus to Moscow.65 
However, Stalin quickly acquired full military and civilian powers and arrested the 
commander of the North Caucasus Military District, the military specialist, A. E. 
Snesarev, on charges of treason.66 Stalin also joined the Revolutionary Military Council 
(RVS), which included Sytin, and Stalin’s close allies Kliment Voroshilov and S. K. 
Minin.67 Stalin then took over military affairs at Tsaritsyn and in September he 
convinced the RVSR to name him the commander of the southern front RVS with Sytin 
as his military specialist.68 None of this pleased Sytin, but he was absent from events 
and headquartered in Kozlov 350 miles away.69 Sytin arrived in Tsaritsyn in September 
to reassert his authority, but Stalin, Minin and Voroshilov dismissed him and requested 
to Moscow that Voroshilov be put in charge.70 The removal of Sytin undoubtedly suited 
Stalin, who was confident in his and Voroshilov’s abilities to take control of the front, 
but he also had an aversion to military specialists. This hostility can be seen in a 
telegram he sent to Lenin in July relating to supply problems in the area. Stalin 
described:  
 
The railway south of Tsaritsyn had not yet been restored. I am firing or telling off all 
who deserve it, and I hope that we shall have it restored soon…If our military “experts” 
(bunglers!) had not been asleep or loafing about the line would not have been cut, and if 
the line is restored it will not be thanks to, but in spite of, the military.71  
 
Yet, Stalin often had harsher words to say about military specialists and his criticisms 
were inseparable from his rivalry with Trotsky. In a separate letter to Lenin, he wrote:  
 
…I ask now, before it is too late, to relieve Trotsky and give him limits, for I fear that 
Trotsky’s erratic commands, if they were repeated would give the whole front into the 
hands those deserving full distrust, the so-called military specialists from the 
bourgeoisie, who will cause a rift between the army and the officers and ruin the front 
completely.72  
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For Stalin, not only were military specialists incompetent, but they were untrustworthy 
and Trotsky was at fault. Stalin’s behaviour did not please Trotsky and in early October 
the Central Committee finally took action. It ordered Stalin, Voroshilov and Minin, to 
subordinate themselves to the centre’s orders and abide by the decisions of the RVSR.73  
Stalin’s ‘insubordination’ was noted specifically, though the Central Committee did 
agree to look at the Sytin appointment again.74 However, this did little to assuage Stalin 
and his supporters who launched another attack on Trotsky’s military policies. On 3 
October Stalin and Voroshilov sent letter to Lenin criticising Sytin as: ‘a man who not 
only is unneeded at the front, but who does not even merit confidence and is therefore 
damaging. We certainly cannot approve of the front going to ruin as a result of an 
untrustworthy general’.75 This letter also reveals how strongly the conflict at Tsaritsyn 
was not only about military specialists, but was closely tied to Stalin’s animosity 
towards Trotsky personally. Stalin and Voroshilov also wrote: ‘we, as members of the 
party, categorically declare that we consider the execution of Trotsky’s orders to be 
criminal, and his threats unworthy.’76 Following this letter Trotsky requested that Stalin 
be recalled to Moscow. Trotsky appointed a new command to the southern front and 
Sytin remained.77 After Stalin was recalled he was given a position on the RVSR, which 
would only ensure further conflict with Trotsky. 
As such, Stalin and Voroshilov’s hostility towards the military specialists is 
visible at Tsaritsyn, but also their hostility to the central line of command. The system 
that Trotsky had established allowed little room for the type of local leadership Stalin 
and Voroshilov wanted to introduce. The two issues are closely related. Stalin did not 
like having to take orders from his political rival and support policies he did not agree 
with, nor did he want to take orders from the ‘untrustworthy’ military specialist Sytin. 
For Stalin, attacking the employment of military specialists in the army was an easy 
way to draw criticisms towards Trotsky. In a letter to Lenin in January 1919, Trotsky 
wrote: ‘I consider the protection given by Stalin to the Tsaritsyn trend the most 
dangerous sort of ulcer, worse than any act of perfidy or treachery on the part of 
military specialists.’78 For Trotsky, treachery by military specialist officers was 
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dangerous, but the type of challenge to the central military leadership, embodied in the 
‘Tsaritsyn trend’ was also damaging. Indeed, Francesco Benvenuti argues: ‘The 
Tsaritsyn dispute was the first signal that an opposition to official military policy could 
be set in motion and that it might find benevolent and authoritative listeners at the party 
centre.’79 
Consequently, Stalin’s true attitude towards military specialists was ambiguous. 
This is not to say that he had no real suspicions about military specialists and was using 
his opposition purely as a political weapon, but it it seems that he took any opportunity 
he could to try and weaken his political rival. Indeed, in other cases, Stalin was happy to 
have those of questionable reliability serve in the Red Army. For instance, in mid-1920 
Stalin encouraged Trotsky to promote the Ukrainian Nationalist-turned-supporter of the 
Bolsheviks, Vladimir Vinnichenko, to the RVS of Ukraine. Vinnichenko was to assist in 
the struggle against the Ukrainian Nationalist leader Simon Petliura, despite the fact that 
both men had been allies only a few years earlier.80 Vinnichenko would surely be as 
untrustworthy as any military specialist serving in the Red Army. If Stalin’s chief 
concern was the political reliability of the officers in the military, it is difficult to see 
how he could have been an advocate of Vinnichenko and request for him to be given 
such a responsible position. Stalin could clearly make some compromises on the type of 
people serving in the army. Evidently Stalin was not a purist about the composition of 
the command. He did not line up with the ‘left communists’ who wanted a purely 
workers’ army.81 Perhaps as military specialists were from the bourgeoisie and 
represented the ‘class enemy’ Stalin held a lower opinion of their loyalty. But his 
advocacy of a former Ukrainian nationalist who had fought alongside groups hostile to 
the Bolsheviks suggests that as much as Stalin distrusted military specialists, he focused 
on them specifically as a way to draw more hostility towards Trotsky. In this respect, 
Stalin’s negative opinions of military specialists, while genuine, were certainly 
pragmatically deployed.82 
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A final point on the ‘Tsaritsyn Affair’ is to look more closely at Voroshilov, 
who led the Red Army from the mid-1920s and during the military purge of 1937-38. 
For someone who would very soon be given such great responsibility, Voroshilov was 
poorly regarded by Trotsky. For example, in a letter to Lenin at the end of 1918 which 
criticised Voroshilov and Stalin’s conduct at Tsaritsyn, Trotsky cuttingly remarked, 
‘Voroshilov is able to command a regiment, but not an army of fifty thousand 
soldiers.’83 On 7 January 1919 in another letter to Lenin, Trotsky again criticised 
Voroshilov’s military skill and made known that he was set against a proposed 
promotion of him to command the Ukrainian front. Citing Voroshilov’s behaviour at 
Tsaritsyn again, Trotsky wrote: ‘Repeating the Tsaritsyn experiment in Ukrainian 
territory in view of a clash with serious enemies – on this course we will not go.’84 
Trotsky had good reason to doubt Voroshilov’s military skill. He had very little of this. 
Voroshilov had no pre-Revolutionary military background and was primarily a party 
man. His first real military experience was heading a detachment of Red Guards in early 
1918. Of course, Trotsky also had a weak military background, having only been a war 
correspondent in the Balkans in 1912-1913, but the Civil War required experienced 
officers to take command positions if the Bolsheviks were going to survive. Trotsky 
believed, correctly, that Voroshilov was not up to the job. Interestingly, there are 
indications that Voroshilov himself agreed with this assessment and in the early 1920s 
he had little appetite for future military career. On 2 November 1921 Voroshilov wrote 
to Stalin and complained about his current role:  
 
I am sick of working in the war department…I suppose I would be more useful in a 
civilian field. I expect approval and friendly support from you before the Central 
Committee about my new posting. I want to work in the Don Basin, where I will ask the 
Central Committee to send me. I will take any sort of work and I hope to shake out of it, 
but I have started to become ill mentally.85  
 
The contrast to someone such as Tukhachevskii is clear. Tukhachevskii hungered for 
responsibility in the army and in moments of inactivity he was eager to return to the 
front. 86 Voroshilov doubted whether he was actually suitable for a military career. But, 
what he did have was Stalin’s support. When in power Stalin would place Voroshilov at 
the head of the Red Army shortly after Lenin’s death. Yet it is questionable whether 
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Voroshilov felt he was suitable for the role, especially after seeming so negative about 
his military career only a few years earlier. As detailed in chapter four, there is much to 
suggest that Voroshilov was out of his depth as the head of the Red Army. 
Opposition to the use of military specialists came to a head at the Eighth Party 
Congress in Moscow that opened on 18 March 1919 at the same time as Kolchak was 
on the Volga.87 During the Congress Lenin reaffirmed the need for a powerful army to 
defend the revolution and the need for military specialists. He attacked as ‘childish’ 
those who questioned the use any specialists in the construction of communism.88 But 
the employment of military specialists came under pressure at the Congress from a 
group of party members known as the ‘Military Opposition’. This group included left 
communists and other members angry at the continued use of military specialists. The 
Military Opposition was led by the left communist, V. M. Smirnov, and was supported 
by Voroshilov. Specifically, Smirnov wanted more power and responsibility given to 
political commissars and local party organisations, and he also criticised the return to 
discipline. Yet, Smirnov did not completely reject the use of military specialists. He did 
concede that they were ‘undoubtedly necessary’, but pressed the point that the former 
Imperial officers were closer to the Whites than the Bolsheviks.89 This was a question of 
loyalties and whether the individuals in command positions could be trusted. It did not 
help Trotsky’s case that he was absent from the Congress (Kolchak’s offensive had 
forced him to travel to the eastern front), but in his place his ally Grigorii Sokol’nikov 
spoke in defence of military specialists. Sokol’nikov argued:  
 
Practically in the entire army we came to use military specialists, and in practice, it has 
been revealed that if there were cases of treachery and betrayal from the side of the 
military specialists, then from the other side, quite often military specialists selflessly 
died at their posts.90  
 
While not denying that military specialists could betray the Bolsheviks, Sokol’nikov 
wanted to highlight that many fought bravely and many died to defend the revolution. 
Sokol’nikov added further:  
 
The facts show that in a period of several months our army has fought successfully. The 
army, in which there are tens of thousands of old specialists, has shown in practice that 
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it is an army of the proletarian revolution. The working class has managed to use 
military specialists not for the resurrection of the old army, but for the creation of a new 
Red Army.91  
 
Sokol’nikov’s appeals, however, had little effect. During a closed session on military 
affairs, the majority of Congress attendees voted in support of the line of the Military 
Opposition. Importantly, from those registered to speak during the military section of 
the Congress who had voting rights, the Military Opposition had a majority.92 The 
Military Opposition’s thesis was popular within the party, largely due to the 
unpopularity of the renewed emphasis on army hierarchy and discipline.93 However, 
following the initial victory of the Military Opposition at the Congress another 
committee was formed to resolve outstanding issues, including three representatives for 
the Central Committee and two from the Military Opposition. A compromise resolution 
was created, which in the end, represented a victory for Trotsky by a very slim majority. 
The principles of centralisation and the use of professional soldiers were agreed upon.94 
However, promises were made to correct the practices which had provoked the most 
dissatisfaction from the party and assurances given that political commissars would 
have more authority and that power would not solely lie with the military specialists.95  
It is doubtful that the Military Opposition or other party members unhappy with 
Trotsky’s policies and the use of military specialists would be content with the outcome 
of the Congress.96 It certainly would not end the suspicions which continued to surround 
the former Imperial officers. Interestingly, Stalin’s behaviour at the Congress displayed 
the same ambiguity noted above. He did not take a hard line towards military 
specialists, indeed he was one of the representatives for the Central Committee line who 
met with representatives of the Military Opposition to hammer out the compromise 
resolution.97 Stalin’s position at was in fact very similar to Sokol’nikov’s. In his speech 
on 21 March, Stalin criticised the previous volunteer Red Army, noting its lack of 
discipline and disorganisation.98 Stalin argued that discipline was necessary for the 
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army to be strong, and criticised the thesis of the Military Opposition.99 As Benvenuti 
argues, it seems that Stalin worked to distance himself from the Military Opposition in 
public and wanted to be seen as a centrist, to draw supporters away from Trotsky.100 
Whatever Stalin’s exact motivation for coming out against the Military Opposition at 
the Congress, it is another reminder that Stalin’s behaviour towards military affairs was 
informed by political calculation. It is unlikely that Stalin had suddenly become 
genuinely enthusiastic about the continued employment of military specialists, but he 
did not want to side with the Military Opposition. Perhaps Stalin saw no benefit in 
challenging the Central Committee’s line towards military specialists, which was 
supported by Lenin. Stalin was pragmatic about military affairs and about who served in 
the army. His ability to make such compromises did not alter in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Consequently, the true threat posed by military specialists is difficult to 
disentangle from how it was perceived by different individuals and groups. Opposition 
to military specialists could be heightened by a number of factors including class 
prejudices, the impact of betrayals by military specialists, political disputes and broader 
hostilities towards Trotsky as War Commissar. Stalin wanted to weaken Trotsky and the 
Military Opposition wanted to reduce the reliance on military specialists. Both played 
upon fears about military specialists to achieve these ends. This helped military 
specialists be seen as a disloyal cohort inside the Red Army, even if there is evidence to 
suggest that they were in fact more loyal than their non-specialist counterparts. 
Importantly, the difference between how threats to the army were presented by certain 
groups and their true reality is crucial in not only understanding the party elite’s 
relationship with the Red Army during the Civil War and in later years, but is vital to 
understanding the military purge of 1937-38.  
 
The Cheka and the Struggle for the Security of the Red Army 
 
 
It was not only members of the Bolshevik Party who were concerned about the security 
of the Red Army and the use of military specialists in combat. The Soviet political 
police were the main line of defence against the subversion of the military during the 
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Civil War. They had a particular perception of army vulnerability, informed by their 
own institutional interests, and saw it as highly susceptible to infiltration. The Civil War 
was the starting point of a long history of the political police closely monitoring the 
army for any signs that it had been compromised. From here on, the political police 
were consistently the one institution most concerned about threats to the military. 
 Lenin created the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat 
Counterrevolution and Sabotage (Cheka) in December 1917 to defend the fragile 
Bolshevik regime from these precise threats. Led by Feliks Dzerzhinskii the Cheka was 
notorious in employing tactics of extra-judicial terror in safeguarding Bolshevik power. 
The Cheka not only focused its attention on political opponents but also acted as an 
internal security service, guarding against uprisings and carrying out summary 
executions.101 A chief task during the Civil War was guarding against White subversive 
groups. For example, twenty-two White organisations were apparently ‘exposed’ in 
Moscow alone during 1918-20.102 Monitoring the Red Army soon came under the 
political police’s remit when it was quickly established that the military was a key target 
of White agents. For example, at the first conference of the Extraordinary Commission 
in June 1918, I. N. Polukarov, the head of the counterrevolution department, spoke 
about the dangers of subversion of the Red Army in general terms:  
 
The aim of the bourgeoisie is to break down our army, to use it for their own aims, but 
we as an organ of political struggle need to take on surveillance of the army. The 
uprising of Czechoslovakians is well known, we know what happened there. We should 
have in mind that the newly formed units are able to go over to the other side. Means of 
terror are necessary to force the counterrevolutionaries to leave the ranks of our army.103  
 
Thus, the Red Army was seen as a potential target, its reliability was under question and 
‘terror’ had to be employed. The mutiny of the Czech Legion had also left a lasting 
impression. From mid-1918 the Cheka went through organisational changes to 
accommodate a closer involvement with the military. So-called Special Departments, 
Osobye otdely (OO), were established on the southern and eastern fronts to monitor the 
army specifically. These grew in number throughout the Civil War to aid observation of 
the army. In early December 1918 a military department was formed, attached to the 
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Cheka, to lead what was seen as a struggle against ‘counterrevolution’ inside the Red 
Army.104    
 The need for such specific organisations for fighting perceived subversion in the 
army demonstrates how seriously the Cheka estimated the various threats to the 
military. Indeed, the threat from White agents to the military specifically was perceived 
as considerable. In December 1919, at the first congress of the Special Departments, I. 
P. Pavlunovskii, the deputy head of the OO, reported on White agents operating not 
only in the Red Army, but on the railways, supply and transport and a range of other 
institutions.105 According to the historian Nikolai Kirmel’, from spring 1918 to autumn 
1919, White agents were able to gain high-ranking positions in the Red Army in 
Ukraine and conducted espionage.106 In February 1919, a report by Genrikh Iagoda, 
who would later head the political police, described the extent the military was 
perceived to have been compromised:  
 
The exposure of large White guard organisations – a national centre and others, shows 
to what degree counterrevolution has penetrated our military apparatus…An 
investigation opened during the last period of 1919 about White Guard organisations 
showed that counterrevolution has transferred from the stage of a conspiratorial struggle 
with Soviet power to a system of using our military apparatus for their purposes and 
thus enjoyed fully legal means found available in each specialist working in a particular 
institution of the military department.  
 
The report noted how these White counterrevolutionaries were apparently working from 
the inside to harm supplies to the fronts and to the troops.107 Similarly, in July 1919 
Dzerzhinskii reported on White guards having supposedly infiltrated the Red Army and 
gained command positions.108 Thus, for the political police the perceived danger of the 
‘enemy’ within was seen as considerable and they perceived the Red Army as 
vulnerable to infiltration. As Iagoda’s report demonstrates, military specialists were 
specifically pointed to as providing the means for the army to be internally 
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compromised.109 Consequently, when the Whites went on the offensive the political 
police stepped up their countermeasures.110  
 Alongside concerns about the loyalty of the military specialists, the political 
police were very concerned about the use of former White officers within the military. 
Trotsky needed all the experienced officers he could get and another solution to the 
skills shortage was to use former Whites as military specialists. However, this posed 
obvious additional security risks as these individuals had only recently come from the 
White forces. The political police were very alarmed. For example, in February 1920 
the head of the Special Department, Viacheslav Menzhinskii, and his deputy, Iagoda, 
sent a telegram to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Nikolai Krestinskii, about the 
admittance of former Whites into the Red Army and made their concerns clear: ‘The 
Special Department of the VChK (Cheka) considers the mass admittance of Kolchak 
officers into command positions as impermissible, especially in those places where 
Soviet power has not yet had time to grow strong enough.’111 In protecting the Red 
Army from any danger, Iagoda and Menzhinskii suggested imprisoning all such officers 
in concentration camps and to individually check them.112 They also suggested that the 
position a former White should receive in the army should depend on the level of their 
past opposition to the Bolsheviks and their loyalty to the state.113 Later in October 1920 
a department was created within the Cheka specifically for the observation and 
management of the White officers.114  
 The employment of former White officers in the Red Army demonstrates an 
important point about the existence of differing narratives of perceived threats to the 
military and how these were informed by different priorities. The role of the Cheka was 
the expose ‘enemies’ within and using former Whites in the Red Army made this task 
far more difficult. The Cheka had to make specific accommodations for these former 
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White officers and establish a practice of closely observing the Red Army. From the 
political police’s point of view, the military was sabotaging itself by employing these 
potential unreliable officers. But Trotsky had different priorities, and consequently, a 
different appraisal of threats to the army. His primary role was to make sure that the 
Red Army won the Civil War, and he needed to make compromises and use former 
Whites to achieve this. While the Cheka certainly supported victory in the Civil War, 
their fixation on the exposure of ‘enemies’ clashed with Trotsky’s willingness to make 
compromises over who served in the Red Army. This difference in priorities gave rise 
to competing narratives about the danger of the perceived threats to the military. The 
different conceptions of perceived threats to the Red Army, which fell broadly between 
the party leadership, political police and army elite, persisted after the Civil War. But it 
was the political police’s conception of threats to the military that eventually achieved 
dominance in 1937.115 
  Finally, alongside mutinies by military specialists and White 
counterrevolutionaries the political police were also battling foreign agents supposedly 
working inside the army. Soviet counter-intelligence services were vital during the Civil 
War. Their role included the study of the systems and methods of foreign intelligence 
agents, investigating the activity of alleged spies and preventing harm to Russia’s 
military interests.116 The political police ‘exposed’ foreign agents and intelligence 
networks within Soviet institutions and inside the Red Army.117 Again, much of the 
problem, as far as the Cheka were concerned, was the perceived ‘enemy’ within. In this 
case, this was seen as from both military specialists and foreign nationalities serving in 
the military.118 For example, in November 1920 the deputy head of the Special 
Department, Iagoda, sent a telegram to the commissar of the Field Staff of the RVSR 
requesting that all non-party Estonians, Latvians, Finns and Poles be dismissed from 
their positions if they have access to secret materials.119 Alleged foreign espionage 
networks allegedly involving military specialists were also ‘exposed’ during the Civil 
War.120 
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 It must be emphasised that not all the foreign agents ‘exposed’ by the Cheka 
were genuine. The Cheka’s role was to actively search for ‘enemies’ and it did not 
matter by what means these were found. Foreign agents could be ‘exposed’ by beating 
confessions from those arrested. Many arrested ‘spies’ would actually be completely 
innocent, and of course, foreign nationalities were singled out alongside other 
‘suspicious’ groups, such as the military specialists. But at the same time, it is well 
known that during the Civil War numerous countries including Britain, France, Poland, 
Japan, Italy, and Finland gave assistance to the White movement and acted on Russian 
soil.121 During 1920-21 the Cheka ‘exposed’ alleged foreign intelligence networks 
apparently financing the Whites.122 Such discoveries would only reinforce a view that 
hostile capitalist states were trying to undermine the revolution. Thus, it is easy to see 
why Lenin and the rest of the Bolshevik Party felt they were under siege and why they 
may not have had much difficultly in accepting the cases of ‘foreign espionage’ 
‘discovered’ by the political police. In addition, unfounded arrests exaggerated the scale 
of the perceived threats to the army. They made the Red Army appear more vulnerable 
than it was in reality. This equally applied to military specialists falsely ‘exposed’ as 
‘counterrevolutionaries’. As long as ‘enemies’ were ‘discovered’ in this way by the 
political police, they, as an institution, could continue to make the case that the Red 
Army was in danger of infiltration and vulnerable to subversive threats. 
 
Peasant Rebellion and the War with Poland 
 
 
The Civil War was not just a clash between the Red and White forces but was 
complicated by the activity of rebellious peasants. Led by individuals such as the 
Ukrainian anarchist Nestor Makhno, these rebel groups, the so-called ‘Greens’, created 
numerous problems for the Red Army. Indeed, the military may have been officially 
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titled the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, but the balance was in favour of the 
peasants. Indeed, by the autumn 1920 seventy-five percent of the army were peasants. 
During the Civil War a great deal hinged on which side could control the vast peasant 
population.123 Consequently, peasant mutinies and rebellions in the rank-and-file during 
the conflict directly undermined army stability. Such upheaval in the lower ranks 
showed that problems with reliability existed in all levels of the army and only further 
reinforced perceptions of army vulnerability. 
 Peasant soldiers rebelled for numerous reasons, but often this was in response to 
social and political greviances. Army performance was closely tied to central policy. 
Peasant soldiers rebelled over poor conditions, inadequate supplies and in protest of 
being drafted into the Red Army in the first place.124 Some rebellions were particularly 
serious, and rebellious units murdering communists were not uncommon.125 Mutinies 
were often put down harshly, such as the rebellion led by an officer, a certain peasant 
rebel Sapozhkov, in Samara in mid-1920. Sapozhkov had been removed from his 
command because of drunkenness and in response he raised a revolt. This attracted 
support from sections of the army.126 Trotsky took a hard line against Sapozhkov’s 
revolt, writing to the command in Samara that the guilty should be ‘mercilessly 
punished’. Trotsky was concerned about the possibility of a widespread kulak 
uprising.127 Indeed, peasant uprisings were particularly dangerous as they could spread 
throughout the rank-and-file. In a similar manner, the Greens played an additional 
destabilising role in the rank-and-file, attracting large numbers of deserters from the 
Red Army who joined the partisan units. These later turned to fight against the 
Bolsheviks.128 The problem was so serious that additional resources were given to the 
political police so they could keep a closer observation of the troops serving at the front 
and rear in case of desertion.129 Indeed, the Greens could potentially infiltrate the troops 
and establish intelligence networks.130 Thus, the concerns that the military could be 
internally subverted did not only come from foreign agents, military specialists or 
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Whites, but applied to ordinary soldiers within the rank-and-file. Furthermore, such 
problems with reliability were not confined to the disaffected rank-and-file peasant 
soldiers. Even the most elite units could succumb. For instance, one of the elite Red 
Army units, the First Cavalry Army (konarmiia), rebelled for three weeks in September 
1920. Approximately half of the konarmiia mutinied, murdered their commissar and 
went on a looting spree before being brought under control by their commander, Semen 
Budennyi.131 That the unit regarded as one of the most elite in the Red Army could 
mutiny in such a manner, demonstrates the extent that military was riddled with 
problems with reliability and stability at all levels.  
 Despite this level of turmoil, the Red Army also played a key role in crushing 
mutinies and successful operations enhanced the profile of those in command. One of 
the most well-known peasant uprisings crushed by the Red Army occurred in Tambov 
in September 1920. This uprising was led by the rebel Aleksandr Antonov and was put 
down by Tukhachevskii, who arrived in May 1921. Tukhachevskii displayed not only 
unwavering loyalty, but also brutality.132 He described the peasant rebels as an 
‘epidemic’ and made use of poison gas and chemical weapons.133 Thus, as much as the 
Red Army was weakened through desertion and mutiny, it still had the ability to 
mercilessly execute those who did betray the Bolsheviks. Following the suppressing of 
the Tambov rebellion similar brutal methods were repeated to put down bandits on the 
Don in 1921.134 Of similar notoriety was the reaction to the mutiny at the Kronstadt 
naval fortress during February and March 1921. At Kronstadt mutinous soldiers and 
sailors joined with Petrograd workers in protest over widespread hunger, the lack of 
democracy and the repression of strikers. The mutiny was brutally suppressed by Red 
Army units, again led by Tukhachevskii. Many of the rebels were executed.135 
Kronstadt, however, had special significance. Even though the mutiny was easily 
overcome, it was undoubtedly alarming. One of the key support groups for the 
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Bolsheviks during the revolution had been these very sailors who rebelled at Kronstadt. 
The mutiny was a clear demonstration about how key support groups could turn against 
the Bolsheviks and this would raise questions about whether the Red Army could be 
completely relied upon, particularly in times of social strain. Of course, the Red Army 
did retain enough strength to win the Civil War and put down its own numerous 
rebellions, but as will be detailed in chapter three, problems with reliability in the lower 
ranks appeared again in a much sharper form at the end of 1920s during a more intense 
period of social transformation. 
 The Civil War was a formative experience for the Red Army, in that almost 
immediately it was perceived as target of subversives and ‘counterrevolutionaries’, and 
instability was widepread in the lower ranks. However, on a personal level, the Civil 
War was a formative experience for those party members and army officers who served 
side by side in combat and who continued to work together after the conflict. Stalin 
spent a great deal of time at the front and his Civil War experiences had consequences 
for his later working relationship with the Red Army leadership. Specifically, within the 
literature much is made of an alleged dispute between Stalin and Tukhachevskii over 
the failed war against Poland, a conflict which began during the closing years of the 
Civil War. This dispute has been commonly been depicted as becoming a near feud 
between the two and is pointed to as contributing to Stalin’s later alleged hostility 
towards Tukhachevskii.136 Yet, how long-lasting this particular dispute was and its 
impact on Stalin’s later relationship with Tukhachevskii is questionable. Much more 
important for Tukhachevskii was how a visible power group, comprising of Stalin and 
his close military colleagues, Voroshilov and Budennyi, was cemented during the Civil 
and Polish War. Professional officers, such as Tukhachevskii, were excluded from this 
close circle. 
 A low-level conflict with Poland had begun during the main fighting of the Civil 
War in 1919. In December 1919 the Allied Supreme Council had marked a line running 
from Brest-Litovsk recognising Poland and Russia’s claims on territory, with Poland 
having any to the west of the line.137 But in April 1920 Polish forces attacked the south-
western front in an invasion of Ukraine.138 The Red Army was mobilised to repulse the 
Polish offensive, but a hapless performance at the battle for Warsaw in August 1920 
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heavily undermined the Soviet offensive and resulted in the loss of the conflict. The 
chief reason for the defeat was the division of the Red Army forces. In repelling the 
Polish forces, the Red Army had been divided into two fronts, a western and south-
western. Tukhachevskii, who headed the western front, had advanced towards Warsaw 
but he did not have sufficient forces to overcome Polish resistance. Indeed, the south-
western front had initially supposed to have travelled northwards in support. However, 
under Stalin’s, Voroshilov’s and Aleksandr Egorov’s direction, and after receiving 
permission from the Commander-in-Chief, S. S. Kamenev, the konarmiia was ordered 
to attack Lwów, the Polish stronghold in Galicia. The 12th Red Army was also delayed 
in marshy terrain.139 It looked like Tukhachevskii would not receive his support. 
However, the strategy quickly changed again and on 11 August Kamenev ordered that 
the forces of the south-western front should travel northwards to support Tukhachevskii, 
but this time Stalin refused.140 Stalin wanted to concentrate instead on the defence of 
Russia from Wrangel’s forces in the Crimea, rather than despatch troops to support 
Tukhachevskii’s march to Warsaw.141 Tukhachevskii’s support never arrived. Pilsudski 
then launched a counterattack on 16 August, the battle for Warsaw was lost and the 
entire conflict with Poland became a stalemate. An armistice was signed in October 
1920, and the Treaty of Riga was signed on 18 March 1921 which transferred part of 
Ukraine and Belorussia to Poland.142  
 Who carries the most blame for the failure of the Polish campaign is more 
complex than it first seems. Stalin and his allies’ refusal to transfer their forces was only 
part of the problem. As Robert Ponichtera and David Stone note, the war with Poland 
was confused from the very beginning. There was little clarity over whether the war was 
defensive, offensive, to capture Warsaw or to act as a means to spread European 
revolution.143 Furthermore, as the Red forces had been divided from the start, by the 
time the order came through in August to send Stalin’s forces northwards, it was very 
difficult to disengage these from combat with Wrangel’s forces in the Crimea. In 
addition, the distance needed to be covered to join Tukhachevskii was considerable. 
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Lenin also sent very conflicting signals at crucial points in the conflict. On 11 August, 
the very day Kamenev ordered that the konarmiia and the 12th Red Army should join 
Tukhachevskii’s western front, Lenin urged Stalin to concentrate on defeating Wrangel 
instead. Lenin incorrectly believed that Tukhachevskii did not need any reinforcements 
and victory had nearly been achieved.144 When Lenin was better informed about the 
need for reinforcements on 12 August he ordered Trotsky to create reinforcements from 
conscripted Belorussian peasants. As Stephen Brown notes, to think that this would be 
sufficient was very naïve.145 Further difficulties were met when Tukhachevskii sent an 
order to Budennyi, the commander of the konarmiia, to coordinate both their troops, but 
this was queried by the latter as the order had only Tukhachevskii’s signature and had 
not been counter-signed. By the time a new order arrived, Budennyi, Stalin and Egorov 
were already heavily engaged in Lwów. Stalin used this as an excuse for a delayed 
response to Kamenev’s order of 11 August, but the delay probably suited his own 
purposes.146 Indeed, Stalin made no efforts find out the truth between the conflicting 
orders of Lenin and Kamenev, and it appears that the confusion allowed him to 
concentrate on Lwów, which was his preferred choice.147 In all, the war with Poland 
was badly planned, had confused outcomes and contradictory orders were made at 
crucial moments. Yet, it is not so important who specifically was the most responsible 
for the defeat, but more that in the aftermath, everyone blamed the failure on everyone 
else.  
 The alleged ill-feeling between Stalin and Tukhachevskii from the failure of the 
Polish War has been a persistent theme in the literature, and it does have some level of 
substance. Firstly, both Stalin and Tukhachevskii share some blame. Stalin clearly 
disobeyed an order. Lenin criticised him at the Ninth Party Conference in September 
1920, accusing Stalin of being ‘biased’ against the western front.148 Yet, Tukhachevskii 
was criticised for too hastily setting of towards Warsaw to try and ignite European 
revolution. Tukhachevskii took risks in how he conducted the drive to Warsaw with 
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stretched forces.149 Indeed, at the Ninth Party Conference Stalin blamed poor 
organisation and his ally Minin blamed the western front for hastily attacking 
Warsaw.150 This was a reference to Tukhachevskii. In addition, in 1920 the Politburo 
produced a resolution which criticised Tukhachevskii’s actions during the campaign for 
undermining the party and Government.151 Thus, Lenin believed Tukhachevskii shared 
some of the blame for acting impulsively. But it seems that Tukhachevskii did not 
accept this. Later in a lecture in February 1923 he argued that the main reason for the 
failure of the Polish campaign was strategy, and that there would have been a different 
outcome if the two fronts had been coordinated. Tukhachevskii did not name anyone 
specifically, but it is very likely he had the leaders of the south-western front in mind, 
namely Stalin, Egorov, Budennyi and Voroshilov.152  
 Yet, it would be going too far to suggest that Stalin and Tukhachevskii were 
hostile to each other from this point on, or that Stalin felt he had a score to settle. This 
defeat against Poland would certainly not be forgotten and it is likely that both 
continued to blame each other, but this issue did not define Stalin’s later relationship 
with Tukhachevskii. Before the defeat against Poland Stalin displayed great confidence 
in Tukhachevskii’s military skill and his ability to achieve results. For example, in 
February 1920 Stalin sent a telegram to Voroshilov and Budennyi describing 
Tukhachevskii as, ‘the conqueror of Siberia and victor over Kolchak’.153 In addition, 
Stalin may have blamed Tukhachevskii for the defeat against Poland, but this did not 
stop him working closely with Tukhachevskii after the Civil War. As shown below, 
Stalin later expressed similar sentiments praising Tukhachevskii’s talent and abilities.154 
Perhaps, it would be most accurate to say that even though Stalin and Tukhachevskii 
had clashed during the conflict, this did not destroy their working relationship. Stalin 
continued to respect the ability of the young officer and perhaps even considered him 
loyal. However, what mattered more than any possible feud or tensions about the failed 
Polish War was that Tukhachevskii was not one of Stalin’s close allies. Stalin formed a 
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tight group with Voroshilov and Budennyi during the Civil War and this was further 
cemented in the Polish War. Tukhachevskii was not part of this close circle and this 
particulary grouping proved to be long lasting. Indeed, Voroshilov and Budennyi were 
some of the very few senior military figures to survive the military purge of 1937-38. 
That Tukhachevskii was not one of Stalin’s close allies in the army, and that Voroshilov 
and Budennyi were also promoted after the Civil War, would have far greater 
consequences for Tukhachevskii’s later career than any alleged feud with Stalin over the 
failed war with Poland. The army leadership became an awkward mixture of 
professional talented officers like Tukhachevskii alongside inexperienced Stalin 
loyalists such as Voroshilov and Budennyi. These were the conditions for conflict.  
 
Both the Civil War and Polish War were formative experiences for both the Bolshevik 
Party, the political police, and for those who would shortly become members of the Red 
Army elite. From the renewed German offensive in 1918 to the fierce combat against 
the White forces, Lenin and the party leadership were given a lesson in realism. In order 
for the revolution to survive any ideological principles against the use of standing 
armies had to be put aside and fears about betrayals by military specialists overcome. 
None of this was without resistance. The Military Opposition opposed the move to 
transform the initial volunteer Red Army into a regular standing force and the distrust of 
military specialists was widespread. Indeed, when a military specialist betrayed the 
Bolsheviks the impact was much larger than a mutiny of an ordinary rank-and-file 
soldier or red commander. Reinforced by persistent class prejudices, military specialists 
were permanently seen as the enemies within. Furthermore, the pragmatic use of 
opposition to military specialists from party members such as Stalin, alongside the 
political police’s use of forced confessions in search of ‘enemies’, helped increase the 
perceived scale of the threat from military specialists and former White officers. 
Importantly, there was no agreed single view about the threat posed by the military 
specialists. Different groups and institutions viewed them differently and these 
perceptions were informed by institutional interests and priorities. This created 
competing narratives about perceived threats to the army. However, the use of former 
officers was not the only problem for the new Red Army. The lower ranks experienced 
widespread discontent during the Civil War and peasant rebellions were very regular. 
During periods of social strain the rank-and-file proved to be unstable and unreliable. 
Finally, this chapter has shown that the experience of combat in the Civil War was a 
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formative experience not only in terms of army organisation, but for those party 
members who had a direct combat role. Importantly, what became a long-term alliance 
between Stalin, Voroshilov and Budennyi had a profound affect on the dynamic within 
the later military elite. This was more influential than any alleged grudge between Stalin 
and Tukhachevskii about the failed war against Poland. Indeed, Tukhachevskii would 
rapidly rise through the army hierarchy after the Civil War, but so would Voroshilov 
and Budennyi. Both would display hostility to Tukhachevskii. Yet, for now, the conduct 
of the new Red Army in the Civil War and during the Polish War had proved to be 
disorganised, chaotic, rebellious and not at all confident. The Red Army displayed a 
lack of professionalism and all agreed it was a target of various ‘counterrevolutionaries’ 
and ‘enemies’ on some level. But as the next chapter will show, even with victory in the 
Civil War, fears about betrayal in the Red Army and perceived problems with its 
political reliability and stability did not subside. The military was only at the very 
beginning of a long process of reform and consolidation. The 1920s were equally 
fraught with accusations of army betrayal and new fears about a military coup. But most 
importantly, the gulf between the perception and the reality of threats to the army began 
to grow wider. 
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Chapter Two: The Red Army in Consolidation 
 
 
With the end of the Civil War the Red Army had passed its first serious test. The 
conflict was hard fought and serious concerns were raised about the reliability of the 
army, stemming from the perceived ‘untrustworthy’ military specialist officers in the 
upper ranks to the upheavals in the rank-and-file. Even though the Bolsheviks emerged 
from the Civil War as victors, the perceived threat level did not subside. As this chapter 
will show, though the White movement had been driven beyond the borders, it was still 
active and seen as dangerous. After the Civil War the Whites changed their tactics to 
carry on the struggle for the homeland and espionage became more widely deployed. 
The Red Army remained a target of White subversion and the Soviet political police 
continued to watch this very closely. The political police also continued to make arrests 
in the army of those deemed to be foreign agents. Thus, the Bolsheviks and the political 
police still saw an army vulnerable to subversion. In addition, this chapter will show 
that notions of betrayal in the military elite were increasingly common at this time and 
fuelled by rumours of a ‘Russian Bonaparte’ emerging from the high command. The 
1920s were awash with variations of this rumour, particularly outside the Soviet Union. 
Rumours about disloyalty permanently trailed several senior members of the army elite. 
But these perceived external threats to the army were not the only cause for alarm. The 
Trotskyist political ‘opposition’ found some support within the ranks in the 1920s 
which led to fears within the Politburo about military support for a coup. Finally, this 
chapter will argue that the gulf between the perception and reality of threats began to 
grow wider during the 1920s. Since the Civil War the real and immediate danger to the 
new Bolshevik regime and the Red Army had subsided, but the Bolsheviks saw the 
world differently. For Stalin, the political police and the army leadership, the threats to 
Soviet Union and the military had not dissipated, but only evolved and taken new 
forms. Yet, at the same time, how perceived dangers to the army were defined 
continued to be influenced by institutional interests, which maintained competing 
appraisals of threats to the Red Army.  
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Fears of Subversion and the Military Specialists 
 
 
Bolshevik victory in the Civil War brought large-scale demobilisation to the Red Army. 
At the end of 1920 the army numbered 5.3 million and by 1924 it had been reduced to 
562,000. The War had not only ravaged the country but led to an economic crisis and 
maintaining a very large standing army became impossible.1 Demobilisation also 
signalled the end of service for many military specialists. The conclusion of war marked 
the beginning of their discharge and the promotion of the academy-trained communist 
red commanders. However, many military specialists remained in the ranks because of a 
widespread skills shortage. At the end of 1922 only half of Red Army officers had a 
sufficient level of training and there were shortages in trained officers for the infantry 
and artillery.2 Thus out of necessity, the replacement of military specialists was a 
drawn-out process. For those pre-revolutionary officers who had proven themselves 
heroes in the Civil War, such as Tukhachevskii, the 1920s was a period of rapid career 
rise.  
The continued use of military specialists in the Red Army was complicated by 
the still present threat from the White forces. This did not dampen concerns about 
possible treachery by some military specialists and the perceived ‘enemy’ within. 
Indeed, the White movement may have lost the Civil War, but this did not bring an end 
to their struggle against the Bolshevik regime. On being driven from Russia by the Red 
forces the Whites had been exiled throughout Europe and largely congregated in Berlin, 
Paris, and Istanbul and in the Far East. As Lenin noted in 1921:  
 
Now, after we have repulsed the attack of international counter-revolution, there has 
been formed abroad an organisation of these Russian bourgeoisie and of all the Russian 
counter-revolutionary parties. The number of Russian émigrés who are scattered 
through all foreign countries, might be counted at from one and a half to two million.3  
 
But Lenin did not adequately grasp that the White movement in exile was even less 
unified than during the Civil War. The White forces were now fragmented in terms of 
both geographic location and internal cohesion, and remained organised only in small 
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military associations and units. It was not until Wrangel founded the Russian General 
Military Union (ROVS) in 1924 that greater cohesiveness was achieved.4 ROVS was to 
act as both a new centre in the prolonged struggle against the Bolshevik regime and as 
an instrument to maintain the White identity. It shortly became the largest centre of the 
movement.5 However, ROVS was hampered by organisational chaos, funding problems 
and a lack of commitment from its membership.6 It would be a mistake to 
overemphasise the Whites’ ability to undertake a new military campaign against the 
Bolsheviks. Yet, despite these problems, Wrangel intended to fight and claim victory, 
though he knew a change of tactics would be necessary.  
From the early 1920s the Whites began to place greater emphasis on covert 
operations and attempted to make contacts with Red Army officers.7 A successful 
overthrow of the Soviet regime would require groups from Red Army to turn against the 
Bolsheviks and the Whites were optimistic this was possible. The counterintelligence 
department of ROVS kept the Red Army command under close observation.8 Aside 
from the common soldier bond, the Red Army officer corps was targeted as it continued 
to employ a large number of military specialists who could be potentially recruited. 
With so many still serving in the Red Army, the Soviet political police put many 
officers under surveillance. Indeed, with the end of the Civil War the importance of the 
political police to the army had not diminished, but only its tactics changed. Their 
methods were altered to suit the post-Civil War period and became, according to one 
historian, far more conspiratorial.9 Observing and monitoring the reliability of the 
military remained a vital task, but espionage and counterintelligence also took on a far 
larger role.10  
The Whites’ greater focus on covert operations against the Red Army is visible 
within Soviet political police intelligence materials. For example, a report from the 
Cheka’s foreign department (INO) from September 1921 detailed a meeting of former 
                                                
4 Recent research has argued that ROVS numbered approximately 60,000-80,000, see ‘Ofitsery i 
komanduiushchie’ in Russkie bez otechestva: ocherki antibol’shevistskoi emigratsii 20-40-kh godov, ed. 
by S. V. Karpenko and others (Moscow: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 2000), p. 
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Brotherhood of Russian Truth, see Paul Robinson, The White Russian Army in Exile (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 132-133. 
6 Ibid., p. 112. 
7 Ibid., p. 134. 
8 ‘Ofitsery i komanduiushchie’ in Russkie bez otechestva, p. 83. 
9 Zdanovich, p. 62. 
10 Vladislav Goldin, Rossiiskaia voennaia emigratsiia i sovetskie spetssluzhby v 20-e godu XX veka (Saint 
Petersburg: Poltorak, 2010), p. 45. 
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Imperial officers in Petrograd and the subject of conversation was described as: ‘the 
organisation of an “expedition” to Moscow with the aim of the possible activation of 
old Wrangel cells and the creation of new ones for infiltration into the ranks of the Red 
army, the VChK (Cheka) and other Soviet institutions’.11 A GPU order on the struggle 
with counterrevolution from March 1922 noted the intentions of monarchist and Kadet 
émigrés to unite their efforts in trying to win over the Red Army and Navy elite and 
their plans to use military specialists for espionage.12 Persistent concerns about the 
loyalty of military specialists were not confined solely to the political police but can 
also be seen from the Red Army officer corps. For example, fourteen officers, including 
Pavel Dibenko and Ivan Fedko, both of whom later became senior officers in the 
military elite, sent a letter to the Central Committee in February 1924 which alleged that 
some military specialists maintained links to counterrevolutionaries and leaders of the 
White movement.13 Thus, the view that military specialists were unreliable and could 
easily turn against the Bolsheviks had not subsided after the Civil War. This had been 
further reinforced by intelligence reporting that the Whites were on a covert offensive 
and looking to military specialists for recruitment. 
Yet, the Whites had a more effective method of getting agents inside the Red 
Army than recruiting serving military specialists. They could use their own men. In a 
continuation of the Civil War practice, former White officers were still permitted to 
serve in the Red Army. The Whites could send agents into the Red Army under the 
guise of returning soldiers.14 The return of White officers from exile had been 
sanctioned through a series of amnesties from 1920 to 1923.15 It seems at first a strange 
decision to employ people who previously had fought so vigorously against what they 
saw as an illegitimate seizure of power. But such amnesties did serve a purpose, even if 
they appeared to invite subversion.16 Firstly, the Red Army still desperately needed 
                                                
11 Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia 20-kh-40-kh godov: dokumenty i materialy, ed. by V. A. Zolotarev and 
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15 Ibid., p. 17. 
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qualified officers and the use of former Whites could not be abandoned.17 However, a 
June 1921 letter from GPU deputy, Iosif Unshlikht, to the close Stalin ally, Viacheslav 
Molotov, reveals a second motivation. In his letter Unshlikht noted that the White threat 
was still very real and that the large numbers of Whites abroad provided a power base 
for the defeated White Generals. Amnesties provided a way to disarm this foreign 
power base by draining the White support from abroad to the Soviet Union. Unshlikht 
did point out, however, that this was a potentially dangerous tactic as among the 
returning Whites there would be agents: ‘I understand that to allow onto the territory of 
Soviet Russia so many soldiers, among whom undoubtedly will be a significant 
percentage of counterrevolutionaries and spies, is a dangerous thing.’18 Indeed, this 
danger was recognised by the political police. A GPU circular from 1923 regarding 
increasing the filtration of repatriates highlighted that: ‘Return to the homeland, 
undoubtedly, was used by Wrangel’s counterintelligence for sending agents, organisers 
and spies to Russia’. The circular called for observation to be moved towards revealing 
White agents among the re-emigrants and to monitor their associations with the local 
population, bandits, the rural intelligentsia, kulaks and the Red Army.19 Similarly, a 
GPU order from 24 March 1923 stated that:  
 
the activity of Wrangel’s intelligence and counterintelligence organs has increased on a 
large scale. A number of new intelligence institutions have opened, whose main aim is – 
the collection of information about the Red army’s condition and armament and also 
breaking down of morale (moral’noe razlozhenie) of the latter by way of planting 
agents in command positions of units of the Red army.  
 
The GPU order noted that White agents were entering the Red Army under the cover of 
returning soldiers and called for a greater observation of former Whites serving in the 
military.20     
Clearly the policy of disarming the White movement by amnesty had many 
attached difficulties and new obligations. Voroshilov, who became People’s Commissar 
for Military and Naval Affairs in 1925, admitted that former White officers were more 
                                                
17 Ibid., p. 347. As late as February 1931 1537 former White officers were still serving in the Red Army 
and 122 serving in the Red Army command, see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 10, l. 1; f. 9, op. 29, d. 10, ll. 
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19 Russkaia voennaia emigratsiia 20-kh-40-kh godov: dokumenty i materialy, ed. by A. A. Kol’tiukov and 
others (Moscow: RGGU, 2007), IV, pp. 803-804. 
20 Ibid., pp. 815-817. For similar material about Wrangel’s espionage activity, see ibid. pp. 803-804. 
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likely to betray the army than military specialists.21 There was a difficult balancing act 
in using former Whites and strict controls were put in place mandating the regions they 
could be stationed, the numbers permitted in each region and clearance from the 
political police was needed before any could serve in the military.22 In any case, the 
policy would remain concerning for both the political police and some army officers.23 
The use of former White officers in the Red Army was not a short-term measure and 
even though their numbers were relatively small, they constituted an additional 
perceived subversive threat. 
However, the White movement took a more direct approach in its continued 
struggle against the Soviet Union and conducted a terrorist campaign. Even though this 
did not target the army exclusively, it certainly gave further credibility to the continued 
White threat. For example, the Soviet representative to the Lausanne conference in 1923 
was assassinated by a White émigré. Later, in early 1924, Dzerzhinskii corresponded 
with Trotsky about his concerns of a possible assassination attempt on the latter from 
intelligence received from Berlin.24 A key figure in the organisation of this White 
terrorism was General Alexander Kutepov, a member of ROVS, who headed the 
organisation after Wrangel’s death in 1928. Kutepov coordinated underground 
operations against the Soviet Union from 1924 and the political police had intelligence 
of this.25 From 1927 Kutepov launched a more direct terrorist campaign, operating 
under the name of the ‘Union of National Terrorists’.26 However, Kutepov faced a 
number of difficulties. He lacked sufficient funding and numbers, and the counter-
intelligence of the political police proved to be very effective.27 Yet, despite this, the 
terrorist acts the Whites did enact had visible impact. In 1927 a bomb was successfully 
exploded at a party club in Leningrad, injuring twenty-six. In July 1927 the Soviet 
diplomat in Poland, Petr Voikov, was assassinated by a White monarchist, an event 
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which contributed to the Soviet ‘war scare’ of that year.28 In July 1928 two of 
Kutepov’s men bombed the political police headquarters in Moscow, thus 
accomplishing a direct attack on their longstanding enemy.29 The combination of high-
impact terrorism with the already perceived subversive threat meant that the Whites 
occupied primary place for the Soviet political police during the 1920s.30          
Concerns about military specialists and the Whites did not just come from the 
political police. In the 1920s, class prejudices and hostility from the red commanders 
did not abate. As such, the difficulty is the same in disentangling the reality of the threat 
posed by military specialists from how it was perceived. During the 1920s, military 
specialists continued to be routinely criticised for their alien ‘bourgeois’ values and 
attracted discontent for still clustering in the higher ranks. For example, in a report sent 
to the Central Committee from a Military Academy party cell on 19 February 1924, it 
was noted that:  
 
…in the army command there is no unity in political goals or tasks. The class point of 
view of the red command runs up against the ‘a-politicalness’ (apolitichnost’) of the 
military specialists….alongside this, there is a completely incomprehensible 
proliferation of specialists in all main sections of the army hierarchy…The quantity of 
former officers in the General Staff in comparison with their quantity in the army at the 
time of the Civil War has significantly increased.31  
 
Relations remained tense in particular over was seen as the greater influence of military 
specialists in comparison with the red commanders. For instance, a thesis prepared by 
the head of the mobilisation department, N. L. Shpektorov, in January 1924 noted the 
disadvantages of red commanders in comparison with military specialists. Shpektorov 
highlighted that qualifications and military knowledge were at unequal levels and that a 
large number of former Imperial officers who had never served in the Red Army before 
were employed in the central army apparatus. He remarked that pre-revolutionary 
methods of ordering the rank-and-file were still being employed and the military 
specialists were trying to instil one-man command at the expense of the political 
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commissars’ power.32 Similar reports about the ‘old habits’ of military specialists are 
detailed in political police reports. Some of the more extreme cases described red 
commanders planning to murder military specialists.33  
Complaints about the domination of military specialists in the central army 
apparatus and the slow pace of their replacement with red commanders were also heard 
in upper party circles. For example, at a Plenum of the Central Committee in February 
1924, Sergei Gusev, a Secretary of the Central Control Commission, accused the 
Revolutionary Military Council of not adequately replacing the military specialists with 
new cohorts of red commanders from the Academy of the General Staff. Gusev argued 
that the majority of new graduates were simply being, ‘demobilised from the Red 
Army’. Gusev also quoted a letter from Ieronim Uborevich, the commander of the 5th 
Red Banner Army, who had apparently complained that the army centre was saturated 
with the ‘customs’ (dukhe) of the military specialists. Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Stalin’s ally 
and the First Secretary of Transcaucasian Regional Committee, remarked that 
Uborevich was not alone and that both Tukhachevskii and Egorov had raised similar 
concerns. Gusev’s Civil War comrade, M. M. Lashevich, a senior political commissar, 
also complained that the officer corps was dominated by military specialists who did not 
understand the ‘psychology of the Red Army’, and that the political commissars lacked 
support.34 In defence, the deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, 
Sklianskii, rejected Gusev’s accusations and pointed out that pay was far better in 
industry than in the army, a factor attracting the graduates away.35 Sklianskii may have 
been correct here, but clearly the use of military specialists remained controversial for 
many in the party and attitudes were hostile. This combination of class prejudices and 
what was seen as a preferential treatment of military specialists continued to make it 
easier to accept allegations of betrayal and treachery against them.  
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Some of these criticisms of military specialists were no doubt still politicised 
and partly aimed at weakening Trotsky. Indeed, Gusev had allied himself with Stalin 
after the Civil War. Yet, the criticisms from other officers and red commanders do seem 
to stem from a genuine dissatisfaction with military specialists. Indeed, Gusev’s 
criticisms at the Plenum were not entirely unfounded. Even though numbers of military 
specialists had been in decline since the Civil War, from occupying thirty percent of 
command positions following the Civil War and dropping to 10.6% in 1928, they 
remained a visible cohort.36 In addition, the communist presence in the army was 
gaining ground. This was 10.5% in 1920, and by the time of Gusev’s complaints at the 
Plenum in 1924 it had reached 31.8%, but there was still a long way to go.37 There were 
moves made to increase the proportion of communist officers, such as the 1924 chistka 
(purge) of the Personal Staff, which gave a boost to the number of communists in 
comparison to military specialists.38 However, while such discharges certainly altered 
the ratio of red commanders to military specialists, they still remained in the higher 
ranks. This continued to be a flashpoint.39 
Attacks on the perceived disloyalty of military specialists continued into the late 
1920s and the strongest came from the fringes of the party. For example, V. M. 
Smirnov, the spokesman for the Military Opposition at the Eighth Party Congress, 
remained a stern critic of military specialists. His group’s criticisms forced Voroshilov 
on the defensive and he was required to defend the speed at which military specialists 
were being replaced by red commanders and the stability and reliability of the Red 
Army as a whole. In a speech given at the Krasnopresnensk raion Party Conference on 
2 November 1927 Voroshilov used the opportunity to reply to the Military Opposition’s 
accusations, specifically, that the employment of military specialists had created 
conditions under which: ‘the Red Army is threatened to become a loyal instrument in a 
Bonapartist coup…for currently the proletariat is deprived of the chance to influence the 
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education, studies, preparation, organisation, all the life of the Red army’.40 Voroshilov 
also addressed a similar attack from the political oppositionist Grigory Zinoviev, who 
had argued earlier in the year that:  
 
There is no doubt that in the period of the NEP, in link with the growth of the kulak and 
the new bourgeoisie in general, there has grown and is still growing people among the 
military specialists who are dreaming about the role of a Russian Chiang Kai-shek.41  
 
Voroshilov was defensive and did not accept this argument. He labelled it ‘slander’ and 
lacking in evidence, and he pressed the point that the army and navy were fully 
reliable.42 Voroshilov presented statistics showing apparent improvements in army 
reliability. For instance, in 1927 workers in the army had grown to a total of sixteen 
percent and the number of peasants had fallen to fifty-nine percent. Perhaps more 
importantly the command was now fifty-four percent party members.43 Voroshilov, 
however, did not completely deny that within the army there were no unreliable 
elements and traitors whatsoever.44 But it is difficult to gauge his genuine level of 
concern about military specialists from his public speeches. It is unlikely Voroshilov 
had suddenly become an advocate of military specialists. Voroshilov was the head of 
the Red Army and it is natural that he would downplay problems of stability or 
reliability. He had an interest in doing so. During the Civil War Voroshilov had been 
happy to side with the Military Opposition and criticise ‘suspicious’ military specialists, 
but as head of the Red Army, he was now directly accountable for its reliability. 
Voroshilov would want to avoid criticisms or doubts about his leadership. As such, in 
public, Voroshilov repeatedly asserted the strength of ideological unity in the Red 
Army. Yet, as shown below, Voroshilov’s private opinions of army reliability were 
more complicated. 
The important question is how successful was the White movement at 
subverting the Red Army? Was the army overrun with military specialists who were 
working on the behalf of the Whites or was this a case of class prejudices and 
suspicions heightening perceptions of threat? These questions are difficult to answer 
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definitively as relevant archival documents largely remain classified. However, a few 
historians with access to political police materials in the archives of the FSB Academy 
have noted that the political police did not arrest large numbers of military specialists or 
former White officers until the late 1920s. For example, from his examination of 
documents in FSB archives Aleksandr Zdanovich argues that during 1924-30 there were 
no mass arrests of military specialists. Zdanovich notes some police reports which show 
an absence of any suspicious activity by military specialists.45 The political police 
certainly received intelligence materials about the White threat to the Red Army and 
they saw a danger of using military specialists and former Whites in the ranks. Some 
arrests were made to counter this threat which used a great deal of time and resources. 
For example, in 1924 the political police were convinced that a group of former officers 
serving in the navy were active counterrevolutionaries when alleged links were 
‘revealed’ between sailors in both Kronstadt and Leningrad and the White movement. 
Several arrests followed.46 1926 also saw a number of pre-emptive arrests of returning 
Whites and suspected White groups.47 But none of these arrests reached a mass scale. 
There was never an immediate and pressing danger from the military specialists. There 
is little doubt that many military specialists did hold negative, and some even openly 
hostile, opinions of the Bolsheviks. There were probably military specialists with links 
to the Whites, and some genuine counterrevolutionaries. But at the same time, many 
would have no suspicious associations or any strong animosity towards the Bolsheviks. 
Indeed, it is difficult to appreciate the scale of the threat from military specialists and 
former Whites accurately. Fears about the subversion of the army by the Whites and 
military specialists remained heightened by continuing class prejudices and the impact 
of White terrorism. Thus, the perceived threat from military specialists could be 
exaggerated. However, opinions of army reliability also depended a great deal on 
institutional interest. As much as Voroshilov publicly downplayed subversive dangers 
to the army, the political police could overplay them. Not only did the political police’s 
primary goal remain the ‘exposure’ of ‘enemies’ but in the absence of an immediate 
danger to the Bolshevik regime after the Civil War, in terms of lobbying for funding 
and proving their value, ‘enemies’ needed to be continually ‘exposed’. For the political 
police, this applied to the Red Army as much as it did throughout the Soviet Union. In 
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this respect, it is likely that the political police exaggerated the dangers from hidden 
‘enemies’ and ‘suspicious’ military specialists in order to justify how they remained an 
indispensible institution to a still fragile Bolshevik regime. They would look to ‘expose’ 
as many military specialist ‘counterrevolutionaries’ as possible. Even though the 
numbers of arrests in fact appear relatively low, and the continued use of the former 
Imperial officers in the army did not create a crisis in the 1920s, this does not mean that 
the political police did not remain very suspicious about military specialists or that they 
lost sight of what they saw as a serious danger. Close surveillance was maintained. As 
detailed below, the political police’s tendency to overplay threats to the army and 
Voroshilov’s bias to downplay these created a tension between the two. 
 
Soviet Counterintelligence and the Myth of the ‘Soviet Thermidor’ 
 
 
The Whites wanted to infiltrate the Red Army not only because of its importance as a 
support of the new Bolshevik regime. Some Whites were optimistic that certain 
individuals from the Red Army command could actually be recruited and that a 
successful military coup was not entirely unrealistic. Alongside noting the pre-
revolutionary ties that existed between some officers in the Red Army with the Whites, 
it is important to appreciate that both White espionage and the corresponding Soviet 
countermeasures operated in an atmosphere of persistent rumours about Red Army 
betrayal. At the same time as the political police were receiving information about 
White espionage attempts, they were also receiving reports and rumours about a 
‘Russian Bonaparte’ emerging from within the Red Army high command and an 
approaching ‘Soviet Thermidor’.  
 The idea that some senior officers would betray the Soviet regime was 
widespread in the 1920s, and particularly so outside of the Soviet Union. These rumours 
were concentrated around the military elite, though some individuals received more 
attention than others. Tukhachevskii attracted a great deal of this hearsay. 
Tukhachevskii was a hero of the Civil War, he was intelligent and ambitious, and the 
Whites rightfully regarded him as a strong voice in the Red Army.48 Following the Civil 
War, Tukhachevskii was a rising star. He became deputy Chief of Staff in July 1924 and 
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Chief of Staff in November 1925. Tukhachevskii was in a position of responsibility and 
power. Indeed, some White publications portrayed him as a careerist obsessed with 
power.49 Tukhachevskii had lost none of the ambition or drive he displayed in the Civil 
War and it would be difficult to find a better candidate for the role of the ‘Russian 
Bonaparte’. It did not take long for the rumour mills to set to work.50  
 Minakov has extensively detailed the numerous channels by which the rumours 
about army betrayal gained a wide audience. For instance, White publications, such as 
Voina i mir, published stories from 1922 about approaching ‘Bonapartism’ in the Red 
Army.51 In addition, through examining the diary of the White General Aleksandr Von 
Lampe, a prominent Wrangel aid and head of ROVS 2nd Department, Minakov has 
shown that the ‘Russian Bonaparte’ was an idea entertained at the apex of the White 
movement. Von Lampe made regular references to Bonapartism and frequent diary 
comparisons between Tukhachevskii and Napoleon.52 But more importantly, these 
rumours also manifested in White intelligence reports, and presumably were given some 
credibility. For example, a report from 15 February 1922 detailed that:  
 
A person, closely acquainted with Tukhachevskii, has indicated that he is a person of 
outstanding ability and with great administrative and military talents. But he is not 
without ambition, and having recognised his own strength and authority, imagines 
himself as a Russian Napoleon.53  
 
 These were not simply idle rumours and the Soviet political police also received 
intelligence describing Bonapartism in the Red Army. Some of this intelligence 
suggested alleged plans for a military coup. For example, a report from the INO OGPU 
from March 1924 detailed how a White officer, a certain Samoilov, an aide of General 
Kutepov, intended to make contact with Tukhachevskii to offer him a role in a military 
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coup and to help establish a military dictatorship.54 Thus rumours about Tukhachevskii 
and his ‘Bonapartism’ could cross over into direct attempts by Whites to make contact. 
It is unlikely that Samoilov would have wanted to contact Tukhachevskii if his public 
reputation was one of a dedicated and loyal Bolshevik. Later in December 1925 a 
political police agent reported that among the officers in the Red Army there were two 
currents, one monarchist and the other Bonapartist, which were concentrated around 
Tukhachevskii.55 These reports were sent directly to the Bolshevik leadership. 
 Yet, there is little evidence to suggest that Stalin or the political police were 
convinced that members of the Red Army elite were plotting a coup or imagined 
themselves as a Russian Napoleon during the 1920s. The political police certainly kept 
Tukhachevskii under close observation. They would have a file on Tukhachevskii that 
would grow thicker with every new piece of hearsay or rumour about him. However, 
not all this was directly related to ‘Bonapartism’. As Zdanovich has pointed out, in 1922 
the GPU Special Department collected compromising materials on Tukhachevskii and 
kept him under observation, but their motive was not to watch for any anti-soviet 
activity. This was related to accusations about the misuse of state funds and bribery. 
Even though this is reasonably uncontroversial, the Special Department also compiled 
character assessments which are more telling. These assessments (kharakteristika) 
described Tukhachevskii as a highly capable military leader, but someone who was less 
capable in party life, arrogant, who underestimates enemies and can act impulsively.56 
Tukhachevskii may have been appraised as arrogant, incautious and impulsive, but he 
was not a ‘Russian Bonaparte’.57 In this respect, there is a level of overlap between the 
White and Soviet character assessments of Tukhachevskii, but their conclusions differ. 
Whereas the Whites would believe that such impulsiveness suggested an independence 
from the Bolsheviks and a desire for real power, and would only fuel rumours about 
Tukhachevskii’s ‘Bonapartism’ outside the Soviet Union, the political police interpreted 
these traits simply as a man prone to risk-taking. They kept a level of observation over 
Tukhachevskii primarily to avoid any impulsive risk-taking following a damaging Civil 
War and within a tense post-war international climate. But importantly, any piece of 
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compromising information about Tukhachevskii would certainly be kept ‘on file’. Even 
if at this time Tukhachevskii was not considered a threat, such files only ever got 
thicker. 
 A further and telling indication that neither Bolshevik Party nor the political 
police were taken in by the rumours of a Russian Bonaparte is the fact that they 
capitalised upon these themselves. The political police enacted a number of 
counterintelligence entrapment operations using the rumours surrounding the Red Army 
elite. They knew these could be turned to their advantage. While not only showing the 
potency of the rumours, this strongly suggests that the political police appreciated they 
were false. The political police knowingly promoted the rumours of a ‘Russian 
Bonaparte’ as disinformation. The key to these entrapment operations was the use of big 
names in the military elite presented as members of counterrevolutionary organisations. 
The aim was to gain information about genuine White organisations, to spread 
disinformation and snare and reveal conspiracy. That these entrapments operations were 
so successful is a testament to the potency of the idea of military betrayal in the Red 
Army command. The operations are also an indication of the tactical change forced 
upon the political police after the Civil War. Espionage and counterintelligence were 
becoming increasingly important and these disinformation operations show that the 
political police were beginning to understand this. The notable operations are ‘Sindikat-
4’ which began in November 1924 and created a fictional White organisation, ‘The 
Internal Russian National Organisation’, and ‘D-7’ which created ‘The Military 
Organisation’.58 However the most successful by far was the Trust operation (Trest). 
 The Trust operation began in November 1921 and ran all the way until April 
1927. The operation created a fake counterrevolutionary organisation, the ‘Monarchist 
Union of Central Russia’ (MOTsR), which was presented to the Whites as: ‘including a 
significant part of the command of the RKKA and able to lead counterrevolutionary 
forces and overthrow Soviet power’.59 Its alleged leaders were the former pre-
revolutionary Generals, A. Zaionchkovskii and A. Iakushev. Both were working for the 
Soviet political police.60 An early target of the operation was the leaders of the Supreme 
Monarchist Soviet in Berlin and the names of prominent Red Army officers were used 
for entrapment. For example, Iakushev, acting as a member of MOTsR, met the head of 
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the Supreme Monarchist Soviet, N. E. Markov, in December 1922 in Berlin and worked 
out a plan for the struggle against the Bolsheviks. In this case, Markov did not need 
much nudging to believe an alleged military conspiracy.61  
 From 1922 the targets of the Trust operation began to widen. It made more fixed 
contact with the leaders of the White movement, including the Grand Duke Nikolai 
Romanov, the grandson of Nicholas I, and the Generals Wrangel, Kutepov and Evgenii 
Miller.62 The operation also targeted foreign intelligence services.63 For example, in 
1923 both Polish and Estonian intelligence agencies made inquiries to MOTsR about 
senior officers in the Red Army.64 With the founding of ROVS in 1924, the Trust 
operation was deployed to establish contact and to neutralise the organisation. This was 
particularly important in light of Kutepov’s terrorist campaign. The Trust operation 
spread false information that Tukhachevskii and other senior officers, including Boris 
Shaposhnikov, Aleksandr Svechin, P. P. Lebedev and S. S. Kamenev, were all members 
of MOTsR and were hostile to the Bolsheviks. Kutepov was completely taken in by the 
operation and it successfully managed to restrain his anti-soviet activity.65 Indeed, in 
order to make MOTsR even more convincing, fabricated documents were passed to 
White groups and foreign intelligence agencies from MOTsR including materials about 
the Red Army and its command with genuine signatures from the military leadership.66 
These entrapment operations represented some of the political police’s greatest 
successes in the 1920s. Kutepov was taken in entirely by the Trust operation, meaning 
the Bolsheviks received a constant feed of intelligence about his activity. In the final 
year of the operation a report by its leader, Artur Artuzov, displayed confidence that 
information held on the Red Army by Poland, France, Germany, Estonia and Japan was 
almost exclusively disinformation.67 When the Trust operation was finally exposed in 
1927 this had a highly debilitating effect on the Whites. Paul Robinson argues that when 
the Whites learnt the reality of the operation it reinforced suspicions that they were 
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surrounded by enemies and provocateurs, and mutual trust was undermined. Kutepov 
himself came under great pressure to resign after being so wilfully taken in.68  
 The Soviet political police’s use of rumour guaranteed that the 1920s would see 
no respite from notions of Red Army betrayal and treachery. Thus, the accusations that 
the ground being prepared for a military coup seen from Zinoviev and V. M. Smirnov in 
1927, and the continued hopes the Whites placed in betrayal from within the Red Army 
elite, were ideas partly reinforced by the Soviet political police themselves. The 
atmosphere in the 1920s was heavy with rumour and it is clear why outsiders and those 
not from the immediate party or military establishment could believe in an approaching 
‘Soviet Thermidor’. Indeed, separate military coups in Europe, such as in Bulgaria in 
1923 and General Jozef Pilsudski’s coup in Poland in 1926, would heighten concerns 
about ‘Bonapartism’ in the Red Army. Yet, importantly, the end of the Trust operation 
did not stop the rumours about betrayal in the military. In 1928 the Polish and English 
press still reported about a supposed ‘insurrection’ in the Red Army led by 
Tukhachevskii.69 As shown in chapter four, new forms of rumours about disloyalty in 
the military appeared in the 1930s meaning that the Red Army elite never escaped the 
hearsay that they were untrustworthy. These rumours and pieces of information about 
disloyalty in the high command would be added into the various political police files on 
members of the military elite. Even if at this point they were not taken too seriously, 
they provided a constant drip of suggestions that the army elite’s loyalty was not 
guaranteed. This created files full of compromising information which would be used in 
the future when the senior officers were held with far more suspicion. 
 
The Espionage Threat from Foreign Governments 
 
 
The political police had shown concerns about foreign agents targeting the Red Army 
during the Civil War and this remained the case after the conflict. Espionage was 
widespread and alleged spy networks and intelligence agents were ‘exposed’ with 
regularity in the Soviet Union in the 1920s.70 The Red Army also saw its share of 
espionage activity. For example, in 1922 Trotsky was certain that foreign agents were 
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trying to infiltrate into the military and he prohibited soldiers from having contact with 
foreigners.71 The political police were particularly concerned about the loss of secret 
documents to foreign agents working inside the Red Army.72 But the possibility of 
officers and soldiers being recruited as agents also caused concerns. Foreign agents 
were ‘exposed’ by the political police at a low, but frequent, level in the 1920s. For 
example, in June 1924 the counterintelligence department of the Kiev OGPU arrested a 
group on charges of Polish espionage. The majority were military specialists who had 
served in the Red Army, and one was still employed.73 On 22 March 1925 the army 
newspaper Krasnaia zvezda published an article on the ‘exposure’ of a Polish spy 
network in the army. The alleged organisation included a number of former Imperial 
officers, who were allegedly working for Poland. All had previously served in the Red 
Army.74 Agents working for Latvia and Britain were also ‘discovered’ in the military.75 
For example, in October 1926 the head of the Inspectorate of the Moscow Military 
District Staff (MVO), P. Filin, and his wife, were arrested for espionage. Filin had 
alleged British contacts.76 After this case Voroshilov ordered that even soldiers’ 
families were forbidden to have any contact with foreigners.77 June 1927 saw the 
execution of twenty people, including former officers and military specialists, accused 
of counterrevolutionary activity and espionage for the Whites and foreign 
governments.78 During the 1920s, the Bolsheviks regarded Poland as the most 
threatening country. When the staunch anti-communist Pilsudski came to power in 1926 
the political police reported an increase in Polish espionage and apparent attempts to 
recruit from within the Red Army.79  
  Common to many of these alleged espionage cases are military specialists being 
used as agents. For example, in a Military Procuracy report on counterrevolutionary 
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organisations in the army for the period of October 1926 to October 1927, it was noted 
that: ‘for their aims foreign intelligence agents use social aliens and those with harmful 
moods towards sov[iet] power, elements/former noblemen (dvoriane)...[and] in the 
main individuals from the command.’80 Like the Whites, foreign governments were 
seen as taking advantage of disaffected outsider elements within the Red Army, 
primarily the military specialists.81 However, the Military Procuracy report also stressed 
that the scale of espionage activity in the army was very minor and much smaller than 
other types of criminal activity. In 1927 the procuracy noted that: ‘The infiltration of 
foreign intelligence agents into the RKKA is on an insignificant scale’.82 Thus, spies 
were seen as having the capability to infiltrate into the army, and to recruit from within, 
but the problem was still not extensive.83 As far as the Military Procuracy was 
concerned the military’s vulnerability to subversion had been demonstrated, but spies 
were not a major problem. However, it would be a mistake to evaluate the significance 
of the espionage threat to the army from the Military Procuracy alone. This was the 
mainstream judicial arm responsible for army crime. The Military Procuracy valued 
evidence-based arrests more so than the political police and had less of an interest in 
actively ‘exposing’ ‘enemies’ to justify their value. The political police no doubt saw 
the espionage threat differently, and as more dangerous and on a larger scale. Indeed not 
all the spies ‘exposed’ by the political police were genuine. They continued to use 
forced confessions which resulted in more ‘discoveries’ of foreign agents and increased 
the perceived scale of the overall spy threat. Again, there were a number of different 
appraisals of the threats facing the Red Army from several institutions. These differing 
views were in competition. The political police’s perception of army vulnerabilities was 
the most alarmist. But despite the political police’s tendency to inflate the scale of 
dangers to the military, it is likely that Stalin too would see the small spy threat as very 
concerning. Indeed, in understanding the significance of the spies and foreign agents for 
the Bolsheviks, it is necessary to appreciate their particular worldview, informed by 
Lenin’s theory of ‘capitalist encirclement’. The Bolsheviks believed that the Soviet 
Union was surrounded by a hostile coalition of capitalist powers making preparations 
for war. This caused a heightened sensitivity to war and the expectation of conflict. 
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Consequently, even a low level of foreign espionage, and particularly that targeted at 
the Red Army, could be seen as a manifestation of this looming threat. 
 The Bolsheviks believed that the Soviet Union was under siege and that a new 
war was not only approaching, but was unavoidable. They believed that the communist 
and capitalist worlds were incompatible and that it was only a matter of time before the 
Soviet Union faced a coalition of hostile capitalist powers.84 Judging by the instability 
in the international situation after the Civil War, it is easy to see why the Bolsheviks 
believed a major conflict was on the horizon. Soon after the end of the conflict, a 
communist uprising in Germany in 1923 created the possibility for a new war as it 
risked drawing in Poland militarily. The Soviet political police in particular were 
concerned about the ‘German October’ and worried that Tukhachevskii would act 
impulsively on the western front, using the events in Germany as a pretext to make a 
drive into Poland in revenge for the failed 1920 war.85 The Bolsheviks wanted to avoid 
a renewed conflict until they were strong enough to win this. Relations with Poland in 
particular had been very poor since the 1920 war. The close ties between Poland and 
Romania made it seem an even more dangerous adversary. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks 
also suspected that the British were attempting to form an anti-Soviet bloc with Poland, 
Romania and the Baltic states.86 In short, the Bolsheviks were again making plans and 
preparations for war and watching the international situation carefully, but their 
perspective was skewed. They tended to see diplomatic ties between capitalist states as 
evidence of the formation of a hostile coalition.87 The Bolsheviks misperceived the 
international situation and this created an expectation of conflict. This anticipation of 
war can be seen in directives sent to the Western Army and the troops stationed in 
Ukraine in 1923, by S. S. Kamenev and P. P. Lebedev, the commander of the Soviet 
republic armed forces and Chief of Staff of the RVS respectively. These directives 
stated that in the near future the Red Army may be required to defend the borders and 
that the most probable aggressor states would be the White movement with Polish and 
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Entente assistance. There were also concerns that other European countries would join 
the war, including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.88  
Within this tense climate intelligence gathering became a priority. For the 
Bolsheviks, in the face of what was regarded as an inevitable clash between capitalism 
and communism, knowing as much about the enemy and its military capability was 
crucial. Much the same can be said for the leaders of the European countries, who had 
hoped for a White victory in the Civil War and now had to adjust to life with the Soviet 
Union. Thus, information about military strength was valuable. The ‘exposure’ of 
intelligence agents within the Red Army had a special significance, despite its small 
scale. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, the capitalist states were not only 
gathering information but actively preparing for war. They would see further ‘evidence’ 
of the capitalist states’ hostile intentions through the continued support of the exiled 
Whites. For example, the British had maintained links with the Whites into the 1920s 
and continued to subsidise White intelligence.89 The British also used the Whites for 
their own ends and their White contacts operated in the Baltics as part of their own 
intelligence operations.90 Such collaboration would only reinforce the impression that 
alliances were being forged for an attack on the Soviet Union. Thus, the scale of foreign 
espionage against the Red Army may have been small, but when viewed in the context 
of capitalist encirclement and foreign collaboration with the Whites, it could appear as 
part of a larger capitalist conspiracy to crush the Soviet Union. Espionage was 
indicative of what the Soviets feared the capitalist states were planning, an intervention 
by hostile coalition. Worst of all, the Red Army was perceived to be vulnerable to 
infiltration by foreign agents who were exploiting military specialists, and there was no 
shortage of potential recruits.  
In contrast to other European countries, Germany was given extensive access to 
the Red Army during the collaboration with the Reichswehr. This collaboration began 
in May 1921 with the signing of a commercial agreement which also established 
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military-industrial contacts.91 The Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922 established formal 
diplomatic relations. The two countries had mutual interests. Russia was bereft of the 
technical ability essential for a build-up of industry, while Germany needed secret 
locations which it could use to rearm and work around the Treaty of Versailles. The 
collaboration was meant to remedy both problems. Germany also helped create the Red 
Army’s chemical weapons program and gave assistance in tank and aircraft 
production.92 However, hopes that the collaboration would provide what the Bolsheviks 
needed were short-lived. By late 1925 the Bolsheviks realised that they needed to 
industrialise and build their own armaments industry.93 Despite this, a military 
collaboration was still continued and included the exchange of officers between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. For example, one of the first Red Army officers to 
spend significant time in Germany was Uborevich, who was there for thirteen months 
from November 1927. Uborevich studied with the German officers and was given open 
access to large amounts of military technology.94 Following in his steps nearly all of the 
army elite studied in Germany for varying periods of time.95  
Such close collaboration with Germany, though this had obvious benefits, would 
put the Red Army at risk in giving German agents a free hand. The Soviet political 
police were suspicious of this from the beginning.96 For instance, an OGPU circular 
from 1924 pointed to the espionage threat from the presence of so many Germans inside 
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the Soviet Union.97 With the foundation of the aircraft construction company Junkers in 
the Soviet Union the political police made a number of accusations, including that the 
company was attempting to forge links with the Red Army command to gather 
intelligence and that it was a counterrevolutionary organisation working with the 
British.98  The political police’s fears were not entirely incorrect, but in many cases 
what the Germans were engaged in cannot be described as ‘espionage’. Some German 
representatives did gather materials during the collaboration. They sent home 
information from the Soviet military press and notes from personal observations of 
military manoeuvres and conversations with Red Army officers.99 This type of 
information gathering is documented in interrogation transcripts of arrested German 
diplomats from the 1940s.100 But this activity cannot be described as ‘espionage’. 
Furthermore, it appears to have been tolerated. For example, on 24 December 1928 the 
head of military intelligence, Ian Berzin, sent a letter to Voroshilov, detailing that:  
 
There is no doubt that all the German enterprises apart from their direct task also have 
the task of economic, political and military information/espionage… But this espionage, 
according to all information, is not directed along the line of the extraction and 
collection of secret documents, but is conducted through personal observations, 
conversations and verbal information (ustnikh informatsii). This espionage is less 
dangerous…101  
 
There is no indication that Berzin felt the Germans were trying to undermine the Red 
Army or constituted a serious threat. He did not regard the German ‘espionage’ as 
espionage in its true sense. This was not the theft of highly secretive material. In 
addition, Berzin added that an exchange of intelligence on Poland with the Germans 
was desirable.102 Indeed, the two countries did exchange intelligence on Poland, 
Romania and the Baltic States throughout the collaboration. 103 Thus, the threat from 
Poland was regarded more seriously than the possible danger of German intelligence. 
Even though Voroshilov had shown some scepticism towards German intentions, 
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believing that they were holding back information during the collaboration and 
exploiting the Bolsheviks, he also took advantage of the close contact. Voroshilov 
instructed those visiting Germany to find out specific information about the organisation 
of the Reichswehr and its level of military technology.104 Before Uborevich’s long stay 
in Germany in 1927 Voroshilov asked him to find out specific information about the 
organisation and armament of the German forces.105 Both Voroshilov and the German 
government used the collaboration to gain information. For the Bolsheviks, it seems that 
despite the potential dangers of such close contact with Germany, the benefits of 
collaboration outweighed the disadvantages. Even though a close relationship with 
Germany would leave the Red Army open to infiltration, the partnership was seen as 
vital in helping the Soviet Union prepare for the inevitable war. There is little to suggest 
that either Berzin or Voroshilov shared the opinions of the political police about the 
German threat. Indeed, the collaboration took place before Hitler’s ascendency to 
power. However, as Germany became more hostile to the Soviet Union from 1933, the 
close collaboration, and particularly the personal connections between the Soviet and 
German officers forged in the 1920s, put the entire Red Army elite in danger. 
      
Trotskyism in the Red Army 
     
 
The perceived external threats from the White movement and foreign agents were seen 
as serious enough problems for the Red Army, but it faced one final threat in the 1920s. 
This was from what Stalin regarded as the Trotskyist ‘Opposition’, which found a small 
level of support within the ranks. The Trotskyist ‘Opposition’ differed to the perceived 
subversive threats from Whites and foreign agents. It was wholly internal and not reliant 
on infiltrated agents. It could potentially spread easily from one army party organisation 
to another. Thus, it posed a specific type of threat. However, typically within the 
literature on the Red Army, Trotskyists have only been briefly commented upon. There 
has been little examination of how this threat was perceived and on what terms. 
Importantly, there were differences of opinion about the danger posed by the Trotskyists 
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to the military and this internal danger demonstrates particularly well how perceptions 
of army vulnerabilities were shaped by institutional interests. 
In the early 1920s the Bolshevik Party was divided over how to overcome the 
economic crisis and rebellion in the countryside, both consequences of the Civil War. 
The authoritarian policy of War Communism which had seen forced grain requisitions 
and kept the Bolsheviks afloat during the conflict was now to be abandoned. A new 
course was required to revive the country’s struggling economy. Yet the solution proved 
to be divisive. The Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 laid the foundations for the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) that aimed at economic recovery through introducing a 
limited private sector and allowing peasants the freedom to engage in their own 
economic activity. The policy, however, was controversial and Trotsky did not agree 
with the measures. Trotsky saw a risk in giving too much leeway to the rich peasants, 
the reviled kulaks. He also began to argue for fast-paced industrialisation, which went 
against many in the wider party.106 However, the NEP was not the only cause for 
Trotsky’s growing opposition. He openly criticised Stalin and accused him of 
centralising power and argued that there was a lack of democracy and a creeping 
bureaucratisation of party life. But Trotsky’s own position was not as strong as it had 
once been. His popularity had seen a sharp decline since the Civil War and in the early 
1920s a new dispute erupted over the trade unions which drew further dividing lines. 
Trotsky’s weakening support in the party was clearly shown at the Tenth Party 
Congress in March 1921 where he only managed to come tenth in the vote for the new 
Central Committee and the number of his supporters was reduced.107 Tensions were 
further exacerbated by Lenin’s developing illness and subsequent absence from public 
and party life. 1922 saw the transfer of everyday leadership to a triumvirate of Stalin, 
Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev.108 
Trotsky’s record as head of the army was also increasingly undermined. He 
continued to attract animosity because of the employment of military specialists and 
came under further pressure due to the poor condition of the Red Army itself.109 In 1923 
a military commission found a series of problems with the army, chiefly relating to 
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manpower and supply, and as War Commissar, Trotsky was held responsible.110 A 
further commission in 1924, that included a number of Stalin’s allies and both future 
heads of the army, Mikhail Frunze and Voroshilov, further weakened Trotsky in 
criticising the condition of the military.111 These commissions were certainly politicised 
and used to weaken Trotsky, but the defects and problems in the Red Army were 
genuine. In addition, 1924 saw a range of transfers and promotions which undermined 
Trotsky further. His deputy Sklianskii was replaced by Frunze and Voroshilov took 
command of the MVO, ousting another Trotsky supporter, Nikolai Muralov.112 
Despite Trotsky’s weakened position, he continued to have support. In October 
1923 forty-six party members, including a number of Trotsky’s supporters and 
Democratic Centralists, sent a letter to the Central Committee repeating his earlier 
criticisms of economic policy and party bureaucratism. The letter, known as the 
platform of the forty-six, was denounced by Central Committee and before long Trotsky 
was accused of factionalism by the triumvirate. But Trotsky also attracted some support 
from the Red Army. His army supporters included senior military figures such as 
Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, who headed PUR until his removal in 1923, and several 
other senior officers such as Muralov, who commanded the MVO until his replacement 
with Voroshilov, and the commander of the PriVO, Sergei Mrachkovskii. A number of 
other officers and political workers also joined the Opposition. Those most notable are 
Vitalii Primakov, Vitovt Putna and Gaia Gai. Trotsky was also supported by numerous 
military specialists both in the army and the military academies.113 The Trotskyist 
influence was most strongly felt within the military academies and the navy, and 
especially among the young and within PUR.114 In terms of scale, Trotsky’s support in 
some places did reach quite significant levels in the early 1920s. For example, it has 
long been known that he had the support of approximately a third of Moscow’s military 
cells in 1923.115        
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The party regarded this army support for Trotsky as dangerous. One event of 
particular scorn was Antonov-Ovseenko’s unsanctioned distribution of a PUR circular 
on 24 December 1923 that addressed the restoration of party democracy and called for 
the election of party cell secretaries. The circular prompted a resolution from the Central 
Control Commission in January 1924 describing Antonov-Ovseenko’s behaviour as 
having created a ‘harmful mood’ in a section of army communists and that he had 
attempted: ‘to raise the military workers against the leading organs of the party and all 
the party as a whole’.116 At the Thirteenth Party Conference in January 1924 Antonov-
Ovseenko was criticised for sending the circular. He was removed from the head of 
PUR and sent overseas on diplomatic work. Lenin died on 21 January and infighting 
within the party sharpened further. The triumvirate of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev 
were now determined to stop Trotsky from becoming the party leader. Pressure on 
Trotsky and his supporters began to build throughout 1924.117 In January 1925 Trotsky 
resigned from his position as the head of the army and was replaced by Mikhail Frunze. 
Frunze, however, died shortly after and was replaced by Stalin’s old comrade 
Voroshilov.118 
The party may have come down hard on the Trotsky’s army supporters in 1924, 
but in general, reactions varied widely. For instance, PUR tended to downplay the 
impact of the Opposition in the military. In a range of reports throughout the 1920s, 
PUR consistently reported on the Opposition’s minority presence in the armed forces. 
For example, in a PUR survey from February 1925, compiled in reference to the 
previous year’s publication of Trotsky’s essay ‘The Lessons of October’, it was reported 
that support for Trotsky was only at a low level in the army and navy.119 In September 
1926 another PUR report stressed the unity of the army party organisations in face of 
the Opposition’s agitation. The report noted that despite oppositionist speeches during a 
plenum of the Central Committee: ‘The resolutions, accepted in the party meetings, 
meetings of the aktiv etc; utterly and completely endorse the decisions of the plenum, 
sharply condemning the opposition and welcome the firm Lenin line (leninskuiu liniiu) 
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of the TsK (Central Committee).’120 A month later Anton Bulin, a senior political 
commissar, sent Voroshilov a report on the scale of the Opposition in several military 
districts. According to Bulin the Opposition was only having limited impact in the 
ranks. For example, in the PriVO Bulin reported: ‘…the oppositionists have shown their 
political wretchedness, poverty and full unscrupulousness. It absolutely has no trust and 
influence in the wide party mass’.121 Similar appraisals were described in the Central-
Asian Military District (SAVO).122 Indeed, a PUR report from 1927 placed Trotskyists 
at only 0.25% of the army party organisations.123 As such, PUR were consistently 
reporting the Opposition’s lack of impact in the ranks. However, PUR were of course 
responsible for the political reliability of the army. They had an interest in downplaying 
problems with its political stability. It is natural that they would try and emphasise the 
reliability of the army. They did not want to attract criticism over how they were failing 
to instil a proper political education. Thus, it is likely that PUR saw a danger posed by 
Opposition to the military, but also saw a danger in admitting this.  
Voroshilov also publicly downplayed the oppositionist threat to the army. As 
noted above, as head of the Red Army he was ultimately responsible for political 
reliability. He had a direct interest in not admitting to problems with its stability. For 
example, in a speech on the achievements of the party organisations, given on 10 
January 1927, Voroshilov praised the army highly for having stood firm in the face of 
the oppositionist threat: ‘The interparty events, which happened in the past year were in 
my opinion a serious examination for our party organisations, and we should note with 
satisfaction that our party organisation brilliantly passed this examination in political 
Leninist maturity’. Voroshilov added that: ‘The Red Army is the most delicate 
organisation in all of the Soviet system and therefore party work here should be 
arranged the most correctly.’124 
However, the political police held a very different view of the army Trotskyists 
and were far more concerned about their agitation in the ranks, despite their small 
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numbers. They received reports about alleged underground and illegal oppositionist 
propaganda and agitation within the army and took action.125 From December 1925 to 
15 November 1927, eighty army oppositionists were discharged from the ranks and 
expelled from the party.126 The problem was not merely confined to propaganda and 
agitation. The political police were very concerned about a possible oppositionist coup 
using the army Trotskyists. An early investigation into possible military involvement in 
a coup attempt concerned the case of Iakov Dvorzhets, a subordinate of Antonov-
Ovseenko.127 In this case, Antonov-Ovseenko had apparently persuaded Dvorzhets to 
speak out against Zinoviev in a discussion meeting in 1923. In response, Zinoviev 
argued that Dvorzhets’s speech was counterrevolutionary and the case attracted the 
attention of the political police.128 When Antonov-Ovseenko heard about the case 
against Dvorzhets he sent an ultimatum to the Central Committee which threateningly 
noted that there were members of the party, in particular within the Red Army, that: 
‘will at some point call to order those leaders (vozhdei) who have overstepped the 
mark’.129 Dvorzhets was formally arrested on 11 January 1924.130 When the political 
police interrogated him they tried to find out specific information about a possible 
military coup led by Trotsky, but no convincing evidence was found.131 But the lack of 
evidence this time did not bring an end to the political police’s search to uncover plans 
for a Trotskyist coup.  
In 1926 Trotsky was joined by Zinoviev and Kamenev in the formation of the 
‘United Opposition’ after they had too had broken with Stalin a year earlier. 1927 was 
the peak year of the United Opposition’s activity. In response, all three were expelled 
from the Central Committee in October and later expelled from the party. Similar 
discharges were also seen in the Red Army as the party put further pressure on the 
Opposition. For example, in 1927 Primakov and Putna, the senior Trotskyist officers, 
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lost their commands and were sent overseas on diplomatic work. Primakov became the 
military attaché in Afghanistan and Putna likewise in Japan, though they both remained 
members of the party. In November 1927 the Opposition planned demonstrations on the 
anniversary of the October Revolution, but importantly, the political police received 
information that the Opposition’s ‘combat organisation’ was allegedly planning a coup. 
The head of the political police, Menzhinskii, informed the Central Committee.132 
According to the Menzhinskii, the conspirators had planned to take over the Kremlin 
and the OGPU headquarters with similar operations hatching in Leningrad and 
Kharkov. The coup never materialised and the political police were praised for their 
response, though Trotsky’s resistance to the plot was also alleged to be a factor. From 
the letters sent to the Central Committee about this supposed coup attempt it is clear that 
Stalin did not doubt its credibility. He did not regard it as a political police intrigue. 
Stalin specifically praised the decisive actions taken by both Menzhinskii and 
Voroshilov in forestalling the plot and reiterated the dangers posed by the 
oppositionists.133 Importantly, the army was central to the conspiracy. According to 
Menzhinskii, the preparations for the coup coincided with continued and vigorous 
oppositionist agitation within the Red Army, of which Menzhinskii was now 
particularly pessimistic about its reliability. In his initial letter about the Opposition’s 
‘combat organisation’ Menzhinskii detailed: 
 
In this secret report of the combat organization it is further stated that propaganda 
among the workers and in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Army should continue by all 
possible means until further orders. Especially in the army. The destructive effect of this 
propaganda in the army, I have already pointed out many times – though, unfortunately, 
not always with the desired results…We must therefore expect, in the time immediately 
ahead, that opposition propaganda will be at least as vigorous as it has been until now. It 
will be directed first of all, judging from the present state of affairs, at subverting the 
army. Comrade Voroshilov has acknowledged to me without question the pernicious 
effect of the opposition slogans...It makes me very sad to have to assert here, in this 
place, that the army today, unlike before, had already been partly contaminated and that 
the commanders now are often not reliable in the full sense of the word. Comrade 
Voroshilov is thoroughly aware of the seriousness of the situation and fully shares my 
pessimistic mood.134  
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Menzhinskii clearly did not place much faith in the Red Army’s ability to withstand 
oppositionist agitation and propaganda. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that he was 
being pessimistic. PUR held a different view of army reliability and continued to 
downplay the oppositionist influence in the ranks.135 Even though PUR had a tendency 
to downplay problems with army political reliability, this time they were supported by 
military intelligence who reported to Voroshilov in October 1927 that oppositionist 
agitation in the army had been met with a sharp rebuff from the party masses.136 Most 
importantly, even though Stalin did not doubt the reality of the coup attempt itself and 
regarded the danger from Opposition to the military as serious, he did not entirely share 
Menzhinskii’s view. In a separate letter to the Central Committee Stalin distanced 
himself from Menzhinskii, noting that he could not ‘fully share the very pessimistic 
viewpoint of the GPU Collegium’. Stalin added that the Opposition’s agitation in the 
army had been made far more difficult because of the countermeasures already taken. 
Instead, Stalin regarded industry and the Central Committee as more open targets of 
oppositionist propaganda.137 In addition, Menzhinskii’s letter reveals he had complained 
about the Opposition’s agitation in the army ranks in the past, but this had not met the 
‘desired results’. We can only speculate about the nature of these ‘desired results’ but it 
is likely Menzhinskii wanted permission for a serious crack-down on the military. He 
saw a very serious danger from a relatively small number of Trotskyists. Furthermore, 
Menzhinskii would have heard all of Voroshilov’s past assertions that the army was 
reliable and stable. It is unlikely he agreed. Thus, when the opportunity presented itself 
with the alleged Trotskyist coup in 1927, Menzhinskii perhaps took this as a chance to 
try and undermine Voroshilov and convince Stalin of his views about army 
vulnerabilities. But in the end, Menzhinskii’s complaints about the oppositionist threat 
to army reliability had clearly failed to find resonance with Stalin. He had hesitated. 
Stalin did not believe the military was at a crisis point in 1927 and favoured restraint. 
There would be no crack-down that Menzhinskii was lobbying for. 
Voroshilov’s attitude to the alleged coup was more complex than it first seems. 
In public he continued to emphasis army loyalty and publicly defended its reliability 
during 1927. For example, a month before Menzhinskii’s letter to the Central 
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Committee, Voroshilov publicly criticised both Trotsky and Zinoviev for having only 
weak support within the military:  
 
Comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky, in regard to all their spiteful hatred towards everyone 
that is not with them, who are against them, they are not able to dispute the fact that in a 
Red Army of 600,000 people we have ninty-five thousand party and candidate 
members, and 120,000 members of the komsomol (komsomol’tsev). The opposition also 
knows well that regardless of all its efforts, having sent a factional infection into the 
party ranks, it has not seen success.138  
 
In his speech to the Krasnopresnensk raion party conference on 2 November 1927 
Voroshilov mentioned a supposed oppositionist coup attempt highlighted by the 
political police, but argued that the majority of the arrested never had anything to do 
with the Red Army.139 Yet, it is very unlikely that Voroshilov held such a positive view 
of the army in private. Indeed, Menzhinskii’s letter reveals a discrepancy between 
Voroshilov’s private and public views, and gives support to those who have argued that 
oppositionist activity was hushed up due to the army’s importance as a prop to the 
regime.140 In his letter to the Central Committee Menzhinskii noted that Voroshilov also 
shared his pessimism over army reliability. Indeed, it is very likely that Voroshilov did 
see the oppositionist threat to the military as a more serious problem than his public 
speeches suggest, but it is doubtful that he was as alarmist as Menzhinskii or that he 
wanted to go as far as a serious crack-down on the military. Voroshilov would have 
appreciated the danger from the Trotskyists, but he would not have wanted to draw 
criticisms about his leadership of the army. The Trotskyists had already gained a 
foothold in the ranks under his watch and it is unlikely Voroshilov wanted to draw 
further attention to this and create further concerns about how army stability had been 
affected. In this sense, it is possible there was a tension between Voroshilov and 
Menzhinskii over the reliability of the Red Army and a struggle by each to convince 
Stalin of their particular view. Luckily for Voroshilov, Stalin did not agree with 
Menzhinskii this time. As such, for now, the Red Army escaped a new round of 
repression by the political police, but it surely remained under even closer observation 
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and arrests and discharges for Trotskyism continued. From the end of 1927 to February 
1928 there were another 131 cases of Trotskyism in the ranks and during 1928 the 
political police revealed several alleged Trotskyist groups. Further arrests of senior 
officers followed. For example, Mrachkovskii was arrested in early 1928 for his 
Trotskyist activity and for membership in a military group in the capital.141 
The alleged coup attempt of November 1927 was not the only time the political 
police had failed to be convincing about the Trotskyist danger to the military. In 1927 
the political police also ‘exposed’ a supposed underground Trotskyist printing house 
and arrested those responsible. Under interrogation one Trotskyist gave ‘evidence’ that 
he was linked with a group of military men who were planning a coup, taking 
inspiration from Pilsudski.142 However, not all were convinced of the link between an 
underground print works and a military coup. This time even Menzhinskii requested a 
more detailed report.143 It seems that the political police had been overeager, and in the 
end, no charge of a military coup was made. Furthermore, at this time the political 
police were criticised by the Military Procuracy for having a cavalier approach to 
arrests. For example, in a report examining crime in the Red Army in 1927 the Military 
Procuracy noted that the Special Departments had investigated 578 cases that year and 
that half of these investigations had been brought without sufficient evidence. The 
report also criticised the heavy reliance of extra-judicial methods and interrogation 
methods: ‘…too long periods of investigation and interrogation and long periods of 
custody for those arrested is practised by the Special departments even for petty, 
insignificant matters. The Procurator considers all of this abnormal’.144 Finally, there 
are indications that Voroshilov himself was sceptical towards the credibility of some 
political police investigations. In a letter to Mikhail Tomskii, the head of the All-Union 
Central Council of Trade Unions, on 2 February 1928, in regard to the Shakhty Trial, 
Voroshilov questioned whether the political police were fabricating the case.145 But as 
noted above, that the political police saw the small number of army Trotskyists in much 
more threatening terms should not come as a surprise. Since the Civil War they had 
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monitored the army for any sign of counterrevolution from White and foreign agents. 
For the political police, the Trotskyist Opposition presented a further destabilising 
influence in an already difficult situation. Furthermore, the Trotskyist Opposition 
provides another example of how institutional interest influenced how perceived threats 
to the military were appraised. In this case, the political police tried to convince Stalin 
that serious organised conspiracies were being created in the ranks, no doubt to further 
enhance their own value and perhaps justify a closer involvement with the military. 
Importantly, Menzhinskii was pushing a view of army vulnerability that clashed with 
Voroshilov’s version. Even if at this point the political police were seen as being too 
pessimistic, and at times alarmist, Stalin would eventually come to align more closely 
with their view about army reliability.146 
Despite the tendency of PUR to downplay the impact of the Trotskyist 
Opposition, there are glimpses about how dangerous some individuals within the 
organisation regarded this threat to be. For example, on receiving information about 
oppositionist activity within the Leningrad Military District (LVO), the deputy head of 
PUR in the district, Mikhail Landa, contacted the Central Control Commission on 18 
September 1926 and he was very concerned. The Leningrad PUR had received a letter 
from a political worker, a certain Khvatskii, who had been until very recently a member 
of the Opposition. Khvatskii had detailed the activities of his oppositionist group and its 
military arm the ‘Military Bureau’. He described that the Military Bureau had members 
working in differing positions in a range of units and he described his past position as 
‘practically against the party’.147 Landa had reacted to this news with alarm:  
 
This letter paints a scandalous picture of the Opposition’s underground work in the 
army. From this letter it is apparent that in parts of the Leningrad military district the 
Opposition has organised underground troikas, which are organising underground 
meetings…Such dissenting and disruptive work is dangerous for the party organisation 
of the army. I consider it necessary to bring a decisive end to such unprecedented 
irresponsible and hugely harmful disorder. Therefore I request the TsKK (Central 
Control Commission) to bring all mentioned in the letter to account.148  
 
Beyond the formal PUR reports which tended to downplay the Opposition’s influence 
in the army, the reality is that some, such as Landa, saw a greater danger.  
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After the political Opposition had been crushed in 1927 and its members 
expelled from the party and sent into exile, the immediate perceived danger appeared to 
have passed. Indeed, many members of the opposition were allowed to rejoin the Party 
at the end of the 1920s if they were willing to recant their ‘political errors’. This equally 
applied to the Red Army Trotskyists. In this respect the officers, Primakov and Putna, 
who had been sent into exile as military attachés because of their opposition, present 
particularly interesting cases. Despite their opposition to the party both were given 
surprisingly levels of responsibility during their diplomatic exile. The trust placed in 
Putna and Primakov by Voroshilov suggests that he did not see the Trotskyist threat in 
as threatening terms as the political police. 
Even though the political police had established that Putna was working on 
Trotsky’s orders in the mid-1920s, only a few years later he was given a great level of 
responsibility abroad and even found a patron in Voroshilov. Moves to find Putna a 
position again within the Red Army were initiated not long after his exile as a military 
attaché in Japan. In April 1928 the Soviet ambassador in Japan, Aleksandr Troianovskii, 
wrote to Stalin and forwarded a letter he had received from Putna. This letter contained 
Putna’s wishes to once again find work in the army, perhaps as a corpus commander. In 
this forwarded letter Putna had written:  
 
…I must to express the desire that the C[entral]C[ommittee] of the party create the 
possibility and accept active measures for the return to the party ranks of those excluded 
comrades who have declared their intentions, joy and unity with the party, to fully 
submit to the decisions of the Party Congress.149  
 
In his covering letter Troianovskii praised Putna, writing that there were only very few 
like him in the Red Army and that he, ‘is a very business-like and very dedicated to 
military work’.150 However, Voroshilov’s character assessment of Putna was even more 
glowing. In May 1929 he wrote to Krestinskii, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, where 
Putna was soon to be a military attaché having moved on from Japan. Voroshilov 
praised Putna highly and asked Krestinskii to give Putna ‘comradely support’ on his 
arrival in Berlin.151 Later in September Voroshilov complained to Krestinskii about 
supposedly poor relations between the Soviet embassy and Putna which were hindering 
his work and making his life difficult. Voroshilov went on to say:  
                                                
149 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 38, l. 35. 
150 Ibid., l. 33. 
151 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 21, d. 42, l. 9. 
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I very much request of you to take into consideration that in the person of com[rade] 
Putna we have one of the best of our commander-party men (komandirov-partiitsev), I, 
the RVS of the USSR, and the party fully trust him and I have entrusted to him 
extraordinarily serious and responsible tasks, which he will be able to fulfil only in 
conditions of full support from the side of you and your embassy apparatus…In the 
period of the last few years com.[rade] Putna, as you well know, had a hard experience 
of a party and personal character, [and] our responsibility is to help him to now finally 
eliminate these remaining difficult traces, creating real comradely circumstances for 
him.152  
 
Voroshilov even requested that Putna be allowed to access top secret documents which 
he had not had previously.153 Voroshilov’s letters to Krestinskii are striking as it seems 
that less than two years after the scare over Trotskyism in the military and the political 
police fears of a military coup he had become an advocate of a prominent ex-Trotskyist. 
We can only speculate about the ‘extremely serious’ work that Voroshilov had entrusted 
to the Putna, but British secret service materials from the period point to an espionage 
role. Information from British agents and intercepted communications indicate Putna 
was heavily involved in espionage work while working as a military attaché, and 
particularly so in Berlin. He had also apparently controlled Soviet agents in Finland. 
According to the British, Putna was charged with the collection of information about 
British defence and placing agents within the War Department.154 
The Trotskyist officer Primakov was also given surprisingly responsible work 
considering the seriousness of the threat he and his associates embodied only a few 
years earlier. Primakov had also been sent into exile as a military attaché, first to 
Afghanistan, and then from mid-1929 in Japan. In April 1930, Berzin, the head of 
military intelligence, wrote a letter to Voroshilov complaining about Primakov’s 
conduct in Japan. Berzin opined about Primakov’s careless and uneconomical attitude 
towards state funding, but also added:  
 
The promotion of c.[omrade] Primakov as military attaché and leader of secret service 
work (agenturnoi raboti) in Japan has not brought a substantial improvement to the 
leadership of our military apparatus in Japan, not in relation to the obtaining of 
                                                
152 Ibid., l. 91. 
153 Ibid. 
154 National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) KV 2/2404. According to V. I. Vinokurov, 
Putna did have an intelligence role while in Japan and Germany, see Istoriia voennoi diplomaty: voennaia 
diplomatiia mezhdu pervoi i vtoroi mirovymi voinami, 4 vols (Moscow: Inzhener, 2010), II, p. 14, 27. The 
Soviet ambassador in Britain Ivan Maiskii described Putna’s post as attaché in Germany as 
‘extraordinarily important’, see Ivan Maiskii, 3 vols, Vospominaniia sovetskogo posla (Moscow: Nauka, 
1964), I, p. 273. 
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intelligence (agenturnikh) materials…on the contrary, for the past six months a 
weakening in the flow of the necessary materials from Japan has been noted.155 
 
Berzin concluded by asking Voroshilov to transfer Primakov elsewhere.156 That Berzin 
was not happy with Primakov’s performance in Japan is not the key point here, and 
perhaps his performance was sub-standard. What is interesting is that Primakov had 
some role in espionage against Japan. Again, for an individual whose political 
convictions were of such concern not long before his posting to Japan, it seems 
remarkable that Primakov would be given such responsibility at a time of increasingly 
strained relations in the Far East. 
Both the experiences of Primakov and Putna suggest that Voroshilov believed 
that the danger from the army Trotskyists had passed. That Primakov, and probably also 
Putna, were given intelligence assignments is indicative of the trust Voroshilov placed 
in them. His letters about Putna in particular reveal what seems to be a genuine sense of 
trust in him. Why Voroshilov placed so much responsibility in the two is hard to say for 
certain. It is possible that he knew Putna and Primakov previously. For example, both 
Voroshilov and Primakov had commanded partisan units in Ukraine in 1918.157 
Voroshilov must have vouched for Primakov for him to be given the intelligence role in 
Japan and this could be because they had a previous acquaintance. Furthermore, both 
Putna and Primakov certainly had compromised pasts because of their support of 
Trotsky, but so did a great many other people in the army and within other Soviet 
institutions. In the late 1920s having a stain on a past record did not automatically 
exclude someone from working again, even in very responsible positions. Compromises 
were made regularly, and clearly Voroshilov believed these two could be trusted enough 
for an intelligence role. In addition, it is possible that there was a skills shortage of 
experienced officers for intelligence assignments. Or perhaps Voroshilov was simply 
being naïve. As such, even though Voroshilov surely appreciated the danger from the 
Opposition in stronger terms than his public speeches indicate, and he may well have 
shared some of Menzhinskii’s pessimisms in November 1927, he was content enough 
for former Trotskyists officers to return to responsible positions. Similarly, by not 
indulging Menzhinskii in 1927 Stalin also showed that he believed the immediate 
Trotskyist danger to the army had passed. Yet, he would certainly not forget how the 
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military had been influenced by the Opposition or its alleged role in the coup attempt of 
1927. This would create further suspicions and nagging doubts about army reliability. 
But for now, Stalin did not think a serious crack down on the army was needed. He too 
was willing to make compromises. Indeed, Stalin would know about Putna and 
Primakov’s responsible assignments abroad. But at the same time, neither Putna nor 
Primakov’s opposition would ever be forgotten. In the Stalinist system nothing was ever 
forgotten. Everything would be kept ‘on file’ by the political police. Indeed, as shown in 
chapter four, even if Voroshilov felt Putna and Primakov could be trusted again, the 
political police certainly did not. They were far more attentive to past incriminations 
and showed far greater concern about former oppositionists serving again in the Red 
Army. The political police continued to keep a close watch over the former Trotskyists 
and tried to ‘expose’ a Trotskyist conspiracy within the ranks into the 1930s. 
 
Victory in the Civil War did not bring an end to the perceived threats to the Bolshevik 
regime. Facing a tense international situation and what the Bolsheviks regarded as 
hostile capitalist encirclement, the Red Army was of paramount importance. Both Lenin 
and Stalin believed that the capitalist world would not reconcile peacefully to the 
existence of the Soviet Union and would actively seek its destruction. Yet, the 
institution vital for defence, the Red Army, was perceived as not fully reliable. It was 
seen as displaying alarming vulnerabilities to a number of perceived external and 
internal threats. As espionage and subversion became key tactics of the Soviet Union’s 
enemies, the Red Army was regarded as a primary target and seen as susceptible to 
infiltration by foreign and White agents. Indeed, the continued policy of employing 
military specialists and former White officers out of military necessity only heightened 
these fears. To many in the party and political police, the use of military specialists and 
former Whites acted to sabotage army stability at the very time they perceived the 
building of a hostile capitalist coalition. Consequently, the political police continued to 
keep the Red Army under very close observation. In addition, the rumours of a ‘Russian 
Bonaparte’ surrounding the military elite only heightened tensions further. The Whites 
were easily drawn in by Soviet entrapment operations such as the Trust operation, but 
the constant use disinformation by the political police would bring no respite from the 
rumours of betrayal surrounding the high command in the 1920s. This provided a 
constant drip of hearsay about certain members of the military elite. Importantly, 
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everything would be carefully recorded by the political police and kept ‘on file’, even 
what was seen as merely disinformation. 
However, there were no mass arrests in the army during the 1920s in response to 
the perceived threats from the Whites or foreign agents. The perception of these threats 
could be greater than their reality. In fact, the gulf between the perception and reality of 
these threats increased at this time. The 1920s was a period when the army did not face 
any large crises, but when numerous perceived threats to its reliability persisted 
nonetheless. The Bolsheviks did not face the same immediate challenges to their 
survival as they had during the Civil War, but they still regarded their regime as under 
threat from the Whites and a range of hostile capitalist powers. However, how threats to 
the army were depicted depended on institutional interest. Voroshilov and PUR tended 
to downplay subversive dangers, while the political police tended to overplay the level 
of threat. But the political police failed to convince Stalin of the danger posed by the 
Trotskyists to the army in 1927 and they never arrested enough military specialists or 
spies to bring the army to a crisis point. Indeed, in the 1920s, different and competing 
narratives of threats to the Red Army began to emerge more visibly between PUR, the 
political police, Stalin and Voroshilov. But there were no serious crises in the army or in 
the wider Soviet Union to galvanise the political police’s view and allow it to dominate. 
Indeed, regarding the army Trotskyists, Stalin had the last word, and he ruled that the 
Trotskyists posed no immediate danger to the army in 1927. He hesitated. Perhaps 
Stalin took such a pragmatic approach as Trotsky had been crushed politically and he 
believed the army was now easier to control. One major perceived threat to the military 
had been removed. However, Stalin would surely harbour some doubts and lingering 
suspicions about army reliability as a consequence. He would not forget how easily the 
oppositionists had gained a foothold in the ranks. But for now, the differing appraisals 
of threats to the Red Army would remain in competition. Voroshilov remained on the 
defensive and the political police actively searched out further ‘enemies’ and organised 
‘conspiracy’ in the ranks. Stalin would wait and see what further ‘evidence’ the political 
police came up with, but in the 1920s he was not compelled to launch a serious crack-
down on the Red Army.  
However, the 1920s were only the beginning of a long period of flux in Red 
Army as it grappled with difficult external and internal challenges. The struggle with 
Trotskyists, the Whites and foreign agents would continue into the 1930s. But as the 
next chapter will show, further pressures, divisions and infighting quickly appeared as 
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the international situation began to worsen in the late 1920s, and when the Bolsheviks 
realised that alongside improving the political reliability of the Red Army, it also 
needed to be improved militarily.  
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Chapter Three: Reorganisation and Crisis in the Red Army 
 
 
As the previous chapter has shown, numerous suspicions and doubts were raised about 
the political reliability of the Red Army during the 1920s. The army was still perceived 
as vulnerable to subversion and the political police believed that close observation 
needed to be maintained. Yet the army’s perceived susceptibility to subversion was not 
the only problem. In the early 1920s the Red Army was militarily weak and in no 
condition to fight a major conflict. As Stalin was convinced that the Soviet Union was 
encircled by hostile capitalist powers and a future war was inevitable, military 
expansion and reorganisation was deemed essential. However, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, the arguments put forward about the direction and scale of rearmament 
revealed bitter disputes between members of military elite. In addition, the rapid 
industrialisation of the economy in the late 1920s created further difficulties for the 
army. Industrialisation may have provided the opportunity to build military power, but 
the collectivisation of agriculture which fuelled economic growth aggravated the large 
mass of peasants in the rank-and-file. The resulting upheavals called into question army 
reliability as a whole. Thousands of soldiers were discharged from the ranks in reponse. 
Therefore, this chapter will show that the measures intended to eliminate military 
weaknesses (army reform and industrialisation) in fact revealed additional weaknesses, 
in terms of exposing divides within the army elite and fomenting mass resentment in the 
lower ranks. Finally, at the very same time as mass discharges were spreading 
throughout the ranks the political police ‘exposed’ a very large military specialist ‘plot’ 
which reached into the highest levels of the army leadership. This combination of 
widespread discontent in the rank-and-file and an ‘exposed’ military specialist ‘plot’ in 
the upper ranks meant that for the first time the Red Army was experiencing a severe 
period of crisis. The early 1930s should be seen as a tipping point for the Red Army 
which firmly reinforced serious doubts about its stability and political reliability.  
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Disputes about Military Reform and the Problem of Tukhachevskii 
 
 
In the mid-1920s the Red Army was not militarily prepared for the expected inevitable 
conflict with the capitalist world. In the aftermath of the Civil War the army was weak 
in comparison to the armies of the capitalist states. The Red Army would struggle for 
investment during the NEP years and even with the launch of rapid industrialisation in 
the late 1920s the army leadership did not receive the funds they wanted to build 
military power. Indeed, despite the tense international atmosphere following the Civil 
War, and the Bolsheviks’ convictions that a war with capitalism was inevitable, the 
clash was not seen as imminent. There was breathing room for army reform. The 
Bolsheviks believed they had time on their side. In addition, during the NEP the Soviet 
economy was financially constricted and giving large boosts to military spending was 
impossible. It was in this context that the Red Army elite fiercely lobbied for 
investment, but they were far from united about the best way to lead reform. Questions 
about the speed and direction of rearmament were hotly debated, and issues of power 
and authority were sources of tension. Efforts to overcome military weaknesses threw 
into sharp relief the divides between some senior officers in the military leadership. 
However, these fissures were not only about rearmament, but had the subtext of 
institutional interest, power and pure ambition.  
On Trotsky’s resignation as War Commissar in January 1925, Mikhail Frunze 
was promoted as People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs.1 Frunze’s 
promotion represented a consolidation of the red commanders in the army elite. Stalin 
had strengthened his own hand.2 Frunze embarked on a number of reforms which aimed 
at improving army organisation and these represented the first major attempt to create a 
modern efficient Red Army. In reality, the Frunze reforms created more problems than 
they remedied, and in any case, his time at the top was cut short. Frunze died in surgery 
in October 1925, paving the way for his deputy Voroshilov to take over the army 
                                                
1 Frunze had little military experience previous to the Civil War, having only led a red brigade during the 
seizure of power, see Figes, A People’s Tragedy, p. 653. 
2 The Stalinist contingent in the army had previously been strengthened in March 1924 when Frunze, as 
Deputy People’s Commissar, created a new RVSR which included a number of Stalin’s allies, including 
Andrei Bubnov, Budennyi, Unshlikht and Ordzhonikidze, see Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 
171. 
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leadership.3 As Voroshilov was Stalin’s old comrade from Tsaritsyn, this promotion 
further increased Stalin’s influence in the army. However, not all would have welcomed 
the appointment. Voroshilov had little military experience and what he did have was 
confined to the Civil War years. In comparison to the newly promoted Chief of Staff, 
Tukhachevskii, who now held the second most powerful position in the army, the 
disparity in experience created a rift between the two. Indeed, this tension between 
Tukhachevskii and Voroshilov is well documented.4 Tukhachevskii was forthright, 
ambitious and had grand plans for Red Army development and he must have resented 
having to work under someone he regarded as militarily inferior. As Stone has 
remarked, in a stark contrast to Tukhachevskii, Voroshilov never wrote anything of 
substance on military matters.5 Voroshilov had risen as the head of the army purely 
because of Stalin’s patronage. Indeed, it is likely that Tukhachevskii thought he was 
better suited to lead the military. Even though both men had an interest in working 
together for the benefit of the Red Army and to try and increase its share of the budget, 
they often held very different views about the direction of army reform. Tukhachevskii 
was more capable of driving forward army modernisation, but he was not one of 
Stalin’s close allies. As such, he was easily sidelined. This tension between the two top 
members of the army elite was a constant feature of army life until Tukhachevskii’s 
execution in June 1937.       
Frunze had left a legacy of reform, much of which was positive. He made 
improvements to discipline, pay, regulations, housing and food provisions. However, 
some measures were more controversial. The introduction of one-man command and the 
subsequent transfer of influence from the political commissars to the officers provoked 
                                                
3 Frunze’s death has been subject to speculation about whether this was arranged by Stalin, for a small 
discussion see ibid., pp. 199-200. However, as Frunze’s promotion had strengthened Stalin’s position 
within the Red Army in the first place, and that Voroshilov was Frunze’s deputy, there seems to be little 
to suggest that Frunze was a threat to Stalin. Having Frunze sidelined would have been easier than 
arranging a murder. 
4 See for example, Otto Preston Chaney, Zhukov (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 
pp. 24, 42. Marshal Georgy Zhukov had supposedly remarked that Voroshilov hated Tukhachevskii, and 
Tukhachevskii considered Voroshilov incompetent. See also, Oleg Ken Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie i 
politicheskie resheniia, konets 1920 - seredina 1930-kh godov (Saint Petersburg: Evropeiskii universitet 
S. Peterburga, 2002), pp. 130-131. 
5 Stone, ‘Tukhachevsky in Leningrad: Military Politics and Exile, 1928-1931’, Europe-Asia Studies, 48. 8 
(Dec., 1996), 1365-1386 (p. 1367). Oleg Ken has argued that many accounts of Voroshilov’s weak 
military knowledge are exaggerations and that he was smarter than his detractors make out. Ken points 
out that individuals, such as Zhukov and Khrushchev, had a motive in criticising Voroshilov, see Ken, p. 
312. 
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a very negative reaction from certain sections of PUR.6 Yet, it was the weakening of 
Staff authority started under Frunze which caused the first major rift between 
Tukhachevskii and Voroshilov in the 1920s. Previous to the Frunze reforms the army 
Staff had been a dominant force in the military hierarchy and wielded great influence. 
However, the Staff was both powerful and cumbersome. In a bid to increase efficiency 
Frunze had weakened the Staff by splitting it into three bodies, creating an 
Administrative, an Inspectorate and a smaller General Staff for mobilisation planning. 
This was much to Tukhachevskii’s consternation, and not only because of the increased 
confusion and overlapping lines of authority.7 Tukhachevskii felt that the reform meant 
there was no dominant institution responsible for defence and he wanted to reassert 
Staff influence. Tukhachevskii also argued that the Staff should have a closer 
relationship with the main economic institutions.8 Furthermore, throughout 1926-27 
Tukhachevskii pressed that the Staff needed to assume more power and take charge of 
directing rearmament for the entire Red Army.9 In practice, Tukhachevskii believed in 
the Staff’s dominant place in directing army reform, and thus believed in his own place 
in directing this reform. Inter-department rivalry added a further complication to 
Tukhachevskii’s ambitions. He clashed with S. S. Kamenev, the head of the Main 
Administration of the Red Army, about the latter apparently purposely weakening Staff 
authority. In a letter to Voroshilov from February 1927, Tukhachevskii accused 
Kamenev of leading a campaign against the Staff from the very beginning of the Frunze 
reforms.10 This conflict made it impossible for the Staff to direct the work of all the 
central directorates in the People’s Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs.11 
Kamenev was putting a halt on Tukhachevskii’s ambitions. In addition, Tukhachevskii 
was particularly agitated about his loss of control over military intelligence on his 
promotion as Chief of Staff. In January 1926 Tukhachevskii appealed to Voroshilov and 
complained that without military intelligence the Staff was unable to sufficiently study 
foreign countries and create mobilisation plans.12 He saw the loss of military 
intelligence as a manifestation of a lack of trust in his department, even though, as he 
                                                
6 See Main, ‘The Red Army and the Soviet Military and Political Leadership in the Late 1920s: The Case 
of ‘Inner-Army Opposition of 1928’, Europe-Asia Studies, 47. 2 (Mar., 1995), 337-355. 
7 Stone, ‘Tukhachevsky in Leningrad’, p. 1368. 
8 Samuelson, Plans for Stalin's War Machine, p. 37. 
9 Ibid., p. 45. 
10 Reforma v krasnoi armii, ed. by Anderson and others, II, pp. 43-44. 
11 Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, p. 55. 
12 Minakov, Stalin i ego marshal, p. 357. 
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put it, the Staff was now ‘almost 100% Communist’.13 More seriously, in February 
1928 Tukhachevskii directly accused Voroshilov of weakening and discrediting the 
Staff and that by not supporting its authority, he was working against it.14 Clearly 
Tukhachevskii could not reconcile himself to his now lowered authority. The greater 
task of preparing the Soviet Union for the inevitable war was too important. However, 
Tukhachevskii’s ambitions and demands were increasingly pushing against the fixed 
power relations within the army hierarchy, and he was directly challenging his superior. 
This was despite Voroshilov being one of Stalin’s closest allies. 
The reason why Voroshilov did not give in to Tukhachevskii is revealed in an 
unsent letter in which he addressed the crux of Tukhachevskii’s complaints: ‘You 
insisted on concentrating this enormous power in the Staff of the Red Army. I was 
categorically against this, because I considered that this task must also be accomplished 
by the civilian authorities and be directed by a government organ.’15 The mention of 
‘enormous power’ is instructive of how Tukhachevskii’s growing ambitions were 
perceived. Indeed, the tensions about Staff power reached a breaking point between 
April and May 1928. In April, a group of senior officers, Egorov, Budennyi and 
Dibenko (all of whom were closely allied with Voroshilov), sent a letter to the RVSR 
concerning the overlapping lines of authority between military departments, but 
importantly, the letter also criticised the Staff’s attempts, ‘to take into its hands a 
leading role in all questions of construction and operational leadership of the RKKA’.16 
Tukhachevskii’s ambitions were becoming divisive. Those close to Voroshilov were 
closing ranks, unhappy with Tukhachevskii’s attempts to gain ‘enormous power’. 
Egorov, Dibenko and Budennyi called for Tukhachevskii to be transferred.17 
Tukhachevskii, however, struck back with an even more radical proposal which 
envisaged a highly centralised Staff, taking over many of the duties of the army 
Administration and Inspectorate, and controlling not only mobilisation and rearmament, 
but taking a leading role in guiding industrial policy at large.18 Unsurprisingly, these 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Reforma v krasnoi armii, ed. by Anderson and others p. 173. 
15 Quoted in Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, p. 59. Why the letter is unsent is unknown and 
not explained by Samuelson. 
16 Quoted in Stone, ‘Tukhachevsky in Leningrad’, p. 1369. 
17 Stone, ‘Tukhachevsky in Leningrad’, p. 1369. There were some tensions between Tukhachevskii and 
Egorov. The latter had criticised Tukhachevskii in 1929 for his conduct during the war with Poland in the 
book L’vov – Varshava. 1920 g. vzaimodeistvie frontov. For more on the tensions between Tukhachevskii 
and Egorov and Dibenko, see Kantor, Voina i mir Mikhaila Tukhachevskogo, p. 44. 
18 Stone, ‘Tukhachevsky in Leningrad’, pp. 1369-70. 
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new proposals were far too ambitious and his radical proposals were rejected. Following 
his defeat Tukhachevskii resigned from the Staff and took the position as the 
commander of the LVO. His vacated position at the Staff was taken by the more 
moderate Boris Shaposhnikov, someone who could be relied upon not to challenge the 
status quo.19 Therefore, in a sense, the rumours surrounding Tukhachevskii that he 
craved power did have a certain degree of substance. From the military elite it was 
Tukhachevskii who most actively challenged authority. The specific reasons why 
Tukhachevskii resigned are a matter of speculation, but there is no indication that he 
was pushed from the Staff. When Tukhachevskii’s proposals for increasing Staff 
authority were rejected, rather than acquiesce, he may have seen resignation as the only 
option. Tukhachevskii would rather resign than obey a policy he did not agree with. 
Indeed, his replacement with Shaposhnikov is telling in this sense. Shaposhnikov was a 
knowledgeable military specialist and was one of the very few from the army elite to 
survive the Terror. This was a testament to his moderation, but also his reluctance to 
push boundaries. Despite his defeat and resignation, Tukhachevskii continued to 
research army organisation and training in Leningrad. But the move to the LVO should 
not been seen as much of a demotion. This was a strategically important district and a 
prestigious post. It was an industrial centre and a vital defensive outpost against attack 
from the north or the Baltic States. Tukhachevskii remained a key individual in the 
army leadership and his resignation from the Staff did not bring an end to the divides in 
the military elite or his ability to provoke his comrades. 
 Tukhachevskii was a military professional committed to an ideal of a superior 
mechanised Red Army that could compete with the armies of the capitalist countries, 
but mechanisation quickly became a further divisive issue between Tukhachevskii and 
other members of the military elite. Even though no one denied that the Red Army had 
to modernise and mechanise, there were a number of influential officers, most notably 
Budennyi, who remained nostalgic for tradition, particularly for the role of the cavalry 
in modern war. This soon became another source of tension. Budennyi was the 
                                                
19 Stone has noted that on Shaposhnikov’s promotion to the Staff many of the more radical changes that 
Tukhachevskii had proposed were actually put in place. As such, Shaposhnikov had managed to achieve 
what Tukhachevskii could not. Eighteen months after Tukhachevskii’s resignation all power for army 
mobilisation was given to the Staff. This suggests that either Tukhachevskii’s proposals were more 
palatable eighteen months later, or what is more likely, that Shaposhnikov did not have Tukhachevskii’s 
level of ambition. He was not seen as craving power like Tukhachevskii. Thus Shaposhnikov was trusted 
with increased Staff power, whereas Tukhachevskii was not, see ibid., pp. 1372-1375. 
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cavalry’s chief advocate, Voroshilov’s closest ally and Stalin’s Civil War comrade.20 
However, during the 1920s Tukhachevskii was pushing his theory of deep operations 
which required a strong mechanised army. The theory left little room for the cavalry in 
its current form.21 
 A split within the military elite over the role of the cavalry is particularly visible 
during 1929-30. For example, during an RVS meeting in 1929 the key proponents of 
army modernisation, Tukhachevskii and Uborevich, argued for increasing the 
development of technical troops, but Budennyi believed that this would mean the 
sidelining of the cavalry. He made accusations that Tukhachevskii wanted to convert the 
cavalry into infantry.22 Budennyi then accused Iakir, another proponent of 
modernisation, of similar desires. He argued Iakir had been ‘…with the Germans, they 
indoctrinated him (emu mozgi svernuli), he wants to turf the cavalry out on foot’. 
Luckily for Budennyi, Voroshilov was on his side and registered his support by adding, 
‘I am against those who believe that the cavalry has had its day’.23 The support of 
Voroshilov was obviously important. Like Budennyi, Voroshilov did not want to see the 
cavalry ignored.24  
 Budennyi made a number of written complaints to Voroshilov about the cavalry 
question in late 1929 and early 1930 and his contempt for those supporting large-scale 
                                                
20 The Civil War cavalry army was disbanded after the conflict, despite opposition from Budennyi and 
Voroshilov. Only a few divisions were maintained, see Viktor Anfilov, ‘Semen Mikhailovich Budenny’ 
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argument that Uborevich was close to Stalin, see Minakov, Sovetskaia voennaia elita 20-kh godov, p. 
245; Ken, p. 89 (footnote). 
23 Quoted in Kantor, Voina i mir Mikhaila Tukhachevskogo, p. 303. 
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mechanisation, particularly Tukhachevskii and Vladimir Triandafillov, is clear.25 In 
November 1929 Budennyi wrote to Voroshilov describing a report on the cavalry given 
by Triandafillov. This report had criticised the cavalry’s performance during the 
Belorussian manoeuvres and noted its lack of technological application.26 In his letter 
Budennyi accused Triandafillov of defaming both Voroshilov and the RVS and 
interpreted the report as a concerted attack on the cavalry, writing, ‘These scoundrels 
are leading a systematic campaign for the liquidation of the cavalry’. Indeed, Budennyi 
added that he believed the question of the cavalry had acquired a ‘political character’.27 
For Budennyi this was also a question of power relations in the army leadership. Indeed, 
Budennyi had been part of the group who had criticised Tukhachevskii’s ambitions for 
the army Staff in 1928 and was attentive to shifts in power inside the military elite. In 
March 1930 Budennyi made another accusation against Tukhachevskii and 
Triandafillov, this time arguing that they were trying to ‘indoctrinate’ their ideas into 
the army under the guise of ‘progressivism’. Budennyi again accused Tukhachevskii 
and Triandafillov of discrediting the cavalry and its command.28 Budennyi continued:  
 
Demagogic methods are used in all of these speeches - to attribute to the cavalry staff 
what they in fact never defended, namely, that the cavalrymen, supposedly, in ever way 
possible deny technology, that the cavalrymen recognise the exclusive mode of action in 
all cases only as attack on horse.29  
 
Budennyi felt that his arguments were being misrepresented, that Tukhachevskii and 
Triandafillov were being highly dishonest and the subtext to this debate was political 
power-politics. Budennyi perhaps believed Tukhachevskii wanted to strengthen his 
control over army modernisation, maybe in an attempt to seize more power within the 
army leadership itself. 
 Therefore, alongside the grouping of Egorov, Budennyi and Dibenko, who had 
positioned themselves against Tukhachevskii’s grandstanding over Staff authority, an 
alliance of Iakir, Uborevich, Triandafillov and Tukhachevskii, linked by a shared 
                                                
25 Vladimir Triandafillov was the Chief of the Operations Directorate in 1923-31 before his death in a 
plane crash. He was a close associate of Tukhachevskii and shared many of his ideas over the concept of 
Deep Operations and the increased mechanisation of the Red Army. Triandafillov wrote a key text on the 
theoretical concepts of Deep Operations. 
26 Triandafillov had alluded to Voroshilov’s support for Budennyi, describing the former as ‘a wing-mate 
to the cavalry’, see RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 174, l. 43. 
27 Ibid., l. 42. 
28 Ibid., l. 44. 
29 Ibid., l. 46. 
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commitment to army mechanisation, clashed with Budennyi.30 The latter argued that 
Tukhachevskii and Uborevich expressed full solidarity with Triandafillov and indeed, 
there is little doubt that Budennyi felt under siege. 31 Of course, debates over 
modernisation are common to all militaries and these can often be heated. However, in 
this case, the dispute was seen to have the subtext of a power struggle. In this sense, 
there are parallels to the earlier conflict about Staff power. From the criticisms levelled 
at Tukhachevskii over his ambitions for the army Staff (specifically the accusations that 
he was trying to gain ‘enormous power’) to what Budennyi regarded as the 
politicisation of the cavalry question, Tukhachevskii’s critics implied an ulterior motive. 
The ambitious Tukhachevskii and his allies wanted to strengthen their position in the 
army leadership and take control over army reform. Perhaps there were even suspicions 
at this time that Tukhachevskii wanted to seize control of the army. Importantly, Stalin 
would not be ignorant of these struggles within the military elite and he no doubt 
watched the debates unfold attentively. However, the biggest controversy was still to 
come and Tukhachevskii created further waves shortly after the dispute about the 
cavalry. This time, however, he would finally raise Stalin’s ire. The wider context of the 
cavalry debate was issues of military spending and the speed of rearmament. 
Tukhachevskii was already the most vocal member of the military elite in advocating 
increasing the Red Army’s technological development and achieving parity with the 
West.32 However, in the late 1920s he began to argue for much higher levels of military 
spending than he had done previously, and this proved very controversial. 
 For the Bolsheviks the international situation worsened during 1926-27. In 1926 
Pilsudski came to power in Poland through a military coup, reviving the danger from 
the Soviet Union’s old enemy. Indeed, the political police wrote to Stalin about 
‘evidence’ they believed showed that Poland was planning an operation to seize both 
Belorussia and Ukraine.33 Later in 1927 Chinese communists were massacred by the 
Guomindang following a Chinese raid on the Soviet embassy in April. 1927 was the 
year of the so-called ‘war scare’, when a wave of mass panic about the outbreak of war 
gripped the Soviet Union following the breakdown of relations with Britain. This 
breakdown in relations was caused by a raid on the Soviet trade offices in London that 
                                                
30 Stoecker notes that Egorov and Dibenko were also members of the group defending the cavalry, see 
Stoecker, p. 155. 
31 RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 174, l. 47. 
32 Stoecker, p. 18. 
33 Harris, ‘Encircled by Enemies’, pp. 519-520. 
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supposedly revealed compromising documents detailing Soviet intelligence activity. 
The Soviet government interpreted this raid as evidence of a more assertive British 
stance against the Soviet Union.34 In the same year the Soviet ambassador in Poland 
was assassinated by a White monarchist, which increased tensions further. Yet within 
this threatening international climate, the Red Army remained underfunded and 
technologically backward.35 Despite the assessment from the Defence Sector of the 
State Planning Committee (Gosplan) in early 1927 that the army was not ready for war, 
defence spending was still not substantially increased.36  This was primarily because, 
even though the war scare was real, the Soviet economy remained too financially 
restricted.37 Budgets were tight and the defence spending was no exception. While there 
was a need to rearm and industrialise, there was no appetite within the party for 
substantial increases in defence spending. In addition, the international situation was 
certainly seen as threatening, but the probability of war breaking out in the immediate 
future was appraised as low.38 As such, despite Tukhachevskii and Voroshilov’s pleas 
for more money for the army in the face of what they saw as a hostile international 
environment, military spending was not expanded. There were no substantial increases 
in defence spending on the scale that the Red Army were lobbying for.     
As noted above, in light of the weak economy, early hopes were placed on 
collaboration with Germany in giving assistance to the build-up of the Soviet military 
industry. But the situation changed with the introduction of the first five-year plan 
(1928-1932). The move to rapid industrialisation saw rising targets and huge 
investments in heavy industry. The plan pushed the Soviet Union towards rapid 
economic growth and saw an increase in defence spending, even though still at a 
                                                
34 Harris, ‘Encircled by Enemies’, p. 521. 
35 Stone, Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2000), p. 1, 20. Stone notes that in 1924 Gosplan’s military sector remarked that the Red 
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36 Andrei Sokolov, ‘Before Stalinism: The Early 1920s’ in Guns and Rubles: The Defence Industry in the 
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relatively low level.39 However, Tukhachevskii began to push too far. From his position 
in Leningrad he sent proposals to the centre for dramatically increased military 
spending.40 Tukhachevskii’s approach placed more importance on the potential amount 
of resources which would be released by industrialisation and collectivisation, and it 
was on these assumptions that he based his armament proposals. These were very 
hypothetical. Tukhachevskii believed that rapid industrialisation had provided the 
opportunity for a rapid expansion of the Red Army and he was going to take it.41 But 
what Tukhachevskii proposed far exceeded the capacity of the Soviet economy. Perhaps 
he sincerely believed that the economy could deliver what he was suggesting, or he was 
simply caught-up in the frenzy of rising targets which characterised the five-year plan 
and did not want the army to be left behind. However, a substantial increase in defence 
spending would not materialise until 1931.42  
In 1930 Tukhachevskii drew up a far-reaching and ambitious rearmament plan 
with proposals unrealistic for the current industrial level and spending restrictions of the 
Soviet Union. He projected massive increases in tanks, cavalry and rifle divisions, 
communication lines and improvements to chemical industry.43 His memorandum of 
January 1930 predicted that industry could produce over 100,000 tanks and aircraft for 
the first year of war and deploy at the very least 240 infantry divisions.44 Tukhachevskii 
sent these projections to Voroshilov, Shaposhnikov and Uborevich and they were 
rejected immediately. From Shaposhnikov’s calculations, in order to fulfil 
Tukhachevskii’s plan those aged just fourteen would need to be called up for military 
service and the budget required exceeded the combined state budgets for the previous 
three years.45 This was the picture that was presented to Stalin, along with the following 
note from Voroshilov, who took the opportunity to undermine the ambitious 
Tukhachevskii: ‘Tukhachevskii wants to be original and…“radical”. It is bad that in the 
R[ed] A[rmy] there are these sort of people, who take this “radicalism” at face value’.46 
Stalin too rejected the Tukhachevskii plan. He replied to Voroshilov on 23 March, 
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writing that he respected Tukhachevskii and considered him an ‘unusually capable 
comrade’, but Stalin described his proposals as ‘fantastic’, lacking realism and that they 
would squander and waste equipment. Stalin went so far as to say that to put 
Tukhachevskii’s plan into operation would be ‘worse than any counterrevolution’.47 As 
Samuelson had shown, in another unsent letter intended for Tukhachevskii, Voroshilov 
criticised what he regarded as Tukhachevskii’s negligence of his duties in Leningrad in 
order to draw up his unrealistic armament proposals. He described Tukhachevskii’s 
views as ‘incorrect’ and ‘politically harmful’.48 It is not known why the letter remained 
unsent, but Voroshilov’s negative opinions of Tukhachevskii are clear. 
Tukhachevskii had suffered another defeat and this time not only angered 
Voroshilov, but more seriously, he had annoyed Stalin.49 Events, however, changed 
rapidly. Tukhachevskii appealed to Stalin throughout 1930 about the rejection of his 
proposals, complaining that his figures had been distorted by Shaposhnikov. Despite not 
immediately winning Stalin over, in June 1931 Tukhachevskii made a dramatic return 
from Leningrad and was promoted as the Red Army’s Director of Armaments. He 
replaced Uborevich, who was transferred to command the Belorussian Military District 
(BVO). It appears that Uborevich had also been having difficulty as Director of 
Armaments.50 However, that Tukhachevskii could be brought back into the heart of the 
army establishment within such a short time may seem remarkable, considering Stalin’s 
very negative appraisal of the 1930 armament proposals, but this was indicative of the 
growing international pressures facing the Soviet Union, in particular the threat from 
Japan. 
When Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931, this provided the impetus to 
drastically increase military spending. The Soviet Union faced a hostile enemy, now 
closer to the border. Tukhachevskii’s armament proposals were reconsidered and Stalin 
brought him back from Leningrad. Military spending was now increased. Just two 
months after Tukhachevskii’s return, the Council of Labour and Defence (STO) 
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approved an expansion in tank production known as the ‘big tank programme’.51 
However, it is necessary to point out that the Politburo had been making moves in this 
direction before the invasion. In summer 1929 priority had already been given to 
defence with Politburo approval given for the reorganisation of war industries, 
mobilisation capability and production methods.52 Furthermore, in June 1930 Stalin had 
promised Tukhachevskii that he would look again into his armament proposals in 
response to his protests about the miscalculations from the Shaposhnikov and the 
Staff.53 But despite these other factors, it was the heightened international tension 
following the invasion of Manchuria that finally pushed party opinion towards rapid and 
large-scale rearmament.54 Tukhachevskii was fully rehabilitated in May 1932 when 
Stalin sent a rare letter of apology for what he admitted was his misunderstanding of 
Tukhachevskii’s armament proposals in 1930.55 Tukhachevskii had thus been the 
beneficiary of a threatening international crisis and without the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria it is doubtful that he would have been brought back from Leningrad. 
These conflicts and disputes within the army elite are important in many 
respects. Firstly, the army leadership were divided over most questions aside from the 
need for a larger share of the state budget. The Red Army was still very much a 
fledgling force and attempts at reform had only just begun. These would have been 
difficult enough without the complication of an awkward mixture of professional and 
party officers within the army elite and the personal ambitions of certain individuals. 
Clashes and conflicts were almost inevitable. But questions of army reorganisation 
almost took the form of power politics as individuals tried to assert their vision for a 
new Red Army. Tukhachevskii in particular was criticised for what were seen as 
personal ambitions to increase his power and politicise military issues. The need to 
reform and reorganise the army to overcome its military weaknesses had consequently 
revealed further weaknesses in the unity of the high command. However, most 
surprisingly of all, after all the controversy he had caused, Tukhachevskii’s vision was 
victorious. This was very unlikely to have pleased some of his colleagues, particularly 
Voroshilov and Budennyi, and would only fuel further resentment against 
Tukhachevskii. But now, Tukhachevskii had be given Stalin’s endorsement as someone 
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54 Stone, Hammer and Rifle, p. 7. 
55 Sovetskoe rukovodstvo perepiska 1928-1941, ed. by Kvashonkin, pp. 171-172. 
 123 
‘unusually capable’ who would take control of building Red Army power. Yet the need 
to industrialise and build economic and military power caused even greater problems to 
wider army stability than the quarrels in the elite. The regime’s policies in the 
countryside which accompanied the industrialisation drive created a widespread crisis in 
the rank-and-file. 
 
Collectivisation and the ‘Peasant Mood’ 
 
 
During 1926-27 party opinion had begun to shift towards abandoning the NEP and 
introducing rapid industrialisation. This shift was driven by a number of factors, 
including the recovery of industry to pre-First World War levels, the war scare of 1927 
and the necessity of building military power in the face of the perceived threat from the 
capitalist world.56 In addition, an agricultural crisis in 1927 finally broke the 
compromise the regime had held with the countryside during the NEP years.57 The grain 
crisis affected internal supply and exports, which was treated very seriously in the face 
of the 1927 war scare.58 Hoarding of grain was rife, urged on by the war scare and a 
scarcity in manufactured goods. The peasants began to feed what little grain they had to 
their livestock, hoping for higher price returns. Consequently, grain supplies to urban 
areas were adversely affected. The solution to this growing crisis was found in a return 
to forced grain requisitions, a method not seen since War Communism of the Civil War 
years.59 Party opinion increasingly turned towards squeezing the peasantry in order to 
fuel the rapid industrialisation of heavy industry. Stalin believed peasants were 
withholding their grain and waiting for better market prices, engaging in speculative 
practices which were causing the state to lose out. A crack down against speculation 
began. 1928 saw increasing repression against the peasantry and the use of 
‘extraordinary measures’ of grain requisition.60 This shift towards forced grain 
collection was the beginning of a growing repression in the countryside which would 
give way to the wholesale collectivisation of agriculture and the attempt to ‘eliminate 
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the kulak as a class’, so-called ‘dekulakisation’. Yet, the introduction of forced grain 
requisitions was not without resistance.  
Opposition to the increasingly repressive measures in the countryside came from 
the upper echelons of the Bolshevik Party. The party theorist, Nikolai Bukharin, the 
head of the Soviet Government, Alexei Rykov, and the head of the Trade Union 
Organisation, Mikhail Tomskii, formed a loose grouping that Stalin labelled the ‘Right 
Deviation’. The group opposed the use of repressive measures in the countryside and 
forced grain requisitions.61 By the late 1920s Stalin had substantial support within the 
Politburo and easily overcame this challenge. The Right Deviation was accused of 
factionalism and all three were removed from their positions. Opposition to 
collectivisation, however, did not come solely from the political elite. Resistance from 
the peasantry itself has been well-documented, but very large numbers of soldiers in the 
rank-and-file also showed high levels of discontent. 62 This army resistance has been 
less well examined in the literature, though there have been some exceptions.63 
According to Soviet statistics, at the height of the collectivisation drive in 1930 peasants 
constituted 57.9% of the army.64 As the Red Army contained so many peasants in the 
lower ranks some kind of negative reaction to collectivisation was unavoidable.  
The use of forced grain requisitions and ‘extraordinary measures’ in the 
countryside placed the Red Army under great strain. Many peasant soldiers maintained 
ties to the countryside and were soon aware of the repressive measures and forced grain 
requisitions. Army reliability quickly began to waver. The crux of the problem for the 
military was its territorial structure. In an effort to cut costs a process to transform the 
army into a territorial force had been initiated in 1923. This reform was completed 
under Frunze and left the Red Army comprising of both a standing cadre army and 
territorial-militia divisions.65 This increased the number of peasants within the ranks as 
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a whole. By 1926 the territorial divisions had grown to be 65.8% of the Red Army.66 
There had been dissenting voices against this reorganisation. The political police were 
not happy with the new system and saw a danger in letting the peasants have more 
influence in army life and potentially affect its reliability.67 In this sense, the political 
police were eventually proved right. Furthermore, the upheaval inside the rank-and-file 
during the collectivisation drive was nothing new. It was only the scale of the problem 
which was unforeseen. The political police had dealt with similar problems in the ranks 
before. As early as 1923 the deputy head of the OGPU, Iagoda, had been informed 
about the hostile reaction within the ranks towards agricultural taxes. In a series of 
letters from a subordinate in the Far East, Iagoda was briefed about the appearance of a 
sharp ‘demobilisation mood’ within the ranks and that some soldiers had formed groups 
which were agitating against taxes. This activity was deemed ‘counterrevolutionary’.68 
Peasant dissatisfaction had manifested in the army and the political reliability of the 
troops was seen as weakened.69 Presaging the forms of peasant agitation seen under 
collectivisation, the political police also recorded the circulation of anti-soviet letters.70 
These letters formed the crucial link between the rank-and-file and the villages and 
would do so in the late 1920s and early 1930s.71 In 1923, despite receiving thousands of 
complaints from soldiers about the tax campaign, the problem was not yet widespread. 
The so-called ‘peasant mood’ (krest’ianskoe nastroenie) had not gripped the ranks as it 
later would during forced grain requisitions and throughout the collectivisation drive.72 
Before 1928, dissatisfaction in the ranks towards agricultural policy was nothing that 
PUR could not easily handle.73  
As such, it was already understood that there would be negative consequences 
for the army if forced grain requisitions were used in the countryside. But whether there 
was opposition from the army leadership to collectivisation is difficult to establish. 
Those who were pushing for rapid rearmament, such as Tukhachevskii, appear to have 
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had no concerns about the negative consequences of collectivisation in the rank-and-
file. Tukhachevskii’s calculations for his ambitious armament projections were based 
upon the potential resources released by both collectivisation and industrialisation. He 
saw the collectivisation of agriculture as a necessary step in creating a powerful 
military.74 There are some indications that Voroshilov was against launching 
collectivisation. For example, documents from the British Foreign Office suggest that 
Voroshilov warned Stalin that he could not be responsible for the army if he continued 
to push collectivisation.75 But these sources are too removed from the decision-making 
processes within the Politburo to allow any firm judgement. There is, however, concrete 
evidence that Voroshilov supported Bukharin in 1929, when the latter petitioned not to 
be transferred to the Commissariat of Education because of his opposition against Stalin 
(as Oleg Khlevniuk notes, this would have meant political exile). Bukharin instead 
wanted to become the head of the scientific technical administration.76 Voroshilov went 
against Stalin on this issue. But it is difficult to say whether Voroshilov’s support for 
Bukharin in this instance would have translated into support for his stance against 
collectivisation. Indeed, Stone argues convincingly that there was considerable 
animosity between Rykov and Voroshilov over the former’s continual attempts to block 
the army’s drive for increased military spending. This would make any wider alliance 
between Voroshilov and the Right Deviation unlikely.77  
As soon as forced grain requisitions were used in the countryside problems with 
army morale were recorded. Autumn 1927 saw increasing levels of dissatisfaction 
within the rank-and-file towards grain requisitions.78 This trend continued into 1928 and 
it was at this point that the ‘peasant mood’ became a serious subject of study.79 In early 
1928 PUR compiled a series of reports on the ‘peasant mood’ which went some way to 
reaching an understanding of how the Red Army was being influenced by peasant 
agitation. The reports noted that, unsurprisingly, dissatisfaction with forced grain 
requisitions was largely confined to the lower ranks. Reactions were more diverse 
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within the command and depended on how closely officers were linked to the villages.80 
In addition, soldiers were not just displaying solidarity with the peasantry, but some 
were apparently engaged in direct action and agitation, something which was largely 
blamed on the influence of the ‘kulaks’. For example, an RVS order from 1928 noted 
that the growing rank-and-file hostility was a reflection of the class struggle and kulak 
attempts to agitate within the barracks.81 Thus, the growing discontent in the rank-and-
file was perceived through the lens of the army’s vulnerability to subversion. The Party 
regarded this growing hostility in the rank-and-file very seriously. On 10 July 1928 the 
Central Committee ordered that additional efforts were needed to combat the discontent 
in the ranks and criticised PUR’s inability in combating the negative influence ‘class 
aliens’ were having on groups of soldiers.82 In terms of the scale of this rank-and-file 
hostility to forced grain requisitions, the 1928 PUR reports did not note this statistically 
but described this as a ‘large wave’ which could get stronger as more information fed 
into the barracks.83 Indeed, PUR noted that even after a lull in the level of hostility in 
February 1928, questions about grain requisitions remained the centre of attention for 
many soldiers.84  
PUR reports noted that by using letters and envoys from the villages peasants 
were asking their relatives in the army to assist in direct action against grain 
collections.85 PUR collated excerpts from these letters, and it is possible to see the 
picture of hardship in the countryside presented to the rank-and-file soldiers. For 
example, in the first two months of 1928 a Caucasus Infantry Battalion received letters 
on the following lines: ‘In the village and at the shop they’re not giving out goods for 
money, they’re only giving them out for wheat.’ Another letter described: ‘One village 
[stanitsa] was saddled with a mandatory assignment of 100,000 poods of grain, and we 
can’t sell the surplus without permission from the village soviet.’86 A 1928 PUR report 
highlighted a letter from the Kuban Oblast’ sent to a soldier which is typical of an 
incitement to violence. The author of the letter complained that in the countryside the 
peasants were being ‘fleeced’, and called for action from the military: ‘you are silent in 
the army. Put pressure on your commanders, bring about a revolt (bunt), we have to go 
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82 Ibid., ll. 137-138. 
83 Tarkhova, pp. 327, 357. 
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to war’.87 The appeal for soldiers to revolt was common in the intercepted letters and 
sometimes could be successful in turning army opinion against the regime.88 Indeed, a 
letter from a political worker sent to Rykov described that such letters had fomented in 
the ranks, ‘extraordinarily abnormal and dangerous moods’.89 In the PriVO the 
following comments were reported from a member of a machine gun regiment:  
 
When the campaign for the collection of taxes was done, we supported Soviet power, 
but now Soviet power has neglected us – it does not give us bread. We must liberate the 
poor from collection and must force the kulaks to serve.  
 
Furthermore, some remarks were regarded as ‘counterrevolutionary’. For example, from 
the same group of soldiers in the PriVO and in response to whether they were devoted 
to the government, there was an outcry of ‘we all don’t love Soviet power!’90 
Both Voroshilov and the political police called for increased observation of the 
hostility within the rank-and-file, but more dramatic measures were taken. In July 1928 
an army purge was initiated. The targets of the purge were those regarded as ‘socially 
alien’ (sotsial’no chuzhdye), which included, for example, the sons of priests and 
judicial bureaucrats. The other targets of the purge were classified as ‘class harmful 
elements’ (klassovye vrazhdebnye elementy), which included the sons of kulaks, those 
deprived of voting rights and rich peasants. By January 1929, 4029 discharges had 
already been made.91 Importantly, prior to the purge in July 1928 discharges of ‘socially 
harmful’ or ‘social alien elements’ from the army were done on a case-by-case basis, 
and it was this purge that brought these on a mass scale.92  
The resort to mass discharges demonstrates how concerning the problem of the 
‘peasant mood’ was for Stalin and the army leadership.93 But as with the alleged 
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Trotskyist coup of 1927 there was also a divergence between PUR and the political 
police about the scale of the threat in the lower ranks. Institutional interest continued to 
influence differing depictions of the seriousness of the threat to the Red Army. The 
political police were more concerned about the ‘peasant mood’ than PUR. In 1929 they 
focused on this as the main cause of trouble in the army. They also linked the ‘peasant 
mood’ to what they saw as increasing activity of ‘anti-soviet elements’.94 Thus, for the 
political police the ‘peasant mood’ in the ranks was a manifestation of how the Red 
Army remained vulnerable to subversion and infiltration. Perhaps the political police 
were still trying to make a point about how they remained indispensible to the security 
of the army and how PUR were unable to adequately secure the army against ‘enemies’ 
infiltrating into the ranks. In contrast to the political police, PUR had been much more 
sanguine about the ‘peasant mood’, particularly towards the end of 1929. By this point 
they argued that it had been largely overcome and regarded the army as stable again. 
For example in PUR materials prepared for the May 1929 Fifth Congress of Soviets, it 
was noted: ‘It is possible with full foundation to characterise the general political 
condition of the Red Army as fully stable, healthy’.95 Of course, PUR would continue to 
downplay anything that influenced army political reliability and particularly where they 
were directly responsible. In this case, PUR were criticised for not instilling a sufficient 
political education in the ranks. As such, it is not surprising that they would seize any 
lull in the intensity of the ‘peasant mood’, which did drop in mid-1929, to declare the 
army stable. 
  The lull in the ‘peasant mood’ in 1929 did not last. As ‘extraordinary measures’ 
gave way to wholesale collectivisation and dekulakisation in late 1929 another wave of 
the ‘peasant mood’ was recorded.96 Dekulakisation increased the scale of repression, 
aiming to ‘eliminate the kulaks as a class’. Correspondingly, the ‘peasant mood’ in the 
army now became known as the ‘kulak mood’. Mass arrests and deportations followed 
of those regarded as class enemies. In this respect, this was another indication of how 
the broad discontent in the ranks was framed as caused by subversives rather than an 
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expression of the legitimate concerns of peasant soldiers. Indeed, by mid-1930, PUR 
weas recording an increased growth in ‘kulak agitation’ within the Red Army and the 
political police reported an increase of ‘counterrevolutionary’ groups within the ranks.97 
The discontent associated with collectivisation and dekulakisation at this point was 
extensive. Reese has argued that during the winter of 1929-30 the whole Red Army can 
be considered as unreliable because of the very high levels of turmoil.98 Thus, the purge 
of the army had to be continued, but at an increased pace. In the first six months of 1930 
alone, 5703 soldiers were discharged.99 In response to this turmoil greater ‘class 
vigilance’ and the increased repression of class enemies were called for in an army 
resolution of 8 January 1930.100 Later in a directive from 31 January 1930 the new head 
of PUR, Ian Gamarnik, spelled out the danger facing the army:  
 
The kulak will send provocative letters to the barracks. The attempts by the kulak “to 
knock at” (stuchat’sia) the barracks, to influence it, undoubtedly will increase in the 
near future. This should force the political organs, party organisations and members of 
the komsomol’ to strengthen class vigilance, to improve political work, mass work, [to] 
mobilise all the red army masses around the slogans of the party – to liquidate the kulak 
as a class…More than it has even been the political organs are required to watch the 
mood of the red army men, to study them and react to them in good time.101  
 
As head of PUR, Gamarnik was surely coming under pressure. His organisation had 
been criticised by the Central Committee for what was seen as its inability to secure the 
reliability of the soldiers in the face of kulak agitation, and the discontent in the ranks 
was getting worse. However, Gamarnik’s solutions were hardly radical. He merely 
called for greater observation and more ‘vigilance’. It is unlikely this would have a 
radical impact on restoring army stability. However, Gamarnik would want to be seen 
as doing something, especially as the political police continued to push an image of an 
army infiltrated by numerous ‘enemies’. Indeed, a political police report from October 
1930 detailed that there had apparently been a ‘greater intensification’ of the formation 
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of counterrevolutionary groups in the ranks with links to other alleged 
counterrevolutionary organisations outside of the military. The political police also 
noted that the participation of junior, middle and even senior officers in what this 
‘counterrevolutionary’ activity had also ‘significantly grown’.102 Gamarnik would be 
conscious of this occurring under his watch, but it does not seem he had any credible 
solutions. 
It was not until the end of 1932 that the situation in the army improved and, 
according to PUR, was stable again.103 This was partly the result of a change in policy 
in reaction to the discontent in the ranks. For example, during the dekulakisation 
campaign the families of Red Army soldiers were exempted.104 All the letters being sent 
to the Red Army from the countryside were also checked. In late 1929-30, a propaganda 
campaign had been initiated involving soldiers themselves writing to the villages 
promoting the benefits of collectivisation.105 But by far, the crude method of mass 
discharges and the eventual winding down of both dekulakisation and collectivisation in 
1932 were the most important factors in regaining control over the rank-and-file. This, 
however, was at a heavy cost to the army. At the very least, 36,938 soldiers had been 
discharged by the end of 1933.106 There would be different conclusions drawn about 
this huge turmoil in the ranks. The political police would see further weaknesses in 
army reliability and how it remained susceptible to infiltration, especially as they tended 
to frame so much of the discontent in the ranks as the consequence of the agitation by 
‘counterrevolutionaries’ and kulaks. This was more ‘evidence’ that the army could not 
be depended on and that PUR alone were not properly safeguarding the stability of the 
military.107 Indeed, as the peasant and kulak ‘moods’ had been depicted as caused by 
kulaks and ‘counterrevolutionaries’, rather than stemming from legitimate soldiers’ 
grievances, this played into the political police’s hands. It is likely that they were in a 
strengthened position after collectivisation and PUR undermined. Yet, despite the huge 
levels of discontent in the ranks, Voroshilov denied in public that the army had been 
affected at all by collectivisation. He publicly hushed up the wave of discontent that had 
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expanded through the Red Army. At the Sixteenth Party Congress in July 1930 
Voroshilov remarked:  
 
The difficulty with collectivisation and the sortie of kulak elements, the intrigues of the 
right deviation – these are all factors, comrades, which gave us the full opportunity to 
fundamentally verify the political stability and loyalty of the red army masses to the 
matter of the proletarian revolution. After these checks we are able to declare with pride 
that, regardless of the difficulties, despite the sharpening of the class struggle during 
these two and a half years, the Red army never once wavered.108  
 
Voroshilov was obviously aware of the huge level of dissatisfaction in the lower ranks 
in reaction to collectivisation. It was manifestly disingenuous to declare that the army 
had never wavered. Voroshilov was again masking the problems with army reliability. 
In reality, Voroshilov had been given a lesson that when under certain social pressures 
the army could not be fully relied upon. But like PUR, Voroshilov did not want to admit 
this. Stalin would surely listen to both Voroshilov and the political police about what 
lessons should be taken from the negative reaction in the rank-and-file to 
collectivisation, but ultimately, he too would see a military that cracked under pressure 
and further ‘evidence’ of subversion in the ranks. Yet, the crisis in the army in early 
1930s was not limited to the rank-and-file. At the same time as mass discharges were 
spreading through the lower ranks a very large ‘military specialist plot’ was unrolling in 
the upper ranks. 
 
Operation vesna 
 
 
Throughout 1930-31 the political police conducted operation vesna (springtime) which 
saw the discharge and arrest of thousands of military specialists from the Red Army and 
its military academies, with the majority of arrests made in Moscow, Leningrad and 
Ukraine.109 The arrested specialists were charged with being members of monarchist 
and White counterrevolutionary groups that allegedly conducted wrecking, sabotage and 
espionage, and whose aim was to aid the destruction of Soviet power at a time of war. 
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Importantly, the charges against the military specialists were nearly entirely fabricated 
by the political police. They grew from fears about the subversion of the army by 
groups of traitorous military specialists backed by hostile foreign powers. However, 
Stalin believed the bases of the arrests, even though forced confessions surely provided 
the necessary ‘evidence’. In this respect, for Stalin, operation vesna was the first time 
that a large alleged ‘counterrevolutionary conspiracy’ had been ‘discovered’ in the 
military. This would be something he would not forget. The ‘exposure’ of this 
‘conspiracy’ would also directly undermine both PUR and Voroshilov’s assurances that 
the army was reliable and further strengthen the more pessimistic view of the political 
police. As this ‘conspiracy’ was ‘exposed’ at the same time as mass discharges were 
occurring in the rank-and-file, the late 1920s to early 1930s should be seen as a period 
of crisis in the entire Red Army. There were few areas left within the military where 
perceived weaknesses had not been revealed and reliability not questioned.  
Operation vesna did not come out of nowhere. As shown in chapter two, since 
the close of the Civil War military specialists continued to attract the suspicions of the 
political police. They were seen as collaborators and potential agents of both hostile 
capitalist powers and the exiled White movement. The political police made numerous 
arrests of military specialists throughout the 1920s on indictments of 
counterrevolutionary agitation and espionage, but these arrests never reached a large 
scale. There had been an increase in the arrests in 1927 and larger numbers of military 
specialists serving in the army and teaching in the military academies were arrested for 
alleged counterrevolutionary activity in Leningrad and Moscow. But these arrests were 
still not on a mass scale.110 This increase was probably partly linked to the war scare of 
1927. Indeed, the political police had initiated closer observation over military 
specialists in 1926 in response to the perceived worsening international situation. 
Specifically, they saw a threat from Britain and feared the outbreak of a new war. 
Military specialists were seen as welcoming such a conflict as it would hasten the fall of 
Soviet power.111  
There is another important wider context to the increased observation and arrests 
of military specialists in 1926-27. In the late 1920s, specialists in all institutions were 
increasingly persecuted during the turn towards rapid industrialisation and the 
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introduction of the first five-year plan. This was a time of utopian optimism and 
unrealistic industrial targets. Younger idealistic party members were encouraged to 
challenge their pre-revolutionary superiors.112 There was little room for the realism and 
guidance from the experienced specialists. Indeed, they were often regarded as lacking 
sufficient revolutionary optimism and purposely holding back, and even sabotaging, 
production tempos. But they also served as scapegoats for failures to meet the 
increasingly ambitious economic targets. This growing campaign against specialists is 
epitomised by the Shakhty Trial of May to June 1928. The trial convicted fifty-three 
specialist coal engineers from the North Caucasus of alleged sabotage and working with 
foreign powers. The cases had no foundation, but the trial was a very public 
demonstration of how specialists were supposedly holding back the tempos of industrial 
development through sabotage, which was known as ‘wrecking’. As shortages increased 
towards the end of the 1920s, campaigns against wrecking and sabotage flourished. In 
short, as Stone comments, during industrialisation, ‘moderation became criminal’.113  
Alongside the Shakhty trial, there were other key arrests and specialist trials. For 
instance, the former General V. S. Mikhailov, the head the Main Industrial Directorate, 
was arrested in May 1928 on a charge of leading a wrecking group in military industry. 
In general, 1929 saw a spate of arrests of specialists working in industry, in the 
weapons-arsenal trust in March and within the artillery administrations and ammunition 
trusts in summer and autumn.114 Late 1929 saw another highly publicised specialist 
trial, this time of the ‘Industrial Party’.115 Also in late 1929 a number of lecturers, pre-
revolutionary ‘former people’ (byvshie liudi), were arrested in Leningrad. The arrested 
were forced to acknowledge their supposed monarchist sympathies and their private 
meetings were construed as meetings of counterrevolutionary organisations.116 
Importantly, the OO OGPU was concerned that this foreign-backed ‘wrecking’ and 
‘sabotage’ would also affect the Red Army.117 Consequently, a number of alleged 
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wrecking groups were ‘exposed’ in the artillery, navy, the topographic department and 
sanitary departments. The ‘wreckers’ were those regarded as outsiders, such as former 
White officers, former Social Revolutionaries, sons of kulaks, and those who had served 
with Kolchak in the Civil War. In the military topographical department, military 
specialist ‘wreckers’ supposedly had ties to Poland and were conducting espionage 
work.118 As such, the army could not avoid the Party-sponsored persecution of 
specialists which accompanied the first five-year plan. The large numbers of military 
specialists still serving in the army made this unavoidable and the political police were 
looking to the army to find ‘evidence’ of ‘wrecking’. The wider campaign against 
wrecking continued into the early 1930s and there would be no shortage of ‘exposed’ 
cases as long as industrial tempos remained impossibly high and hysteria was whipped-
up about sabotage.119 
As the arrests of military specialists from 1927 shared a wider context with the 
campaign against wrecking in industry, the extent to which the Red Army was very 
receptive to the fluctuating currents of Soviet party politics is once again shown. As the 
party promoted specialist-baiting, the military specialists came under pressure. 
Furthermore, these earlier anti-wrecking trials had already drawn the broad outlines of 
the military specialist ‘plot’ that was ‘exposed’ during operation vesna. The arrested 
specialists in industry were accused of sabotage, having links to foreign powers and 
planning to assist the fall of Soviet power. In addition, the atmosphere was such that 
during the late 1920s and early 1930s almost all former Whites in military service were 
regarded as possible ‘wreckers’ and members of counterrevolutionary organisations.120 
The background was primed for a large military specialist ‘plot’ to be ‘exposed’ within 
the Red Army. But while this atmosphere of specialist-baiting certainly contributed to 
the ‘exposure’ of a military specialist ‘conspiracy’ and helped give it seeming 
credibility, its origins were in 1928 and the specific trigger was the perceived foreign 
threat.  
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In August 1928 the political police were concerned that the British planned to 
use the poor relations between the Soviet Union and Poland to stoke a conflict and 
eventual war.121 According to intelligence received by the INO OGPU, the British 
planned to forment an anti-Bolshevik uprising in Ukraine led by members of the then 
obsolete Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR). Apparently in 1927 the British had paid 
Pilsudski one hundred thousand pounds to organise the uprising. The plan purported to 
make use of the forces of the UNR, but also Red Army troops who had been turned 
against the Bolsheviks. However, later the INO OGPU received further intelligence that 
these plans had been postponed until spring 1929 as Pilsudski had apparently fallen 
ill.122 It is very difficult to authenticate this intelligence. It could have been 
disinformation or simply inaccurate, but nevertheless the political police acted on it. 
They had already kept military specialists under closer observation from 1926 because 
of the worsening international situation and this was precisely the type of foreign-
backed plot they had been searching for. Furthermore, the political police already had 
concerns in late 1927 that some form of joint action was being prepared between the 
British government, Ukrainian Nationalists and a host of other foreign powers. A 
number of arrests had already been made in Ukraine of alleged ‘counterrevolutionary’ 
groups.123 As such, when further reports about a Polish collaboration with 
representatives of the UNR was received by the political police, indicating that the plans 
for the uprising were again active, a decision was made to make arrests.124 In Ukraine 
the political police searched for ‘double-dealers’ (dvurushniki) working for Polish 
intelligence and the majority of the arrested were former officers (pre-revolutionary 
officers). However, many of these arrested former officers had connections to retired or 
still serving men within the Red Army command. Thus, the focus now turned towards 
the Red Army. Surveillance was set up over those with connections to the army under 
an operational name of vesna.125 Menzhinskii sent the details about the arrests to Stalin, 
noting that counterrevolutionary organisations had been discovered which were trying 
to infiltrate into the Red Army. Menzhinskii gave the order to shift the operation 
towards exposing counterrevolutionary activity in the Red Army, something he 
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regarded as overlooked.126 The first arrests of operation vesna were in early 1930 and 
within months the arrests had spread throughout the military academies affecting 
thousands of military specialists.127  The arrested specialists were charged with being 
members of monarchist and White counterrevolutionary groups who had conducted 
espionage and sabotage. The arrests were first concentrated in Moscow, spreading to 
Kiev and Leningrad into early 1931.128 Yet, a large number of these arrests were 
confined to academies. Indeed, by the end of the 1920s military specialists were 
increasingly concentrated in teaching roles. In this respect the victims of operation 
vesna were largely army outsiders and not directly in the chain of command. However, 
a few of the arrests and incriminations did affect the upper Red Army elite.129 
As operation vesna spread to Moscow in August 1930 several senior officers 
were implicated as members of counterrevolutionary organisations. Tukhachevskii was 
directly implicated. In early 1930 Tukhachevskii had already started to come under 
closer police scrutiny and the political police had begun to collect numerous bits of 
rumour and hearsay about him.130 However, when two military specialists working in 
the Frunze Military Academy, N. Kakurin and I. Troitskii, were arrested, they gave 
‘evidence’ incriminating him. During their interrogations in August, Kakurin and 
Troitskii implicated Tukhachevskii as being sympathetic to the Right Deviation and 
portrayed him as the head of a Right-led conspiracy that wanted to initiate a military 
coup.131 Kakurin had served with Tukhachevskii during the Civil War which perhaps 
gave weight to the charges.132 It is important to emphasise again that the political police 
still made use of forced confessions. The ‘evidence’ from Kakurin and Troitskii was 
probably extracted through torture and beatings.133 In this respect, it is possible that the 
political police were looking to find incriminating information about Tukhachevskii or 
that they were looking to ‘expose’ some kind of organised conspiracy in the upper 
military leadership. Perhaps they feared that the growing military specialist ‘conspiracy’ 
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extended into the military elite. They already had a large number of collated rumours 
about Tukhachevskii’s supposed disloyalty and alleged ambitions for power from the 
1920s. Indeed, the ‘evidence’ against Tukhachevskii from Troitskii and Kakurin was 
similar to the earlier ‘Russian Bonaparte’ rumours, in terms of his supposed aim of 
establishing a military dictatorship.134 Menzhinskii then sent the details of the 
interrogations of Kakurin and Troitskii to Stalin on 10 September with the following 
note:  
 
...to arrest the participants of the group one at a time – is risky. There are two possible 
conclusions: either immediately arrest the most active participants of the group, or to 
wait for your arrival having applied covert observational measures in order not to be 
caught off guard. I consider it necessary to add that now the whole insurgent group is 
maturing very quickly and the later solution presents a certain risk.135  
 
However, Stalin chose not to follow Menzhinskii’s advice and he first wrote to his ally 
Ordzhonikidze on 24 September: 136  
 
Please read as soon as possible the testimony of Kakurin – Troitskii and think about 
measures to liquidate this unpleasant business. This material, as you see, is strictly 
secret: only Molotov, I, and now you, know about it. I do not know if Klim 
[Voroshilov] is informed about it. This would mean that Tukhachevskii has been 
captured by anti-soviet elements from the ranks of the right. That is what the materials 
indicate. Is it possible? Of course, it is possible, it cannot be excluded. Evidently the 
Rights are preparing to install a military dictatorship, just to get rid of the Central 
Committee, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the Bolshevik tempos of development of 
industry...It is impossible to finish with this matter in the usual way (immediate arrest 
and so on). It’s necessary to think about this carefully. It would be better to postpone a 
decision on this question, raised in Menzhinskii’s memorandum, until mid-October, 
when we will all be gathered again.137  
 
Stalin’s letter suggests that initially Voroshilov had not even informed about the 
‘evidence’ against Tukhachevskii, thus showing that the political police went directly to 
the General Secretary and not through army channels. It is possible that Menzhinskii 
was trying to undermine Voroshilov in front of Stalin by leaving him in the dark. Even 
though Voroshilov probably would have welcomed the arrest of Tukhachevskii, the 
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whole case would reflect very badly on his leadership. If someone as prominent as 
Tukhachevskii turned out to be a ‘counterrevolutionary’, this would be a dramatic 
demonstration for Stalin that ‘enemies’ were operating at the highest level and 
Voroshilov seemingly had not noticed.  However, as he had done during the alleged 
Trotskyist military coup in 1927, Stalin showed some hesitation. He had doubts over the 
next step. Indeed, he had waited two weeks before acting on Menzhinskii’s letter and he 
wrote to his close ally Ordzhonikidze first. Perhaps Stalin questioned the quality of the 
evidence against Tukhachevskii. He certainly wanted more time to consider before he 
made his final decision. Stalin decided to put off the issue until the end of October for 
discussion in the Politburo. In the meantime Kakurin gave further ‘evidence’ on 5 
October. He remarked that Tukhachevskii had spoken about an attempt on Stalin’s life 
by a ‘fanatic’ and hinted that Tukhachevskii would be the candidate for a military 
dictator in the case of a struggle with ‘anarchy and aggression’. These were serious 
insinuations and corroborating material was also received from the interrogation of 
Troitskii. In October Stalin met with Ordzhonikidze and Voroshilov and they conducted 
a face-to-face confrontation with Tukhachevskii, Kakurin and Troitskii. Also present at 
the gathering were Gamarnik, Iakir and Ivan Dubovoi, the aide to the commander of the 
Urals Military District (UVO). The latter three were interviewed about Tukhachevskii. 
Following this confrontation Tukhachevskii was released from suspicion.138 Stalin later 
wrote to Molotov on 23 October and remarked: ‘With regard to the case of 
Tukhachevskii, he turned out to be 100% clean. This is very good.’139 
Tukhachevskii had escaped arrest despite damaging testimony from both 
Kakurin and Troitskii. Evidently Stalin doubted the case against him and the face-to-
face confrontation had convinced him of Tukhachevskii’s innocence. That this case 
came so closely after Stalin’s dramatic rejection of Tukhachevskii’s radical armament 
memorandum is important. Despite previously describing Tukhachevskii’s proposals as 
being ‘red militarism’ and ‘worse than any counterrevolution’, Stalin did not take the 
opportunity to have Tukhachevskii removed from the army elite when the chance 
appeared. This was not due to any doubts over the military specialist ‘plot’ itself. Stalin 
was not sceptical of operation vesna. Indeed, thousands of military specialists remained 
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discharged from the army and large numbers arrested. In addition, Stalin’s 
correspondence from this time indicates that he believed the premises of the military 
specialist ‘plot’. For instance, at the height of operation vesna in September 1930, Stalin 
wrote to Molotov and mentioned his concerns that Poland was joining forces with the 
Baltic States and that they were planning to wage war against the Soviet Union. 140 
Operation vesna grew out of concerns about Polish intervention in Ukraine. Thus, 
discounting any doubts about the credibility of the ‘plot’ itself, we can speculate that 
perhaps Stalin felt a level of respect for Tukhachevskii’s military skill and ability, 
despite the latter’s tendency to push boundaries. Indeed, in his letter describing 
Tukhachevskii’s plan as ‘worse than any counterrevolution’, Stalin also mentioned that 
he respected Tukhachevskii as an ‘unusually capable’ comrade. As the face-to-face 
confrontation had convinced Stalin that Tukhachevskii was innocent, it served no 
purpose to have him drawn into operation vesna on the basis evidence he did not accept. 
The Red Army needed people of Tukhachevskii’s talent. Voroshilov, however, was less 
forgiving. Even after Stalin’s judgment that he believed Tukhachevskii to be ‘clean’ 
from any participation in a military conspiracy, Voroshilov continued to send Stalin 
supposedly compromising information about Tukhachevskii.141 Perhaps Voroshilov 
now sensed an opportunity to play on Tukhachevskii’s incrimination, and ignite some 
doubts in Stalin, in an attempt to have this troublesome figure removed from the 
military leadership. Indeed, even though Stalin had hesitated again and decided that 
Tukhachevskii was innocent, he would not forget this episode or the damning 
accusations made against him, particularly as Stalin had such a close role in 
investigating Tukhachevskii’s incrimination. Suspicions about the army elite would 
linger and Stalin would certainly have some nagging doubts about Tukhachevskii’s 
loyalty. The political police file on Tukhachevskii would also continue to expand. 
In February of 1931 operation vesna reached it apogee and took on an all-Union 
level. The different strands of investigation in Ukraine, Moscow and Leningrad were 
finally tied together on 16 February 1931 when the head of the OGPU in Ukraine, 
Vsevolod Balitskii, sent a telegram to Menzhinskii and Iagoda with ‘evidence’ of an 
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‘All-Union military-officer counterrevolutionary organisation’.142 In doing so Balitskii 
was acting in accordance with Menzhinskii and Iagoda’s wishes, who had previously 
urged him to apply harsher repressive measures applied in Ukraine and find ‘evidence’ 
of a much broader plot.143 Menzhinskii may have pushed Balitskii for ‘evidence’ of a 
wider plot to confirm his own suspicions about the true scale of the military specialist 
‘conspiracy’, but this would strengthen his argument that the army remained vulnerable 
to infiltration. As Stalin appears to have accepted Menzhinskii’s ‘evidence’ about the 
the military specialist plot, this meant that for the first time an extensive all-Union plot 
had been ‘discovered’ within the Red Army, with supposed links to foreign powers and 
whose members aimed at the overthrow of Soviet power during war. However, only a 
few months later, the operation reached its end in May 1931 and was gradually wound 
down.144 
Operation vesna had added to what was already a period of acute crisis. A major 
military specialist ‘plot’ had been ‘exposed’ at the same time as mass discharges were 
taking place in the rank-and-file. Indeed, the political police drew links between the two 
processes. In some of interrogation transcripts of arrested military specialists, they gave 
‘evidence’ that they believed peasant dissatisfaction towards collectivisation would 
cause uprisings in the countryside and weaken the Soviet regime. This would apparently 
allow a foreign intervention to successfully bring down the Bolshevik government.145 
As the ‘plot’ had been fabricated, such ‘evidence’ reveals more about the concerns of 
the political police and what type of conspiracy they were looking to uncover than any 
genuine threat. The political police seemed concerned about army vulnerability in times 
of social strain and they believed that hostile foreign countries may seize the 
opportunity to provoke discontent in the ranks. These concerns can be seen in political 
police materials of the late 1920s and early 1930s.146 Furthermore, the early 1930s 
represent a tipping point. Stalin would see clearly that his army remained vulnerable to 
                                                
142 Zdanovich, p. 390. 
143 Ibid., pp. 390-391. Zdanovich notes that a few members of the political police questioned the 
‘evidence’ of an All-Union plot, doubting the links between the various ‘counterrevolutionary’ military 
groups. However, they were soon criticised and the Politburo had them removed from their positions. 
Stalin must have believed the basis of the broader  all-Union ‘conspiracy’, see ibid, p. 393. 
144 Tynchenko, p. 238. 
145 See the interrogation of a certain military specialist, Akhdverov, from 7 January 1931, published in 
ibid., p. 421. Links between kulaks and the White émigrés had been made years before operation vesna at 
the start of forced grain requisitions in 1927, for example this link had been identified in the SKVO, see 
RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 70, l. 32. 
146 See a letter from the head of the political police to all police heads and heads of special departments in 
the military districts, printed in Zdanovich, pp. 668-669. 
 142 
infiltration at all levels and this is something he would never forget. In addition, the 
political police surely came out of the crisis period of the early 1930s strengthened. 
They played an assertive role towards both the rank-and-file discontent from 
collectivisation and the military specialist ‘plot’. PUR had been criticised by both the 
Central Committee and the political police for poor politicial work in the lower ranks 
and Menzhinskii had scored a victory with the discovery of a major military specialist 
‘conspiracy’. This would undermine Voroshilov’s leadership of the military and the 
confidence placed in him that he was able to keep army reliability in check. That 
Menzhinskii did not even inform Voroshilov about Tukhachevskii’s incrimination in 
1930 suggests this may have been his intention. But even though Stalin had hestitated 
again, this time in the face of Tukhachevskii’s incrimination and did not entirely 
endorse Menzhinskii’s ‘evidence’, he believed the basis of the broader military 
specialist ‘plot’. He saw that Menzhinskii brought results in guaranteeing army security. 
In comparison, Voroshilov still tended to downplay problems with army reliability.  
A final point on operation vesna concerns its legacy. The operation is commonly 
mentioned in the literature, usually, however, only briefly.147 Even in more detailed 
examinations the link to the military purge of 1937 is not fully explored.148 Indeed, it is 
easy to regard operation vesna and the later military purge during the Terror as separate 
episodes. The targets were very different. Operation vesna targeted primarily military 
specialists, who were already the subject of suspicion and were increasingly outsiders, 
occupying teaching roles in the military academies. During the Terror, the Red Army 
elite and the officer corps were targeted. Those who had contributed so much to 
reforming and reorganising the army, such as Tukhachevskii, were executed in 1937. 
However, even if the targets were different, the motivations for both purges were 
identical. Operation vesna was triggered by the foreign threat and those arrested were 
accused of plotting the downfall of the Soviet government with the assistance of foreign 
powers. The arrested military specialists were also charged with wrecking and sabotage. 
These are the exact accusations which would be used against members of the army elite 
in 1937-38. What was needed was for the officer corps and military elite to be seen with 
as much suspicion as the military specialists had been in the early 1930s. The 
incrimination of Tukhachevskii during operation vesna was an early sign that the 
                                                
147 Exceptions are the work of Tynchenko and Zdanovich. 
148 Tynchenko argues that at the very minimum operation vesna was a precursor for the military purge in 
1937, but his study does not analyse the similarities between the two. 
 143 
political police were beginning to develop suspicions about the loyalty of some of the 
most senior army officers.  
    
The previous chapter examined the perceived weaknesses in the reliability of the Red 
Army following the Civil War, in terms of what were seen as vulnerabilities to external 
and internal subversion. However, in emerging from the Civil War the Red Army was 
also militarily weak. Yet, attempts to push through military reform to make the army 
competitive with the armies of the capitalist states and ready for the inevitable war only 
exposed further weaknesses. Firstly, the Red Army elite proved to be divided and 
quarrelled over the direction and speed of army reform. These disputes were 
acrimonious, especially between Tukhachevskii, Budennyi and Voroshilov. A divided 
command would not produce the effective leadership required in the forthcoming 
conflict. In addition, the petitioning of Stalin about their grievances by both Voroshilov 
and Tukhachevskii reinforced an impression of disunity in the army leadership. The 
disputes between Tukhachevskii and Voroshilov continued into the 1930s and would 
not escape Stalin’s attention. Secondly, the industrialisation and the collectivisation 
drives, which aimed at increasing the power of the Soviet Union and prepare it for war, 
resulted in widespread discontent from peasant soldiers. The large wave of hostility in 
reaction to the collectivisation campaign undermined the Red Army’s ability to wage 
war effectively. Furthermore, as much of this hostility was explained by the political 
police as the consequence of an increase in ‘kulak agitation’ and ‘counterrevolutionary’ 
groups within the lower ranks, rather than soldiers’ legitimate grievances, this further 
reinforced the army’s perceived susceptibility to infiltration. Such ‘evidence’ of 
subversive activity would demonstrate again that the army could very easily be 
infiltrated by ‘enemies’. Thus, even though it was through both collectivisation and 
industrialisation that the Soviet regime would increase its strength, they also reaffirmed 
perceived weaknesses in army reliability. Finally, the initiation of operation vesna 
shows that the foreign threat to the military loomed continually. Even though the 
operation was carried out in an atmosphere of specialist baiting and the Cultural 
Revolution, it was the perceived threat from Poland towards Ukraine, supposedly 
backed by Britain, which provided the trigger. This supposed foreign threat enhanced 
the army’s perceived weakness of being seen as a target of foreign agents and capitalist 
conspiracy. At times of internal social strain, the political police feared that the army 
would become the target of ‘enemy’ agents looking to take advantage of military crises. 
 144 
In the case of operation vesna, the already suspect military specialists were perceived as 
potential recruits for foreign-backed counterrevolutionary plots. This large military 
specialist ‘plot’ would not be forgotten, particularly as it incriminated some of the 
leading members of the army elite. It undermined Voroshilov’s authority and enhanced 
Menzhinskii’s. But most importantly, for Stalin, it showed how easily a widespread 
foreign-sponsored ‘conspiracy’ could take root inside the Red Army. 
By 1932 more stability was brought to the military. The collectivisation 
campaign had eased and operation vesna had been brought to an end. In this respect it is 
accurate to say a period of crisis had been passed. This crisis was experienced in the 
rank-and-file, upper ranks, and between the military and civilian leadership. Of course, 
the end of the 1920s and early 1930s was not just defined by crisis. The army continued 
to modernise, defence spending was finally being increased, new tank and aircraft 
programs were introduced and military doctrine revised. The army was becoming more 
advanced and modernised through industrialisation. The military was finally gearing up 
for the future inevitable war. But what were seen as problems with army political 
reliability continued to cause alarm. Indeed as the next chapter will show, even though 
overt manifestations of army discontent were absent after 1932 and there were no 
further rebellions in the rank-and-file or very large ‘conspiracies’ ‘exposed’ by the 
political police, the image of the Red Army as vulnerable to subversion persisted. As 
the political pressure within the Bolshevik Party began to rise during the 1930s, this 
perceived vulnerability manifested in new forms. 
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Chapter Four: The Red Army and Bolshevik Party, 1930-36 
 
 
With the end of operation vesna and the easing of the collectivisation drive very large 
numbers of soldiers and military specialists had been discharged from the Red Army.1 
However, this had still not eliminated the perceived problem of those officers and 
soldiers deemed suspicious or unreliable serving in the ranks. Numerous ‘socially 
harmful’ and ‘socially alien’ individuals continued to be discovered in the army after 
1932. Spies, ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and various other ‘enemies’ also continued to be 
‘exposed.’ Even though there were no mass purges and arrests in the army until the 
Terror, efforts were made to remove these remaining ‘unreliable elements’ and 
‘enemies’. But as this chapter will show, this process saw little success. The officer 
corps and PUR were seen as incapable of rooting out ‘enemies’ independently. 
Dangerous ‘enemies’, including foreign agents, continued to go undiscovered at a time 
when the perceived espionage threat to the Soviet Union was seen as increasing. In this 
respect, there are strong indications of serious problems with self-policing within the 
Red Army. However, in response, Voroshilov tended to ignore the roots of these 
problems and vaguely called for ‘vigilance’ to be increased. This proved to be 
ineffective in improving the discovery of hidden ‘enemies’ and ultimately strengthened 
the position of the political police. Indeed, there are indications that Voroshilov was 
starting to lose ground to the political police in the first half of the 1930s as the army 
struggled to successfully ‘expose’ dangerous ‘enemies’ in the ranks. Furthermore, as the 
political atmosphere became tenser in the 1930s and Stalin assumed more direct control 
over the party, the military was immediately affected. As pressure increased on 
members of the former Opposition from 1934, it was impossible to ignore the former 
oppositionists in the army. As this chapter will show, several senior former army 
Trotskyists were arrested during the summer and autumn of 1936 and this provided 
‘evidence’ that the Red Army had been internally compromised by a Trotskyist military 
group. Finally, the rumours about an alleged connection between the Red Army high 
command and the Nazis trailed the military elite in the mid-1930s. These were surely 
added to the expanding police files on members from the army leadership. During the 
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1937-38 military purge this supposed connection between the Red Army and Germany 
was very prominent. As such, even though there were no mass arrests from the army 
before the outbreak of the military purge in 1937, this period revealed serious 
underlying perceived problems with army reliability, particularly within the officer 
corps and military elite. But most importantly, the summer of 1936 was the point when 
an alleged Trotskyist military group was ‘exposed’. This would quickly lead to growing 
calls for a deeper investigation into the Red Army and would pave the way for the 
military purge.  
 
Underlying Problems of Army Reliability in the Early 1930s 
 
 
The Soviet Union faced a number of international threats in the early 1930s which 
raised the prospect of imminent war for the first time. The most pressing of all was the 
increasingly aggressive stance taken by Japan, whose relations with the Soviet Union 
had worsened since the Japanese seizure of the jointly-owned Chinese Eastern Railway 
in 1929. In September 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, which was occupied by February 
1932 and a puppet state Manchukuo was established. Regular low-level fighting became 
commonplace along the border between the Soviet and Japanese troops and would 
continue into the 1930s.2 Why Japanese aggression was so threatening was that it raised 
a possibility of the Soviet Union having to fight a war on two fronts. This was prospect 
that both the Red Army and Soviet military industry were woefully prepared for. In 
addition, Soviet intelligence indicated Japan’s desire for a quick and decisive war.3 
Consequently, to try and forestall this perceived conflict the Soviet Foreign Commissar, 
Maxim Litvinov, offered a non-aggression pact in December 1931. This, however, was 
rebuffed by the Japanese government. At the same Soviet military power was also being 
strengthened. Stalin had brought Tukhachevskii back from Leningrad in response to the 
invasion of Manchuria. The army need to be stronger to counter the Japanese threat and 
Tukhachevskii was the person skilled enough to make this happen. He was trusted to the 
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important position of Director of Armaments and priority was given to defence.4 Even 
though bottlenecks, shortages and unfilled orders remained a problem as military 
industry struggled to fulfil growing demand, the Soviet Union was finally getting onto a 
war footing.5 Yet, the Japanese threat was only one part of the unstable international 
scene. The Bolsheviks still faced what they perceived as a hostile coalition of capitalist 
powers to the West. Even though the Great Depression was deepening in Europe and 
this made a major European conflict extremely unlikely, Stalin viewed events very 
differently. In accordance with Lenin’s Theory of Imperialism, it was when capitalism 
was in crisis that war became more likely. During an economic crisis capitalist states 
would apparently seek out new markets through conflict.6 For the Bolsheviks, the threat 
of war remained real and there was little change about which countries were seen as 
dangerous, with Poland, Britain, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Finland remaining 
high on the list. Germany, however, was an additional threat. Hitler’s coming to power 
in January 1933 brought a formal end to the military collaboration between Germany 
and the Soviet Union. The new threat from Nazism gradually became the focus of 
Soviet foreign policy in the mid-1930s.7 Finally the White movement was still active 
and intent on overthrowing Soviet power, adding a further complication to an already 
tense international scene. Admittedly, ROVS had lost much of its dynamism due to an 
ageing membership. It had also suffered the disappearance of its leader, General 
Kutepov, in Paris in January 1930, who had been kidnapped by the political police. He 
did not make it to the Soviet Union alive.8 The new leader of ROVS, General Evgenii 
Miller, was less forthright than Kutepov and eschewed terrorist activity, but he still 
represented a threat. Miller favoured planting agents within the Soviet Union who, at a 
point of internal crisis or foreign intervention, would assist in the overthrow of Soviet 
power. Subversive organisations such as the White youth intelligence group the ‘White 
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idea’ (Belaia ideia) operated within the Soviet Union.9 In addition, White groups in the 
east were reported as collaborating with Japan.10 Yet, the Whites independently had 
never been able to launch a serious intervention into Soviet territory and little had 
changed. Even though White subversion and espionage persisted, the larger threat of 
European war quickly came to eclipse any other danger. Stalin attempted to avoid the 
slide into war though collective security, a policy commonly associated with Litvinov 
that forged international alliances to counter the growing threat from fascism. But 
alongside open diplomacy, espionage was a key tool for all countries.11  
In a climate of approaching conflict and escalating military power, enhancing 
knowledge about a potential enemy had obvious importance. While the Soviet Union 
planted agents in other countries, the political police ‘exposed’ foreign agents within the 
Soviet Union with regularity in the early 1930s.12 Unsurprisingly, the Red Army 
continued to be perceived as a target of foreign intelligence. During the early 1930s 
there were frequent cases of the ‘exposure’ agents who had apparently infiltrated the 
ranks and occupied positions of responsibility.13 In addition, the late 1920s had seen a 
sharp rise in reported cases of soldiers deserting across the borders, apparently taking 
secret information with them to pass to foreign governments.14 Of course, it remained 
the case that not all the ‘exposed’ spies were genuine. The political police continued to 
use the same brutal interrogation techniques and actively sought out foreign agents. In 
addition, within an increasingly hostile international climate the political police no 
doubt searched more attentively for ‘enemies’. This guaranteed that ‘spies’ would be 
more frequently ‘exposed’ in the ranks as the political police searched for anyone who 
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Soviet Union, see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 39, l. 378. 
11 For a discussion of intelligence see Harris, ‘Encircled by Enemies’; Christopher Andrew and Julie 
Elkner, ‘Stalin and Foreign Intelligence’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 4, 1 (2003), 
69-94; John Ferris, ‘Intelligence’, in The Origins of World War Two, ed. by Boyce and Maiolo, pp. 308-
329. 
12 For the stream of intelligence received by Stalin previous to the Terror see Harris, ‘Encircled by 
Enemies’. Some of the revealed espionage groups could be extensive, such as the large Japanese spy ring 
exposed by the political police on 26 November 1932 in the Far East which had supposedly been 
organised by the Japanese General Staff. The members of the spy ring allegedly included former Whites, 
traders and kulaks, see RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 13, l. 2. 
13 See for example RGVA f. 37837, op. 21, d. 10, l. 366; op. 19, d. 19, l. 29; op. 9, d. 42, l. 45. For a rare 
case of spying for Turkey see, RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 615, l. 70. 
14 See Zdanovich, pp. 502-507. Zdanovich notes that the number of these cases increased during 1933 and 
that from 1 October 1932 to 20 June 1933, twenty Red Army men fled to Poland. For a case of an officer 
from the BVO apparently trying to escape to Poland with secret documents in December 1933, see 
RGVA, f. 37837, op. 10, d. 20, l. 22. 
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fit the profile. Thus the perceived scale of the espionage threat to the army would 
remain exaggerated. The alleged spy cases ‘exposed’ by the political police were 
diverse. For example, in December 1931, Gamarnik wrote to Stalin about a group of 
Latvian spies who had managed to enter Soviet territory. The group had apparently 
gained access to positions in the Red Army through a member of military intelligence.15 
Polish intelligence was seen as a grave threat.16 An OGPU circular of November 1932 
reported that Polish espionage had increased and that some agents had established links 
with the Red Army.17 In September 1932 spies working for the Japanese and Chinese 
intelligence services were ‘discovered’ in the OKDVA (Special Red Banner Far Eastern 
Army).18 In March 1933 Finnish spies were found in the LVO, also within military 
intelligence.19 In broader terms, the espionage threat was analysed in a report looking at 
threats to the army in 1933. This report argued that the more frequent discovery of 
foreign agents in general terms was an indication of how the ground was being prepared 
for an invasion of the Soviet Union, and that during 1933 the Red Army was the target 
of counterrevolution more than at any other time.20 According to this report, in 1932 
112 Red Army men had been arrested by the political police for espionage from a total 
of 8599 cases. In 1933 this had doubled to 224 army arrests from an increased grand 
total of 23,190 arrests.21 Thus, arrests for espionage had increased dramatically from 
1932 to 1933. Arrests for Polish espionage alone had seen a three-fold increase. The 
report also detailed that Japanese agents were collaborating with White groups in the 
Far East and German spies were targeting both the Red Army and defence industry, and 
had seen some success.22 The majority of the espionage cases in the military were from 
the sensitive border regions of the UVO, BVO, LVO and the Far East Region.23 This is 
understandable. These regions were on the periphery and the borders were porous. 
Larger numbers of foreign nationals lived in these areas. Thus, there was a large supply 
of those who could potentially be labelled as ‘foreign agents’. Indeed, several very large 
                                                
15 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 10, l. 341. For another group of soldiers supposedly working as Latvian spies 
from September 1934, see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 39, l. 46. 
16 Zdanovich, p. 77.  For examples of Polish espionage cases in the army from 1932-34 see, RGVA, f. 
37837, op. 21, d. 39, l. 360; d. 52, l. 53; d. 39, ll. 324-325. 
17 Zdanovich, p. 76. 
18 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 14, l. 592. For another Japanese spy case in the army from March 1934 see 
RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 63, l. 59. 
19 Zdanovich, p. 521. 
20 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 178, ll. 2-3. 
21 Ibid., l. 4. 
22 Ibid., l. 10. For ‘exposed’ German espionage groups see, ibid. l. 25; f. 37837, op. 21, d. 52, l. 44. 
23 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 178, l. 4. 
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spy rings were ‘exposed’ on the borders in the early 1930s.24 The troops stationed in 
these regions were seen as at an increased risk of infiltration and there are signs that the 
political police were unhappy with how they were being monitored. For example, the 
political police in the BVO noted that three quarters of the troops in the district were 
stationed close to the border which left them exposed to infiltration by intelligence 
agents. They called for more intense countermeasures.25  
As such, espionage was perceived to have increased greatly in general terms 
during 1933 and the Red Army continued to be seen as targeted by foreign agents. It is 
likely this sharp increase in reported espionage cases was tied to the worsening 
international situation. Hitler’s rise to power, increasing Japanese aggression and the 
persistent poor relations with countries such as Poland, no doubt compelled the political 
police further in the search to ‘expose’ spies. Yet, in examining the numbers alone, the 
number of espionage cases in the Red Army is not significant in comparison to the 
grand total, even taking into account the increase in army cases in 1933. But the actual 
scale of the espionage problem in the army may not have been the entire cause for 
alarm. What was problematic for Voroshilov was not simply the reported number of spy 
cases in the military, but PUR and the officer corps’ inability in rooting them out.  
Voroshilov was clearly concerned about how easily foreign agents were seen to 
be infiltrating into the Red Army and occupying positions of responsibility. On 2 
January 1932 the RVS published an order, signed by Voroshilov, on this very question. 
The order concerned a former commander of a tank battalion in the BVO, Mikhail 
Bozhenko, who had been given a promotion within the region. However, Bozhenko 
apparently turned out to be a Polish agent and had subsequently fled to Poland. 
Voroshilov was agitated that Bozhenko had been able to slip by and he accused the 
BVO Staff of not checking Bozhenko’s background, despite an already impressive list 
of accumulated ‘anti-moral offences’ previous to his promotion. Bozhenko had already 
been charged with having a ‘demobilisation mood’ and ‘counterrevolutionary Trotskyist 
mood’. In fact, he had been slated for discharge from the army the year before. This had 
                                                
24 For example, in a letter to Stalin and Molotov from February 1935, Mikhail Frinovskii, the head of the 
Chief Directorate for Border Troops of the political police, reported that in 1933 a large espionage group 
had been exposed on the border strip between Leningrad and Karelia. This was apparently organised by 
Finnish and Estonian intelligence. 1640 people were arrested. Frinovskii also noted that in 1933 
seventeen other Finnish spy groups had been liquidated, totalling 433 people, see RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 
1414, ll. 2-4.  
25 Document printed in Zdanovich, pp. 682-684. 
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even been ordered by the RVS.26 Voroshilov criticised this negligent attitude towards 
the promotion of officers and stressed the need for ‘unremitting’ Bolshevik vigilance 
and a closer scrutiny of officers by the command, PUR, the army political organisations 
and the komsomol’. Voroshilov pressed the importance of officer selection in the border 
regions, especially for the Air Force, the artillery units and the motorised and 
mechanised units.27 However, standards were not improved immediately. On 2 April 
1933 the same order was published again.28 This was clearly a reminder. Then a year 
later in August 1934 a Politburo commission issued an order concerning the promotion 
of officers and referenced the Bozhenko case again. This order called for careful 
background checks and criticised what it described as an inattentive approach to the 
study of the officer corps. In addition, the order also mandated the checking of the 
officers in the border districts within a three month period and the transfer of those 
regarded as less politically reliable to interior districts.29 The order stipulated that due to 
the importance of air, tank and artillery divisions, their commanders should be members 
of the party or from the komsomol only.30 Thus, the Bozhenko case had been used as an 
example three times during 1932-34. The original case was not a stand alone issue. It 
appears that there were persisting problems with the way background checks were 
conducted in the army. Perhaps, in the aftermath of operation vesna, a very large police 
operation which involved many arrests by mere incrimination alone, there was 
resistance from some officers and from PUR in being overly ‘vigilant’. Indeed, if an 
officer or political worker was constantly on the look out for unexposed foreign agents 
and ‘counterrevolutionaries’ serving with them, this may be rewarded, but it could also 
draw unwanted attention. Questions may be asked about why these dangerous ‘enemies’ 
had not been noticed before, especially after operation vesna had made it clear how 
easily ‘enemies’ could infiltrate the ranks. As such, some officers and political workers 
may have thought it was easier not to dig too deep in the search for dangerous ‘enemies’ 
to avoid any unwanted attention. In any case, Voroshilov’s calls for increased 
‘vigilance’ were never going to be effective. He was not addressing the reasons why 
‘vigilance’ was at a low level and why some officers were not performing proper 
background checks. Simply calling for more ‘vigilance’ did not engage with the 
                                                
26 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 10, d. 76, l. 55. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., l. 52. 
29 For cases of transfers from border regions to interior districts because of doubts about reliability or the 
individual having a connection abroad, see, RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 40, ll. 226, 231, 318. 
30 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 9, d. 42, l. 65.  
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problem seriously. It was an easy solution that would ultimately prove ineffective. 
Furthermore, the reference to the Bozhenko case by the Politburo indicates that Stalin 
had little confidence that reliable people were being promoted to command positions. 
Voroshilov may have started to feel pressure from above. But that he chose to merely 
call for more ‘vigilance’ suggests that he had no real solutions to the problem of the 
inadequate verification of officers, even though this was occurring at a time when the 
perceived threat from foreign espionage was increasing. But it was better to call for 
more ‘vigilance’ than do nothing at all. Importantly, these indications of a failure in 
army self-policing would only strengthen the political police’s pessimistic view of army 
reliability and emphasise how the military was unable to independently maintain its 
internal security. 
  What Voroshilov did instead was continue to publicly downplay any problems 
with army political reliability. For example, at a joint Plenum of the Central Committee 
and Central Control Commission in January 1933 he praised the apparent increasing 
reliability of the Red Army as a whole. According to Voroshilov, the number of 
workers within the command had reached forty percent, and sixty-one percent of 
officers were now party members.31 In March, Voroshilov reiterated this theme, 
highlighting that in 1933 peasants within the army had dropped to forty-seven percent. 
He pointed out that all the main commanders of military districts were now party 
members. Voroshilov’s tendency to inflate army achievements in public is clear with 
the remark: ‘Without any kind of exaggeration it is possible to say that in the business 
of the preparation of Bolshevik military cadres we have achieved enormous, decisive 
results.’32 Indeed, Voroshilov made a great deal of the military’s good performance 
during the Bolshevik Party membership purge (chistka) in 1933. Membership purges 
were common to the Bolshevik Party and were used to weed out members not living up 
to the standards of party life, be it for reasons of careerism, ‘passivity’ and criminality.33 
Soldiers and officers were expelled from the party during the chistka for numerous 
reasons, including hiding a background as a ‘social alien’, or being linked to one, for 
having an ‘anti-soviet mood’, or for passivity and poor party political work.34 The 1933 
chistka expelled 4.3% of the membership of the army party organisations, which was 
                                                
31 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 19, l. 63. 
32 Voroshilov, pp. 573-576. 
33 See Getty, Origins of the Great Purges, pp. 38-58. 
34 For individual examples of expulsions in the 1933 chistka see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 55, ll. 125-
325; op. 9, d. 42, l. 145. 
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much lower than the seventeen percent excluded from ten other civilian party 
organisations.35 In his speech to the Seventeenth Party Congress on 10 January 1934 
Voroshilov pointed out what he described as a ‘significant’ divergence of the chistka 
results between the army and the civilian party organisations.36 Indeed, the 1933 chistka 
had excluded fewer army party members than the previous chistka in 1929, which had 
expelled 5.04% from the army party organisations.37 These statistics were welcome 
news for Voroshilov. They were tangible figures providing ‘proof’ that military 
reliability was at a high level. Voroshilov was using these statistics to present a public 
image of a Red Army growing in internal cohesion and political reliability that he hoped 
could not be ignored. However, these statistics masked a range of serious underlying 
problems that had repercussions in perceptions of army reliability. 
Even after the mass discharges from the ranks during the late 1920s and early 
1930s the Red Army was still not entirely stable, regardless of the assurances from PUR 
in 1932. Despite the numerous ‘socially alien’ and ‘socially harmful’ individuals 
discharged from the army during 1929-32, large numbers continued to be ‘discovered’. 
Discharges of those deemed ‘socially harmful’ carried on during 1932 and increased in 
1933. Evidently, the army may well have regained some stability after the turmoil of 
collectivisation, but the composition of the military Red Army remained far from ideal. 
According to the above report from 1933 that examined threats to the army, 22,308 
individuals, including kulaks, former Whites, and ‘anti-soviet elements’ were 
discharged from the army in that year. This represented a huge increase from the 3889 
discharged during 1932. The largest group discharged in 1933 were ‘kulaks’. Indeed, 
during 1933 there was a reported increase in the number of alleged kulak groups 
operating within the Red Army.38 In addition, the Military Procuracy reported persistent 
wrecking activity aimed at armaments and it criticised the OO OGPU and military 
                                                
35 Those excluded from the party appear initially to not have been discharged from the army. However, in 
October 1933 Anton Bulin and Feldman wrote to Voroshilov suggesting that for those excluded from the 
party for being ‘class aliens,’ for keeping their past secret (for example previous service in the White 
armies), or for ‘double-dealers’, ‘careerists’, the morally degenerate and those obstructing military 
preparation and discipline, to discharge from the army as well. This suggestion was adopted in October 
and a corresponding resolution was sent to all districts, see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 21, ll. 16-18. 
36Voroshilov, p. 611. 
37 RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 23, l. 94. However, the 1933 chistka appears to have only been conducted in 
sixty percent of army party organisations, see ibid., l. 101. 
38 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 178, ll. 27-28. In addition, in March 1933 the OO OGPU contacted Feldman 
about an increase in ‘negative behaviours’ and dissatisfaction within the Red Army during the last quarter 
of 1932 and into January 1933. They had highlighted anti-soviet groups, soldiers with links to class 
aliens, but also alcoholics and those simply deemed ‘dissatisfied’, see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 39, l. 
345. 
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industry for not doing enough to combat this. 39 In a March 1933 report, the OO OGPU 
detailed some of these counterrevolutionary groups that had been ‘exposed’ within the 
army. Some of the charges against the alleged groups included planning terrorist acts 
and actively working to undermine the command. Some supposedly planned to murder 
Stalin.40 Aviation in particular saw growing alleged counterrevolutionary crimes. The 
political police saw this as an explanation for the increase in accidents, such as aircraft 
crashes.41 The results of inefficiencies in construction and poor pilot preparation were 
still framed as ‘evidence’ of sabotage.  
Why there was such a very large increase in discharges in 1933 could be because 
the political police began pushing harder to find ‘enemies’ in the army within an 
increasingly threatening international environment. The political police were probably 
conscious of the remaining ‘unreliable elements’ in the ranks, who they had pointed to 
as causing so much trouble during collectivisation. The 1933 report on threats to the 
army specifically noted that having large numbers of peasants in the ranks gave foreign 
agents more opportunities to create espionage networks.42 Therefore, the political police 
may have viewed the remaining ‘socially-harmful’ and ‘alien elements’ in the army as a 
large pool of potential recruits for foreign agents and tried to secure further discharges. 
In addition, a severe famine in Ukraine during 1932-33 also caused a new wave of 
discontent in the army, similar to that seen during collectivisation.43 This would lead to 
another round of discharges in response. Therefore, even after the conclusion of 
operation vesna and easing of collectivisation, the Red Army was not seen as free from 
perceived ‘unreliable elements’. The political police still probably had the military 
firmly in its sights and were searching to expose ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and foreign 
agents. In addition, it is possible that the political police were trying to undermine 
Voroshilov’s public assurances that the army was secure. It is hardly likely they 
accepted Voroshilov’s public defence of army reliability and would be aware of its 
problems with self-policing. Perhaps emboldened by their recent success in operation 
vesna, they kept up the pressure on the military. In this respect, despite giving a good 
performance in the 1933 chistka, the underlying problems in the Red Army persisted, in 
terms of both its composition and levels of criminality. Voroshilov made no mention of 
                                                
39 RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 145, ll. 37-39. 
40 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 39, l. 360. See also ibid., l. 154; d. 52, ll. 116, 182 for other such groups 
exposed by the political police in 1934. 
41 Document published in Zdanovich, see p. 697. 
42 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 178, l. 3. 
43 Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, p. 49. 
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these problems publicly, but he certainly was very aware of them. He, of course, 
remained ultimately responsible for army reliability and so pushed instead an image of a 
united and loyal Red Army.  
Even though Voroshilov did not mention these problems in public, efforts were 
made to discharge the remaining ‘unreliable elements’ from the ranks. Alongside the 
political police, the army played a key role in the increase in discharges in 1933. 
Regular purge commissions, chaired at military district and RVS level, met to discharge 
or make transfers of these individuals from the ranks and the officer corps.44 The 
reasons for discharge were wide ranging. Many fell under a category of being a ‘social 
alien’, for example former Whites who had not declared their past service, or the sons of 
kulaks or priests. Individuals were also discharged for having undeclared relations 
abroad. Discharges were also made for more serious crimes, including membership of a 
counterrevolutionary group or, more commonly, having an ‘anti-soviet mood’. Within 
the Russian Military Archives there are numerous documents sent from the OO OGPU 
to the army leadership petitioning for the arrest and/or demobilisation of soldiers for 
their supposed counterrevolutionary or anti-soviet activity.45 However, a large number 
of discharges were for more mundane reasons such as alcoholism, having weak health, 
for being undisciplined or conducting poor political work. 
However, in a similar manner to the problems with the promotion of officers 
seen in the Bozhenko case, mistakes were also being made in regard to discharges. For 
example, on 4 July 1933 Voroshilov sent a circular to all military districts about the 
numerous complaints he and the Main Administration of the Red Army had received 
from officers about incorrect discharges. Voroshilov argued that there was a lack of 
‘sufficient attention’ being paid to the important issue of discharging officers. Using 
similar language to the Bozhenko case, Voroshilov argued that such a ‘formalistic’ 
approach to discharges was not a small issue and that he could give many other 
examples.46 Indeed, in April 1934 Voroshilov gave another order on discharges, giving 
an example of the incorrect demobilisation of a Red Army man and publicised the 
                                                
44 For examples of commissions throughout 1933-35 see, RGVA, f. 37837, op. 10, d. 23, ll. 2-103; d. 20, 
ll. 28-88, 199-207, 265-271. 
45 For individual cases of counterrevolutionary activity within the ranks in 1932-34 highlighted most 
commonly by the OO OGPU, see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 19, d. 29, ll. 28, 32, 229, 249; op. 21, d. 10, ll. 
239-502; d. 39, ll. 72, 289, 392; d. 52, ll. 25-228; op. 10, d. 26, l. 35; op. 9, d. 42, ll. 20-21, 136. Not all 
cases resulted in the discharge and some soldiers were transferred to the reserves. 
46 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 21, l. 9. 
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reprimand given to the officer responsible.47 The problem of incorrect discharges was 
widespread enough to warrant Voroshilov’s intervention and when seen alongside the 
problems of promoting reliable officers, there are strong indications that the system of 
the verification of army personnel was breaking down.48 But again, there is probably 
more to this than officers and political workers simply not checking the grounds for 
discharges. Some officers may have been making a conspicuous show of being vigilant 
and making discharges on weak grounds. They perhaps had worries about the potential 
consequences of finding dangerous ‘enemies’ such as spies in their commands and 
whether they in turn would become the subject of scrutiny. It was maybe easier to 
respond to Voroshilov’s calls to raise ‘vigilance’ by making groundless discharges in an 
attempt to cultivate a reputation of being vigilant. This avoided having to actually 
search and ‘expose’ dangerous ‘counterrevolutionaries’ or foreign agents, which could 
have consequences. Indeed, the reason for the incorrect discharge in the example given 
by Voroshilov in April 1934 was for being the son of a kulak. This was a minor issue 
(and evidently this was not even true). In this respect, as in the Bozhenko case, there are 
suggestions that some officers may have been using tactics to avoid searching for the 
dangerous ‘enemies’ in the ranks. Over the next two years there were further criticisms 
from the army leadership of officers making discharges for minor crimes, sometimes on 
a large scale, while those regarded as more dangerous ‘enemies’ were being missed. In 
addition, Voroshilov’s accusation that this behaviour was evidence of ‘formalism’ does 
not give the full picture. It is very likely that Voroshilov appreciated the deeper reality. 
This was not merely a problem of incorrect discharges and promotions. These were only 
the symptoms of a more serious issue. This was the attitude and approach of some 
officers towards searching for ‘enemies’ in the ranks. By calling for more ‘vigilance’ 
Voroshilov was not effectively tackling this problem. His focus on weak ‘vigilance’ and 
‘formalism’ in the command may have been an attempt to turn attention away from 
these underlying problems that he did not know how to solve. Once again, Voroshilov’s 
criticisms of weak ‘vigilance’ were unlikely to bring any substantive changes. 
                                                
47 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 10, d. 26, l. 37. In this particular case the OO also acknowledged the mistake, see 
ibid l. 49.  
48 Voroshilov certainly had an uphill struggle in tightening standards for discharges. For example, a Main 
Administration of the Red Army report from April 1934 noted that in the Staff of the LVO relevant 
materials for the discharge of army men were still not being studied correctly. Indeed the report noted that 
from the protocols of the RVS commission in the LVO it was not clear if anyone had even read the 
relevant materials for the discharges. The report noted such a situation placed fulfilling Voroshilov’s 
order under doubt, see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 10, d. 23, l. 107. 
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A lesson of the consequences of this apparent ‘weak vigilance’ in the officer 
corps was soon given through the ‘Nakhaev Affair’ in 1934. On 5 August, A. Nakhaev, 
the Chief of the Staff of the artillery battalion of Osoaviakhim, attempted to lead a 
revolt from the Moscow barracks and tried to enlist trainees to help him.49 However, 
Nakhaev lacked sufficient numbers and the revolt was a failure. He was subsequently 
arrested. Stalin’s deputy, Lazar Kaganovich, wrote to the General Secretary about the 
incident, informing him that the initial investigation had given the impression that 
Nakhaev had psychological problems. Kaganovich added that Voroshilov had described 
Nakhaev as a ‘psychopath’ and placed blame on Osoaviakhim, commenting that they 
had ‘messed up here’.50 As such, there was nothing particularly special about the case. 
However, in his reply Stalin presented a very different version of events. On 8 August 
he wrote to Kaganovich:  
 
The Nakhaev affair is about a piece of scum. He is, of course (of course!), not alone. He 
must be put up against the wall and forced to talk – to tell the whole truth and then 
severely punished. He must be a Polish-German (or Japanese) agent…He called on 
armed people to act against the government – so he must be destroyed.51 
 
The difference between Kaganovich’s and Stalin’s explanation is striking. That Stalin 
saw the influence of a foreign hand is prominent, despite being far removed from the 
Nakhaev case (Stalin was in Sochi at the time). Stalin said he was certain that Nakhaev 
was a foreign agent. As the recorded scale of foreign espionage had increased greatly 
only the year before, this perhaps explains why Stalin argued that Nakhaev was a spy. 
In pushing this explanation he may have been signalling that he believed espionage was 
a more serious problem than others, and in need of attention. In his reply Kaganovich 
fell quickly into line, agreeing that Stalin was ‘absolutely right’ in his assessment.52  
Despite being an Osoaviakhim matter, the Nakhaev arrest affected the Red 
Army directly. As a revolt had been attempted at the Moscow barracks Stalin ordered 
that Kork, the commander of the MVO, be called in and given a ‘tongue-lashing for the 
heedless and sloppy conduct in the barracks’. Kork was later removed from his post. 
                                                
49 Osoaviakhim was the ‘Society to Assist Defence, Aviation and Chemical Development’, an 
organisation for civil defence, in particular military training. While not being strictly an army 
organisation, it had links to the Red Army and importantly Nakhaev’s revolt had occurred at the Moscow 
barracks.  
50 The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, ed. by Davies and others, p. 246. 
51 Ibid., p. 248. 
52 Ibid. The investigation of Nakhaev linked him to a former General Bykov, who worked at the Institute 
of Physical fitness and was allegedly an Estonian intelligence agent, see ibid., p. 264. 
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Stalin also told Voroshilov to issue an order regarding the ‘sloppy conduct’ at the 
barracks.53 Voroshilov no doubt came under further pressure about undiscovered 
‘enemies’ in the army after Nakhaev’s failed revolt. It would highlight further how 
standards of ‘vigilance’ were not being maintained by the officer corps. In punishing 
Kork, Stalin clearly felt that he personally was not doing a good enough job of securing 
the MVO and this was allowing dangerous foreign agents to gain responsible positions. 
It is likely that Stalin saw this as problem that went further than Kork alone. Indeed, 
Stalin was kept notified about espionage within the Red Army at this time. For example, 
on 17 February 1934, Iagoda had sent him an intercepted telegram from the Japanese 
military attaché in Moscow, Kavabe. In the telegram Kavabe detailed that he had been 
speaking with the head of foreign relations for the Red Army, A. A. Sagin. In his 
comments, Iagoda requested that Sagin be removed from his position, suspecting he had 
been passing secrets to the Japanese.54 Stalin would expect Voroshilov to take more 
action to secure army reliability in light of the ‘Nakhaev Affair’ and other high-profile 
espionage cases, but as noted, Voroshilov had very few solutions to this problem. The 
OO OGPU, however, also took a lesson from the Nakhaev case. In a report from 
September 1934 they noted that in conditions of approaching war the special 
departments needed to work especially hard to combat enemies within the ranks. They 
noted a range of reports about the presence of ‘counterrevolutionaries’ within the army 
and Nakhaev was given as an example.55 The political police intended to keep up their 
pressure on the army and this should have been concerning for Voroshilov, who was 
well aware that his officers and PUR were failing to ‘expose’ dangerous ‘enemies’. If 
this continued it would undermine his authority and the trust placed in his leadership of 
the Red Army. Finally, Nakhaev had supported the Trotskyist Opposition during 1926-
28 and had been expelled from the party and the discharged from the army.56 This was 
not prominent in 1934 and Stalin’s certainty that Nakhaev was a foreign agent overrode 
anything else. But as the political atmosphere became tenser within the Bolshevik Party, 
former Trotskyists quickly reemerged as a dangerous subversive threat to the military. 
    
                                                
53 Ibid., p. 252. 
54 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 186, ll. 79-81. 
55 Document printed in Zdanovich, p. 700. 
56 Ibid., p. 326. 
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Growing Political Pressures and the Red Army Elite 
 
 
During the early 1930s, with war looming and the international situation worsening, the 
atmosphere within the Bolshevik Party became tenser as Stalin assumed greater power 
and control. Stalin suppressed any resistance to the radical policies of collectivisation 
and industrialisation. Indeed, even though the ‘Left Opposition’ had been defeated in 
the late 1920s and the ‘Right Deviation’ had been crushed shortly after, vestiges of 
dissatisfaction towards Stalin and his policies remained within the party. These were not 
as organised as they had been in the 1920s, but were still taken very seriously and 
quickly closed down. Indeed, such discontent often manifested within the lower tiers of 
the party and posed a danger of expanding throughout the rank-and-file.57  
However, in the early 1930s, the rumours which had been so prominent a few 
years earlier about a ‘Russian Bonaparte’ and disloyalty within the army elite could 
converge with this lower-level party criticism of Stalin. For example, in December 
1930, Sergei Syrtsov, the Chairman of the Soviet Government and Vissarion 
Lominadze, the First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, were 
expelled from the Central Committee having been accused of forming a ‘left-right bloc’ 
because of their opposition to the severity of collectivisation.58 But, interestingly, the 
‘Syrtsov-Lominadze Affair’ also affected Uborevich in the army elite. Part of the case 
against Syrtsov was a denunciation given by a Secretary of a party cell at the Institute of 
Red Professors, B. Resnikov. This denunciation detailed that Syrtsov had apparently 
spoken about mooted party plans for Voroshilov to take Rykov’s position as the head of 
the Soviet Government, and that Voroshilov was going to be replaced at the head of the 
army by Uborevich. Syrtsov allegedly described the latter as ‘unprincipled’, ‘devilishly 
narcissistic’ and a ‘clear Thermidor’.59 The political intrigues aside, the unflattering 
description of Uborevich is very reminiscent of the rumours about a ‘Russian 
Bonaparte’ so common to the 1920s. In addition, a similar declaration was made in the 
investigation by another party member, a certain Nusinov, who had described a small 
gathering, supposedly including Syrtsov, where the ‘mood’ of the Red Army was said to 
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have been discussed. Syrtsov had apparently brought up Uborevich’s name, describing 
him as very talented, but narcissistic. In addition, Nusinov acknowledged that he did not 
know Uborevich particularly well but pointed to an incident when the former had been 
proposed for candidacy to the Central Committee. Apparently, Uborevich’s suitability 
had been heatedly discussed and some members were very opposed.60 According to 
Nusinov, he had been passed a note describing Uborevich as a capable person, but with 
little experience in party affairs. The note also apparently described that Uborevich 
regarded himself as a ‘Napoleon’.61 The accuracy of Resnikov and Nusinov’s 
denunciations is difficult to assess. Denunciations are open to falsehoods and 
fabrications. But even if both were manifestly false, it is still interesting why 
Uborevich’s name appeared within this factional party case. Clearly Uborevich’s name 
had associations of disloyalty and of being a potential ‘Russian Bonaparte’. Such 
associations were not publicly voiced, but could surface in private and were perhaps 
held in some party circles. 
1932 saw a similar case to the ‘Syrtsov-Lominadze Affair’, but this time 
Tukhachevskii’s name appeared. During November and December, N. B. Eismont, the 
People’s Commissar for Supply, V. N. Tolmachev, a department head in Transport, E. 
P. Ashukina, Chief of the Personal Planning Department in the Commissariat for 
Agriculture, and another party member, V. F. Poponin, were arrested for allegedly 
having ‘counterrevolutionary’ conversations. The men had supposedly gathered at 
Eismont’s apartment, drank heavily and were accused of speaking critically about 
Stalin. There was allegedly some talk of his removal.62 What raised the seriousness of 
this case was the involvement of A. P. Smirnov, a senior party figure and the Chairman 
of the Public Housing Commission of the Central Executive Committee. He was also 
questioned.63 During the investigation into the group, Tukhachevskii’s name was 
mentioned in a similar manner as Uborevich’s two years previously. In Poponin’s 
declaration he remarked that Eismont had allegedly asked about Tukhachevskii’s 
‘mood’. The context of the conversation between Poponin and Eismont had apparently 
been the outbreak of war, peasant rebellion and where the government could find 
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support.64 In this respect, asking about Tukhachevskii’s ‘mood’ suggests Eismont 
thought his loyalty was not guaranteed. As the group were supposedly 
‘counterrevolutionary’ the implications were more sinister. However, as in the Syrtsov-
Lominadze case it is very difficult to authenticate these denunciations, but even if 
entirely false, it remains interesting why Tukhachevskii’s name appeared. It would seem 
that, like Uborevich, Tukhachevskii’s name was loaded with associations of disloyalty 
and these could surface when accusations were flying over ‘counterrevolution’. 
Furthermore, both the Syrtsov-Lominadze and Eismont-Tolmachev cases located the 
idea of army betrayal more firmly within party circles, linking this to what was viewed 
as factionalism. There is also the possibility that as Tukhachevskii had been 
incriminated in operation vesna the political police had lingering suspicions about him 
and other members of the military elite. They may have tried to steer the testimony in 
both cases to find out if some senior officers were connected to either alleged 
‘counterrevolutionary’ group. Indeed, at the very same time as Eismont-Tolmachev 
investigation was underway the political police received further rumours about 
Tukhachevskii. Reports were received from Berlin about an alleged plot with 
Tukhachevskii at its head. However, in this case Iagoda apparently brushed this off as 
disinformation.65 Even so, this was another reminder that Tukhachevskii was subject to 
significant speculation about his loyalty. Indeed, reports from Berlin about alleged 
disloyalty in the army elite and supposed preparations for a military coup were regularly 
received by the political police through their agents. These were received in December 
1932, June 1933, March, April and December 1934. Even if such reports were regarded 
as nothing more than disinformation, they would surely be added to the growing files on 
the relevant members of the army elite.66  
As such, for now, despite being named in both cases of party ‘factionalism’ 
there were no noticeable consequences for Tukhachevskii and Uborevich. Both kept 
their high-ranking positions and Tukhachevskii’s career maintained an impressive 
upwards trajectory. In February 1933 he received the Order of Lenin and in 1934 both 
he and Uborevich became candidate members of the Central Committee.67 The 
incriminations in both cases were only indirect and clearly not strong enough to build a 
case against Tukhachevskii or Uborevich. Furthermore, both were talented and 
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experienced military leaders. The army would be worse off without them. Stalin would 
gain nothing from having them arrested on the basis of indirect ‘evidence’, though these 
new incriminations would have almost certainly been kept ‘on file’. Indeed, Stalin had 
what he needed if he did change his mind about Tukhachevskii or Uborevich in the 
future. 
Trotskyism also remained a simmering issue in the Red Army in the 1930s. 
Despite the crushing of the Left Opposition in the 1920s and the recantation of many 
former army oppositionists, active ‘Trotskyist agitation’ remained a cause of arrest and 
discharge in the army. According to the report noted above examining threats to the 
army in 1933, Trotskyist groups were still identified as trying to organise 
counterrevolutionary groups within the ranks.68 Thus, low-level arrests for ‘Trotskyist 
activity’ continued into the early 1930s.69 In addition, the political police had initiated 
surveillance over some senior former army Trotskyists. For example, even after several 
senior army Trotskyists had recanted their ‘political errors’ in the late 1920s, the 
political police remained unconvinced about their sincerity. In August 1933 they created 
a file on the former Trotskyist Primakov, who was sent abroad as a military attaché in 
1927, but recanted his opposition the following year. Crucially, the memorandum noted 
that: ‘in June 1928 he gave a declaration about breaking with the Opposition of a 
double-dealing (dvurushnicheskogo) character, having actually maintained his 
Trotskyist positions’.70 The memorandum called for close observation of Primakov in 
view of exposing his suspected subversive work and Trotskyist activity.71 In addition, 
the former Trotskyist brigade commander, M. Ziuk, had told the political police that, 
apparently, another former Trotskyist, Ie. Dreitser, had contacted him and proposed 
starting their underground activity again.72 The veracity of Ziuk’s statement or whether 
Primakov was in fact a ‘double-dealer’ is difficult to gauge. The political police had 
shown alarmism about the Trotskyist threat in the 1920s, but it is clear that they 
remained concerned about this influence in the army. They did not trust those 
Trotskyists who had recanted. Indeed, it is not out of the question that some former 
Trotskyist officers were actually meeting once again, even if they were not ‘conspiring’ 
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or agitating against Stalin. It is certain that some former Trotskyists would not have 
admitted their ‘political errors’ sincerely. Some would have accepted the need to recant 
for the sake of keeping their positions and party membership, but privately would 
remain dissatisfied and discontented with Stalin’s leadership. Some former Trotskyists 
may well have continued to meet each other in the early 1930s after they believed the 
pressure had eased.73 Yet, as far as the political police were concerned, any gathering of 
former Trotskyists was suspicious, and perhaps evidence of a ‘conspiracy’, and they 
were keeping watch. However, the increased attention Primakov received in 1933 did 
not halt his advancement in the army. In January 1935 he was made a member of the 
Military Soviet, one of the army’s highest bodies.74 That year he also became deputy 
commander of the LVO, an important strategic military district. Thus, being a former 
Trotskyist in the army under political police observation did not always stifle a military 
career. It is possible that Voroshilov was unaware of the surveillance over Primakov. He 
had been kept out of the loop regarding Tukhachevskii’s incrimination in operation 
vesna and the political police may have done so again, perhaps sensing another 
opportunity to undermine Voroshilov in front of Stalin. It is hardly likely they were 
happy that Voroshilov had given Primakov responsible intelligence tasks in Japan. 
Therefore, if it did turn out that he was up to anything suspicious, this would reflect 
badly on Voroshilov. Though, if Voroshilov did know about the surveillance, he may 
have preferred to ignore the suspicions surrounding Primakov. Indeed, scrutinising 
Primakov could clear the way for a wider investigation into ‘suspicious’ former 
Trotskyists occupying other command positions. Voroshilov must have known this 
would result in the ‘exposure’ of other ‘enemies’ missed by the officer corps and PUR, 
and this would undermine his leadership. Or perhaps Voroshilov genuinely believed 
Primakov was reliable, in the same way that he seemed to believe in Putna’s loyalty in 
the late 1920s. In the first half of the 1930s former Trotskyists were not seen in the 
same threatening terms that they were in 1936. However, as the 1930s progressed the 
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pressure on members of the former Opposition increased dramatically and Voroshilov 
was soon confronted with the problem of hidden Trotskyists in the ranks. 
      
The Kirov Murder 
 
 
On 1 December 1934 Sergei Kirov, the Leningrad Party Secretary, was shot outside his 
office in the Smolny Building in Leningrad by a lone assassin, a disgruntled party 
member Leonid Nikolaev. The repercussions of the murder were profound. Following 
the assassination the apparatus of repression was scaled upwards and an emergency 
degree was rushed through by the Politburo, the law of 1 December 1934. This 
shortened the process of arrest and trial for those accused of terrorism. Under the law 
there would be no right to appeal and immediate execution if guilt was established.75 
There has been much speculation in the literature about whether Stalin had a role in the 
Kirov murder as a means to increase the apparatus of repression and expand his 
power.76 But while there is no evidence that Stalin had a hand in the murder itself, that 
he exploited it is beyond question.77 Indeed, as some of the initial arrests were of former 
Zinovievites, Stalin used the Kirov murder to implicate the former oppositionists 
Zinoviev and Kamenev.78 Both were later arrested and charged with creating the 
conditions by which the assassination could occur. They supposedly had ‘moral 
complicity’ and received prison sentences. On 18 January 1935 the Central Committee 
sent a secret letter to all party organisations relaying the charges against Zinoviev and 
Kamenev and about the existence of a Zinovievite counterrevolutionary group, the 
‘Leningrad Centre’. The letter also mentioned apparent ties between the Centre and 
German fascists.79 The murder increased political tensions and in February 1935 
hundreds of former oppositionists were arrested in Leningrad. However, in the 
immediate aftermath of the Kirov murder the arrests were not targeted. These have been 
described by Getty as ‘spasmodic and unfocused’.80 The regime was thrashing around in 
the wake of the murder of the Leningrad Party Boss. Yet, there has been very little 
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analysis over whether the Red Army was affected by this kneejerk reaction and what the 
consequences of the Kirov murder were for the military.81 
The Kirov assassination did play some role in several military arrests from 
December and into January 1935. For example, the charge of ‘counterrevolutionary 
agitation in reference to the murder of Kirov’ appeared on some indictments. Shortly 
after the assassination, sixty-three Red Army men, including twenty officers, were 
arrested for connections to Zinoviev.82 In addition, from 1 December 1934 to 20 
January 1935, forty-three soldiers were arrested in the MVO for apparently having 
‘counterrevolutionary moods’ linked to the murder of Kirov.83 Similar cases can be seen 
in other military districts.84 However, theses arrests did not represent a targeted scrutiny 
of the army and the military elite seemed initially unconcerned about any negative 
consequences in the army following the shooting. Nine days after the shooting the Red 
Army held the inaugural meeting of the Military Soviet and Kirov was hardly 
mentioned at all.85 His name was only mentioned twice throughout the three day 
meeting and only once in terms of how the murder represented the growing class 
struggle.86 There were no calls whatsoever to launch an investigation in the army or to 
purge the ranks of suspicious individuals. Where Kirov was mentioned, he was used as 
an example of how the army needed to raise its ‘vigilance’. This was not a new 
complaint. Yet, despite the few references made to Kirov, the army leadership were not 
entirely at ease over ‘enemies’ within the ranks. 
During the Military Soviet numerous formulaic pronouncements were made by 
participants about the increasing quality of political work and how the troops were more 
closely aligned around the party and Stalin. However, some more worrying trends were 
noted which give a clearer impression of the problems within the army which ran deeper 
than ‘weak vigilance’. For example, the deputy head of PUR, Anton Bulin, noted that in 
a recent check of the political reliability of forty-five military formations, thirteen were 
appraised as ‘good’, twenty-seven as ‘satisfactory’ and five as ‘unsatisfactory’. There 
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was clearly room for improvement. Bulin also criticised ‘forms of bureaucratic cabinet 
leadership’, which suggested that some officers and political workers did not know their 
rank-and-file soldiers well enough.87 Apparently, it was this detachment that allowed 
‘enemies’ to go undetected. Bulin also argued that even when a satisfactory general 
appraisal was given for political reliability, this could mask the ‘enemies’ who are 
working within.88 Good appraisals provided little incentive to root out ‘enemies’. Yet, 
as much as positive appraisals may have induced genuine complacency within the 
officer corps, they may also have been used by some as a good excuse not to dig any 
deeper into a regiment to look for foreign agents and ‘counterrevolutionaries’. A good 
appraisal was an effective means of avoiding attention. Most interestingly, Gamarnik 
criticised the ‘formalistic’ manner over which reprimands were being applied to 
soldiers, leaving some divisions with sixty to seventy percent of the soldiers having 
some kind of reprimand. In describing the practice as ‘formalistic’, Gamarnik viewed 
this as mechanistic, being without thought or consideration. He also noted that 
reprimands were given as an easy alternative to proper political education.89  A 
reprimand of this type would be given for a minor crime, and certainly not a political 
crime, which would lead to arrest or discharge. As such, not only was political 
education not being conducted correctly, but reprimands for minor crimes were being 
given out on mass. Again, this could suggest that some officers were taking the easy 
route out and not tackling the real problems of ‘enemies’ in their units. They were 
perhaps resorting to mass reprimands as an overt demonstration that they were in fact 
‘vigilant’. This way an officer could avoid tackling the more difficult problem of 
potential political ‘enemies’ and foreign agents in the ranks while still giving the 
impression of being duly alert against criminality. The ‘exposure’ of political enemy or 
spy, of whom an arrest may draw attention back to the commanding officer, was 
avoided. This criticism about reprimands was similar to Voroshilov’s earlier orders 
condemning incorrect discharges. But most damningly, Gamarnik noted that those who 
gave inspections of their own troops often exaggerated these in a positive light. The 
defects and problems in the army were being smoothed over. Gamarnik cautioned 
against embellishing successes and argued that this allowed ‘enemies’ to get into the 
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ranks. He remarked, ‘under our very nose the enemy is huddled near us’.90 Thus, there 
are further indications that some officers were deliberately not tackling the real 
problems with political reliability under their commands, through exaggerating their 
own stability and discharging soldiers needlessly. It is likely this was the reality behind 
the complaints about poor ‘vigilance’.  
The political police had a presence at the Military Soviet in M. I. Gai, the head 
of the Main Administration of State Security of the NKVD in the army. He kept up the 
pressure on Voroshilov by presenting a picture of an army highly vulnerable to 
infiltration.91 Gai pointed to an increasing espionage threat and the growing activity of 
foreign intelligence agents on Soviet territory. He argued that foreign agents were not 
simply collecting intelligence but were engaged in ‘the organisation of diversionary 
acts’.92 Spy residencies were apparently being created which would activate at a time of 
war.93 Gai noted that he could give several examples of poor ‘vigilance’ in the 
command and barracks, and made a note of the Nakhaev case.94 Gai also complained 
that the study of people in the army had not been given suitable attention and 
consequently harmful ‘socially alien elements’ were often exposed. According to Gai, 
this problem was not confined to the ranks, but was present in the officer corps.95 Gai 
argued that such people were the ‘direct agents of the enemy’, who, using false 
documents, were able to get into responsible positions in the army and pointed to former 
White officers with links to the émigré groups who had apparently managed to get 
command positions.96 Thus, according to the political police, the Red Army was still at 
a high risk from infiltration and this was no time to be complacent. They were 
maintaining their focus and keeping up the pressure on the military in the context of a 
perceived increase in foreign espionage, and were emphasising the danger from external 
‘enemies’ and subversives. In his final speech Voroshilov pointed to the political 
stability of the military noting its strength and praised the work which had been done to 
achieve this. However, he argued that traitors had no place in the army and if they did 
appear this was the consequence of weak vigilance. He pressed the need once more to 
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raise this.97 But criticising ‘vigilance’ did not get to the heart of the problems detailed 
above. This was not a serious approach in tackling these issues. It seems that 
Voroshilov still did not have any credible solutions to these symptoms of a failure in 
army self-policing. However, Voroshilov was in an increasingly difficult position. It 
was far easier for the political police to ‘expose’ ‘enemies’ in the ranks than the officers 
and PUR. Indeed, many of those arrested by the political police were innocent. They 
made arrests on weak grounds, for example in arresting ‘suspicious’ foreign nationals as 
‘spies’, and forced confessions could provide the necessary ‘evidence’. Potentially the 
political police could arrest innocent soldiers on the charge of espionage and then blame 
the commanding officers and PUR for missing the ‘enemies’ in their midst. In this 
sense, the army would always struggle to compete with the political police in terms of 
‘exposing’ ‘enemies’. The officers and PUR did not have the same approach, methods, 
or standard of evidence. Thus, the army’s efforts would never satisfy the political police 
and as shown below, increasingly neither Stalin. But Voroshilov’s orders about 
‘vigilance’ are slightly contradictory. He criticised how ‘enemies’ went undiscovered 
and the danger of this, but his response was always measured and focused vaguely on 
raising ‘vigilance’. Voroshilov surely knew that the political police had the upper hand 
when it came to ‘exposing’ ‘enemies’ in the ranks and that Stalin wanted these people 
found. But considering the problems Voroshilov faced in getting his officers to correctly 
scrutinise their soldiers, to which he had no real solution, the army could not compete 
with the political police. Thus, calling for more ‘vigilance’ may have been a way for 
Voroshilov, and also Gamarnik, to be seen as doing something about the problems with 
army self-policing, to show that they were aware of the issue and about the serious 
threat from hidden ‘enemies’, even though this call would prove ineffective. They 
needed to highlight the danger and display the correct ‘signals’. In this sense, calling for 
more vigilance may not have been completely sincere, and perhaps it was more a way 
for Voroshilov and Gamarnik to cover their backs. 
In early 1935 German rearmament was progressing as such a rate that it was no 
longer possible to keep secret and the German government began to signal their 
aggressive intentions.98 In 10 March interview with the British newspaper the Daily 
Mail, Hermann Göring declared that Germany had an Air Force, the Luftwaffe, and on 
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16 March the German government declared universal conscription. Both 
announcements caused an international uproar. In the Soviet Union Tukhachevskii was 
one of the most vocal figures pointing to the German threat. He publicly sounded the 
alarm in 1935 in a Pravda article in March entitled, ‘The War Plans of Contemporary 
Germany’, which was edited by Stalin. The article attacked German rearmament and 
criticised their expansionism. On the very day this article was published Stalin met with 
the British Conservative Anthony Eden and warned about the danger of war and how 
this was greater than 1914.99 The Bolsheviks now saw Germany, Japan, Poland and 
Finland as their most probable enemies in war.100 In May the strength of the army was 
bolstered by phasing out the territorial system and increasing the cadre component of 
troops by 600,000.101 German-Soviet relations would remain highly tense from this 
point on and the Soviet Union signed mutual assistance pacts with France and 
Czechoslovakia in May.    
Alongside the worsening international situation, members of the former political 
Opposition came under growing pressure in 1935. Political arrests in general increased 
dramatically in the tense political climate following the Kirov assassination. This was a 
trend which would carry on into 1936.102 Alongside these political arrests, the numbers 
of cases of ‘counterrevolutionary crime’ and ‘agitation’ also increased.103 The army was 
not insulated from these political pressures. Despite not being subject to any specific 
scrutiny following the Kirov assassination, arrests for ‘counterrevolutionary’ crime 
increased in the army in 1935. For example, the Chief Military Procurator, Naum 
Rozovskii, reported that in 1935 counterrevolutionary crime constituted twenty-seven 
percent of all crime in the army, occupying first place, and furthermore it had seen a 
nine-fold increase from 1934, from 151 convictions to 1374 in 1935.104 Before the 
Kirov assassination counterrevolutionary crime had fallen in the army from 2811 cases 
in 1932, to 2390 cases in 1933.105 It is difficult to establish whether such a large 
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increase in arrests for counterrevolutionary crime in 1935 was a consequence of the 
calls from Voroshilov at the December 1934 Military Soviet to raise ‘vigilance’ or the 
impact of the Kirov assassination itself. A separate report from the Military Procuracy 
gave both reasons.106 Though it is more likely that the increase was more the result of 
focused political police attentions in searching out ‘counterrevolutionaries’ in the wake 
of the Kirov assassination, rather than any real improvements in self-policing within the 
army. Indeed, the officer corps continued to be criticised for ‘weak vigilance’ and their 
inability to expose the dangerous ‘enemies’ in ranks over the next two years. In any 
case, political and ‘counterrevolutionary’ crimes were on the increase in the army, but 
this was at the same time as general criminality was in decline. According to Rozovskii, 
5062 cadre Red Army men were convicted of various crimes during 1935, a decline 
from 5298 in 1934 and 7091 in 1933. This decline in general arrests continued into 
1936.107 As such, it was political arrests and ‘counterrevolutionary’ crime that were 
becoming the focus of attention. The Military Procuracy also noted that ‘class-alien 
elements’ were attempting to influence the less ‘conscious’ of the Red Army soldiers 
and highlighted the convictions of a number of Trotskyist ‘double-dealers’ in 1935.108 
Arrests for Trotskyism continued throughout 1935.109 According one set of statistics 
268 individuals were removed from the army command for Trotskyism in 1935, slightly 
surpassing the 239 for ‘counterrevolutionary agitation’.110  
 The chief reason why general crime was falling at the same time as political 
arrests and cases of ‘counterrevolutionary’ crime were increasing is that the Voroshilov 
had gained control over the sanctioning of army arrests. This required the political 
police to gain permission before an arrest was made. Specifically, the Military 
Procuracy had gained more authority in sanctioning the arrests of officers in April 1933 
when the Central Military Procuracy mandated that agreement for these arrests was 
required from either the Central Military Procuracy or the district Military Procuracies. 
On 26 May 1934 the Politburo issued a further order forbidding the political police to 
                                                
106 RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 1684, ll. 33-36. 
107 Furthermore, according to the Chief Military Procurator, in 1927-28 there were 16,059 convictions in 
the army, in 1928-29 this fell to 11,123, see RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 281, l. 144. For declining arrests in the 
army command throughout 1934-36, see Feldman’s comments in March 1937 to a meeting of the Red 
Army aktiv, RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 1820, l. 558. 
108 RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 1684, ll. 33-36. 
109 For examples of cases of Trotskyist agitation in 1935, see RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 39, l. 32; d. 63, 
ll. 223-226, 256, 356-357, 458, 633; d. 64, ll. 21, 355, 417; d. 80, ll. 126, 164, 219, 238, 355; d. 94, ll. 6, 
209, 270, 307, 324, 338-339; f. 4, op. 14, d. 1366, ll. 12, 62. 
110 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 107, l. 14; these same statistics are also in a separate report on l. 16. 
 171 
arrest soldiers and officers without the agreement of a political commissar. In February 
1935 only Voroshilov, or in his absence Gamarnik, could sanction sending a person of 
the rank of platoon commander and above to court. Sanction for arrest at this level also 
needed Voroshilov’s permission. In a speech to the Red Army party members in March 
1937 Feldman specifically highlighted that awarding the army the right to approve 
arrests caused a decline in arrest levels.111 Voroshilov’s gaining the right to sanction 
arrests was in line with a larger shift in Soviet judicial policy in 1934 towards increased 
legality, giving more power to the courts and removing the extra-judicial power from 
the political police. This saw the creation of an all-Union Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs (NKVD) on 10 July 1934, which replaced the OGPU, and the creation of a 
Procurator of the USSR. Such reforms were an attempt to ensure greater supervision 
and centralisation of police power from the centre. Importantly, the NKVD did not have 
the same extra-judicial powers as the former OGPU. Indeed, these were coming under 
criticism. In mid-1934 Stalin had criticised ‘illegal’ investigative methods used by the 
political police.112 For Voroshilov these reforms would be welcome news. It allowed 
him much greater control of the arrests made by the political police. This strengthened 
his position, and the new emphasis on legality saw declining arrest levels which would 
support Voroshilov’s argument that the army was reliable and stable. However, there 
were limits to this. ‘Counterrevolutionary’ crime still surged after the Kirov 
assassination. The murder was a tipping point for the Bolshevik Party and in escalating 
political repression. It had huge impact, and Voroshilov would have felt this as much as 
other senior Party figures. Like Stalin, Voroshilov also no doubt had serious worries 
about hidden ‘counterrevolutionaries’ following the murder of his colleague. 
Furthermore, the climate was such in 1935 that it would be difficult for Voroshilov to 
take a more evidence-based approach to arrests for ‘counterrevolutionary’ crime in the 
military even if he wanted to. Stalin wanted a crack-down on hidden ‘enemies’ and on 
members of the former opposition in the wake of the assassination, and Voroshilov 
needed to show he was doing this in the Red Army. He probably also wanted to find 
dangerous ‘enemies’ in the ranks after the Kirov murder. Consequently, broader arrests 
may have been in decline in the Red Army from 1934, showing that the military purge 
of 1937-38 was not the culmination of a steady building repression in the wider army, 
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but arrests for counterrevolutionary crimes still grew rapidly from 1935 and worries in 
the Party about dangerous hidden ‘enemies’ only increased. In this sense, the political 
police still retained the initiative. With PUR and the officer corps struggling to 
successfully ‘expose’ these dangerous political ‘enemies’ and ‘counterrevolutionaries’, 
the groups now the focus of Stalin’s attention, and with Voroshilov’s solution being 
merely to raise ‘vigilance’, the political police had the upper hand. 
Within this surge in recorded cases of ‘counterrevolutionary’ crime, 
Tukhachevskii’s name was mentioned in another investigation into a 
‘counterrevolutionary’ group. In June 1935 Gaya Gai, who had supported Trotsky in the 
1920s and a Professor of War History and Military Art, was arrested and accused of 
being part of a counterrevolutionary group. He was charged with spreading Trotskyist 
‘slander’ and having designs to ‘remove’ (ubrat’) Stalin.113 G. Gai denied these 
accusations, which had supposedly occurred during a drunken conversation. This did 
not save him however, and he received five years in the labour camps.114 G. Gai had a 
history with Tukhachevskii, having met in the 1st Revolutionary Army in 1918 and 
subsequently fought in battle. There are indications that they were close 
acquaintances.115 During the investigation, one of the arrested men, a certain Avanesian, 
remarked that G. Gai had apparently complained about how his career had been held 
back and he blamed Budennyi and Voroshilov for this.116 He had supposedly then said: 
‘If Tukhachevskii was People’s Commissar (Narkom), then my chances would be much 
better’.117 Not only was this another case where Tukhachevskii’s name emerged during 
an interrogation into an alleged counterrevolutionary group, but these comments show a 
clear separation between Voroshilov and Budennyi on one side and Tukhachevskii on 
the other. This indicates that the disunity within the army leadership had filtered down 
throughout the ranks and was known to a wider circle of officers. Yet, despite G. Gai’s 
alleged mention of Tukhachevskii’s name, there were no obvious consequences. 
Tukhachevskii’s career continued on an upwards trajectory. He was one of the very few 
to be given the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union when military rank was restored to 
the Red Army in 1935 and he seemed to have more influence than ever before. 
Tukhachevskii had become dominant voice in foreign policy in 1935, beginning with 
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his Pravda article on Germany. He took on further diplomatic responsibilities in 1936 
and 1937. During 1935 there is little indication Tukhachevskii was being sidelined due 
to questions about his character, his judgement or political reliability. Yet, the new 
incrimination from G. Gai’s case would surely be added to Tukhachevskii’s growing 
police file and the case created a further association between him and 
‘counterrevolution’. 
Despite the increase in ‘counterrevolutionary’ crime in 1935 there was no 
change in how Voroshilov approached the issue of ‘enemies’ within the ranks. He still 
merely called for ‘vigilance’ to be raised. For example, in April he published another 
two RVS orders on this issue. The first order gave an example of a supposed ‘scoundrel 
and swindler’ who had impersonated a party member and through fraudulent means got 
a position in an aviation brigade in the Zabaikal forces. The imposter had even been 
able to fly aeroplanes. Voroshilov noted that the man had managed this because of a 
close acquaintance with some officers. This was a question of nepotism. Voroshilov 
argued that the case demonstrated a lack of ‘vigilance’ towards the class enemy and that 
the officers in question should be punished harshly. He added that similar cases were to 
be regarded as serious crimes.118 The second RVS order in April was similar. This time 
Voroshilov highlighted the ‘blunting of Bolshevik vigilance’ of a number of soldiers in 
regiment. Apparently the regiment Chief of Staff had engaged in ‘counterrevolutionary’ 
conversations for an extended period but no one had reported this. Voroshilov ordered 
reprimands to be applied and those responsible to be removed from their positions.119 
However, Voroshilov’s continued criticisms of ‘weak vigilance’ were unlikely to 
change anything. Again, he was not tackling the roots of the problems. Why was there 
‘insufficient vigilance’ in the command? Why were incidents going unreported?  
Perhaps Voroshilov did not have the answer. It was easier to simply proclaim the need 
for increased ‘vigilance’ as a catch-all solution to the army’s problems, and be seen as 
doing something rather than nothing. Indeed, the need for more ‘vigilance’ was the 
official line and Krasnaia zvezda published a few front page articles about this in 
1935.120 
Voroshilov was soon given the opportunity to find out whether his previous calls 
for more vigilance had been effective when in May 1935 the party conducted a chistka, 
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the verification of party documents (proverka). The proverka aimed to improve the 
chaotic state of party record keeping and also weed out corrupt and criminal members. 
The proverka uncovered ‘social aliens’, kulaks, Whites, but also alleged Trotskyists, 
Zinovievites, and spies. This purge is generally passed over in the literature on the Red 
Army, but its results are revealing. During the proverka the army party organisations 
expelled 5311 party members and 2472 candidate members, representing 3.6% and 
5.3% of their total numbers respectively.121 The combined total of full and candidate 
members was consistent with the nine percent expelled from the party nationally.122 The 
most common reason for army expulsion from the party was hiding social origins, 
having a link to a ‘socially-harmful element’ or having kept secret a past service in the 
White forces during the Civil War. These reasons totalled 3350 exclusions. For 
Trotskyism and Zinovievism, 261 were expelled, and 114 were expelled for espionage. 
The latter represented only 1.5% of expulsions. Thus, while demonstrating the 
continued presence of these more dangerous groups (spies and former oppositionists) 
they were by no means dominant. Espionage in particular was low down on the list as a 
reason for expulsion.123 
However, on 26 June 1935 Gamarnik gave a speech to the heads of the political 
organisations in the BVO and spoke about the results of the proverka, and it is clear that 
he was not happy. Gamarnik remarked that the proverka showed that in the army people 
were still being studied ‘very badly’ and that they ‘did know know people well’.124 
Despite Trotskyists and spies being on the lower end of expulsions, Gamarnik 
highlighted them specifically:  
 
The fact of the matter is that in total in the Belorussian district 555 people were 
excluded. This figure is not so large, it is four or something percent. Among those now 
exposed and excluded from the party are clear enemies – spies, white guards, 
Trotskyists, who we had not revealed before the proverka of party documents, although 
the people were studied. The proverka of party documents helped us to identify the 
enormous quantity of people who we did not know earlier or knew poorly.125  
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Thus, despite ‘socially harmful elements’ assuming the bulk of the expulsions, 
Gamarnik was concerned that the more dangerous enemies, the spies and Trotskyists, 
had not been exposed before the proverka. Clearly standards of ‘vigilance’ had not been 
improved in the army and it had taken an independent party purge to reveal the hidden 
‘enemies’. At a time when the focus was increasingly placed on spies and active 
members of former opposition, this should have concerned Gamarnik as head of PUR. 
The problems of the conduct of the proverka were well-publicised and PUR were 
criticised in Krasnaia zvezda for completing the proverka too hastily and taking a 
‘purely technical attitude’.126 This, however, was an easy platitude that would did get to 
the real reason why the army was seemingly failing to discover ‘enemies’.  Voroshilov 
and Gamarnik were again only addressing the symptoms of a much deeper problem in 
how the officer corps and PUR responded to campaigns to root out ‘enemies’. But 
again, for both men, it was crucial to be seen as doing something, rather than nothing. 
In addition, that Gamarnik singled out foreign agents in particular corresponds 
to how they were gradually perceived as a much greater threat in general terms. For 
instance, the organiser of the proverka, Nikolai Ezhov, who later led the political police, 
reported to Stalin in the summer of 1935 that foreign agents had infiltrated the party. He 
repeated this in a report to a conference of regional party Secretaries in September. 
Ezhov also remarked that he was confident that the, ‘Trotskyists undoubtedly have a 
center somewhere in the USSR’.127 As William Chase notes, Ezhov spoke of 
Trotskyists and spies very much in the same breath. He saw little difference between 
them in either goals or tactics.128 From 1935 the Soviet Union’s borders were 
strengthened and thousands of Germans and Poles and other national groups were 
deported from the border regions from a fear they would turn against the regime during 
war.129 Furthermore, the rise of Hitler in 1933 had increased the number of communists 
arriving to the Soviet Union from Germany, adding a further perceived security threat. 
There were questions about whether those fleeing Nazi Germany could be fully trusted. 
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At the end of the year a Central Committee Plenum of December 1935 resolved to 
check all political émigrés.130   
When the Military Soviet met again in December 1935 the usual formulaic 
statements were made about sizable gains in military and political preparation, but many 
of the concerns from the meeting the previous year were reiterated. In his speech, 
Gamarnik highlighted the problems associated with ‘vigilance’ demonstrated by the 
proverka:  
 
The proverka of party documents, great in its organisational and political significance, 
carried out according to the initiative of c.[omrade] Stalin, again showed that we still 
badly, often only formally, know people, that often we miss enemies – spies, 
Trotskyists, Zinovievites, swindlers, and very often we do not notice, promote, cultivate 
truly loyal to the party, able and valuable people.131  
 
In a contrast from the previous year’s Military Soviet, Gamarnik mentioned former 
oppositionists specifically rather than simply use the term ‘enemies’, showing how the 
they were an acknowledged danger following the Kirov assassination. However, 
Gamarnik’s chief point was how it had taken the proverka to actually reveal the 
dangerous ‘enemies’ in the ranks and that they should have been discovered before if 
the officers had correctly responded to the calls for more vigilance. Clearly, there had 
been little improvement in army self-policing. Yet Gamarnik did note that the proverka 
had increased the practice of studying people and had raised awareness.132 During the 
Military Soviet further examples given about how some officers may have been 
avoiding scrutinising their own units properly in the search for the more dangerous 
‘counterrevolutionaries’ and foreign agents. For instance, the commander of the 
Siberian Military District, Ia. P. Gailit, highlighted the ‘extraordinary number’ of court 
cases and discharges from the army, and that soldiers were being rejected far too easily. 
This was a similar accusation to Gamarnik’s previous complaint about the mass use of 
reprimands at the previous Military Soviet, and Voroshilov’s earlier criticisms of 
incorrect discharges. According to Gailit, dismissal was taking precedence over re-
education. Sufficient investigations into criminal cases were not being carried out and 
the officers and political workers were to blame. Gailit noted that in many cases no one 
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from the command had even properly examined the discharge case or spoken to the 
individual in question.133 He argued that the officers had responded incorrectly to 
Voroshilov’s call to raise vigilance.134 According to Gailit no other methods were being 
used except sending a soldier to court or discharging them from the army.135 The use of 
large numbers of discharges on weak grounds suggests again that some officers may 
have been making conspicuous demonstrations that they were actually responding to the 
calls to raise ‘vigilance’. Discharging large numbers of soldiers would give cover to 
accusations of not being sufficiently ‘vigilant’. At the same time the need to dig deeper 
to uncover the more dangerous political ‘enemies’ and spies was avoided. Thus, any 
danger of the officer themselves being incriminated or blamed for the presence of these 
dangerous ‘enemies’ in their command was also avoided.136 In this respect, Gailit’s 
comments build on earlier accusations at the previous Military Soviet that some officers 
may have been giving overly positive appraisals of their own units’ political reliability. 
In all, this adds further evidence that some officers were not fully engaging with the 
task of rooting out ‘enemies’ within what was becoming a tense political and 
international climate, and when Voroshilov and Gamarnik were under pressure to 
produce results. 
Indeed, the international situation continued to worsen into 1936. On 7 March 
Germany took possession of the Rhineland, in May Italy annexed Abyssinia and in July 
the Spanish Civil War began. For the Bolsheviks it seemed that the hot war had finally 
begun and Soviet defence spending correspondingly rose sharply.137 This downturn in 
the international scene increased concerns about foreign agents.138 In February the 
Central Committee accepted Ezhov’s draft report, ‘On Measures to Protect the USSR 
Against the Penetration of Spy, Terrorist, and Sabotage Elements’, which pointed to the 
growing spy threat within political émigré circles within the Soviet Union. Polish 
espionage in particular became a focus of the political police’s attention.139 There was 
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similarly little change of tone in the army during the first half of 1936 and Gamarnik 
continued to speak about the need for greater ‘vigilance’ and reiterated the lessons of 
the proverka. For example, in a February speech he remarked:  
 
By the way of a verification of party documents in the personnel of the RKKA we 
found real enemies, who deceived us, who got into the army using false documents. We 
revealed spies in the army, of who are not only expelled from the army and party but 
were sent to prison… much to our shame we are still allowing such scum into the army 
…And at the same time there are often people who we are not allowing into the army, 
but who ought to be permitted, who ought to be in the army.  
 
Alongside the continual ‘discovery’ of dangerous ‘enemies’ in the ranks, the issue of 
incorrect discharges is clear in this speech.140 On 1 April Gamarnik gave a similar 
speech to the Moscow Garrison. Speaking about the party expulsions from the army 
during the proverka Gamarnik remarked that: ‘there are many crooks among them, 
having infiltrated into the party with false documents. There is a group – not large – of 
spies’.141 Gamarnik again emphasised the need to raise vigilance and added that:  
 
We have to close all gaps for the enemy, and still it must be admitted, not only gaps, but 
all the doors and windows were wide open and any clever person, any clever crook, was 
able to infiltrate anywhere…in link with insufficient vigilance of the individual army 
party organisations, in our organisations we revealed spies, white guards, crooks, we 
revealed a group of Trotskyists and Zinovievites who led subversive work.142  
 
Gamarnik was still not offering any real solutions in blaming ‘vigilance’. He drew 
attention to the dangerous ‘enemies’ that had apparently been missed by the army, and 
perhaps this was his only intention. Gamarnik needed to show he was aware that of the 
‘unexposed’ ‘enemies’ in the ranks to provide some cover that he did not have any 
answers. As such, unfortunately for Gamarnik, the ‘gaps’ he identified would remain 
unclosed.  
1936 saw another party purge, similar to the proverka, the exchange of party 
documents (obmen partdokumentov). The proverka had stumbled during its fulfilment 
and the obmen provided the opportunity to replace old party documents and reconsider 
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many of the cases from the proverka. During the course of the obmen further members 
of the army party organisations were expelled. Party passivity, being deemed a ‘social 
alien’ or having a link to one, and moral degeneracy constituted the majority of the 
expulsions.143 However, again the more dangerous political ‘enemies’ were also 
discovered. According to Voroshilov in early 1937, the obmen expelled 244 Trotskyists 
and Zinovievites, which was just short of the 261 expelled in the proverka.144 Like the 
proverka, the obmen would provide another demonstration that despite the calls for the 
army to increase ‘vigilance’, ‘enemies’ were still unexposed in the ranks and that it took 
an independent party purge to reveal these. This would add to concerns that the army 
was still not successfully rooting out ‘enemies’ independently. 
However, despite these growing political and international tensions and 
concerns about unexposed ‘enemies’ in the ranks, there is no indication that anything as 
extreme as an all-army purge was looming. General military arrest levels continued to 
decline during 1936. According to a March 1937 report by Feldman, the head of the 
Main Administration of the Red Army, 6000 people from the army command were 
discharged in 1936, whereas in 1935 this number had been 7500.145 A report compiled 
by Vasily Ulrikh, the Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, 
detailed that within the cadre element of the Red Army for the first half of 1936 there 
had been 1692 convictions, whereas during the same period in 1935 the number was 
2839. The downwards trend was for both officers and ordinary soldiers.146 Furthermore, 
the army recorded a decline in cases of counterrevolutionary agitation in 1936 in the 
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commanding bodies, but discharges for Trotskyism were still climbing.147 This is 
consistent with the continued pressure put on the former Opposition by Stalin, which 
saw further intensity in 1936. Indeed, during the first half of 1936 numerous directives 
were sent to the localities from the political police concerning strengthening the rooting 
out of Trotskyists.148 Consequently, in the first half of 1936 there is no indication that 
repression was increasing in general terms within the Red Army or that a mass purge 
was on the horizon. If anything, only former Trotskyists were being increasingly 
targeted, most likely by the political police following the Kirov murder. But Trotskyists 
had only ever been a minority of the Red Army in the 1920s. In this respect, the military 
purge beginning in June 1937 was in no way a culmination of a rising general 
repression. In reality, general arrest levels were in decline before an explosion of arrests 
in the summer of 1937. However, that political arrests were increasing in 1936 was 
important. Stalin and the political police were cracking down on the former opposition, 
but Gamarnik and Voroshilov were not doing anything about these ‘enemies’ in the 
army. They vaguely appealed for ‘vigilance’ to be raised. Clearly, neither had any real 
solutions or knew what to do to actually improve the ‘exposure’ of ‘enemies’ by the 
officers and PUR. Voroshilov’s failure to act would give the political police more space 
to investigate the Red Army later in 1936. 
The rumours about the supposed disloyalty of the military elite had also refused 
to subside and were maintained into the mid-1930s. Though they did not lead to any 
serious action at this time, these rumours would add further to the political police’s 
suspicions about the army elite and would be added to corresponding police files. For 
example, in Czechoslovakia in December 1935 a Russian journal, Znamia Rossii, 
reported that an illegal underground organisation was operating in the Soviet Union 
under the name of Kraskomov. The members of the organisation were allegedly from 
the Red Army high command and they aimed to overthrow Soviet power.149 While on 
his way to England in January 1936 to attend the funeral of King George V, 
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Tukhachevskii gave an interview to the Polish newspaper, Ekspress Poranni, which 
contained the following passage:  
 
…Tukhachevskii had always gone ‘with the wind’ (po vetru). In the past, when it had a 
purpose, he was considered to be a very staunch supporter of Trotsky. But he first 
turned his back on his patron as soon as he felt that Trotsky was losing and firmly took 
the side of Stalin.150  
 
At a time of increasing pressure on the former Opposition, being associated with 
Trotsky and depicted as politically capricious was damaging. The most prominent 
rumours, however, concerned an alleged connection between the Red Army elite and 
Germany. For instance, a report compiled by a corpus commissar in Germany in 
November 1935 describing Red Army officers’ behaviour in Germany was sent to 
Voroshilov and Stalin in April 1936. The report suggested that Tukhachevskii was 
friendly with the Germans: ‘Tukhachevskii’s conduct was significant…they say that he 
is a Francophile. Now in an extremely courteous tone he asked about the acquaintances 
of the German officers with interest. This is completely different behaviour than 
before.’ The report noted that nearly all present officers expressed disappointment about 
the changed relations between their armies and the futility of war for both countries.151 
More worringly, in December 1935 a report on foreign threats to the Soviet Union 
compiled by head of military intelligence, S. P. Uritskii, noted a supposed ‘secret 
connection’ between the German officers and the Red Army.152 Further hints that 
Tukhachevskii specifically was sympathetic to the Germans were also received by 
Voroshilov from a military intelligence report of 17 May 1936. This report detailed 
Hermann Göring’s alleged comments during a meeting with the Polish minister of 
foreign affairs. According to the report, Göring had said he had met with Tukhachevskii 
when the latter had stopped in Berlin on his return from England. Tukhachevskii had 
supposedly raised the possibility of resuming the military collaboration between the two 
countries.153 The idea of renewing the collaboration and the sense of disappointment 
that this had ended was nothing new. From 1933 many Red Army officers, including 
Voroshilov, were reported by German representatives of expressing their 
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disappointment at the end of collaboration.154 However, to speak favourably of the 
Germans during 1933-1934 was very different than in 1936. Germany was now the 
most likely enemy in the approaching war.155 It was possible to be arrested for even 
making positive comments about Germany and Hitler at this time. For instance, in May 
1936 a teacher at the Frunze academy was arrested for apparently saying that Hitler 
reflected the national sentiment in Germany.156  
In early 1935 the INO NKVD did take an interest in investigating a possible 
connection between the Red Army command and the Germans. In March 1935 a Soviet 
agent in Germany was instructed to investigate this supposed connection.157 Despite 
this, it remains difficult to judge how credible and threatening these rumours were 
actually seen. It is very likely that these rumours were recorded and added to the 
expanding police files on the relevant officers and probably led to a closer police 
observation of the high command, but still there were no serious, immediate, 
consequences for the army elite. Tukhachevskii’s life seemed to continue as normal. 
Tellingly, that he was chosen as a representative to attend the funeral of King George V 
in January 1936 indicates Stalin held him in enough trust for a trip abroad at a time of 
international crisis. Indeed, 1936 has been pointed to as the high point of 
Tukhachevskii’s career.158 Tukhachevskii was also promoted as Voroshilov’s first 
deputy in April 1936, the same level as Gamarnik.159 As relations between Voroshilov 
and Tukhachevskii remained poor, Stalin may have engineered this promotion. 
Tukhachevskii was also given additional responsibilities at this time, namely the 
authority to supervise the department of combat training which had been separated out 
from the General Staff. This applied supervision of the inspectors of corps, cavalry, 
artillery, all educational institutions, physical preparation and sport, and the military 
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work of Osoaviakhim.160 If Tukhachevskii was a marked man and if there were serious 
questions about his loyalty due to rumours about a connection to the Nazis, it is strange 
that he was given a promotion and additional responsibilities. It seems likely that closer 
observation of Tukhachevskii was probably initiated at this time, but the rumours were 
not strong or credible enough for any other action to be taken.  
Alongside these growing rumours about the alleged disloyalty of the military 
elite, tensions between Tukhachevskii and Voroshilov continued to simmer. The 
conflict between the two had never been resolved from the previous clashes in the late 
1920s. For example, at the Seventeen Party Congress in 1934 Voroshilov again made 
his hostility known towards those trying to sideline the cavalry. Voroshilov did not 
mention any names specifically, but it is very likely that he had Tukhachevskii in mind. 
He referred to the need to bring ‘wrecking theories’ (vreditel’skimi teoriiami) about the 
cavalry to an end.161 On 1 May 1936 in Voroshilov’s apartment after a military parade 
these tensions came to a head. In Stalin’s presence Tukhachevskii accused Voroshilov 
and Budennyi of having formed an exclusive group who were dominating military 
politics. Following Tukhachevskii’s outburst, Stalin had supposedly called an end to the 
dispute and offered to examine the issue in the Politburo. Tukhachevskii later withdrew 
his accusations at this session. Tukhachevskii had not been the only person to speak out. 
Gamarnik and Iakir were supposedly also on poor terms with Voroshilov.162 After this 
clash in Voroshilov’s apartment, Tukhachevskii was publicly criticised in Pravda on 24 
May when an anonymous writer accused him of pushing harmful theories which aimed 
at undermining the cavalry.163 Voroshilov probably would welcome if Tukhachevskii 
was removed from the army leadership, but for now there was little chance of this 
happening. Even though Stalin continued to see a divided military leadership, the 
worsening international situation meant that the Red Army needed experienced leaders 
like Tukhachevskii in command. 
                                                
160 V. Danilov, ‘Sovershenstvovanie sistemy tsentral’nikh organov voennogo rukovodstva v 1929-1939 
gg.’, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 6 (1982), 74-79 (p. 78). 
161 XVII s’ezd Vsesoiuzno kommunisticheskoi partii (b), 26 ianvaria - 10 fevralia 1934 g.: 
stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Partizdat, 1923), p. 226; Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, p. 
199 (footnote). 
162 Vlast’ i oppozitsiia: rossiiskii politicheskii protsess XX stoletiia, ed. by V. V. Zhuravlev and others 
(Moscow: Rossiiskaia politicheskaia entsiklopediia, 1995), p. 161. Voroshilov confirmed this story in 
June 1937, see Voennyi sovet pri narodnom komissare oborony SSSR:  1-4 iiunia 1937 goda, ed. by 
Anderson and others, p. 76. 
163 Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, p. 199 (footnote). 
 184 
However, Voroshilov’s relationship with some of the other senior officers who 
would be executed in 1937 appeared to show no tensions whatsoever in 1936. For 
example, in June Voroshilov wrote to Stalin requesting that a number of military 
reprimands being removed from several senior officers as four years had passed since 
their application. This included the reprimands against Kork, Uborevich, Iakov Alksnis 
and L. N. Aronshtam.164 In August 1936 Kork had another reprimand removed which 
he had received over the Nakhaev case.165 Kork, Uborevich, Alksnis and Aronshtam 
would all be indicted as members of a ‘military-fascist plot’ in under a year. Kork and 
Uborevich would be publicly presented as two of the main conspirators. But for now 
both their positions seemed secure. Whatever tensions Voroshilov had with 
Tukhachevskii did not extend to all members of the future ‘military-fascist plot’. Thus, 
conflicts in the army elite may have helped give the ‘military-fascist plot’ some surface 
credibility following its ‘exposure’ in 1937, but there is little to suggest that the divides 
in the army elite provided the urgency to purge the Red Army. It was not a decisive 
factor. Importantly, the first major step directly leading towards the military purge can 
be seen in the summer of 1936 with the ‘exposure’ of the ‘Trotskyist-Zinovievite 
Counterrevolutionary Bloc’. Links were drawn to middle-ranking former Trotskyist 
officers, rather than to the military elite, from this alleged oppositionist conspiracy. The 
‘discovery’ of an alleged organised Trotskyist organisation in the ranks changed the 
path of repression and political climate within the military.  
 
The First Show Trial and the Trotskyist Military Centre 
 
 
1936 was the decisive year for the fate of the Red Army. In the summer and autumn 
numerous senior officers who had been Trotskyists in the 1920s were arrested by the 
political police for their alleged participation in a major ‘counterrevolutionary’ 
organisation. These arrests established supposed links between the former Trotskyist 
officers and the defendants of the first Moscow show trial. This provided ‘evidence’ of 
a Trotskyist counterrevolutionary organisation operating within the military. Attentions 
were now firmly turned towards the Red Army. However, typically in the literature on 
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the military purge the primary focus is on Tukhachevskii and the other senior officers 
put on trial in June 1937. The earlier arrests of former Trotskyist officers in 1936 are 
rarely commented on. Yet, they are vitally important. Without these arrests the military 
purge would not have developed as it did and may not have even occurred. The arrests 
in the summer of 1936 are not only crucial to understanding the purge of the military in 
1937-38, but are a decisive factor.  
In January 1936 the political police arrested an associate of Trotsky, Valentin 
Ol’berg, soon after his arrival to Gorky from Germany on suspicion of being an 
emissary from Trotsky. Under interrogation Ol’berg was forced to give evidence about 
his ‘counterrevolutionary activity’ and named his fellow participants. Ol’berg’s arrest 
was the starting point of an expanding series of arrests and the ‘exposure’ of a major 
‘counterrevolutionary’ group.166 By April the political police had arrested over 500 
Trotskyists. Ezhov once again had a close role in the investigations, even though he was 
not yet the head of the political police.167 Indeed, during this time Ezhov had been 
collating an increasingly large file on supposed Trotskyist subversive activity. In late 
spring he pushed a theory that Zinoviev and Kamenev had a direct hand in the Kirov 
murder on Trotsky’s orders. Thus, their crime was no longer merely ‘moral culpability’ 
for the assassination.168 The ‘exposure’ of this new counterrevolutionary group in 1936 
was the culmination of Ezhov’s push to confirm his suspicions. Of course, this was 
nothing more than a conspiracy theory, but Ezhov believed he had discovered a 
‘counterrevolutionary centre’. The investigation into the Kirov assassination was 
reopened and Zinoviev and Kamenev were brought from prison, re-interrogated and 
forced to give confessions about their terrorist activity and of murdering Kirov.169 On 
29 July the Central Committee published a secret letter, ‘Concerning the terroristic 
activity of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist counterrevolutionary bloc’. This was sent to the 
party organisations and explained the guilt of Zinoviev and Kamenev in the Kirov 
assassination and Trotsky’s overall direction of the counterrevolutionary centre’s plans 
to murder other Soviet figures, including Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and 
Ordzhonkidze.170 Zinoviev, Kamenev and another fourteen defendants were 
subsequently put on a show trial in August, the proceedings of which were heavily 
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directed by Stalin and Ezhov. All were executed on 24 August. The use of a show trial 
was a very public demonstration of how a dangerous conspiracy had been exposed. It 
was a lesson that former oppositionists could not be trusted and that all party members 
needed to show vigilance.171 
This move against former oppositionists affected the Red Army directly. The 
army was not insulated from changes in political currents. The expanding arrests from 
the Ol’berg case in January had created numerous connections to former army 
Trotskyists and they were subsequently arrested for belonging to the Zinoviev-Kamenev 
group itself or for membership in a separate Trotskyist military organisation. For 
example, one of the August show trial defendants, R. Pickel, who had been in charge of 
Zinoviev’s secretariat in the past, gave testimony under interrogation on 4 July that the 
former Trotskyists Putna, D. Shmidt and Ie. Dreitser were members of a military 
organisation.172 With the exception of Dreitser, who was the deputy director of the 
Cheliabinsk factory Magnezit, they were army officers. Shmidt was a battalion 
commander in the Kiev Military District and Putna was the Soviet military attaché in 
Britain. Dreitser was arrested at the end of June and on 6 July Shmidt was arrested as a 
member of a counterrevolutionary Trotskyist organisation.173 Shmidt also served with 
another corps commander, S. A. Turovskii, who was later arrested in September as part 
of the alleged Trotskyist organisation.174 Shmidt also gave testimony that a Trotskyist 
centre existed in Moscow. He said that this centre united the activity of the Trotskyist 
organisations, particularly those in the Red Army.175 Another former army Trotskyist 
arrested was Sergei Mrachkovskii, who as shown in chapter two, had been a senior 
Trotskyist in the army in the 1920s. In 1936 he was one of the defendants in the August 
show trial. Thus, there were direct links between the Red Army and the first show trial, 
and not just associations. The former Trotskyist, B. I. Kuzmichev, the chief of staff of 
an aviation brigade and one time secretary of Primakov, was also arrested in August.  
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These arrests must have been seen as vindication of the political police. They 
had kept some of these former Trotskyists under observation from the early 1930s, 
including Dreitser, who was now regarded as one of the key conspirators. He was 
named in the secret Central Committee letter as receiving direct orders from Trotsky to 
assassinate Stalin and Voroshilov. 176 Dreitser was also a close acquaintance of Putna, 
who as Soviet military attaché in Britain in 1936 had often met him. According to a 
letter from the deputy head of military intelligence, Artur Artuzov, to Voroshilov from 3 
September 1936, Putna had been in regular contact with Dreitser in England. Artuzov 
relayed a conversation he had with Putna’s wife, who aside from arguing that her 
husband was innocent, noted that Putna and Dreitser often saw each other in London. 
On hearing the news about the Trotskyist-Zinovievist Counterrevolutionary Bloc, 
according to his wife, Putna had had remarked that because of his contact with Dreitser 
he would come under suspicion.177 Again, it is not out of the question that other former 
Trotskyists continued to meet in the 1930s. These may not have been ‘conspiratorial’ 
meetings, but they political police would view them very suspiciously. For Putna, being 
a former Trotskyist was not the only problem. In the file on Putna, held at the UK 
National Archives and compiled during his time as military attaché in Britain, he is 
described as being a Soviet military intelligence agent. In a report dated 26 June 1936 it 
detailed that Putna had been in ‘constant touch’ with a German intelligence agent 
named Erich von Salzman. If this is indeed true, a close association with a German 
intelligence agent and the meetings with Dreitser would have been very damning for 
Putna. He was eventually arrested on the 20 August.178 In addition, five days after 
Putna’s arrest, Voroshilov received a letter from the military attaché in Germany, A. 
Orlov, who was writing in response to reading about Putna’s involvement with the 
Zinoviev-Kamenev group in German papers. In his letter, Orlov recounted meeting with 
Putna in Paris in January 1935, and their conversation had turned to the Kirov murder. 
According to Orlov, Putna had remarked: ‘I ran into Kamenev. He invited me to come 
and see him as an old friend. For some reason I did not go. What would you now think 
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about me if I had gone to see him, in link with my past?’179 If Orlov’s account is 
accurate, it shows that Putna was very aware that his background as a former Trotskyist 
was very compromising. He knew how the system worked, and how his past could 
count against him. If Putna considered himself an ‘old friend’ of Kamenev, it is possible 
that the political police kept him under closer watch following the Kirov murder when 
Zinoviev and Kamenev were given ‘moral culpability’ for the assassination. However, it 
was only with the ‘exposure’ of the Zinoviev-Kamenev group in 1936 that the political 
police could finally act on their suspicions about Putna and have him arrested. Other 
prominent army arrests at this time included the former Trotskyist and deputy 
commander of the LVO, Primakov, on 14 August, who also had been under political 
police observation since 1933.180 A day later the former Trotskyist and commander of 
the 25th Rifle battalion, M. Ziuk, was also arrested. 
As expected, Voroshilov tried to distance himself from these arrests. On 7 June 
he sent a letter to Stalin, and in reference to the ‘evidence’ emerging from the 
interrogations of Dreitser and Pikel, remarked: ‘…what an abomination, how low 
people can sink. But the worst of this scum, nevertheless, is Mrachkovskii…This should 
serve as a lesson: it is impossible to have any kind of business with these people’.181 But 
as shown in chapter two, Voroshilov had ‘business’ with precisely ‘these people’ in the 
past. He had been a very strong advocate of Putna in the early 1930s, describing him as 
‘one of our best commander-party men’ and had even petitioned for him to have access 
to secret documents while he was military attaché in Germany. That Putna was now 
supposedly involved in a counterrevolutionary group should have alarmed Voroshilov. 
It raised serious questions about his judgment. His letter to Stalin was no doubt an effort 
to put some distance between himself and the arrested former Trotskyist officers in 
realisation of this. 
Therefore, the increased pressure on Trotskyists during 1936 and the 
investigation and the trial of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist Counterrevolutionary Bloc had 
dragged in the Red Army. It had been caught up in an expanding investigation into an 
alleged counterrevolutionary oppositionist group based on Ezhov’s conspiratorial 
suspicions, with ‘evidence’ extracted through forced confessions. The arrested 
individuals from the army were not of the highest ranks, such as Tukhachevskii, Iakir or 
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Uborevich, but these were not insignificant cases. Primakov had been a member of the 
Military Soviet and he was also a member of the Central Executive Committee.182 In 
addition these arrests were more serious than the earlier arrests in the army for 
Trotskyism. A ‘counterrevolutionary centre’ had been ‘discovered’ with alleged 
responsibility for the Kirov murder and there were ties to the military. Furthermore, the 
‘exposure’ of this Trotskyist military centre provided the opportunity for arrests to 
spread further throughout the Red Army.183 For example, following the arrest of 
Shmidt, Voroshilov received a denunciation from the head of the army Military Political 
Academy on 4 August, against another an army man named Rubinov. According to the 
denunciation, Rubinov was very close the Shmidt, they had served together, and 
Rubinov was said to have defended him. The denunciation noted: ‘I would not be very 
surprised if an attentive investigation would establish that Rubinov was close to this 
entire band, and in any case, knew about Shmidt’s mood.’184 It is unclear what 
happened to Rubinov as a consequence of this letter but such denunciations would 
feature much more heavily in 1937-38.  
 
The Red Army may well have regained some stability after ending of operation vesna 
and after the winding down of collectivisation and dekulakisation, but the army 
leadership could not be confident that they had expunged all ‘enemies’ or that the army 
was now fully reliable. Large numbers of soldiers continued to be discharged during 
1933 and the military remained seen as vulnerable to subversives, particularly foreign 
agents. Yet, having a powerful and reliable army was becoming increasingly important 
as the international situation degraded in the early 1930s. The surge of Japanese 
aggression in the east and the rise of Hitler in the west meant a war on two fronts was 
becoming more likely. The worsening international situation coincided with an increase 
in the scale of the perceived espionage threat and the Red Army was regarded as a 
target. However, what would have concerned the military leadership more than the 
perceived scale of this espionage threat was the persistent lack of ‘vigilance’ from some 
officers in rooting out ‘enemies’ in the ranks. Similarly, the officers were just as poor at 
conducting correct discharges. Thus, ‘enemies’, including foreign agents, continued to 
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go undiscovered. However, as argued, weak ‘vigilance’ is a codeword which masked 
deeper problems with army self-policing. There are numerous indications that poor 
‘vigilance’ stemmed from some officers’ desires not to examine their own units too 
carefully, to protect their own interests and make conspicuous demonstrations of being 
on guard. Further examples of this behaviour will be detailed in chapter five. However, 
Voroshilov was as guilty of this behaviour as anyone else. It is very likely that he was 
feeling pressure from Stalin about ‘enemies’ in the army, but his only solution was to 
call for even more ‘vigilance’. This was not a serious engaging with the problems with 
army self-policing and was more for show than substance. As a consequence, it would 
be difficult for Stalin, the army leadership, or the political police, to be confident that 
the Red Army was sufficiently insulated from the growing perceived subversive threats 
in the first half of the 1930s. Rather than discover ‘enemies’ independently, it took 
seperate party purges, the proverka and obmen, to ‘expose’ the hidden spies, Trotskyists 
and Zinovievites in the ranks. Indeed, it seemed as if the previous army calls for more 
‘vigilance’ were having no effect at all. The army failed to ‘expose’ dangerous 
‘enemies’, whereas the party chistki succeeded. This was very serious, particularly in 
such a tense political atmosphere following the Kirov murder and at a time of 
international crisis. But it was the perceived threat from Trotskyists that really began to 
solidify what came to be seen as organised conspiracy in the army ranks. As Stalin and 
the political police focused on members of the former opposition as representing a more 
established danger in 1936, and as links were drawn between former Trotskyist officers 
and the ‘exposed’ Zinoviev-Kamenev Counterrevolutionary Bloc, it was impossible to 
ignore the issue of former Trotskyists in the military. During the second half of 1936 the 
political police would arrest a growing number of former Trotskyists in the ranks. Yet, 
for now, the upper army elite were not at risk. Despite continued rumours about their 
disloyalty and brushes with party factionalism, of rumours about a possible German link 
and the clashes at the very top between Voroshilov and Tukhachevskii, there is little 
indication that the upper Red Army elite were braced for a purge. Some reprimands 
were removed from those officers who would be executed only a year later and none of 
the military elite were former Trotskyists. Indeed, in the summer of 1936 there was little 
indication that the arrests would move beyond a Trotskyist purge in the army. General 
arrest levels and criminality were in decline in army during 1936. A mass purge was not 
being planned.  
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Some authors have dismissed the significance of the arrests of the former army 
Trotskyists due to their minority within the forces.185 However, the importance of 
Trotskyists within the military was not so much their actual size. An established 
‘Trotskyist group’ provided ‘evidence’ for Ezhov that the military had been 
compromised and focused attentions on the Red Army. This was a decisive moment for 
the military purge in 1937. It showed once again how the officer corps and PUR were 
‘missing’ dangerous ‘enemies’, and that they could not self-police effectively. This 
would further strengthen the political police and undermine Voroshilov, despite the 
latter’s control over sanctioning arrests. But the arrests of the former Trotskyist officers 
turned attentions firmly towards the army and the ‘exposure’ of a Trotskyist military 
group provided a basis for a perceived ‘conspiracy’ to evolve in the Red Army. As will 
be argued in the next chapter, this is exactly what happened. In this respect, a police 
investigation into the former opposition, external to the military, made further political 
repression in the army inevitable and provided the basis for the 1937 ‘military-fascist 
plot’. But it was the perceived threat from foreign agents which would eventually 
change the direction of arrests from Trotskyism. Indeed, Ol’berg was a former 
Trotskyist, but he had also arrived from Germany. As shown in the next chapter, further 
links started to be drawn between former Trotskyists and the Nazis from mid-1936. This 
convergence of two perceived threats widened the possibility of incrimination in the 
army beyond being a Trotskyist. Once the arrests took on a broader international 
dimension even those at the very heart of the upper military establishment were put at 
risk. 
 
 
                                                
185 See for example, Cherushev, p. 8. 
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Chapter Five: The Military Purge 
 
 
The arrests of Primakov, Putna and the other former Trotskyist officers represented the 
starting point of a much deeper investigation into ‘unexposed’ Trotskyists in the Red 
Army. The attentions of Stalin and the political police were now firmly turned towards 
the military as a result of the ‘exposed’ links between the former Trotskyist officers and 
the Zinoviev-Kamenev group. With the political police taking the lead, the search for 
further ‘hidden Trotskyists’ gradually expanded into an investigation into widespread 
espionage and sabotage in the Red Army during the second half of 1936 and early 1937. 
It was this wider line of investigation into foreign espionage that played a crucial role in 
triggering the military purge in June 1937. This chapter will explore this transformation. 
But this chapter will also show that arrests in the army did not expand gradually, but 
exploded in June 1937 after Stalin was finally compelled to act against the Red Army. 
The resulting military purge reached an unexpected scale and had to be reined in and 
central control re-established. Before long there were calls for those incorrectly 
discharged from the army to be reinstated. As such, this chapter will argue that the best 
way to understand the military purge is not in terms of a steady expansion of arrests 
from 1936, showing a premeditated intent to purge the military elite and officer corps, 
but as a last minute response to Stalin’s misperception that the Red Army was widely 
infiltrated by ‘enemies’ and foreign agents. 
 
The Investigation into the Trotskyist Military Organisation 
 
 
The arrests of the former Trotskyist officers in the summer and autumn of 1936 were 
different in many respects to the arrests of army Trotskyists in previous years. The 
‘exposure’ of ties between the defendants at the August show trial and serving officers 
in the Red Army was more serious than earlier arrests for army Trotskyism. Since the 
summer of 1936 senior officers were understood to be complicit in a plot to assassinate 
leading party members, including Stalin. The ‘existence’ of a Trotskyist military 
organisation gave form to what had previously been a relatively disparate, if growing, 
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string of arrests for Trotskyism in the military. These had been on an individual basis 
and showed no signs of organised conspiracy.1 Now there was what was seen as a 
defined military group, led by Trotsky, with subversive designs against the party elite. 
Furthermore, it is not surprising that following the arrests of Primakov, Putna and the 
other former Trotskyist officers that the army would face scrutiny. The previous years 
had seen repeated calls about the need to increase Bolshevik ‘vigilance’ in the face of 
the ‘enemy’ within, of criticisms about incorrect discharges and promotions, and the 
continued ‘exposure’ of ‘enemies’ within the ranks. The ‘discovery’ of this Trotskyist 
group in the army would be seen as further evidence that army self-policing remained 
inadequate. Once again, it had not been improvements in army ‘vigilance’ which had 
brought about these recent arrests, but this time a separate political police investigation. 
This would hardly provide assurances that all the ‘enemies’ in the ranks were now 
discovered and would further strengthen the political police’s views about army 
vulnerabilities. 
The calls to root out the remaining ‘conspirators’ from the ranks came very soon 
after the arrests of Primakov, Putna and the other Trotskyist officers. One such call 
came from Budennyi, who sent Voroshilov a letter on 22 August where he remarked: 
 
The trial of the counterrevolutionary band going on now in Moscow, as never before, 
clearly shows all humanity of the whole world to what point these degenerates and their 
mangy ringleader – Trotsky – have sunk. But this, in my view, should not be the end. I 
think that it is necessary to raise all the working people, both in the Soviet Union and in 
all countries of the world, to demand the extradition of Trotsky and his foreign 
company, in order to put him on trial in our country…It is clear that the network of this 
organisation has penetrated into the army, into the railways, industry, agriculture, into 
the organism of our state in general…It seems to me that it is necessary to especially 
carefully check the people in the army, since in its ranks we see people from the 
command, and officers and political workers (nachal’stvuiushchego sostava) with 
careerist tendencies on one side, and on the other, a tendency to consider serious 
questions not from the point of view of the state, but from a narrowly personal point of 
view, a local “oligarchy” (bat’kovshchina), and also people who are able to give in 
easily to any kind of influence, in particular counterrevolutionary.2 
 
Because of his close relationship with Voroshilov, Budennyi no doubt believed his letter 
would carry weight and he was probably also trying to influence Stalin. Indeed, 
                                                
1 Lower-level arrests did still continue on the same pattern as in previous years. For example see a report 
dated 21 August 1936 sent to the deputy head of PUR, G. A. Osepian, from a deputy battalion commissar 
in the BVO, detailing the arrest of four Trotskyists within the army which appear separate from the main 
line of investigation into the senior Trotskyist officers, see RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 872, ll. 24-26. 
2 RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 16, l. 265. 
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Budennyi chose to write to Voroshilov and he surely had a purpose in mind. It is 
possible he wanted his letter forwarded to Stalin. If so, Budennyi got his wish. It seems 
that Voroshilov agreed with his concerns and the letter was sent to Stalin, Ezhov and A. 
A. Andreev, a Secretary of the Central Committee, on 1 September.3 The significance of 
Budennyi’s letter was not only his direct call for a careful scrutiny of the army, but his 
singling out the command is important. Aside from the fact that the officers would bear 
much of the weight of the military purge during 1937-38, by focusing on their supposed 
narrow self-interest, Budennyi touched on the complaints about the command seen in 
previous years which had been framed as weak ‘vigilance’. Indeed, using the term 
‘bat’kovshchina’ (oligarchy) implied that some officers were primarily concerned with 
maintaining their own power and influence. It suggested systems of patronage and 
nepotism. For Budennyi this type of localism gave the opportunity for ‘enemies’ to 
operate freely. If officers were protecting their own narrow self-interests, what 
motivation would they have to find the Trotskyists, Zinovievites or spies under their 
commands? Budennyi’s comments add further weight to the indications that some 
officers were reluctant to search out ‘enemies’ in their own commands and were 
focused instead on serving their own interests. More explicit descriptions of this 
behaviour followed in 1937. Finally, in writing such a letter Budennyi may have been 
starting to disassociate himself from Voroshilov. He was pointing to a serious problem 
in the officer corps and he did not downplay the danger in his letter. Perhaps Budennyi 
sensed that further arrests were around the corner and he wanted to show that he had 
given suitable ‘signals’ about the threat in good time. 
Importantly, the political police also matched Budennyi’s call and declared that 
the army should be searched more thoroughly, but a change in leadership proved 
decisive. On 25 September Iagoda was replaced by Ezhov as the head of the political 
police. Ezhov had already begun to encroach into police affairs having been closely 
involved with the investigation into the Kirov assassination. Then on the ‘exposure’ of 
the Zinoviev-Kamenev Counterrevolutionary Bloc, Stalin had criticised Iagoda as being 
‘four years behind’ in its discovery. Interrogations showed the group had apparently 
formed in 1932. Furthermore, explosions at the Kemerovo mines, blamed on Trotskyist 
sabotage days later, further undermined Iagoda.4 Ezhov’s appointment at the head of the 
political police is commonly understood as a crucial event in the history of the Terror 
                                                
3 Ibid., l. 262. 
4  Getty and Naumov, The Road to Terror, p. 276. 
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and it was no less so for the military purge. Ezhov was far more conspiratorially minded 
than his predecessor and had a different standard of what constituted evidence. His 
appointment provided the opportunity for the already ‘exposed’ Zinoviev-Kamenev 
counterrevolutionary ‘conspiracy’ to achieve greater dimensions. Indeed, following the 
very public demonstration of the danger from the former Opposition at the August show 
trial and Ezhov’s appointment at the head of the political police, the pressure on former 
oppositionists in the party greatly increased and further high-profile arrests followed. 5 
In September the former Trotskyist, Georgy Piatakov was arrested. Piatakov was the 
deputy People’s Commissar for Heavy Industry, working under Ordzhonikidze, and his 
arrest located the ‘oppositionist plot’ higher up the party hierarchy. Ezhov was widening 
the scope of the investigation. In terms of investigating the Red Army specifically, 
Ezhov signalled his intentions early on. Just prior to his appointment as the head of the 
political police, in a letter to Stalin on 9 September which discussed the August trial, 
Ezhov remarked that he believed that there must still be Trotskyist officers unexposed 
within the Red Army.6 Ezhov’s letter was sent to Stalin shortly after he had received 
Budennyi’s letter, and the latter may have had some influence. Thus, with Ezhov at the 
helm of the political police and a call from Budennyi to investigate the officer corps, 
two powerful influences coincided to expand the investigation of the Trotskyist military 
centre deeper into the Red Army.  
There were several ways by which the arrests of former Trotskyists in the Red 
Army gathered pace. Most directly, implication through interrogation secured further 
key arrests.7 The political police also targeted officers and soldiers who had links to the 
group of arrested former Trotskyists. For example, on 26 September, M. I. Gai, the head 
of the OO NKVD, sent Voroshilov a request to demobilise four army men who had 
supposed links with the now arrested former Trotskyist, Dreitser.8 However, arrests also 
expanded through denunciations. As a Trotskyist military group had been ‘exposed’ 
including several senior officers with numerous connections throughout the army, the 
ground was set for a flurry of denunciations. Whether for careerism, to cover one’s own 
back or a genuine belief in the danger posed by ‘hidden Trotskyists’, the letters flowed 
in incriminating other soldiers for their supposed connections to the already arrested 
                                                
5 See for example, Getty and Naumov, The Road to Terror, pp. 281-282. 
6 Jansen and Petrov, p. 49. 
7 See Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, p. 54; Cherushev, p. 84. 
8 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 22, d. 1, l. 178. For other cases of the political police ‘exposing’ Trotskyist 
soldiers in October 1936 see, RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 94, ll. 365-366, 397; d. 99, l. 65. 
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officers. Some denunciations were sent directly to Stalin. For example, on 10 October 
Stalin received a denunciation from a political worker in the Black Sea Fleet with a list 
of ten people he claimed were former oppositionists. The political worker added that the 
list was not complete.9 Indeed, Stalin was kept well informed about the number of 
Trotskyists discovered in the military. For example, Georgy Malenkov, the director of 
the Department of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee, sent Stalin the 
details of ‘exposed’ Trotskyists working in the central army apparatus and the military 
academies in November 1936.10 These army denunciations show that ordinary officers 
and soldiers directly participated in expanding the investigation into Trotskyists in the 
military. This participation from ‘below’ helped the later military purge achieve the 
very large scale it took during 1937-38.  
What is also noticeable from mid-1936 is how the widening investigation into 
the Zinoviev-Kamenev Counterrevolutionary Bloc began to solidify the notion of a 
potential ‘military plot’ through its frequent appearance in investigation testimony. For 
instance, during the investigation into the Zinoviev-Kamenev group, one of the 
supposed members, Isak Reingol’d, a former Trotskyist and at the time the Chairman of 
the Cotton Syndicate, had mentioned two ways that power could be seized by the 
counterrevolutionaries, by ‘double-dealing’ or a ‘military plot’ (voennyi zagovor).11 
Later, the senior party member and journalist, Karl Radek, who had been indirectly 
implicated during the August show trial and arrested soon after, testified during 
interrogation in December to the existence of a military plot which apparently included 
Primakov, Shmidt and Putna. At the same time the former oppositionist Grigory 
Sokol’nikov, the first deputy People’s Commissar for Light Industry, gave testimony 
about preparations for treachery by the Trotskyist officers in the case of war.12 In light 
of the more frequent mention of a ‘military plot’ it is important to stress again that the 
political police used forced confessions. Investigators could shape arrest testimony in a 
particular direction. The increasing frequency of a ‘military plot’ suggests that the 
political police were perhaps looking to uncover ‘evidence’ of an organised conspiracy 
within the Red Army from autumn 1936. 
                                                
9 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 285, l. 22. On 15 November Gamarnik was sent a long list of army men who had 
in the past been part of the Trotskyist Opposition, ninety-two individuals were named, see ll. 232-242. 
10 Khaustov and Samuelson, p. 108. 
11 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 93, l. 43. 
12 Khaustov and Samuelson, p. 108. For other army arrests in December 1936 and January 1937, see ibid. 
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The Military Soviet met again in October 1936, but this was dominated by 
strictly military issues such as weaponry and organisation. The arrested former 
Trotskyists were not mentioned specifically and only the general trend in the arrests of 
former oppositionists was commented on. It is possible that the army leadership 
considered these arrests a police matter or they may not have been too alarmed at what 
were, at this stage, only a relatively small number of arrests. However, despite this, the 
usual discussion of army political reliability took place. Alongside the litany of 
pronouncements about the army’s apparent growing political cohesiveness, several 
negative trends persisted. For instance, the deputy head of PUR, G. A. Osepian, 
remarked that even though the proverka and obmen had expelled ‘class enemies’ and 
‘harmful people’ it was not time to be complacent. Not all ‘enemies’ had been 
discovered. But Osepian also cautioned against deliberate shows of vigilance. Some 
officers were apparently classifying what was only harmless talk as something more 
dangerous and this was leading to unnecessary expulsions from the party and discharges 
from the army.13 This is another indication that some officers were making conspicuous 
shows of ‘vigilance’. Later, P. A. Smirnov, the head of PUR in the LVO, highlighted 
that the proverka and obmen had shown that ‘class aliens’, ‘harmful elements’ and 
‘foreign elements’ had infiltrated into the army and its command. He pointed to the 
BVO and LVO, where apparently a number of Polish and Finish nationals had managed 
to infiltrate the army. Smirnov argued that these individuals had been sent by ‘fascist 
elements’.14 Ian Berzin, the deputy commander of the OKDVA and former head of 
military intelligence, made a similar point about hidden ‘enemies’ and highlighted the 
danger of treachery by nationalities serving in the military in the border regions.15 
Therefore, the ‘enemy’ was perceived as having infiltrated the ranks, but the problem 
was not confined to domestic ‘class aliens’ and included foreign agents apparently sent 
by hostile fascist countries and currently serving foreign nationals. The threat from 
perceived foreign agents was beginning to take on a larger dimension and would 
become the main focus of attention in 1937. 
That the members of the 1936 Military Soviet only made a brief mention of the 
arrested Trotskyist officers suggests that these had not created a panic. Even though 
pressure had undoubtedly increased on members of the former Opposition in the army 
                                                
13 Voennyi sovet pri narodnom komissare oborony SSSR, oktiabr’ 1936 g.: dokumenty i materialy, ed. by 
A. S. Kniaz’kov and others (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009), p. 327. 
14 Ibid., p. 354. 
15 Ibid., p. 377. 
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after the August show trial, there was no large wave of repression. According to a report 
summarising arrests between 1 August and 31 December 1936 within the command and 
other leading army bodies such as PUR, there were 212 arrests for 
‘counterrevolutionary Trotskyism’, of which thirty-two were from the command. The 
number of such arrests for the previous six months, from January to 1 August 1936, 
totalled 125 with six from the command. As such, from August 1936 arrests had 
increased in the command, though by less than one hundred cases. From 1 January 1937 
to 1 March 1937 the pace of arrest seen in the latter half of 1936 was maintained with 
125 further arrests, with forty-three from the command.16 These are not large numbers 
in comparison with the military purge in 1937-38. Furthermore, between July 1936 and 
February 1937, those arrested from the rank of Major and above included only Putna, 
Primakov, Turovskii, Shmidt, Ziuk, Kuzmichev, Iu. V. Sablin, and I. L. Karpel’.17 The 
upper ranks were as yet not affected. Those from the military elite who would become 
the defendants at the June 1937 military trial as representatives of the ‘military-fascist 
plot’ were not in danger of arrest at this time. They had never been Trotskyists. In 
addition, Voroshilov continued to push for promotions for some the future members of 
the ‘military-fascist plot’. For example, on 10 November he wrote to Stalin about 
freeing Uborevich from the command of the BVO and promoting him as his deputy and 
the head of the Air Force.18 Voroshilov also requested that Eideman be freed from his 
position as head of Osoaviakhim and promoted to the head of the anti-aircraft 
administration, as, in Voroshilov’s words, it needed someone of ‘major authority’.19 
Neither promotion was made in the end. Uborevich resisted the transfer to the Air Force 
and he made this known to Voroshilov.20 Perhaps Stalin thought Eideman was not the 
right candidate for the new role, especially after the Nakhaev case at Osoaviakhim only 
two years previously. He may have had some suspicions about Eideman or simply 
doubted his competence. In any case, in just seven months both men would be executed 
                                                
16 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 107, l. 14. Following the August trial political arrests continued to increase, 
but according to this report, arrests for counterrevolutionary agitation halved between 1935 and 1936 in 
the command and nachal’sostav. PUR seem an exception. A separate report from the then head of PUR, 
P. A. Smirnov, sent to Voroshilov from 27 December 1937, shows that the number of discharges from the 
Political staff for either political reasons or belonging to the Trotskyist opposition actually fell between 
1935 and 1936 from 301 to 250, see RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 992, l. 209. 
17 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 99, l. 57. Karpel’, the head of staff of the 66th Rifle division, was arrested in 
December 1936. Sablin, a battalion commander, had been incriminated through the testimony from the 
Trotskyist officers arrested in the summer 1936, see Cherushev, pp. 70, 97. 
18 RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 18, l. 179. 
19 Ibid., l. 176. 
20 Minakov, 1937. zagovor byl!, p. 236. 
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and Voroshilov did not appear to be suspicious of the pair. Admittedly, Stalin may have 
had more developing doubts about the military elite. He would be aware of Ezhov’s 
suspicions, which seemed to point towards uncovering an organised conspiracy in the 
army. Yet, if Stalin had doubts about some members of the army leadership, it looks 
like he had not made these known to Voroshilov, who would not have suggested 
promoting Uborevich and Eideman if this had been the case. Stalin was waiting to see 
what the political police discovered, if anything at all, and for now Voroshilov may well 
have been kept out of the loop once again. 
Another indication of a lack of panic and that a large purge of the army was not 
yet being planned can be seen from the Military Procuracy. In late January the Chief 
Military Procurator, Naum Rozovskii, wrote to Feldman about releasing N. Kakurin 
from prison. Kakurin had been arrested during operation vesna in 1930 and had 
incriminated Tukhachevskii as leading a counterrevolutionary group at that time. 
Rozovskii contacted Feldman after receiving an appeal from Kakurin’s wife, and he 
wanted Feldman’s opinion about whether Kakurin could be reinstated in the army as a 
specialist.21 Feldman’s judgement is unknown, but that the Chief Military Procurator 
was even considering that a convicted ‘conspirator’ could be released from 
imprisonment suggests a level of complacency about ‘enemies’ within the Red Army. If 
there was growing panic about hidden ‘enemies’ it is unlikely that releasing Kakurin 
would be entertained. Yet at the same time there are also suggestions that a cautious 
approach was being taken. At the same time as Rozovskii was writing to Feldman about 
Kakurin, Gamarnik ordered that officers discharged from the ranks for ‘political’ or 
‘moral’ reasons would not be able to rejoin the army even in the early phase of war.22 
This is a clear attempt to improve the political reliability of the command, but still not 
an indication that a major purge was being prepared. 
There is also evidence of a certain level of push-back from within the military 
elite against the unfounded cases brought by the political police. This can be seen most 
clearly from Feldman, the head of the Main Administration of the Red Army. 
Throughout 1936 and early 1937 Feldman frequently defended those charged with 
‘counterrevolution’ or espionage and lobbied Voroshilov and Gamarnik for more 
lenient punishments. In some cases he argued that the cases were actually unfounded. 
Feldman often made the argument that the accused was in fact good officer who denied 
                                                
21 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 109, l. 87. 
22 Vadim Rogovin, 1937: Stalin’s Year of Terror (Oak Park, Mich.: Mehring Books, 1998), p. 414. 
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the accusations against them and that a transfer would be a better solution than 
demobilisation.23 A typical case concerned an alleged wrecking group in the Chemical 
Industry. This group had been highlighted by M. I. Gai at the OO NKVD, who notified 
Voroshilov on 26 August. In addition, two men from the Chemical Administration, 
Nikitin and Ostovskii, had sent Voroshilov a denunciation naming almost thirty alleged 
Trotskyists.24 It appears that Voroshilov ordered Feldman, Osepian, and a deputy at the 
OO NKVD, N. I. Dobroditskii, to investigate the case. Feldman and Osepian later 
reported back to Voroshilov on 19 September. In reference to Gai’s case materials and 
the denunciation from Nikitin and Ostovskii, Feldman and Osepian argued that without 
a strict scrutiny of the work of the accused individuals they could not advise arrest with 
full confidence.25 They argued that there was no concrete evidence against the group, 
and in fact, their appraisals had shown them to be loyal and disciplined.26 In addition, 
both argued there was no clear evidence in the letter from Nikitin and Ostovskii either.27 
The outcome of the case is unknown, but Feldman and Osepian were challenging the 
political police on the need for better evidence. Importantly, it is very doubtful that 
Feldman would be able to intervene in this manner if the army leadership were making 
preparations for a large purge. But Feldman’s hopes of maintaining legality would do 
little to forestall the military purge in 1937. Ezhov’s views about hidden ‘enemies’ in 
the army was gaining ground. At a political police conference in December Ezhov again 
voiced his opinions about hidden ‘enemies’ within the Red Army, arguing that they had 
more opportunities there to cause damage than in industry.28 Feldman was an influential 
                                                
23 For example see a petition from Feldman to Voroshilov from 14 November about keeping an officer 
accused of Trotskyist agitation in the army, RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 99, l. 91. For another similar case 
from 19 November, see d. 109, l. 191. In 14 December Feldman examined another case brought by M. I. 
Gai for a discharge from the command for Trotskyist agitation. Feldman requested to keep the man in the 
army and that PUR and the command should help him ‘improve himself’ and become a good officer. In 
this case, Voroshilov agreed, see d. 94, ll. 311-312. In December Feldman petitioned Voroshilov about an 
academy student who was linked to Primakov, Shmidt and Ziuk and requested that he be allowed to work 
within Osoaviakhim in a remote area, rather than be demobilised to the reserves, see l. 375. In a letter to 
Voroshilov on 9 January 1937 Feldman agreed with an indictment against an army man for anti-soviet 
agitation, but argued that the man’s background and his appraisals were good and that he was not a 
‘hopeless commander’. In Feldman’s opinion he needed support in order to improve himself, see d. 109, l. 
126. On 19 March 1937 Feldman wrote to Gamarnik about a colonel who had a brother arrested as a spy. 
Feldman argued that the colonel said he had no knowledge of this and that he found this explanation 
convincing. Feldman asked whether the colonel could be transferred to another position in the army, and 
perhaps also be kept in the party, see d. 99, 160. 
24 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 100, l. 570, 537. 
25 Ibid., l. 570. 
26 Ibid., l. 563. 
27 Ibid., l. 565. 
28 Jansen and Petrov, p. 69. 
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military voice, but he did not have Ezhov’s power. It was the latter’s particular narrative 
of a conspiracy within the Red Army which became dominant in 1937. 
As such, as political repression had gathered pace in the party in 1936 it had 
been impossible to ignore former Trotskyists in the Red Army. By the second half of 
1936 the military was firmly in Ezhov’s sights. However, there is nothing to suggest a 
large purge of the military was imminent or even being planned. Trotskyists were too 
much of a minority and absent from the upper ranks. For a much larger military purge to 
even be considered by Stalin, the political police needed to ‘expose’ a much broader 
conspiracy and move the charges on from ‘Trotskyist counterrevolution’. Otherwise, the 
upper ranks and those who were not former Trotskyists would remain unaffected. 
However, during the last few months of 1936 the charge of Trotskyism began to align 
with a charge of foreign espionage and sabotage. It was this that provided the 
opportunity for the nascent army ‘plot’ to move beyond Trotskyism and, at the very last 
moment, provide the momentum to affect a much wider circle of officers.   
 
Foreign Espionage and the ‘Military-Fascist Plot’ 
 
 
Alleged links between the defendants at the August 1936 show trial and the Nazis had 
been ‘exposed’ as part of the investigation into the Zinoviev-Kamenev 
Counterrevolutionary Bloc. But this gradual alignment of the foreign threat with the 
internal Trotskyist threat had preceded the August trial. For example, the case of 
Valentin Ol’berg was an early example of how a charge could be levelled as being both 
a counterrevolutionary Trotskyist and as working for a hostile foreign power. This trend 
continued after the August trial but in more visible terms. For example, on 29 
September the Politburo issued an order, ‘About the relations to the 
counterrevolutionary Trotskyist-Zinovievite elements’. This described that these 
‘elements’ should be regarded as, ‘Intelligence agents, spies, subversives and wreckers 
of the fascist bourgeoisie in Europe’.29 The message was clear: domestic 
counterrevolutionaries were actively engaged in espionage and wrecking for hostile 
countries. This increased focus on foreign agents was no doubt fuelled by the worsening 
of the international situation. On 25 October the Rome-Berlin Axis was formed and a 
                                                
29 Khaustov and Samuelson, p. 93. 
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month later the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact was signed. In addition, the 
Spanish Civil War demonstrated the dangers of foreign agents infiltrating the military. 
As Khlevniuk has shown, Stalin received reports about an alleged fifth column within 
the Republican armed forces. For example, the Trade Representative in Spain, A. 
Stashevskii, in a letter sent on 14 December remarked that it was, ‘not out of the 
question that among the highest officers there exists a Fascist organisation which is 
engaged in sabotage and, of course, spying’.30 Later in March 1937, Georgy Dimitrov, 
the head of the Communist International, wrote in his diary that Stalin had received two 
Spanish writers and the discussion had been the Civil War. Notably, Stalin had 
mentioned that the General Staff of the Republic forces were unreliable and that, ‘there 
has always been betrayal on the eve of an offensive by Republic[an] units’.31 With an 
‘exposed’ Trotskyist military centre already within the Red Army this Spanish example 
would surely reinforce the dangers of a compromised military. However, Ezhov was 
also a major influence to why the threat from foreign agents became far more prominent 
during the second half of 1936 and in 1937. Even before he became head of the political 
police, Ezhov was obsessed about discovering ‘conspiracy’. This can be seen in the 
manuscript he had been working on since 1935, ‘From Factionalism to Open 
Counterrevolution’, which set out a conspiracy theory linking the opposition of 
Zinoviev and Kamenev to acts of terrorism and ‘counterrevolution’.32 This manuscript 
went through several versions and laid the foundations for how Ezhov defined the 
former oppositionist conspiracy in 1936-37. Furthermore, as noted above, Ezhov saw 
little difference in goals and tactics between Trotskyists and foreign agents. He was 
very sensitive to foreign connections and had been closely involved with checking the 
activity of soviet citizens working abroad since 1934. In mid-1936 Ezhov was focused 
on espionage by foreigners.33 As head of the political police, Ezhov tried to draw links 
between the differing oppositionist groups and pushed for the foreign connections to be 
made to the already ‘exposed’ oppositionist conspiracy. The second Moscow show trial 
represented the results of these efforts. 
The second Moscow show trial of the ‘Anti-Soviet Trotskyite-Centre’ was held 
in January 1937. On the one hand this trial was another public demonstration of the 
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danger of the former political Opposition and the need for ordinary party members to 
remain vigilant, but on the other, it thrust the perceived danger from foreign agents into 
the open. The defendants at the trial included Sokol’nikov, Radek and Piatakov, and 
fourteen others who had fallen under suspicion during the investigation into the earlier 
Zinoviev-Kamenev Counterrevolutionary Bloc. These men were not party outsiders like 
Zinoviev and Kamenev and some like Piatakov held senior positions. The conspiracy 
was now rising up the party ranks. Specifically, the January trial emphasised the 
dangers posed by ‘double-dealers’. These were individuals in responsible party 
positions supposedly working for the enemy.34 The accused were charged with 
terrorism, wrecking and sabotage, which had been directed by Trotsky, Germany and 
Japan. Their aim was to overthrow Soviet power and not merely to assassinate leading 
party figures. Furthermore, even though links had been ‘exposed’ between the 
defendants with German fascists at the previous show trial, the defendants at the 
January trial were not only linked to fascist powers, but were supposedly working on 
the direct orders of Germany and Japan.35 There is a marked difference between the first 
and second show trials in terms of the prominence of this connection. Stalin believed 
the ‘evidence’ extracted by Ezhov from the arrested former oppositionists and hostile 
foreign powers were now seen as sponsoring and directing terrorism inside the Soviet 
Union. The chief danger was moving away from domestic Trotskyism and towards the 
espionage and subversion by foreign agents. This shift in the political repression in the 
party came to directly shape the military terror. 
The January trial was also another occasion when Tukhachevskii’s name was 
mentioned alongside arrested ‘counterrevolutionaries’. During his testimony Radek 
remarked that Putna had come to see him, ‘with a request from Tukhachevskii’ relating 
to some government task the latter was engaged in. Much has been made of this name-
drop and it has been argued that it was planted by Stalin in order to incriminate 
Tukhachevskii.36 However, Radek went on to say that Tukhachevskii had no connection 
to the arrested men and that he was ‘devoted’ to the party. If Radek’s comments had 
been contrived and meant to be incriminating, they were clumsy and ambiguous. If 
Stalin wanted to incriminate Tukhachevskii he could have arranged this in a more direct 
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 204 
way. Radek’s comments are consistent with how Tukhachevskii’s name had a tendency 
of appearing in investigations in ‘counterrevolutionary’ groups, as in the Eismont-
Tolmachev case. This was another indirect connection between Tukhachevskii and 
‘counterrevolution’. But that Radek named Tukhachevskii also could be nothing more 
than the fact that Tukhachevskii and Putna were in professional contact. They had both 
travelled through Europe in 1936. Yet, early 1937 was a time of increasing political 
arrests, and even though Tukhachevskii’s arrest was still months away, the mention of 
his name at the trial may have focused political police attentions further. 
  As the second show trial was underway, there are a number of indications that 
the perceived problem of foreign agents inside the Red Army specifically was becoming 
a more pressing issue. Firstly, there were a number of alleged espionage cases in the 
military in early 1937. For example, in January, P. A. Smirnov wrote to Gamarnik about 
a soldier who had been arrested as a German agent following the ‘exposure’ of a 
Germany intelligence residency.37 In mid-January, I. M. Leplevskii, the head of the 
Special Section of the GUGB NKVD, notified Voroshilov that a subversive group had 
been ‘discovered’ in the 16th artillery regiment in air defence, and eleven arrests were 
made. This group had been supposedly been created by a German agent and recruited 
Germans in the Red Army for wrecking.38 At the end of January Ezhov sent Voroshilov 
a note about an ongoing investigation into a Trotskyist group which included several 
officers who been arrested at an ammunition depot in November 1936. Ezhov reported 
that it had now been established that one was a German spy.39 In this respect, Ezhov had 
added a new charge of espionage against a Trotskyist group. On 9 March Ezhov wrote 
to Voroshilov that a German spy had been arrested in Leningrad who was serving in the 
Red Army and that his task had been to find out military secrets from the LVO.40 It is 
likely that Ezhov was looking to uncover specific ‘evidence’ of espionage in the 
military at this time as part of a much larger ‘conspiracy’ that went beyond the confines 
of the former opposition. The charges at the second show trial demonstrate clearly that 
Ezhov was trying to make connections between former oppositionists and fascist states. 
It is very likely that Ezhov was looking to draw the army into his growing ‘conspiracy’ 
and make further connections. Indeed, as detailed above, the Red Army had displayed 
many perceived vulnerabilities since its formation. It was seen as susceptible to 
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infiltration and had been identified as a target of foreign agents since 1918. There had 
been large ‘exposed’ foreign-backed plots in the past, such as the military specialist 
‘conspiracy’ ‘discovered’ through operation vesna. The army remained seen as a target 
of foreign agents in the mid-1930s when Stalin and the political police were focused on 
the growing espionage threat. Furthermore, the rumours about a connection between 
Germany and the military elite, and their alleged disloyalty, had never abated. Thus, 
when Ezhov became head of the political police in 1936 he would have inherited thick 
files full of compromising information and rumours about members of the army 
leadership. He would also be very aware of how the Red Army had been seen as an 
object of subversion and would know about all the past ‘conspiracies’ and 
‘counterrevolutionary’ plots in the ranks. He would be very aware about how senior 
officers such as Tukhachevskii had been repeatedly incriminated and how nearly all the 
military elite had spent extended periods of time in Germany with the Reichswehr in the 
1920s. As Ezhov was particularly focused on the threat from foreign agents in 1937 and 
was trying to ‘expose’ a much broader oppositionist conspiracy, that he now looked to 
incorporate the army into this vision is unsurprising. 
Indeed, the reports and rumours continued to filter in about disloyalty in the 
army and a supposed connection between the Red Army high command and the Nazis. 
This would only galvanise Ezhov’s suspicions further and add more material to the files 
on the military elite that he now controlled. For example, in September and again in 
December 1936, the political police received information that Marshal Vasily Bliukher 
was allegedly planning a coup with assistance from the Red Army.41 In mid-January 
1937, Pravda’s correspondent in Berlin sent a letter to the paper’s editor, Lev Mekhlis, 
about an alleged link between the Red Army high command and the Nazis. 
Tukhachevskii was named specifically.42 Furthermore, Tukhachevskii had previously 
been linked to an arrested Polish Communist, Tomas Dombal’, who had been working 
at the Moscow Institute of Mechanisation and Electrification and arrested on 29 
December 1936 as a member of an espionage organisation.43 On 31 January 1937 
Dombal’ confessed to being part of the ‘Polish Military Organisation’ and having 
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gathered information on the condition of the Red Army.44 Dombal’ said that he had 
spoken with members of the high command including Tukhachevskii.45 Also in January 
Ezhov received a letter from the former head of the INO NKVD, Artur Artuzov, about 
alleged ‘wrecking activity’ conducted by Tukhachevskii. This information was initially 
received from foreign agents.46 In addition, at this time the INO had apparently planned 
to collect materials on members of the army high command and to pay closer attention 
to Moscow and the peripheries to expose ‘fascist groups among the army men’.47 
Finally, in March 1937 during an official conversation with the Soviet ambassador, 
Vladimir Potemkin, the French Prime Minister, Édouard Daladier, apparently spoke 
about alleged plans of certain circles in Germany to prepare a coup in the Soviet Union 
using members from the Red Army high command hostile to the Soviet Government. It 
was purported that the new Soviet regime would join a military union with Germany 
against France.48 Of course, it is not unlikely that the German government was 
spreading some of these rumours about a connection between themselves and the Red 
Army elite in order to undermine Stalin’s trust in his military. But even so the rumours 
about a connection between the Red Army elite and the Nazis were accumulating and 
by now some officers, most likely Tukhachevskii, were certainly under increased 
political police observation.49  
The 1937 February-March Plenum of the Central Committee was a turning point 
in the Terror and also for the Red Army, leading to a strengthening of the investigation 
into ‘enemies’ within the ranks. The Plenum opened under the shadow of the recent 
suicide of Ordzhonikidze, the People’s Commissar for Heavy Industry, and acted as a 
forum which the remaining members of the former Right Deviation, Bukharin and 
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Rykov, were denounced by those present at the Plenum.50 Bukharin and Rykov had too 
been incriminated in the growing party ‘conspiracy’ which had grown under Ezhov’s 
direction from the ‘exposure’ of the Zinoviev-Kamenev Counterrevolutionary Bloc. 
During the Plenum both were accused of conspiring with former oppositionists, of 
sabotage and espionage, having knowledge of the Kirov assassination and trying to 
overthrow the party.51 Such accusations against very senior party figures represented 
another escalation in the evolving ‘conspiracy’ in the party. Ezhov had linked the 
members of the former ‘Right Deviation’ to the former oppositionist ‘plot’, and Stalin 
accepted their guilt. Both were subsequently expelled from the party and arrested in 
March.  
During the Plenum Voroshilov took part in the attacks on both Bukharin and 
Rykov, but in terms of problems inside the Red Army he tried to downplay the danger 
of the enemy within.52 It is difficult to see Voroshilov as being sincere here. He, more 
than anyone, was aware of the army’s failures in self-policing. He had repeatedly 
criticised ‘weak vigilance’ in the officer corps and how this had allowed ‘enemies’ to go 
undetected. Yet, despite this, Voroshilov defended the army’s political reliability and 
argued that the threat from Trotskyists was in reality only small: ‘...in the army at this 
present time, happily, not that many enemies have been revealed’. Furthermore, in an 
obvious appeal to army loyalty he argued that the party sent the ‘best of its cadres’ to 
serve in the Red Army.53 He also raised the familiar refrain that the army was the most 
delicate and most important instrument in the state apparatus.54 Voroshilov was not 
incorrect in pointing to the small number of arrested Trotskyists. He produced figures 
showing that since the struggle against Trotskyists in the army began in the early 1920s, 
47,000 people from the military leadership had been discharged from the ranks, with 
22,000 during 1934-36. He added that 5,000 were oppositionists. Voroshilov also 
pressed that these discharges had been conducted with caution, no doubt trying to 
convince all present that this process had been thorough.55 Voroshilov did, however, 
concede the possibility that there were more ‘enemies’ in the military than that were 
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currently known, but the thrust of his speech was that the army was secure and 
remained politically reliable. The command and PUR had worked hard to remove 
subversive influences over the previous twenty years.56 Voroshilov did see room for 
improvement. He pointed to the importance of studying people better and knowing their 
personal lives, as apparently no one had suspected Putna, Primakov and the other 
Trotskyist officers of any wrongdoing, but this was hardly a radical solution to 
protecting the army from hidden ‘enemies’.57 Voroshilov was offering the same 
solutions as he had done in the past, when he had merely ordered ‘vigilance’ to be 
raised. Importantly, Voroshilov also tried to deflect responsibility, surely sensing that 
the discovery of these Trotskyist ‘enemies’ in the military could develop into a serious 
problem. Indeed, he stated that he was not fully responsible for the arrested Trotskyists 
having gone undiscovered, as no one else had noticed anything suspicious.58 In all, 
Voroshilov’s speech was largely confined to discussing the already arrested officers, 
rather than the need to further purge the ranks. With the repetition that the army 
contained the best people in the Soviet system and his emphasis on the small number of 
‘enemies’ presently exposed, Voroshilov did not strike a note of alarm. Yet, not all 
agreed with him. Molotov was not reassured by Voroshilov’s defence of army loyalty. 
In his speech he called for a more thorough checking of the military. Molotov agreed 
with Voroshilov that there were only ‘small signs’ of sabotage, espionage and 
Trotskyist activity in the army, but he argued that if the problem was ‘approached 
carefully’ further ‘enemies’ would be revealed:  
 
If we have wreckers in all sectors of the economy, can we imagine that there are no 
wreckers in the military. It would be ridiculous. The military department is a very big 
deal, and its work will not be verified now, but later on, and it will be verified very 
closely.59  
 
Molotov’s intervention is significant. He would not have made his comments without 
Stalin’s backing. Yet, there still seems to be some level of hesitation to clamp-down on 
the army even at this point. There are similarities to 1927 and 1930 when Stalin also 
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acted with restraint. The military would be more closely investigated, but not 
immediately. Molotov specifically noted this would be ‘later on’. Perhaps more 
evidence of ‘counterrevolution’ in the army was required, or maybe Stalin was merely 
being cautious. The Red Army was a very important institution, especially at a time of 
looming war. Stalin would not want to crack down without absolute certainty or until he 
was compelled to. This point had not been reached. At the Plenum, Stalin did not 
address the issue of the military arrests specifically. On 3 March he did point to 
apparent espionage and sabotage by foreign fascist agents and Trotskyists.60 In this 
respect, Stalin explicitly linked Trotskyists to foreign agents and Ezhov’s influence is 
clear.61 He also warned about the dangers of ‘enemies’ masked as party members, 
another reference to ‘double-dealers’. Those carrying party cards working for the 
‘enemy’ were seen as the chief danger. Stalin also warned about not forgetting the 
dangers of capitalist encirclement.62 Stalin did make one reference to the dangers of 
hidden spies in a military during war when he remarked:  
 
In order to win a battle during war, this may require several corps of soldiers. But, in 
order to thwart these gains at the front, all is needed are several spies somewhere in the 
staff of the army or even in the staff of the divisions, who are able to steal operative 
plans and give these to the enemy.63  
 
A final indirect reference to the army came from Ezhov. Along with talking about the 
alleged connections between the former Right Deviation and foreign agents, he spoke 
about one of the arrested ‘counterrevolutionaries’, a certain A. Slepkov, who had 
apparently given ‘evidence’ that a military coup was a potential method of seizing 
power.64 This was yet another example of how the idea of a ‘military plot’ increasingly 
appeared in interrogation testimony. It seems that the Ezhov continued to steer 
investigations in this direction.  
The impact of the Plenum is visible in the sharp contrast between Voroshilov’s 
Plenum speech and a speech he later gave to a meeting of the Red Army party members 
(aktiv) on 13 March. Here he spoke with more concerned terms about the danger to the 
army from hidden ‘enemies’ and struck a note closer to Molotov’s position. The party 
line towards the army had changed at the Plenum and Voroshilov had no choice but to 
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follow. Yet, before his speech to the aktiv there were more prominent army arrests. On 
the 11 March, I. I. Garkavyi, the commander of the UVO, and V. I. Vasilenko, his 
deputy and commander of the 65th rifle division, were arrested.65 Both had been 
implicated in February when Stalin received a denunciation about an alleged wrecking 
group operating within the engineering department of the Red Army. This was quickly 
investigated by the political police, leading to the arrest of N. I. Velezhev, the aid to the 
head of the engineering troops in the UVO. Velezhev’s arrest led to the incrimination of 
Garkavyi, Vasilenko, the commander of the 65th rifle division, G. F. Gavriushenko, and 
a number of other officers.66 The arrests of Garkavyi and Vasilenko are significant. 
Neither was a former Trotskyist and they had connections to the upper military elite. 
Garkavyi was an acquaintance of both Iakir and Gamarnik.67 Thus, the expanding 
arrests were starting to creep higher towards the upper military elite. This may have 
influenced Voroshilov in taking a more forthright tone about hidden ‘enemies’ during 
his speech to the aktiv in March. Yet Molotov’s insistence that the Red Army would be 
thoroughly checked remains the decisive factor.  
In his speech to the aktiv Voroshilov spoke about how deeply the ‘fascist-
Trotskyist bands’ had penetrated into the Soviet Union and pressed the need for all of 
the army to keep an eye on each other.68 Voroshilov highlighted what he saw as poor 
‘self-criticism’ and placed blame on the army party organisations.69 These criticisms 
were similar to highlighting ‘weak vigilance’ as he had in the past. In this sense, there is 
still little to suggest Voroshilov was tackling, or knew how to approach, the problem of 
why officers were not successfully rooting out the ‘enemies’ in the ranks. Pointing to a 
lack of ‘self-criticism’ was not going to get results. But in other respects, Voroshilov 
was far more forthright than he had ever been. For the first time he articulated the 
danger from foreign agents in very clear terms. For example, Voroshilov mentioned a 
series of fires which had resulted in a number of deaths and damage to machinery and 
transport, and he remarked, ‘I am absolutely convinced that it is the work of Japanese 
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spies, it is the work of Japanese agents.’70 Voroshilov also pointed to the large numbers 
of accidents in the army that were apparently due to ‘enemies’ and he called for each 
incident to be carefully investigated.71 Most importantly, in referring to the already 
arrested Trotskyists, Voroshilov now argued that these arrests did not mean that the Red 
Army was free from ‘enemies’. He argued:  
 
We do not have the right to permit one enemy in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, 
we must not allow this. Not only should we not have a single enemy in the ranks of our 
party, but we should not accept one enemy in the army because the army should be 
utterly and completely clean.72  
 
This was a much stronger call to ‘clean’ the ranks than he had made at the February-
March Plenum. Even though Voroshilov did not propose many specific solutions to 
tackling these remaining ‘enemies’ in the army, since Molotov’s intervention he was 
surely feeling the pressure from Stalin and wanted the officers to redouble their efforts. 
Voroshilov must have known that this meant further ‘enemies’ would inevitably be 
found and perhaps he worried that he would be held responsible. But he could no longer 
deny or downplay the threat that Stalin and Ezhov now saw within the Red Army. As 
such, rather than emphasise how well the army had done in exposing ‘enemies’, as he 
had done at the February-March Plenum, Voroshilov now pushed for the remaining 
hidden ‘enemies’ to be rooted out. 
Voroshilov’s comments were echoed by others during the meeting. There were 
similar criticisms about a lack of ‘Bolshevik vigilance’ and how ‘enemies’ had been 
able to slip by.73 However, some present also called to deepen the search into the Red 
Army. For instance, Budennyi argued that it was impermissible that ‘enemies’ were 
within the military. It was just too vital an institution. He pushed for deeper 
investigation to find the remaining ‘conspirators':  
 
It is not possible that it is one group, fifteen to twenty people, and no more. You know 
that in the first trial, the Trotskyist-Zinovievite trial, Mrachkovskii openly said that we 
have a direct order from Trotsky to plant groups in the RKKA.74  
 
The commander of the MVO, I. Belov, spoke in similar terms:  
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it is impossible to be so naïve that since the arrest of several officers that there are no 
more enemies in the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army…We should 
understand now more than ever that the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army is a very 
attractive object for all counter-intelligence agents, and we should note that the group of 
arrested commanders, who were actively working, will have had some kind of nest, a 
nest that we have to open and help the organs of the People’s Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs more actively in our future work than we are doing at the moment.75  
 
Again, not only were there unexposed ‘enemies’ in the army but the perceived danger 
from foreign agents is very clear. Budennyi and Belov presented the threat from hidden 
‘enemies’ in stronger terms than Voroshilov, perhaps sensing the approaching arrests 
and the need to display the necessary ‘signals’ of having highlighted the threat to the 
army. However, not everyone argued in the same terms despite also seeing the coming 
arrests. Feldman agreed that insufficient ‘vigilance’ had provided the enemy the 
opportunity to infiltrate the ranks and he called for a need to study each individual 
officer carefully.76 But Feldman remained consistent in pushing for legality to be 
observed during an investigation. He pointed out that since 1934 the improved standards 
of evidence required for arrests had seen declining levels in the officer corps. Feldman 
emphasised the importance of Voroshilov having gained the right to sanction arrests in 
the army. Feldman saw a danger of a shift towards mass unfounded arrests. Indeed, he 
criticised the discharges of officers ‘indiscriminately’ or by ‘list’.77 These concerns 
turned out to be justified. However, Feldman was not out of step with Ezhov on this 
particular issue. At the February-March Plenum, Ezhov had criticised the use of mass 
arrests as ineffective in finding genuine ‘enemies’.78 Mass arrests were seen as a blunt 
instrument. Thus, Feldman’s concerns about arrests ‘by list’ were not controversial. The 
use of mass arrests was facing criticism at this time and in this respect there is still little 
indication that a large military purge was being planned. Ezhov and Stalin wanted a 
centrally controlled and careful investigation of the army to find the hidden ‘enemies’. 
However, when the ‘miltary-fascist plot’ was finally ‘exposed’ in May, there was little 
restraint and a noticeable lack of central control. 
Finally, Gamarnik’s speech to the Red Army aktiv demonstrates the degree to 
which the military was now perceived as internally compromised. In a contrast to his 
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speeches in previous years, Gamarnik now described the scale of the inflitration in 
much greater terms: ‘Comrades, the Japanese-German Trotskyist agents, spies and 
wreckers are in a full range of our army organisation, in the staffs, the institutions, the 
academies, the military-training institutions.’79 The problem was no longer a small 
number of Trotskyist officers, but foreign-backed Trotskyist agents operating in a great 
many areas of the Red Army. Notably, Gamarnik no longer tried to downplay the 
perceived danger to the army. Like Voroshilov, after the February-March Plenum 
Gamarnik must have known that it was impossible to go against how Ezhov was 
framing the threat to the Red Army and how Stalin believed there were undiscovered 
‘enemies’ in the ranks. Again, foreign espionage was firmly on Ezhov’s agenda at this 
time. All foreign citizens in the Soviet Union had been placed under surveillance in 
early 1937 and those suspected of espionage were expelled from the country. Following 
the February-March Plenum, the political police had begun to gather further information 
on suspected foreign agents. Instructions sent to local NKVD administrations noted that 
foreign agents were working inside the Soviet Union and had created networks ready to 
provoke rebellions when war broke out.80 It is very likely this search extended to the 
Red Army. In addition, speaking about weak ‘vigilance’ was familiar territory for 
Gamarnik, and in his speech to the aktiv he once again highlighted the lessons of the 
proverka and obmen: 
 
We have excluded many people from the party. Some of this group were excluded 
probably for nothing, for so called passivity, insufficient activity, insufficient political 
preparedness and so on. And regarding Trotskyists and Zinovievites, during the obmen 
and proverka of party documents, despite all the warnings of the TsK (Central 
Committee), we excluded only 300 people from all of the army. But the main thing is 
that after the obmen of party documents, after the issue of new party documents, 250 
Trotskyists and Zinovievites were exposed and excluded from the party. Here are the 
characteristics of vigilance. For long time, for almost a year, documents were checked 
and exchanged, and during this long period of work only 300 enemies of the party were 
successfully exposed and excluded; after the obmen 250 were exposed and excluded, to 
whom party documents had been issued. Is this not evidence of insufficiency, of the 
belated vigilance of many of our party organisations and political organs?...each of you 
understands that only one spy, penetrated in any staff of a division, a corpus, army, 
general staff – is able to cause enormous, incalculable disasters (bedstviia).81 
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What is interesting about Gamarnik’s comments is how they again suggest deeper 
problems with army ‘vigilance’. Dangerous ‘enemies’ continued to be discovered in the 
ranks even after the proverka and obmen. Gamarnik had previously pointed to these 
party chistki as having highlighted the poor state of army self-policing. It had taken 
these chiskti to find the dangerous ‘enemies’ which the army itself was incapable of 
doing. But with the continued ‘exposure’ of dangerous ‘enemies’ even after the 
proverka and obmen, Gamarnik now argued that these chistki themselves were 
inadequate. ‘Enemies’ were still perceived as hidden within the ranks and neither army 
self-policing nor the party chistki had been effective at discovering these. In 
highlighting how ‘enemies’ continued to be missed, Gamarnik was in part reacting to 
the changed line towards the Red Army at the February-March Plenum. He needed to 
show that he saw the danger as defined by Stalin and Ezhov. However, Gamarnik’s 
comparison between expulsions from the party for more serious reasons, such as for 
being a political ‘enemy’, and those for passivity and weak political preparedness, 
demonstrates his awareness of the problems with the party chistki in general terms. As 
Getty has argued, the performance of the chistki was complicated by the relationship 
between the central and regional party organisations. Regional party leaders held great 
influence within their locality and had built systems of patronage and support. Getty 
terms these ‘family circles’. When the local elites were ordered to conduct the chistki, 
they tended to deflect the purge downwards and found ‘enemies’ in the party rank-and-
file, rather than purge their ‘own machines’, their own close systems of patronage and 
alliances.82 Indeed, local elites wanted to avoid weakening their own power and 
influence, but also avoid attracting questions about the type of person working with 
them. This was particularly the case if some of the people within the family circles 
could be regarded as dangerous ‘enemies’. Indeed, Getty notes that local elite family 
circles were likely to include former Trotskyists and Zinovievites who had worked their 
way to the top by the mid-1930s and were now experienced party members. The 
reluctance from party elites to correctly conduct the chistki explains why many of those 
expelled were from the party rank-and-file and for minor reasons, such as ‘passivity’, 
and why the dangerous political ‘enemies’ could remain seemingly undiscovered in the 
party.83 As shown above, there are indications that some army officers also behaved in 
this way. They turned towards making unnecessary discharges for minor crimes to 
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perhaps satisfy demands for increased ‘vigilance’, rather than seek out those deemed 
dangerous ‘enemies’ who could be in their close systems of patronage. Budennyi’s 
reference in his August 1936 letter to Voroshilov about some officers and 
‘bat’kovshchina’ (oligarchy) suggests he believed that some officers had built similar 
systems of patronage and local cliques. In this respect, it is very possible that the 
conduct of the chistki in the army was similarly affected by deliberate resistance from 
some officers. Further references to ‘family circles’ in the army will be detailed below 
The growing prominence of the espionage threat to the army can also be seen by 
the frequent mention at the March meeting of the aktiv about the poor security of secret 
documents. For instance, Gamarnik criticised loose talk about the contents of secret 
files and that documents were being left open in public.84 Egorov pointed to ‘the 
disappearance of a colossal number of critical documents’ and how the army had ‘slept 
on our laurels’ in organisational work.85 Another officer, B. I. Bazenkov, remarked: 
‘There is not a month when in any department of the NKO (People’s Commissariat of 
Defence) some kind of secret document is not lost.’86 The army had always struggled 
with the security of secret documents, but with the increasing attention now given to 
hidden foreign agents in early 1937 further preventative measures were needed. Thus, 
only days before the meeting of the aktiv, Gamarnik signed a secret order regarding 
‘enemies’ working in the clerical and technical offices in a range of army staffs and 
institutions. Apparently, secret documents were being handled by ‘enemies’ and this 
was going unchecked by the political police. Gamarnik ordered that all technical and 
clerical staff to be checked within a one month period and those exposed as 
untrustworthy to be discharged from the army.87 Later on 20 March Voroshilov also 
published a secret order concerning document security. This recounted an episode when 
a secret military document had been left in a drawer in one of the rooms of the National 
hotel on 3 February. An investigation had found that Dibenko, the commander of 
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PriVO, was responsible and he received a reprimand. Voroshilov ordered a review of 
how documents were stored and noted that this case was not an isolated incident.88  
However, that the perceived spy threat to the army was beginning to be seen in 
greater terms is most clearly demonstrated in a speech Gamarnik gave on 20 March to 
the Leningrad aktiv. Here he remarked:  
 
Didn’t you know that each capitalist country has spies in other countries, do the 
Germans not have their own counterintelligence agents, spies, agents in France, 
Czechoslovakia and in a whole range of other countries and the other way round? There 
is no capitalist country which would not practise espionage, wrecking, 
counterintelligence work in another capitalist country. These are the laws of 
capitalism…And it is quite natural and understandable that if one capitalist country is 
sending agents and spies to another capitalist country, that it would be 
incomprehensible, strange, foolish, it would be naïve, if we did not think that each 
capitalist country is attempting to get agents, spies inside our country, it would be naïve 
to think that each capitalist country does not have its own agents and spies inside our 
country.89  
 
Gamarnik also mentioned a resolution from the February-March Plenum regarding 
wrecking and espionage within the People’s Commissariats of Transport and Heavy 
Industry, and how this also affected the Chemical Industry and the Red Army. 
Gamarnik noted that the NKO needed to report to the Soviet Government and Central 
Committee about this question within one month. He added:  
 
The evidence of wrecking and espionage is not small…We know that Trotsky gave a 
direct order to his agents from abroad to create a Trotskyist terrorist cell in the Workers’ 
and Peasants’ Red Army, and Hitler and Trotsky gave an order to organise subversive 
cells in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in peace time, which prepared the defeat 
of the RKKA in the future approaching war.90  
 
The perceived scale of the threat from foreign agents in Gamarnik’s speech was 
described in far greater detail than he had done previously. Gamarnik’s comments 
suggest that from the ‘evidence’ given by the arrested Trotskyists, the political police 
had started to make connections between the former Trotskyists in the Red Army and 
German agents. A broader ‘conspiracy’ inside the army was being pieced together by 
Ezhov. In addition, Gamarnik’s speech shows that the danger from foreign agents 
specifically was now a priority for the Red Army as mandated by the February-March 
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Plenum. During the proverka and obmen Gamarnik had pointed to this espionage threat, 
emphasised its importance, but crucially, he had specified its minor scale. 
Circumstances had changed. With Ezhov and Stalin putting pressure on the army and 
with Hitler and Trotsky now seen as working in tandem, the espionage threat was 
perceived in much larger terms.91  
At the end of March Stalin signalled his growing distrust of the officer corps 
when the Politburo ordered that any senior officer who had been expelled from the party 
for political reasons was to be discharged from the army.92 In addition, on 28 April, 
Pravda published a call for the army to tackle ‘internal enemies’ and ‘to master 
politics’.93 These were attempts to improve the political reliability of the army. At the 
same time, arrests in the army continued. The end of April saw the arrests of several 
senior officers, including N. G. Egorov, the head of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee military school, and M. I. Alafuzo, the head of the Department of the 
Academy of the General Staff.94 On 27 April, the aide to the commander of the KVO, 
R. A. Peterson, was also arrested.95 Egorov and Peterson gave ‘evidence’ about their 
role in a possible coup. This was another mention of a ‘military plot’. Peterson also said 
he was a member of a ‘Right-counterrevolutionary’ organisation.96 Indeed, as noted, the 
conspiracy that Ezhov was piecing together linked all earlier oppositionists, including 
the Right Deviation. Yet, the key arrests which brought the direct incriminations of 
Tukhachevskii and the other future members of the ‘military-fascist plot’ were not from 
the army, but from the political police itself. 
During the February-March Plenum Ezhov had denounced his predecessor 
Iagoda for his poor leadership and he attacked the remaining Iagoda group inside the 
political police.97 A resolution from the Plenum entitled, ‘Lessons of the wrecking, 
diversionary, and espionage activities of the Japanese-German-Trotskyist agents’, 
accused the previous political police leadership of harbouring criminal individuals who 
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had apparently held back in exposing the Trotskyist centre, despite already accumulated 
‘evidence’.98 Following the Plenum, Iagoda was expelled from the party and later 
arrested. Furthermore, Ezhov had been staffing the political police with his own 
supporters since his appointment as the head of the NKVD in September 1936.99 After 
the February-March Plenum, he conducted a purge of the political police which led 
several arrests in early April, including M. I. Gai, the head of the OO NKVD, G. E. 
Prokofiev, a former deputy of Iagoda, who at the time of his arrest was deputy People’s 
Commissar of Communications, and the deputy of OO NKVD, Z. I. Volovich.100 Ezhov 
had previously declared at a meeting of NKVD officers during 19 to 21 March that Gai 
and Volovich were German spies.101 Under interrogation at the end of April, Gai, 
Volovich and Prokofiev gave incriminating ‘evidence’ against the Red Army elite, 
linking Tukhachevskii, Uborevich, Iakir, Kork, Eideman and other senior officers with 
the Iagoda conspirators and a planned coup and espionage.102 This was the first time 
that direct testimony was given against the members of the military elite who would be 
put on trial in June. From this point on their names would feature frequently in the 
testimony of other arrested officers. In a sense, it is understandable why it was the 
NKVD men who finally delivered the direct ‘evidence’ against the Red Army elite. The 
political police had a long history of working-up plots and trying to ‘expose’ conspiracy 
in the ranks. They were in the business of looking for ‘counterrevolution’ in the military 
and when arrested this remained familiar territory. If Ezhov was trying to find 
‘evidence’ of an organised military conspiracy in the army elite with links to fascist 
states, this could be easily obtained from the arrested NKVD men. M. I. Gai, in 
particular, had close involvement with the army. He was present and the meetings of the 
Military Soviet and would have repeatedly met with members of the high command. It 
is reasonable to assume that his testimony would carry weight. Thus, the arrests of those 
who had worked for so long to guard the Red Army against subversion had in the end 
delivered the outlines of an imagined conspiracy which would heavily undermine it. 
Yet, Stalin displayed growing suspicions about Tukhachevskii specifically even before 
the ‘evidence’ from the NKVD men had been given. A day before M. I. Gai gave his 
‘evidence’, the Politburo cancelled the Tukhachevskii’s trip to Britain to attend the 
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coronation of King George. This was later publicised on the grounds of ill health.103 
However, previously on 21 April, Ezhov had sent Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov a 
message detailing a chance of a German terrorist attack against Tukhachevskii if he 
attended the coronation. Yet, there is nothing to suggest that this anything more than a 
fabrication. It seems Ezhov had created this story as a means to keep Tukhachevskii 
inside the country.104 Indeed, Ezhov’s growing suspicions about Tukhachevskii can be 
seen even earlier on 12 April, when he sent Voroshilov a report which detailed a 
supposed link between Tukhachevskii and the Japanese military attaché in Poland. 
Voroshilov noted on the report, ‘Reported. Decisions have been made to investigate’.105 
At the beginning of May Stalin signalled again that the army’s political 
reliability needed to be strengthened. The Politburo passed a resolution ending single 
military and political command and reinstated the influence of the political commissar. 
This was a step back to the arrangement that had existed during the Civil War when 
military specialists were regarded as unreliable and needing close observation. The 
officers were beginning to test Stalin’s instinct for restraint. Further damaging 
testimony against the military elite came soon after and this gradually began to solidify 
the case against Tukhachevskii and his ‘co-conspirators’. On 6 May, M. Ie. Medvedev, 
a brigade commander, was arrested as a member of a ‘counterrevolutionary’ group. 
Between 8 and 10 May Medvedev gave testimony, which was undoubtedly forced, that 
he had been a member of a Trotskyist military organisation which included 
Tukhachevskii, Feldman, Iakir, Putna, Primakov and Kork.106 This direct testimony 
against the senior officers now had serious consequences. On 10 May Tukhachevskii 
was removed from his position and transferred to command the less prestigious PriVO. 
The decision to remove Tukhachevskii had been taken earlier on 7 May as Medvedev 
was giving his ‘evidence’.107 Later on 13 May members of the political police sent 
Ezhov a report containing materials on Tukhachevskii, the ‘evidence’ from Kakurin and 
Troitskii from operation vesna in 1930, and a note which contained the types of rumours 
about Tukhachevskii seen in previous years: ‘he dreams more about being a Marshal at 
the command of Germany, than the Soviet government…’108 This was perhaps also 
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forwarded to Stalin. On 14 May Kork was removed from his position and arrested. Kork 
initially denied the accusations of being a counterrevolutionary, but presumably under 
pressure, he gave ‘evidence’ on 16 May about preparations for a coup with 
Tukhachevskii and Putna’s involvement.109 On 15 May Feldman’s appointment as 
deputy commander of the MVO was annulled and he was also arrested. In Feldman’s 
case, it may have been his attempts to restrain the gathering repression in the military in 
1936 that brought him under Ezhov’s suspicions. As with Iagoda, those perceived to be 
holding back in ‘exposing’ ‘enemies’ were in danger of arrest. Putna was also re-
interrogated also on 14 May as the conspiracy was pieced together and he incriminated 
Tukhachevskii. Primakov also gave testimony incriminating Iakir.110 The latter was 
removed from his position on 20 May and transferred to the LVO, while Uborevich was 
transferred to command the troops in the remote SAVO.111 Under interrogation during 
19 to 23 May Feldman gave evidence about the existence of Trotskyist Military plot 
within the Red Army which he said was headed by Tukhachevskii. Feldman also 
mentioned more than forty other officers and political workers.112 Primakov gave 
further evidence on 21 May naming Tukhachevskii and forty others as members of the 
military conspiracy, including Shaposhnikov, Gamarnik, Dibenko and S. P. Uritskii.113 
On 22 May Tukhachevskii, Eideman, Iakir and Uborevich were all arrested. On 24 May 
Tukhachevskii was expelled from the party.114 On 29 May Tukhachevskii himself gave 
testimony. All of the future key ‘conspirators’ of the ‘military-fascist plot’ were now 
arrested. Importantly, Stalin had been very closely involved throughout the 
investigation, receiving Ezhov regularly between 21 and 28 May.115  
However, this series of events is unusual. Despite the incriminating ‘evidence’ 
against the group of officers only Kork and Feldman were actually arrested in the first 
instance, while the others were transferred. This was an unusual way to handle 
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dangerous ‘conspirators’. If these officers were under suspicion, why were they all not 
immediately arrested? Iakir’s transfer from the KVO to the LVO is the most unusual. It 
may have been a move to a less significant military district, but Leningrad was still very 
important strategically. It was a responsible position. These transfers strongly suggest a 
level of uncertainty from Stalin and how he should next to proceed. There is little 
indication that the group of officers had been targets for arrest for a long period of time 
or that there was a well-thought-out plan. Indeed, the decision to move against the 
group appears to have been taken quickly and without a plan. It seems very likely that 
the initial testimony from the arrested NKVD men from April must not have been 
completely convincing. Arresting some of the most senior members of the army 
leadership and accepting the existence of a ‘military plot’ was very serious. Stalin must 
have known that if the military plot was real, there would need to be an extensive search 
for any other undiscovered ‘conspirators’. This risked gutting the officer corps, which 
was a dangerous move at a time of looming war. Stalin would not undertake this until 
he was absolutely certain. Thus, he hesitated once again after the ‘evidence’ was 
received from the NKVD men and the case against the military elite needed to be 
strengthened over several weeks. But even after additional incriminated testimony had 
been extracted from Medvedev in early May, Stalin still chose to make transfers rather 
than arrests, with the exceptions of Kork and Feldman. Even at this point Stalin must 
not have been completely convinced about all of the ‘evidence’. It was not strong 
enough to risk heavily undermining the Red Army. Tukhachevskii was arrested twelve 
days after his transfer and only after further testimony had been received from Putna, 
Feldman, Kork and Primakov.116 But importantly, this sequence of events does not tell 
the full story. In April and May the broader perceived spy threat to the army, which had 
been building throughout 1937, finally peaked. 
It is clear that Voroshilov had been preparing actions to address the perceived 
espionage threat to the army from at least April. On 21 April, Alksnis, the head of the 
Air Force, sent a report to Voroshilov which opened with the line: ‘Herewith I submit 
for your approval a plan of measures for the unmasking and prevention of wrecking and 
espionage in the VVS RKKA (Military Air Force).’117 Alksnis suggested measures such 
as tightening the fulfilment of orders to try and deprive spies and wreckers of the ability 
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to hide their activity, and that those who had access to secret documents needed to be 
scrutinised.118 Alksnis also noted that those excluded from the party for political reasons 
should be discharged from the army.119 Alksnis’s report was followed by a similar 
report a day later from the head of the Navy, Vladimir Orlov, which also addressed 
searching for wreckers and spies. Orlov pointed to the need to check the command, the 
central apparatus and all industrial failures to look for evidence of wrecking. He wrote 
that this process was already underway in the navy with forty-three discharges already 
made.120 On the same day another report was sent to Voroshilov from the army medical 
services on the same theme.121 Voroshilov had clearly solicited these reports, 
demonstrating that the search for spies and wreckers was firmly on his agenda. Indeed, 
he had no choice but to follow Ezhov’s lead after the February-March Plenum. Later on 
10 May, on the very day of Tukhachevskii’s transfer, Voroshilov sent a lengthy report 
to Stalin and Molotov entitled, ‘Measures for the exposure and the prevention of 
wrecking and espionage in the RKKA’.122 In this report Voroshilov emphasised the 
large scale threat of espionage to the army: 
 
The wrecking and espionage activity of the Japanese-German-Trotskyist agents has 
touched (zadela) the Red Army. Acting on the instructions of intelligence agents of the 
imperialist states, the malicious enemies of the nation – the Trotskyists and Zinovievites 
– have penetrated their vile designs into the Red Army and have already managed to 
inflict considerable damage in various domains of military construction.  
 
In response Voroshilov called for ‘vigilance’ to be raised and for all to study the 
evidence of wrecking and sabotage.123 He also called for widespread checks to be made 
by officers on political reliability, discipline and military preparation. In a reference to 
the army’s previously poor record on ensuring only reliable officers were in service, 
yearly appraisals were to be improved and ‘formalism’ and ‘irresponsibility’ were to be 
stamped out. Emphasis was also to be placed on investigating political pasts.124 
Voroshilov also argued that the promotion of new officers should be given importance. 
Indeed, he now made very specific comments about the problems with promotions with 
the officer corps, criticising: ‘‘familiness’ (semeistvennost’), nepotism, injustice, 
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helping on the one hand sycophants and unworthy people (and sometimes enemies) to 
advance easily through the ranks and cause damage’. He argued that this was not only 
harmful, but it produced discontent among the loyal officers.125 This was the clearest 
articulation yet of the existence of possible ‘family circles’ within the officer corps and 
was very similar to Budennyi’s criticisms of patrionage groups in 1936. Voroshilov’s 
comments also aligned with the complaints of previous years suggesting that some 
officers may have been deliberately avoiding searching for ‘enemies’ under their 
command. From the complaints about officers giving overly positive assessment of their 
units, to excessive reprimands and discharges for minor crimes, Voroshilov’s comments 
add further support to the possibility that some officers closed ranks in the face of the 
search for hidden ‘enemies’. They protected one another meaning that army self-
policing broke down. 
In terms of more direct practical measures to combat the percieved threat from 
spies and wreckers, Voroshilov called for a checking of all officers in all areas of the 
Red Army and Navy. Those who have access to secret documents were singled out for a 
more intensive scrutiny. Voroshilov also recommended a strict procedure for checking 
all accidents and ‘extraordinary incidents’ to look for evidence of wrecking or the work 
of spies and saboteurs.126 Thus, Voroshilov’s report shows clearly that a comprehensive 
verification of the army was needed to combat the perceived danger from wreckers and 
foreign agents. The military was perceived as heavily compromised by ‘enemies’ who 
had already done serious damage. What had once been regarded as a minor spy threat in 
1936 was now seen in much greater proportions and was being highlighted by 
Voroshilov as a key danger. As detailed above, Ezhov and the political police showed 
more concerns about the spy threat to the Soviet Union and this had manifested in the 
charges of the second Moscow show trial. During the first months of 1937 it seems that 
the political police were now making links between Trotskyists in the ranks and foreign 
agents. Indeed, as shown above, the spy threat was increasingly on the army 
leadership’s agenda in February and March. Ezhov was the key person in creating this 
agenda. By April and May the spy threat to the army had peaked as demonstrated by 
Voroshilov’s report. Furthermore, this report represents his acceptance of Ezhov’s 
narrative about ‘enemies’ in the ranks. Voroshilov made no effort to downplay the 
danger to Stalin and Molotov. He knew that this was impossible. Crucially this 
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acknowledgement that the army was widely infiltrated by spies came before 
Tukhachevskii and the other officers were arrested for their supposed participation in 
the ‘military-fascist plot’. Indeed, as Voroshilov’s report described that German spies in 
particular had infiltrated the Red Army this was highly dangerous for the military elite. 
All members had spent extended periods in Germany training with the Reichswehr in 
the 1920s and early 1930s. Long-term contacts had been established. With persistent 
rumours running into early 1937 about a secret link between the Red Army command 
and the Nazis, Ezhov must have pushed harder in trying to make connections between 
senior army officers, such as Tukhachevskii, and foreign agents in the light of what he 
saw as a serious spy threat to the army and Soviet Union. Consequently, as the 
perceived spy threat to the Red Army became far more prominent in April and May, it 
is likely that this was a factor in the timing of when the direct incriminating testimony 
against Tukhachevskii and the other senior officers emerged, beginning with the 
‘evidence’ extracted from the arrested NKVD men at the end of April. 
It seems very likely that this broader spy threat was decisive in pushing Stalin to 
act against the Red Army elite in early May. Indeed, at this time Stalin himself was 
strongly focused on the danger from foreign agents in general terms. Since the Nakhaev 
case in 1934 Stalin had demonstrated his concerns about foreign agents infiltrating into 
the Soviet Union. In 1937 he articulated the great danger he believed they posed during 
the February-March Plenum and in May he saw this threat as a priority. From his 
appointment as head of the political police Ezhov had convinced Stalin that the 
oppositionist ‘plot’ was far broader than internal counterrevolutionaries and that there 
was a serious danger from foreign agents. Ezhov’s version of a ‘conspiracy’ of former 
oppositionists and foreign agents had become the dominant narrative. In mid-1937 
Stalin appeared particularly concerned about German agents. In May he participated in 
writing a Pravda article on the methods of foreign intelligence agents. This article, 
published on 4 May, argued that German intelligence had a large number of agents it 
could call upon in Russia, France and Britain.127 Also in May Stalin apparently told 
Voroshilov and Ezhov that biggest enemy was now the German intelligence service.128 
On 21 May he also declared that Soviet military intelligence had fallen into the ‘hands 
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of the Germans’.129 Stalin’s concerns about foreign agents would give credibility to the 
reports and ‘evidence’ obtained by Ezhov about large numbers of spies apparently 
working inside the army and the concurrent incriminations of Tukhachevskii and the 
other senior officers. In early May Stalin must have felt some action was necessary. But 
what may still seem curious is why he still hesitated. Only Kork and Feldman were 
arrested in the first instance from the investigation into the military ‘conspiracy’ in the 
army elite. The other ‘conspirators’ were merely transferred. Stalin needed to be certain 
about the basis of the ‘plot’ in the high command. The broader spy threat to the Red 
Army was serious enough, but if there was also a military conspiracy within the upper 
military elite this was a very different matter and greatly raised the seriousness of the 
situation in the army. This would mean that the Red Army was not only widely 
infiltrated by foreign agents but they had established an organised conspiracy at the 
highest level. It is likely this is the reason Stalin was uncertain. He wanted more 
‘evidence’ of the ‘conspiracy’ in the upper military elite. Indeed, if the ‘conspiracy’ was 
real then his response would be severe and create huge upheaval inside a key institution 
vital for defence. Thus, in most cases transfers were made first while Stalin checked 
‘evidence’ against the group of senior officers. Indeed, he was closely involved during 
the investigation, indicating that he wanted to make certain of the reality of the charges 
himself.130 But once more ‘evidence’ was extracted by the political police from 
Feldman, Kork, Eideman and Putna, Stalin did not hesitate any longer. He now either 
fully believed in the basis of the military plot in the army elite, or he believed this to a 
great enough extent when it was too risky not to take any further action. How could 
Stalin fight the approaching war with an army he saw as infiltrated by spies with a 
military conspiracy in the upper leadership? Thus, Stalin had waited until the very last 
moment until he was certain, but once he had sufficient ‘evidence’ about the supposed 
‘plot’ in the high command, this meant taking no further action was impossible. Finally, 
a defining feature of what became the ‘military-fascist plot’ in the Red Army was an 
alleged connection to Germany and espionage by the senior officers. The ‘exposed’ 
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military ‘conspiracy’ was chiefly defined by supposed connections to hostile countries 
and to foreign intelligence agents. Consequently, it is possible to speculate that without 
this wider perceived spy threat which had been pushed by Ezhov throughout 1937 and 
which culminated in Voroshilov’s report, the arrests in the army elite may not have been 
sanctioned in May, or even at all. The ‘evidence’ against the senior officers, such as 
Tukhachevskii, may not have even appeared in April and May in the absence of a 
growing spy scare in the military which no doubt focused Ezhov’s attentions on the 
army elite to a much greater extent. 
At the end of May the ‘military plot’ remained officially unpublicised but the 
arrests of the senior officers were known to the wider army. A new round of 
denunciations began. For example, on 27 May a denunciation was received by the 
commissar of the Frunze Academy from a brigade commander pointing to alleged links 
between Kork and Tukhachevskii and an academy lecturer. There are numerous similar 
examples.131 Thus, almost immediately the scale of the ‘military plot’ began to expand 
through denunciations. These letters would be instrumental in providing momentum to a 
wave of arrests over the next two years. In addition, the political police also widened 
their line of investigation. For example, on 28 May they compiled a list of those 
working in the artillery administration who had been incriminated by the testimony of 
the already arrested ‘conspirators’. This totalled twenty-six officers. Voroshilov gave 
the order to arrest.132 Thus, the ‘plot’ moved beyond the upper military elite almost 
immediately. 
A final key victim of the ‘military-fascist plot’ was Gamarnik, who committed 
suicide on 31 May after being removed from his position the day before. Gamarnik had 
been named by Primakov on 21 May, but there appears little indication that he was 
under any suspicion before this point. For example, at the end of April the STO was 
abolished and replaced by a Defence Committee under the Soviet Government, which 
included as members Stalin, Ezhov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and several 
others. Gamarnik was also made a member of this new body.133 It is hard to see why 
Gamarnik would be given membership to this exclusive committee if he was under any 
kind of suspicion. In addition, there is little indication that Gamarnik disagreed or was 
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becoming a block to the political repression within the Red Army. He continued to 
sanction the arrests of soldiers for political crimes into mid-May.134 Unless Gamarnik 
was not sincere in sanctioning these political arrests, that he continued to do so suggests 
that he raised no objections. Gamarnik had argued persistently about the dangers of 
hidden ‘enemies’ in the ranks over the previous few years. But it seems that he was 
incriminated by his association with Iakir at the very last moment. Indeed, on the very 
day before Iakir’s arrest, the latter had visited Gamarnik in the morning. When 
Gamarnik was removed from his position on 30 May the Politburo resolution mentioned 
Iakir specifically.135 As such, perhaps as soon as Gamarnik was removed from his 
position he realised he would also share Iakir’s fate. 
The day after Gamarnik’s suicide the Military Soviet met again between 1 and 4 
June in an extraordinary session which was dominated by the newly ‘exposed’ 
‘military-fascist plot’.136 Voroshilov’s opening speech outlined the ‘conspiracy’. The 
arrested officers were said to be spies and wreckers working for Trotsky and foreign 
intelligence who had left not a single area of military industry or army organisation 
unaffected by sabotage. Voroshilov argued that the conspirators had been trying to 
undermine the army so it would be defeated in war. The military plot was seen as one 
part of the wider oppositionist conspiracy. For those present at the meeting, this was the 
first time they read the ‘evidence’ against Tukhachevskii and the other officers. Some 
read their own names in the interrogation transcripts.137 Voroshilov regularly quoted 
from the transcripts and also pointed to other supporting ‘evidence’ in explaining the 
‘military plot’. For instance, past disputes, such as the controversy over 
Tukhachevskii’s radical armament plan in 1930, were now recast as ‘wrecking’.138 But 
in other cases, Voroshilov downplayed the significance of past disputes. For example, 
he recounted the confrontation in May 1936, when Tukhachevskii had accused 
Voroshilov and Budennyi of hoarding all the power within the Red Army. But 
                                                
134 RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 109, l. 327. 
135 RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 313, l. 1; Izvestiia TsK, p. 52. 
136 What is interesting about this Military Soviet is that in an early list of attendees, which has been dated 
21-22 May, Iakir, Uborevich and Tukhachevskii were actually included. Additional incriminating 
testimony against the three was extracted from Primakov and Feldman at around this time, but clearly 
before this additional ‘evidence’ had been received there was still no firm decision about what to do with 
the three after they had been transferred. Again, this shows that Stalin was very indecisive about some of 
the ‘evidence’ for the ‘military conspiracy’ in the first instance. For this initial list of attendees to the 
Military Soviet, see Voennyi sovet pri narodnom komissare oborony SSSR: 1-4 iiunia 1937 goda, ed. 
Anderson and others, pp. 29-34. 
137 Cherushev, p. 139. 
138Voennyi sovet pri narodnom komissare oborony SSSR: 1-4 iiunia 1937 goda, ed. Anderson and others, 
pp. 66-70. 
 228 
Voroshilov noted that such clashes were nothing but the ‘usual squabbles’ between 
people who had worked together for a long time. He downplayed the incidents that may 
have prompted questions about why he did not sound the alarm about the military 
‘conspiracy’.139 Indeed, some may have questioned why Voroshilov did not recognise 
Tukhachevskii’s ‘ambitions’ for power in May 1936. In fact, Voroshilov pleaded 
ignorance that he had not suspected any suspicious behaviour whatsoever. For instance, 
he commented:  
 
The people were so disguised that I have to be honest here and admit that I not only did 
not see counterrevolution in the actions of these people, but I simply did not have any 
idea. Of Tukhachevskii, I, as you well know, did not especially like, did not especially 
love. I had strained relations with him. I did not regard Tukhachevskii highly as a 
worker.140  
 
Voroshilov was distancing himself from Tukhachevskii, pressing the point that they 
were not on good terms. He did not really have any other option without inviting 
suspicion about why he had not raised questions earlier about the ‘suspicious’ conduct 
of his deputy. Voroshilov was in a difficult position. Even if he had been suspicious 
about Tukhachevskii during the previous months, perhaps regarding the rumours about 
his disloyalty and the reports of a connection with Germany, to bring these up now at 
the Military Soviet would have asked further questions about his own ‘vigilance’. How 
could he have not noticed that his deputy was a German spy, and if he was suspicious, 
why did he do nothing about it? Potentially Voroshilov had a lot to answer for and he 
played it safe. Indeed, Voroshilov instead tried to spread the responsibility for having 
missed the ‘conspirators’. He was blaming others. Voroshilov remarked: ‘I have to 
declare just one more time that from you sitting here, I did not once hear one signal.’141 
Others in the room should have been more alert to the danger. However, there were 
other voices at the Military Soviet who tried to argue that suspicions had actually been 
raised against Tukhachevskii much earlier. For example, Dibenko remarked that he had 
highlighted his suspicions of Tukhachevskii in 1931 and that he had doubts about him 
as early as 1923. According to Dibenko, Tukhachevskii had refused to sign a 
declaration condemning Trotsky in 1923. He also noted his suspicions and doubts about 
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Uborevich and Iakir, but said these were ignored.142 Dibenko was trying to show that he 
had shown necessary ‘vigilance’ and given the correct ‘signals’ in light of the ‘military-
fascist plot’, but that these had not been taken seriously. Voroshilov did not accept 
Dibenko’s version of events, replying that he should have written to him about his 
suspicions.143 In contrast, other speakers spoke of their surprise at the arrests. For 
instance, Egorov remarked, ‘the party trusted them politically’, and commented there 
were no indications whatsoever that they were wreckers or spies.144 Dubovoi remarked 
that he had believed Iakir to be a loyal party member, and on this point Stalin agreed, 
noting that Iakir was ‘one of the best commanders’.145 Indeed, from those arrested, Iakir 
appeared to evoke the most surprise. He was someone who had been highly regarded. 
Yet some comments about Iakir were less complimentary. The deputy commander of 
the cavalry in the BVO, Iosif Apanasenko, remarked that Iakir apparently had a 
‘bat’kovshchina’ in Ukraine. This was an exclusive group which contained only Iakir’s 
supporters.146 This is a further indication that some officers were perceived as having 
created their own local fiefdoms and systems of patronage. 
Having glossed over his own responsibility for having not noticed the formation 
of a military ‘conspiracy’ under his watch, Voroshilov proposed the solution to the 
crisis. He wanted a purge:  
 
to sweep out with an iron broom not only all this scum, but everything that recalls such 
an abomination….It is necessary to purge the army literally up to the very last crack 
(shchelochek), the army should be clean, the army should be healthy.147  
 
Rather than dwell on the past, Voroshilov wanted to move on from how these dangerous 
‘enemies’ had been missed and focus instead on a full-scale purge. The contrast to his 
speech at the February-March Plenum is striking. Voroshilov was now focusing on the 
future and the need to purge the ranks, whereas only a few months earlier he had 
emphasised the past performance of the army and how well he had done in removing 
the small number of Trotskyist enemies. This change in emphasis paved the way for a 
large wave of arrests. 
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In his speech, Stalin explicitly stated that the military plot was financed by the 
Nazis and he repeatedly accused many of the arrested officers of being German spies. 
He also saw the military ‘conspirators’ alongside those arrested in the party, such as 
Bukharin, Iagoda and Rykov.148 Stalin presented the ‘military-fascist plot’ as only one 
part of a much broader conspiracy. But as others had done, Stalin also did not admit to 
previous suspicions about Tukhachevskii. For example, he remarked, ‘We thought he 
wasn’t a bad soldier, I thought he wasn’t a bad soldier’.149 Stalin must have had some 
growing doubts about Tukhachevskii before his arrest. Ezhov certainly did. But nothing 
would be gained from admitting this at the Military Soviet. In addition, if Stalin had told 
of his suspicions about Tukhachevskii, this would seriously undermine his old comrade 
Voroshilov. In not mentioning his suspicions it is possible that he was trying to help his 
old friend. Stalin argued more generally that the army had been blinded by its 
successes.150 In a further reference to espionage Stalin also pointed to intelligence 
failures and how poor intelligence was part of the problem. He reiterated that military 
intelligence was riddled with spies.151 Stalin also highlighted what he saw as a problem 
in promoting reliable officers and gave examples of those in command positions who 
turned out to be ‘enemies’.152 Stalin was no doubt very aware of the issues the army had 
with ensuring reliable promotions over the previous few years. However, the key part of 
his speech was when Stalin encouraged denunciations with the remark:  
 
I have to say that they signalled very poorly from the field. Badly…They think that the 
centre should know everything, see everything. No, the centre does not see everything, 
nothing of the sort. The centre sees only part, the rest is seen by the localities. It sends 
people, but it does not know these people 100%, you should check them. There is one 
way to test this – it is checking people at work, according to the results of their work.  
 
Stalin wanted more denunciations and more ‘signals’. Everyone needed to keep a closer 
eye on each others’ conduct. Suspicions needed to be reported. Stalin even remarked 
that it would be enough if these reports contained only ‘5% of truth’.153 Stalin raised 
this point again during Egorov’s speech, pressing the importance of letters from 
‘below’, interjecting that, ‘Not a single query, not a single letter from local people 
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should remain without an answer.’154 Denunciations were to be a key tool in combating 
the exposed ‘plot’. Stalin wanted the whole army to support the centre in flushing out 
the ‘enemies’ hidden in the ranks. This appeal to the lower ranks in helping root out the 
‘conspirators’ in the army was one of the primary reasons that arrests from the 
‘military-fascist plot’ exploded in the months after the June military trial. 
A few days after the Military Soviet Voroshilov reiterated many of the same 
points from the Military Soviet at a meeting of the aktiv for workers in the 
Commissariat of Defense. The military conspiracy needed explaining to the broader 
masses in the Red Army, particularly if the rank-and-file were to be mobilised to root 
out ‘enemies’. Voroshilov made a reference to his earlier speech to the aktiv in March, 
remarking that at that time the army was in ‘last place’ in terms of ‘revealed’ enemies, 
but in three months ‘the picture has sharply changed’.155 Voroshilov went on to describe 
the conspirators, commenting that Tukhachevskii had established a link with the 
Germans as early as 1925.156 Voroshilov remarked that to many people Iakir was ‘a 
distinguished military worker’ who had ‘sympathy among the Red Army masses’, but 
that these qualities were his mask. Voroshilov also noted that he had trusted both 
Gamarnik and Eideman.157 But the main point of the speech was that ‘enemies’ 
remained within the ranks.158 Voroshilov mentioned again the need to study the people 
‘below’, in particular the youth. He wanted these to be the example to follow and for all 
to look to their lives, enthusiasm and ‘healthy revolutionary fervour’.159 Voroshilov was 
emphasising a distinction between the younger loyal generation and the now corrupted 
command.  
On 11 June the ‘military-fascist plot’ was publicised and a group of the arrested 
officers were selected for trial in a closed military court. The group chosen for the trial 
as the public representatives of the military ‘conspiracy’ were Tukhachevskii, Iakir, 
Uborevich, Kork, Feldman, Eideman, Primakov and Putna. All were executed on 12 
June. On that day Pravda published an article about the trial. Little is known of the trial 
itself, but there a limited number of existing accounts from those present. For example, 
on 14 July, Belov, now the commander of the BVO, sent a report to Voroshilov with his 
impressions of the trial. Belov gives a rich account, describing the behaviour of each 
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defendant. According to Belov: ‘Tukhachevskii tried to maintain his ‘aristocratism’ and 
his superiority over others, from the beautiful English suit, with an expensive thin tie, to 
how he held his head and the precision of expression’. Belov remarked that Iakir tried to 
make an emotional appeal to the court: ‘…with several reminders about past joint work 
and good relations with the majority of the members of the court’. He described a 
dishevelled Uborevich, in a civilian suit with no tie, who had, ‘lost his nerve more than 
the first two’.160 Belov described Kork as striking a more confident figure, apparently 
speaking more directly than the first three. According to Belov, Feldman showed little 
resistance. Belov remarked that he: ‘chided his colleagues, that they, like school 
children, were afraid to say things as they were, that they were most often occupied with 
espionage, and here they want to turn this into legal communication with foreign 
officers.’161 Belov described Eideman as looking ‘more miserable’ than the others, with 
a limp figure having difficulty standing, and that he, ‘babbled with a broken muffled 
spasmodic voice’. Putna was apparently thin and showing signs of deafness, but he 
answered with a, ‘clear and firm, confident voice’. In Belov’s opinion Primakov was 
one of the strongest and intelligent of the ‘enemies’.162 He concluded his report with his 
opinion that the group had not spoken the whole truth.163 In any case, if Belov’s 
impressions are truthful, it is clear that torture or physical force must have been used 
during interrogation.164 Budennyi was also present at the trial. In his version 
Tukhachevskii tried to question some of the charges put against him, challenging that 
they did not correspond with reality. But apparently he eventually acknowledged his 
guilt.165 Finally, on the same day as the military trial Voroshilov published a secret 
order regarding the promotion of talented and loyal officers and political workers 
throughout the army. Voroshilov remarked that, ‘every good organisation is as strong as 
its cadres’.166 Thus, at the very same time as widespread discharges and arrests in the 
officer corps were just about to begin in the Red Army, replacements were already 
being anticipated. Creating a politically reliable command had become a new priority.  
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The Aftermath of the Trial and the Expansion of the Military Purge 
 
 
Denunciations from the lower ranks appeared immediately after the Military Soviet 
Meeting in June, but after the closed military trial there was an explosion of 
denunciations and arrests as large numbers of officers and soldiers were linked to 
Tukhachevskii and the other ‘conspirators’.167 From June the arrests began to spread 
throughout the military districts and Stalin received frequent reports of the arrests and 
‘evidence’ of wrecking.168 The arrests also moved into PUR, primarily because of 
Gamarnik’s suicide.169 But as denunciations from ‘below’ were so crucial in driving 
forward the expanding wave of arrests, it is important to try and appreciate the different 
reactions from the lower ranks to the ‘exposure’ of the ‘military-fascist plot’. 
Importantly, these reactions were diverse and motivations for denunciation varied. 
Some soldiers may have taken advantage of the ‘exposure’ of the ‘military-fascist plot’ 
to denounce their fellow soldiers for personal reasons, for careerism, or from a genuine 
belief about the ‘enemy’ within. In addition, when the ‘military-fascist plot’ was 
publicised some soldiers were unsure about who they could now trust. For example, on 
15 June, Budennyi, then the commander of the MVO, sent Voroshilov a report detailing 
the reactions within the military district. Budennyi remarked that the sentence of 
execution for the ‘military fascist spies’, apparently, had met with approval and 
satisfaction, however, there were some negative reactions.170 Budennyi recorded 
distrustful sentiments such as, ‘It is impossible now to believe any one of the 
leadership’. Another soldier had said: ‘…Gamarnik shot himself, but he was a 
prominent and influential person, and to believe the others now is impossible’.171 
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Budennyi, however, attributed these views to the influences of ‘harmful elements’.172 
Budennyi also noted the prevalence of a view that the spies and wreckers were in the 
upper rather than the lower ranks, hinting at a galvanised cynicism towards those in 
power.173 But there are strong indications that some soldiers were not just confused 
about who they could trust but that they had been panicked by the arrests of their 
superiors. Before the military trial Voroshilov had received a report on 25 April from 
the commander of the UVO, Boris Gorbachev, describing the condition of the district 
(Gorbachev himself was later arrested in May). Aside from describing a poorly prepared 
district with underfulfilled orders and overspending, all of which Gorbachev deemed 
due to wrecking, he also detailed the soldiers’ reactions to the presence of ‘wreckers’ in 
the district. According to Gorbachev, this had created a sense of confusion in the ranks. 
He described:  
 
frantic attempts to realise, open and find the effects of sabotage in the most important 
areas…Many workers in the district apparatus are full of fear of personal responsibility 
for what is happening in the district. They show senselessness and excessive zeal, they 
make a lot of noise, and try to insure themselves against an imaginary or real liability 
for their errors and mistakes.174  
 
From Gorbachev’s description it seems a panic had gripped the district and accusations 
about ‘wrecking’ had started to spread. Indeed, Gorbachev commented that it was 
difficult to ascertain the true extent of the ‘wrecking’ within the district due to the level 
of confusion.175 He pointed to the arrests of the senior officers in the UVO, Garkavyi, 
Vasilenko and Gavriushchenko (who were arrested in March) as having sparked this 
panic.176  Gorbachev’s account gives strong suggestions of how a sense of alarm 
quickly spread through the rank-and-file in response to the arrests of their senior 
officers. With a confused and distrustful rank-and-file it is easy to see how they could 
turn on each other.177 Indeed, there was nothing particularly unusual about the UVO. It 
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was not unrepresentative of other districts. Consequently, as such panic had gripped the 
UVO after only the arrests of Garkavyi, Vasilenko and Gavriushchenko in April, when 
the most senior officers in the army, those seen as military heroes, such as 
Tukhachevskii, Iakir and Uborevich, were executed in June, it is likely that this threw 
the rank-and-file into further disarray, causing even more denunciations about hidden 
‘enemies’ in the ranks. David Brandenberger has argued that the arrests of 
Tukhachevskii and the other officers ‘shattered public confidence in the Soviet system.’ 
In addition, Sarah Davies notes reactions to Tukhachevskii’s death such as, ‘Whom do 
we trust now?’178 Privately, even Voroshilov appeared dejected. Shortly after the 
executions in the outline of his speech for the June 1937 Central Committee Plenum 
Voroshilov wrote that the authority of the army had been ‘crippled’ and the high 
command ‘undermined’. These comments did not make it into the final version of his 
speech, but Voroshilov’s private thoughts are clear. Indeed, the following line was also 
absent from the final speech: ‘This means that our method of work, our whole system 
for running the army, and my work as People’s Commissar, has utterly collapsed.’179 
Voroshilov seemed to be seriously affected by the ‘exposure’ of the ‘military-fascist 
plot’. He had tried to defend the Red Army for years, but had been forced to surrender 
by Ezhov’s relentless pursuit of ‘evidence’ of a ‘conspiracy’ in the ranks. 
The surge in denunciations from the lower ranks needed the participation from 
the army party organisations for ‘enemies’ to be ‘exposed’. On 14 June Krasnaia zvezda 
directly called on the army party organisations, which were attached to companies and 
regiments, to help the political police flush out the hidden enemies.180 The party 
organisations acted upon the denunciations they received, approving the expulsions or 
arrests of the individuals in question. Importantly, these organisations were later blamed 
for allowing the purge to get out of control. In addition, Voroshilov and Ezhov tried to 
solicit voluntary confessions of guilt. On 21 June Voroshilov and Ezhov published a 
joint order on the need to expose the remaining ‘enemies’ in the army. The order noted 
that in several districts there were examples of individuals with connections to the 
executed military conspirators, but these had not been communicated to the centre. The 
order made a promise that if those with links to the ‘conspirators’ turned themselves in 
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voluntarily they would not be arrested or have criminal charges brought against them. 
The order promised that there was also the possibility that these people could remain 
within the army.181 It is of course very doubtful that this was honoured. It is certain that 
some of those who did come forward voluntarily were arrested. Indeed, the Special 
Departments planned to launch investigations into any of the cases voluntarily brought 
forward. Unsurprisingly, very few soldiers took up the offer.182 
The number discharged from the ranks in the short term for political crimes from 
the ‘exposure’ of the military plot is detailed in several sets of statistics. Importantly, 
these figures demonstrate that the growth in arrests was not gradual, but an explosion. 
According to PUR, from 1 January to 10 July 1937 there were 4947 discharges for 
political crimes with 1217 arrests. However, 4370 of these discharges were made after 1 
April.183 Approximate corresponding numbers are seen in another set of statistics, 
showing that discharges from the command for ‘counterrevolutionary Trotskyism’ 
during the second quarter of 1937 (from the February-March Plenum until 1 June) 
totalled 3387.184 So, according to these statistics large numbers of discharges and arrests 
had occurred between April and July. But these statistics do not show at which point the 
rate of discharges and arrests increased. However, Khaustov notes that by the end of 
April the arrests in the army were still at an insignificant level. Furthermore, during 
Stalin’s speech to the June Military Soviet he placed the number of arrests at only 300 
to 400.185 In this respect, it seems that large numbers of arrests came only after the June 
military trial and when the ‘military-fascist plot’ was finally publicised. Indeed, during 
the nine days after the trial, 980 senior officers were arrested as participants of the 
‘military-fascist plot’. During the 23 to 29 June Plenum of the Central Committee, 
Ezhov detailed that the number was now 1100.186 Thus, it was after the ‘military-fascist 
plot’ had been publicised that arrests and discharges increased radically. In August, at a 
meeting of political workers, the new head of PUR, P. A. Smirnov, noted that over the 
past few months the total number of discharges from the army was approximately 
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10,000, and the number arrested from this total was 1217. The latter figure is consistent 
with an increase from the figures quoted by Ezhov from the June Plenum.187 
Importantly, Smirnov also pressed the point that despite the already large numbers of 
discharges, the army was not yet fully purged. He argued that, ‘the enemies are well-
masked’.188 Furthermore, denunciations were clearly playing a key role in the expansion 
of discharges and arrests. Smirnov noted:  
 
hundreds and thousands of eyes are now looking at the troops for the intrigues of 
enemies. The troops and commanders are writing hundreds, thousands of letters about 
faults, failures…Now tens, hundreds of thousands of letters are being received by the 
Secretariat, recently more than ten thousand were received.189  
 
Denunciations had increased hugely and the Military Purge was beginning to gather 
momentum of its own. During the meeting there was also an interesting exchange 
between Stalin and a political commissar from the SKVO, A. P. Prokofiev, which 
shows that Stalin understood that the rank-and-file had reacted with confusion and 
distrust to the arrests in the military elite: 
 
STALIN: And how have the soldiers related to the fact that that they had commanders 
that they trusted, and then they were busted and arrested (ikh khlopnuli, arrestovali)? 
How did they react to that? 
 
PROKOFIEV: As I reported, Com[rade] Stalin, at first in the ranks among an array of 
soldiers there were some doubts, and they expressed these doubts by saying that such 
people like Gamarnik and Iakir, whom the party trusted over a period of many years 
with high posts, had turned out to be enemies of the people, traitors of the party. 
 
STALIN: Well, yes, the party was caught napping… 
 
PROKOFIEV: Yes, the party was indeed caught napping. 
 
STALIN: Are there instances where the party has lost its authority, where the military 
leadership has lost its authority? Do they say to hell with you, you send us someone 
today and then arrest him tomorrow. Let God sort it out and decide who’s to be 
believe?190 
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The arrests and discharges from the Red Army continued into the second half of 
1937 and other senior officers were soon drawn into the ‘military plot’. For example, 
Dubovoi was arrested on 22 August. Such arrests of prominent officers allowed the 
circle of arrests to expand further and for the momentum of the purge to be maintained. 
Dubovoi had many connections throughout the army hierarchy. As the arrests continued 
to gather pace, Stalin was kept well informed. For example, he received regular reports 
from the new head of PUR, Lev Mekhlis about the numbers arrested in the ranks.191 
Voroshilov also kept up the pressure in driving the purge onwards. At the Military 
Soviet of November 1937 he gave another call to push this to its completion. He 
declared that the purge was not finished by a long way and called for it to be completed 
quickly. Voroshilov again emphasised the danger from foreign agents and reminded 
those present of Stalin’s guidance:  
 
[Stalin] correctly says, and repeatedly draws our attention to, that if the bourgeoise 
countries are sending spies to each other, sending thousands of spies, then it would be 
ridiculous to think that they would not send hundreds and thousands of spies to us.  
 
Voroshilov argued that foreign states had taken advantage of oppositionists, such as 
Tukhachevskii, Iakir and Gamarnik, who he argued had never been true Bolsheviks or 
genuine revolutionaries.192 Therefore, Voroshilov continued to frame the military 
conspiracy as the consequence of foreign agents having infiltrated into the military.  
However, even as the arrests and discharges were still expanding there were 
signs that the process was already starting to be reined in by Stalin. In January 1938 a 
Plenum of the Central Committee published a resolution criticising incorrect expulsions 
from the party based on false evidence.193 This resolution applied to the broader Terror, 
of which the military purge was one part. As Getty notes, this resolution did not signal 
an end for ‘vigilance’ in the face of hidden ‘enemies’, but it drew attention to incorrect 
conduct in expelling party members. This was an attempt to reassert central control over 
the wider Terror.194 Similar indications of an attempt to re-establish central control can 
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also be seen from the Red Army. On 23 February Mekhlis sent a circular to all PUR 
organisations which noted that:  
 
recently a range of party organisations have expelled from the party, often incorrectly, 
commanding officers and commissars of regiments, brigades, battalions and other units 
equal to them, whereas the question of their party membership should be handled with 
the knowledge and consent of the Political Directorate of the RKKA, working on an 
equal basis with the military department of the TsK VKP(b) (Central Committee).  
 
Mekhlis reminded all army party organisations that materials which, ‘cast doubt on the 
advisability of party membership of commanding officers and commissars’ were 
required to be sent to PUR, and that the party membership of the individual in question 
should only be considered after permission has been given.195 This was a clear attempt 
to gain greater control over party expulsions in the military purge. 
In March 1938 there were further signs that the repression in the Red Army was 
being scaled down. On 9 March, Ie. A. Shchadenko, the deputy Commissar of Defense 
and head of the officer personnel section, sent Mekhlis a report on complaints about 
incorrect discharges from the army. In his report Shchadenko noted that: ‘Examination 
of the presented material on the removals from the RKKA of the command and 
nachal’sostav staff shows that in the overwhelming majority the motive of removal is 
insufficiently grounded, and the incriminating material is unchecked.’196 Shchadenko 
then made reference to the decision of the January Plenum of the Central Committee 
and how this should be applied to the Red Army and that all discharges made by the 
District Military Soviets for 1937 should be re-checked. Those incorrectly discharged 
should be restored to the ranks.197 The extent that those arrested for political crimes 
were affected by Shchadenko’s directive, however, is unknown.198  
On 2 April, Mekhlis gave a report to a meeting of political workers where he 
remarked that the military plot was now ‘defeated and destroyed’ with only ‘fragments 
of various groups’ remaining.199 Mekhlis did warn the political workers that it was still 
no time to be complacent. Indeed, according to Mekhlis, PUR itself still contained 
‘enemies’.200 But he appeared to be trying to bring some sense of closure to the purge. 
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Indeed, the military plot was now apparently ‘destroyed’. Mekhlis raised the issue of 
incorrect expulsions from the party and referenced the decision from the January 
Plenum:  
 
The party commissions of PURKKA looked at around thousand appeals. Almost fifty 
percent of the excluded were readmitted. After the decision of the Plenum of TsK 
VKP(b) the stream of appeals to the party commissions of PURKKA grew – they were 
sent a new 2081 declarations. Our sacred duty is to correct all the mistakes which 
happened at the time of exclusions of communists from the party, and to create a 
friendly environment for them for work.201  
 
Mekhlis blamed the large numbers of incorrect removals from PUR during 1937 on 
‘enemies’ within PUR itself.202 He remarked: ‘They were not guilty when they were 
expelled from the party, but we were - the leaders of the political organs and 
commissars.’ Mekhlis called on these ‘mistakes’ to be corrected.203 
Arrests did not immediately cease despite the attempts in early 1938 to regain 
control over the military purge. More big names continued to be drawn into the 
‘conspiracy’. Egorov, who was now the first deputy People’s Commissar for Defence, 
came under suspicion at the end of 1937. A Politburo decision of February 1938 
accused Egorov of knowing about the ‘military-fascist plot’ and having organised his 
own anti-party group. The Politburo ordered him removed from his position, but 
suggested that he be given a final chance to command a smaller military district. 
Dibenko was accused of having links to American spies and there were incriminations 
that he was a German agent.204 Dibenko was removed from his position, but again it 
was suggested that he could still be put to work this time in civilian area.205 Both were 
later arrested and executed. Other high-profile army victims included Bliukher, Alksnis, 
Berzin, Orlov, Bulin, Osepian and Ivan Fedko.206 Such high-profile arrests would 
continue to provide momentum to the military purge.  
However, a clear indication that Stalin wanted the military purge to be brought 
under control came at the Military Soviet in November 1938. Here Voroshilov again 
recited how the army had missed the ‘conspirators’ and emphasised the importance of 
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having politically reliable people serving in the ranks.207 But like Mekhlis, Voroshilov 
signalled that the main bulk of the purge was now over:  
 
Have we done everything to cleanse the ranks of the army from enemies of the nation, 
of spies (lazutchikov) of the enemy? I think that not everything, but the main and most 
important has already been done. The enemy has lost their large eyes and ears in our 
ranks. But the ears and eyes of course are still somewhere and they need to be found, 
otherwise they will bring enormous and serious harm to the country and Red Army.  
 
On the course of the purge itself, Voroshilov noted:  
 
I will not publish detailed figures here. They are fairly impressive. The chistka was 
carried out radically and comprehensively…This stinking filth, unfortunately, did not 
leave one area, not one layer of our command and political staff that somehow was not 
polluted, messed, dirtied. Therefore the quantity of those cleansed was high and very 
impressive.208  
 
Voroshilov put the numbers purged from the Red Army at over 40,000. He argued that 
since the purge had been so intensive, the ranks were now strong and loyal.209 He called 
for the purge to continue, but warned that it should be carefully carried out, and that 
people should ‘not just shoot from the hip’ (ne prosto rubit’ s plecha).210 Voroshilov 
was signalling that the purge was now largely completed and those ‘enemies’ which did 
remain in the ranks should be sought out more carefully. Thus, by the end of 1938 and 
into 1939 the repression in the Red Army was winding down, a process alongside the 
weakening in the strength and pace of the wider Terror itself. By early 1939 Mekhlis 
was criticising unjustified army expulsions, arguing that fifty percent of these were 
incorrect.211  
It is difficult to know the precise number of arrests relating to the ‘military-
fascist plot’. Indeed, as Reese has shown, officer recruitment came to move faster than 
discharges.212 But undeniably, the purge cost the Red Army very heavily. Different sets 
of statistics put the overall number of discharges of army leaders during the purge at 
approximately 35,000.213 However, a great many were eventually reinstated. According 
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to Reese, between 1937 and May 1940, 34,301 leaders from the Red Army, Navy and 
Air Force were discharged, but 11,596 of these were eventually reinstated.214 In regard 
to arrests, one set of statistics records 4474 arrests in 1937 and 5426 in 1938.215 But 
1431 of the arrested were eventually returned to the ranks. In terms of expulsions from 
the party, Reese details that 11,104 were expelled in 1937 and 3580 in 1938, with 7202 
later reinstated.216 However, despite the many restored to the ranks, the true scale of the 
military purge is unknown. These figures only allow an understanding of the number of 
army leaders removed from the military from 1937 to May 1940 and not from the wider 
army. The numbers affected in the whole Red Army will be far higher. 
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Conclusion 
 
Duing a series of interviews in the 1970s with the writer Felix Chuev, Molotov spoke 
about the military purge and why he still maintained this had been necessary. Of course, 
Molotov’s words have to be treated with caution. It is understandable that he would 
seek to explain the military purge in a manner that exonerated him of personal 
responsibility. However, Molotov’s self-justifying comments are revealing in certain 
respects. They are useful in drawing together some of the key arguments from this 
thesis explaining why Stalin gutted his officer corps only years before the outbreak of 
the Second World War. During his interviews with Chuev, Molotov presented a 
rationale for the military purge that on the surface is similar to the broader argument put 
forward in this thesis. Aside from recycling the details of the ‘military conspiracy’ and 
describing Tukhachevskii as a ‘Rightist’ who had been working for the Nazis, Molotov 
pressed that it had been correct to execute Tukhachevskii because he could not have 
been relied upon when the Second World War broke out. Molotov remarked: ‘I consider 
Tukhachevsky a most dangerous conspirator in the military who was caught only at the 
last minute. Had he not been apprehended, the consequences could have been 
catastrophic.’1 Indeed, in explaining the Great Terror in 1970 Molotov pointed to the 
dangers from a fifth column:  
 
1937 was necessary. Bear in mind that after the Revolution we slashed right and left; we 
scored victories, but tattered enemies of various stripes survived, and as we were faced 
by the growing danger of fascist aggression, they might have united. Thanks to 1937 
there was no fifth column in our country during the war.2  
 
For Molotov, if the Terror had not been conducted and the military purge not initiated a 
fifth column could have had potentially disastrous consequences for the Soviet Union 
during war. Molotov saw Tukhachevskii as an unreliable fifth columnist. The stakes 
were very high and treachery in the army may have caused the defeat of the Soviet 
Union against Germany. In reference to Tukhachevskii and the other executed senior 
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officers, Molotov insisted, ‘The main thing, however, is at the decisive moment they 
could not be depended on.’3 For Molotov, the military purge remained justified.  
Even though his words must be treated with caution, Molotov’s comments do 
have some substance. The decisive factor in finally compelling Stalin to act against the 
Red Army in May 1937 was the perception that it was unreliable. The military purge 
was initiated in reaction to a perceived spy infiltration in the broader army and 
‘evidence’ about a ‘conspiracy’ in the upper ranks. Stalin was now forced to take action 
whereas in the past he had shown hesitancy in cracking down on the army. Even though 
Stalin still wavered at the very last moment, and initially only transferred the majority 
of the senior officers named in the ‘military-fascist plot’, when further ‘evidence’ was 
finally obtained pointing to a military conspiracy in the upper ranks, he sanctioned the 
arrests of Tukhachevskii and the other officers. By early June the Red Army was seen 
as facing a severe crisis and mobilising the ranks for a major purge was Stalin’s 
response. How could Stalin fight the approaching war with an army he believed was 
heavily infiltrated by foreign agents with a conspiracy of leading officers? Indeed, there 
is nothing to suggest that the spy scare in the army in 1937 was cynically contrived. 
Stalin seems to have genuinely believed that the military had been infiltrated by foreign-
backed ‘enemies’ who had managed to organise a conspiracy at the very heart of the 
army leadership.  
Thus, the Red Army was not purged to further extend Stalin’s power or remove 
certain officers he believed could become a block to his political hegemony. The 
‘military-fascist plot’ was not knowingly created for the purpose of furthering Stalin’s 
control over the army. The military purge was enacted in reaction to a perceived spy 
scare and Stalin acted at the very last moment. In this respect, this explanation fits with 
Molotov’s rationale for the military purge. By mid-1937 a fifth column was believed to 
be within the army. But of course the ‘military-fascist plot’ had little basis in reality. 
The alleged military conspiracy was almost entirely imaginary. Stalin misperceived the 
danger from the army in 1937. Part of the reason why can be found in Stalin’s own 
personal suspicions about hidden ‘enemies’ and his concerns about capitalist 
encirclement, but as this thesis has demonstrated, the Red Army itself had a long history 
of being perceived as easily susceptible to subversion. The military purge represented 
the culmination of a number of evolving perceived threats that had their origins in 1918. 
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These dangers had often been depicted in greater terms than their reality. By 1937 the 
gulf between the perception and the reality of threat had become even wider and 
impossible to ignore. 
From its very formation in early 1918 the Red Army was seen as vulnerable to a 
number of threats that evolved broadly in response to what were identified as dangers to 
the Soviet Union by the Bolshevik Party leadership and political police. During the 
Civil War the chief threats to the Red Army were seen as from betrayals by military 
specialists, the White forces and foreign agents. These were all external threats and the 
political police were concerned about the ‘enemy’ within and the possible infiltration of 
the army. Following the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War, the chief threats to the army 
remained military specialists, the Whites in exile and foreign agents, but the political 
turmoil of the 1920s produced a new internal threat to the military from the ‘Trotskyist 
Opposition’. However, these dangers could be exaggerated. Despite the low number of 
arrested military specialist traitors, Whites and foreign agents, and an absence of any 
immediate danger since the close of the Civil War, the army was nevertheless depicted 
by the political police as easily susceptible to subversion. There were even some 
alarmist fears about an approaching ‘Bonapartist’ coup. The situation changed in 1930 
and the political police must have felt vindicated with the ‘exposure’ of a very large 
military specialist ‘conspiracy’ during operation vesna. This military specialist ‘plot’ 
was nearly entirely fabricated and it represented a culmination of the fears of the 
political police about military specialists and foreign agents. It reinforced how the Red 
Army was seen as vulnerable to counterrevolutionaries, and in this case, from foreign-
backed military specialist traitors. The ‘exposure’ of this plot would have had a lasting 
impact on perceptions of army vulnerability and strengthened the political police’s 
position. In addition, as there was so much upheaval in the rank-and-file at the same 
time as operation vesna because of widespread hostility to collectivisation, the entire 
army was going through a period of crisis. This was a tipping point for the Red Army. 
The early 1930s were a stark reminder that the army was susceptible to subversion and 
infiltration at all levels and that ‘enemies’ could easily get inside the ranks. In the years 
after operation vesna there were no mass arrests in the Red Army until the Terror, but 
this period was not primarily characterised by a lull in arrests. The perceived threats to 
the army continued to evolve. The White threat faded away and was replaced by 
heightened concerns about foreign agents in 1933, a likely consequence of the 
worsening international situation.  
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The threat from ‘hidden Trotskyists’ continued to cause the political police 
concern. The latter danger was pushed to the fore following the Kirov murder in 
December 1934 when members of the former political Opposition became the 
scapegoats and were quickly seen as posing a serious internal threat. During the 
resulting crack down the army was also affected when former Trotskyists in the ranks 
came under pressure. This culminated in the arrests of several senior former Trotskyist 
officers, including Putna and Primakov, in the summer and autumn of 1936. Attentions 
were now firmly turned towards the Red Army and there were calls from the political 
police and from within the army leadership to root out the remaining hidden Trotskyists. 
Yet, the charge of Trotskyism was not enough to draw a wide circle of officers into the 
expanding arrests, despite the pressure being applied by Ezhov. For more senior officers 
such as Tukhachevskii to be affected, the oppositionist ‘conspiracy’ had to be developed 
further by Ezhov. It was the perceived foreign threat and building spy scare in 1937, 
driven forward primarily by Ezhov, which provided the vehicle for Tukhachevskii and 
members of the army elite to be incriminated. During the second half of 1936, Ezhov 
developed the already established Trotskyist threat to the military to include links to 
foreign agents and espionage in line with how he was drawing connections between the 
different former oppositionist groups and fascist states. This allowed the scope of the 
arrests in the army to widen during 1937. Indeed, the army was an obvious choice for 
Ezhov to draw into his broader vision of a ‘conspiracy’ inside the Soviet Union. He had 
inherited thick files full of compromising information on senior officers since becoming 
head of the political police in September 1936. As soon as Ezhov started pushing the 
danger from foreign agents, particularly in early 1937, this provided the opportunity for 
a spy scare to build in the army and for Ezhov to capitalise on twenty years’ ‘evidence’ 
of army vulnerabilities, particularly to foreign agents. Thus, the perceived threats to the 
Red Army had finally taken a form that put the entire high command in danger and 
Ezhov’s broadening investigation into the former oppositionist ‘conspiracy’ culminated 
in the incrimination of Tukhachevskii and the other senior officers.  
There were certainly some genuine spies in the Red Army at this time, but the 
spy threat which peaked in 1937 was an extreme exaggeration of this danger. In 
addition, as much as Ezhov’s search for a conspiracy of former oppositionists from 
1936 was crucial to the military purge, without the army’s long history of perceived 
vulnerabilities, Tukhachevskii may never have been incriminated. Consequently, it is 
how perceived threats to the Red Army evolved and developed that is crucial to 
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understanding the military purge. The key point is to see the deeper reality behind the 
rationale for the military purge that Molotov put forward in the 1970s and understand 
that the Red Army was a very fertile ground for a perceived military conspiracy to take 
root. The final spy scare in 1937, that was so crucial in creating the conditions for the 
‘military-fascist plot’ to be pieced together by the political police, had evolved from 
twenty years of the Red Army being seen as vulnerable to various ‘enemies’ and 
‘counterrevolutionaries’. The reliability of the army had been under question ever since 
its very formation in 1918, from the stability in the lower ranks to the loyalty of its most 
senior officers. In 1937 Stalin was compelled to act against the Red Army in response to 
what he saw as the pressing danger from foreign agents, but the long history of the 
Bolsheviks seeing their army as easily susceptible to subversion was crucial in allowing 
such a large spy scare to develop in the ranks in the first place, but also in giving this 
new danger credibility.  
Therefore, viewing the military purge through the evolution of the perceived 
threats to the army also explains its timing. Admittedly, it is very difficult to know the 
precise point Stalin decided to move against the army. But why the direct incriminating 
testimony against Tukhachevskii and the other senior officers emerged in April and 
May 1937 is likely because this was when the wider perceived spy threat to the army 
peaked. This would focus political police attentions on the army even further, and 
particularly on the military elite, whose members almost all had connections to 
Germany from the 1920s. The persistent rumours running into early 1937 about a secret 
connection between the Red Army and Germany would have only added to growing 
suspicions and focused political police attentions further. Under pressure from an 
already identified broader spy infiltration in the ranks, Stalin was then compelled to take 
some action in light of the ‘evidence’ pointing to a military conspiracy, beginning with 
the transfer of Tukhachevskii on 10 May. But importantly, there are no indications that 
the military purge was long planned or premeditated. This was a last minute response to 
an exaggerated perceived threat. Furthermore, the scale of the resulting military purge 
quickly reached a level that was unforeseen. The rank-and-file responded to calls to root 
out the hidden ‘conspirators’ with an immediate explosion of denunciations, leading to 
thousands of unfounded discharges and arrests throughout the entire Red Army. The 
military purge was chaotic. There are strong suggestions that ordinary soldiers were 
panicked by the arrests of their superiors and this drove a wave of baseless 
denunciations as mutual trust was undermined. Central control had to be re-established 
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in early 1938 when it became quickly apparent that the Red Army was subject to a large 
surge of groundless accusations, discharges and arrests. In the mid-1970s even Molotov 
admitted that the military purge lost control: ‘Did everyone who was charged or 
executed take part in the conspiracy hatched by Tukhachevsky? Some were certainly 
involved. Others might have been implicated by mistake. There could have been 
sympathizers among them. It was different with each individual.’4  
Yet, despite Stalin acting against the Red Army at the very last moment, there 
are some suggestions that he had more developed suspicions about a possible 
conspiracy in the army before May 1937. In Dimitrov’s diary an entry from 11 
November 1937 recorded that Stalin had said the following about the plans of the 
former oppositionist ‘conspirators’:  
 
We were aware of certain facts as early as last year and were preparing to deal with 
them, but first we wanted to seize as many threads as possible. They were planning an 
action for the beginning of this year. Their resolve failed. They were preparing in July 
to attack the Politburo at the Kremlin. But they lost their nerve… (Emphasis in 
original)5  
 
Of course, Stalin no doubt wanted to portray himself as anticipating the larger 
‘conspiracy’ of former oppositionists and traitorous officers in good time. He would 
want to maintain confidence in his leadership. Yet, this thesis shows that there is little 
indication that the ‘military-fascist plot’ had been anticipated. Stalin’s vacillations in 
early May demonstrate this clearly. In addition, during the June 1937 Military Soviet 
many participants, including Stalin, seemed genuinely surprised and made references to 
how everyone had trusted the main conspirators, particularly Iakir. But Stalin’s 
comments relayed by Dimitrov are still telling. They are a reminder that even if a 
‘military conspiracy’ came as a surprise in May 1937, it is very likely that Stalin did 
have growing suspicions about the Red Army before this point. It is certain that these 
suspicions were more concrete in early 1937, particularly at the February-March 
Plenum when Molotov called for a close verification of the military. However, Stalin’s 
suspicions and doubts about the Red Army would have stretched back further to the 
early 1930s to the military specialist ‘conspiracy’ ‘exposed’ during operation vesna. 
These doubts probably go back further to 1927 when Stalin believed the army 
                                                
4 Ibid., p. 280. 
5 The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949, ed. by Banac, p. 70; Getty and Naumov, The Road to Terror, 
p. 446. 
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Trotskyists had played a part in the political Opposition’s alleged coup attempt. Stalin’s 
suspicions about the loyalty of the command can be seen as early as the Civil War in 
regard to his low opinions of military specialists. As such, Stalin experienced numerous 
nagging doubts about the Red Army since its formation. But it was probably only after 
the arrests of the former Trotskyists officers in mid-1936 that Stalin began to take these 
concerns much more seriously. Within a climate of rising political repression, the 
arrests of Putna, Primakov and the other former Trotskyist officers provided ‘evidence’ 
of a Trotskyist military organisation directly linked to the Zinoviev-Kamenev 
Counterrevolutionary Bloc. This was a decisive moment. Yet it certainly remains very 
unlikely that Stalin anticipated the ‘military-fascist plot’ in the form it eventually took. 
It is doubtful he suspected at any point before 1937 that a group of his most senior 
officers would turn out to be ‘foreign agents’ who were part of an extensive ‘military-
fascist plot’. This could be partly why he seemed to require stronger ‘evidence’ of their 
guilt and why he hesitated at the very last moment in early May. Even though Stalin 
seems to have begun to align more closely with Ezhov’s views about the danger of 
hidden ‘enemies’ in the army during early 1937, the scale of the perceived spy 
infiltration and the nature of the ‘conspiracy’ in the upper ranks would have been a 
shock. 
In this respect, the military purge of 1937-38 can only be fully understood if 
Stalin’s attitude toward the Red Army is explored. Even though much of the evidence 
used for assessing his relationship with the military has been indirect, owing to the still 
large amount of classified materials in Stalin’s personal archive and inaccessible 
political police documents, this thesis suggests that Stalin was never comfortable with 
his army. He could not fully trust his army and was plagued by nagging doubts about its 
reliability. However, at the same time he knew that the Red Army was an indispensible 
support of his power and vital for the defence of the Soviet Union. Consequently Stalin 
was reluctant to crack down on the army without very good reason and he leaned 
towards restraint. For example, Stalin accommodated large numbers of military 
specialists in command positions into the early 1930s, despite the political police’s 
concerns about their loyalty. Stalin knew he needed their expertise. Indeed, he forged a 
working relationship with Tukhachevskii, the one person in the army subject to the most 
persistent rumours about their disloyalty. Stalin recognised talent when he saw it, but he 
never trusted the military specialists as much as he did the red commanders. He did not 
value Tukhachevskii’s loyalty as highly as Voroshilov or Budennyi’s. Stalin surely kept 
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a close eye on the military elite, but there was no strong case against them until 1937. In 
addition, Stalin would have been well briefed about the political police’s concerns about 
the subversive activity of various different ‘enemies’ against the Red Army. He knew 
that the political police were alarmed about possible infiltration. But Stalin did not share 
their views entirely. The Trotskyist presence in the army during the 1920s reveals a 
divergence between Stalin and the political police, and demonstrates how he was 
reluctant to crack down on the military without being absolutely certain of the danger. 
Despite Menzhinskii’s urging of more repressive measures in 1927 to resolve the 
problems with army reliability he associated with Trotskyist agitation, Stalin ruled that 
this was not necessary. He was not compelled to act against the army at this point. 
Stalin did not doubt the basis of the alleged oppositionist coup of 1927, but he did not 
want a crack down. Similarly in 1930 during operation vesna Stalin hesitated when sent 
the information about the ‘military specialist plot’. He needed more time to think over 
and check Tukhachevskii’s incrimination. In the end, and after being closely involved 
with the investigation itself, he was convinced of Tukhachevskii’s innocence. There was 
no reason to attack the army elite at this time and arrest Tukhachevskii who was a 
valuable asset to the still inexperienced Red Army. But it is very likely that Stalin 
harboured some suspicions about Tukhachevskii nevertheless and he would certainly 
never forget how a very large ‘plot’ supposedly sponsored by hostile capitalist countries 
had been ‘exposed’ within the Red Army. This would create further suspicions and 
nagging doubts about the reliability of the military as a whole. Stalin hesitated once 
again years later during the February-March Plenum of 1937. Even though Trotskyists 
were being discovered in the military at a growing rate, the verification of the Red 
Army promised by Molotov was to be put off until a later time. It seems that Stalin 
wanted to proceed with caution and investigate carefully. The army was too important 
to attack without a very good reason. Stalin knew that war was approaching and did not 
want to undermine his strength. However, as soon as the spy threat peaked in May 1937 
and coincided with the incriminations of Tukhachevskii and the other senior officers, 
even though he still hesitated at the very last moment, by the end of May Stalin was 
finally compelled to order a serious crack down. 
As such, the military purge highlights the different priorities between Stalin, 
Voroshilov and the political police, who all responded differently to the growing mass 
of rumours, hearsay and reports about disloyalty in the army. Institutional interest was 
important in influencing how army vulnerabilities were defined. Stalin had particular 
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priorities as General Secretary. He needed to prioritise the defence of the Soviet Union 
in the face of what he saw as ‘capitalist encirclement’ and the looming war. The Red 
Army had to be militarily strong and in a condition to fight a major conflict. Stalin thus 
made compromises on the type of officers used in the army for this purpose. Yet, 
Stalin’s ability to compromise clashed with the priorities of the political police. They 
were primarily concerned with the ‘exposure’ of enemies and providing the internal 
security of the army. From the early 1920s the political police displayed greater concern 
than Stalin and Voroshilov about threats to military reliability and saw these in more 
threatening terms. When Ezhov headed the political police from September 1936 he 
pushed harder than others for a deeper scrutiny of the Red Army. It seems he was 
looking to expose some form of organised military conspiracy as early as 1936. The 
increasingly frequent mention of a ‘military plot’ within interrogation testimony at this 
time suggests this. The political police were also less resigned to having those with 
compromised pasts serving in the Red Army. As shown, they were alarmed about 
military specialists, and particularly former Whites, serving in the ranks during the 
1920s. In the 1930s they kept a close watch over some of the former Trotskyist officers 
despite Voroshilov having given individuals like Primakov and Putna his full 
endorsement following their recantations in the late 1920s. It is almost certain that 
Ezhov had more developed suspicions about Tukhachevskii and the other members of 
the ‘military-fascist plot’ before Stalin did in 1937.  
Finally, Voroshilov also had different priorities in relation to the Red Army and 
his were born from self-interest. Voroshilov was responsible for the political reliability 
of the army and this led him to downplay instability and ‘enemies’ in the ranks. This 
thesis has argued that Voroshilov behaved in this way not only to cover his own back, 
but because he did not have any credible solutions to the numerous problems with army 
self-policing. He frequently labelled such problems as merely the consequence of ‘weak 
vigilance’ rather than get to the real cause of why ‘enemies’ were going undiscovered in 
the ranks. It was only just before the start of the military purge in May 1937 that 
Voroshilov finally provided a more detailed assessment of the problems within the 
officer corps, commenting specifically that ‘familiness’ had allowed ‘enemies’ to gain 
positions in the upper ranks. Indeed, there are numerous indications that some officers 
tried to avoid looking for dangerous political ‘enemies’ and foreign agents and instead 
made what seem like conspicuous displays of ‘vigilance’ by making high numbers of 
groundless discharges. The accusations that some officers ruled a bat’kovshchina 
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suggests that they had built systems of alliances and close supporters, who closed ranks 
when under pressure to find ‘enemies’. Crucially, it was Voroshilov’s inability, or 
perhaps reluctance, to tackle these deeper problems with army self-policing which 
partly explains why the political police’s view of the Red Army vulnerability achieved 
dominance in 1937. It is likely that there was some tension between Voroshilov and the 
political police about army vulnerabilities since the 1920s. PUR and the political police 
also typically differed in their estimations of threats to the military. But Voroshilov’s 
inability to resolve problems with army political reliability gave the political police 
more freedom and space to act. Indeed, during 1935-36 Gamarnik made frequent 
complaints that the military was not finding hidden enemies independently and that it 
took separate party purges, the obmen and proverka, to actually ‘expose’ these. The 
officer corps was not giving the impression that they had the ability or even the desire to 
find the ‘enemies’ within the ranks. This undermined Voroshilov’s repeated protests 
that the Red Army was loyal and that it worked hard to insulate itself from ‘enemies’. 
This failure in army self-policing would help push Stalin towards endorsing Ezhov’s 
more pessimistic view of army reliability and towards accepting that a deeper 
investigation into the military was required. Consequently, as much as Ezhov carries a 
great deal of responsibility for the military purge in pushing for a deeper investigation 
into the Red Army, Voroshilov’s own failings are also important. But it was Stalin who 
gave the final sanction for the arrests and approval for a military purge. He could have 
rejected the ‘evidence’ against Tukhachevskii and the other senior officers, but by May 
1937 he perceived the risk of not taking action as far too great.  
    
♦ 
 
Even though this thesis has examined the military purge by focusing on broader 
evolving perceptions of the Red Army, Stalin’s attack on the military in 1937 cannot be 
understood without a substantial consideration of Tukhachevskii’s role. His name 
certainly should not be given to the military purge, but Tukhachevskii managed to 
attract more suspicions and doubts about his loyalty than any other person in the army 
elite. In the 1920s he was the hope of White circles that he would challenge the 
Bolshevik regime. For many outside of the Soviet Union, if anyone was going to 
challenge Stalin, it would be Tukhachevskii. The rumours were so potent that 
Tukhachevskii’s name was used by the Soviet political police as part of their 
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entrapment operations in the 1920s. Even inside the Soviet Union it seemed to be an 
unspoken assumption that Tukhachevskii could be disloyal. His name had a habit of 
surfacing in political police investigations into ‘counterrevolutionary’ groups. Indeed, 
there seemed to be a certain acceptance within party circles that Tukhachevskii was 
potentially unreliable. Importantly, any such rumours and hearsay about Tukhachevskii 
would be kept in an expanding police file. However, these rumours about 
Tukhachevskii’s disloyalty were unsubstantiated. There is nothing to suggest that he 
entertained ideas about seizing power or was ever sympathetic to the political 
Opposition. What Tukhachevskii did have was an ambition for power within the Red 
Army. It is very likely that he felt he was the better qualified than Voroshilov to lead the 
army. As such, even though Tukhachevskii was not a ‘Russian Bonaparte’, and there is 
nothing to suggest he conspired to have Voroshilov removed from the army leadership, 
his ambitions may have given this impression. Tukhachevskii had a particular vision 
about where he saw the direction of army modernisation and attracted the hostility of 
his colleagues. Because the miltary elite consisted of an awkward mixture of 
professional officers, such as Tukhachevskii, and Stalin’s political allies, such as 
Voroshilov and Budennyi, this created the conditions for conflict about modernisation 
and rearmament. The tense clashes over the role of the cavalry and Staff power in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s revealed the fault lines in the upper military elite. These 
often lined up Voroshilov and Budennyi against Tukhachevskii and differing sets of 
supporters. Yet, Stalin recognised Tukhachevskii’s talent. In 1931 when Japan invaded 
Manchuria, Stalin endorsed Tukhachevskii’s vision of rapid military expansion despite 
being well aware of the clashes in the military elite and Tukhachevskii’s ambitions for 
greater power in the army. Even though it would antagonise Voroshilov and Budennyi, 
Stalin promoted Tukhachevskii. There is no doubt that Tukhachevskii’s behaviour and 
the rumours about him played a large part in adding to the suspicions Stalin held about 
the army elite. Stalin surely had more developed suspicions about Tukhachevskii during 
the months before the military purge when rumours were circling about a link between 
the army leadership and the Nazis. Indeed, these rumours often mentioned 
Tukhachevskii. But as demonstrated in this thesis, understanding the military purge 
requires an explanation that goes far beyond appreciating Tukhachevskii’s relationship 
with Voroshilov and Stalin’s opinions of him. The military purge affected thousands 
and was an attack on the entire Red Army. For nearly twenty years the military was 
seen as exposed to differing perceived threats and by 1937 this had culminated in a spy 
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scare. This long history of evolving perceived threats was far more important to the 
military purge than Tukhachevskii’s particular role.  
However, where Tukhachevskii’s particular experience is important is in 
showing that for some victims of the Great Terror, the reasons why they were arrested 
or executed can be dated back to 1917. Why Tukhachevskii became one of the public 
representatives of wider ‘conspiracy’ during the Great Terror was not just because he 
was a prominent officer who was implicated in a military ‘conspiracy’, but because he 
had a compromised past, full of rumours about his disloyalty. These rumours persisted 
into 1937 by which point the rising political repression and emerging spy scare made 
Tukhachevskii an easy target for the political police. Ezhov was finally able to capitalise 
upon the growing file full of rumours and hearsay the political police undoubtedly had 
collected on Tukhachevskii since he joined the Red Army. Until 1937 Tukhachevskii 
remained out of danger as the ‘evidence’ was never strong enough against him and there 
was no compelling reason to have him arrested. However, the rumours left a continual 
drip of nagging doubts that Stalin was forced to accept for the sake of maintaining army 
expertise. By mid-1937, with a spy scare in the ranks and ‘evidence’ of a ‘conspiracy’ 
in the upper ranks, Stalin could no longer ignore the large file of compromising material 
on Tukhachevskii.  
Yet, Tukhachevskii would not be alone in having such a police file growing with 
pieces of compromising information and rumour. Many other senior officers in the army 
were certainly in the same position. Other senior officers had been subject to 
speculation in White circles in the 1920s and their names also used in the Soviet 
entrapment operations. The military elite as a whole attracted various rumours, 
particularly during the 1930s when the political police received reports about a 
supposed link with the Nazis. Furthermore, outside of the Red Army there would be a 
very large mass of officials working in key institutions who all had some kind of stain 
on their past record. But as in the military, compromises needed to be made to ensure 
qualified people were occupying key positions. Stalin must have known this situation 
was not perfect and that such people could be untrustworthy. This would create many 
nagging doubts for Stalin about the people working under him, but it was unrealistic to 
exclude such large numbers of people from ever working again. So compromises were 
maintained. During the Terror, individuals with black marks on their records were 
easily arrested. Yet once the wave of arrests began, neither Stalin nor the political police 
could be certain that all suspicious individuals had been found. Keeping tabs on 
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everyone with some kind of compromised past over a twenty year period was 
impossible. Therefore an immediate search for hidden ‘accomplices’ was necessary. 
This is clear for the Red Army in the aftermath of the June 1937 military trial. In this 
sense, to understand the fates of many victims of the Great Terror it is necessary to look 
previous to 1937 and before other recognised landmarks in the history of the Terror, 
such the crack-down on the former Opposition after the Kirov assassination and even 
before Stalin’s rise to power in the late 1920s. For some of the Terror’s most well-
known victims, such as Tukhachevskii, it was as early as 1917 when the Bolsheviks 
first seized power that their previous pasts immediately became a liability and would 
later be used to help justify their execution.  
The Bolshevik regime’s attempt to keep a close observation over ‘suspicious’ 
individuals such as Tukhachevskii was a characteristic of totalitarian rule. The regime 
was not only highly concerned about the loyalty of prominent and powerful figures such 
as Tukhachevskii, but this extended to wider population. It expended manpower and 
resources to carefully monitor ‘anti-soviet’ feeling within the different sections of 
Soviet society. However, it was the failure to monitor potential ‘enemies’ to a level 
which gave the regime confidence that left a deep sense of vulnerability. When major 
crises hit the regime, such as the ‘military-fascist plot’ in the Red Army, this lack of 
confidence about who was an ‘enemy’ and who was loyal left anyone with the slightest 
incrimination in danger of arrest. Lacking confidence in the loyalty of the Soviet 
society, Stalin could take no chances and his calls to the Soviet masses to help ‘expose’ 
hidden ‘enemies’ allowed waves of repression to gather their own momentum and break 
from the regime’s control, destabilising the Soviet state. The Stalinist regime’s attempts 
to control and monitor the Soviet population were indisputably totalitarian, but its 
failure to this comprehensively left it fragile and vulnerable to outbreaks of violence 
driven by officially endorsed conspiracy theories. In this sense, the regime could easily 
undermine its own stability and power. 
 
♦ 
 
The approach of this thesis has been to place an examination of the military purge 
within the literature on the Great Terror published since the opening of the Soviet 
archives. With only few exceptions, there has been little analysis about how the growing 
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political repression in the 1930s was manifested in the Red Army.6 This thesis has 
demonstrated that the army was very sensitive to the changes in the broader conspiracy 
narrative which defined the Great Terror. For example, following the Kirov 
assassination in December 1934 there was an increase in political arrests in general 
terms as Stalin clamped down on the former political Opposition. The Red Army 
likewise saw an increase in political arrests. Later in 1936, when former Trotskyists and 
members of the former Opposition were the focus of Stalin and the political police’s 
attention, the Red Army also saw an increase in arrests of former Trotskyists. The 
investigation into the first show trial in August 1936 was a turning point for the Red 
Army when alleged links were drawn between the Zinoviev-Kamenev 
Counterrevolutionary Bloc and senior officers in the army. Most importantly, as the 
broader conspiracy narrative of the political repression in the Bolshevik Party evolved 
into 1937 and gradually took on a more pronounced international dimension, placing 
greater emphasis on the perceived threat from foreign agents, this was also reflected in 
the military. In addition, Ezhov’s role in the Great Terror is well documented and this 
thesis has shown his importance to the military purge. The wider point to emphasise is 
that the Red Army was not in a vacuum. It was closely integrated to the Bolshevik Party 
and it was very receptive to how perceived threats were defined by Stalin. External 
pressures such as the party repression directly shaped the repression in the army. The 
military purge was certainly a culmination a number of perceived threats specific to the 
Red Army that stretched back to 1918, but it was also the product of a specific series of 
political events which were crucial in raising political tensions inside the Bolshevik 
Party. How the broader external conspiracy narrative that defined the Great Terror 
developed from 1934 is inseparable from the military purge. 
In addition, there is an important question about the role played by the military 
purge to the Great Terror itself. The Red Army did not just reflect the changing broader 
conspiracy narrative that defined the Great Terror and the military purge would directly 
contribute to it. Once the military plot was ‘exposed’ in June 1937, this would have 
firmly reinforced and heightened the perceived danger from foreign-backed 
counterrevolutionaries to the Soviet Union. The impact of the ‘military-fascist plot’ had 
an influence which went far beyond the confines of the Red Army. In terms of the 
course of the repression in 1937 Getty describes the arrests of Tukhachevskii and the 
                                                
6 Exceptions include Reese, ‘The Red Army and the Great Purges’, and Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA. 
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other senior officers in May as a ‘watershed’ moment. According to Getty, this was ‘the 
first repression of large numbers of people who had never been overt oppositionists and 
had always sided with Stalin in various party disputes.’ He argues that the military 
purge ‘triggered a nationwide explosion of terror directed at leading cadres in all fields 
and at all levels’.7 The military purge firmly took the growing repression outside the 
confines of the former political Opposition. When Tukhachevskii’s execution was 
publicised this created widespread confusion and a loss of morale in both the army and 
wider society.  
Furthermore, soon after the initiation of the military purge Stalin approved a 
series of mass operations starting in early August targeting the broader Soviet 
population. These included the mass operation based on Order 00447, which targeted 
kulaks, criminals and other ‘anti-soviet elements’. Later operations during the end of 
1937 and in early 1938 targeted ‘anti-soviet elements’ within suspicious foreign 
nationalities, such as Germans, Poles and Koreans. The Great Terror now moved into 
the wider Soviet population. The mass operations saw the arrests of tens of thousands 
by list, many of whom were executed after a judgement by extra-legal troika. Execution 
quotas were used throughout. Almost half of the victims of the Great Terror are 
accounted for in these operations. These mass sweeps of the Soviet population are still a 
disputed part of the history of the Great Terror. How the process of repression in the 
Bolshevik Party became such a widespread repression of the Soviet population remains 
contested. The extent that there are linkages between the party repression and mass 
operations and the nature of these connections is disputed.8  
                                                
7 Getty and Naumov, The Road to Terror, pp. 447, 451. 
8 The mass operations are seen as a break in the style of repression, moving to large sweep operations 
against population cohorts, rather than targeting individuals. However, the transition from the party 
Terror to the mass operations is disputed. Getty argues that Stalin launched the mass operations out of a 
‘blind rage and panic’, through a fear that they were losing control of the countryside to ‘enemies’ and 
‘anti-soviet elements’. This was not a targeted repression, but an indication that the regime had lost 
control and represented a sharp change in the style of repression, see The Road to Terror, pp. 480-481. 
Other historians, such as Hagenloh has disputed Getty’s explanation, arguing that the mass operations 
were not an extension of the repressions with the Bolshevik Party representing a break with previous 
repressive practices, but were non-political operations that had deeper roots in ‘the histories of Soviet 
policing, social engineering, and state violence stretching back to the very beginnings of the Bolshevik 
regime’. As such, the mass operations were not an ‘abrupt change in policy’ but represented a 
culmination of Soviet policies towards groups who were perceived as dangerous, see Hagenloh, pp. 6, 
283-284. Khlevniuk has argued that the mass operations are a sharp break with previous repressions in the 
Bolshevik Party, seeing the initiation of the mass operations as the start of the Great Terror. Khlevniuk 
argues that the mass operations were launched in response to concerns about a fifth column inside the 
Soviet Union in the face of looming war, see Master of the House, pp. 179, 201. 
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This thesis suggests that the repression in the party and the mass operations are 
directly connected, and the military purge provides the link. When the military 
‘conspiracy’ was ‘exposed’ in mid-1937, this moved the growing repression beyond a 
focus on the former Opposition and reinforced the perceived threat from foreign agents 
in a very dramatic fashion. A conspiracy in the Red Army was extremely serious and it 
seems to have genuinely alarmed Stalin. This would highlight the danger of hidden 
foreign agents in even starker terms. The infiltration of the Red Army by foreign agents 
provided further ‘evidence’ of an already established danger of capitalist encirclement. 
It reinforced the threat of war and how the Soviet Union was perceived as vulnerable to 
the subversive activity of the capitalist states. It is reasonable to argue that as a ‘fifth 
column’ had been ‘exposed’ in the Red Army Stalin felt compelled to sanction the later 
mass operations against suspect groups, such as kulaks, criminals and national groups, 
throughout the Soviet Union. He may have perceived these groups as part of the same 
fifth column in light of the ‘military-fascist plot’. If so, the next step for Stalin was to 
move beyond the Red Army and broaden the repression within the Soviet population 
and initiate the mass operations to remove any possible danger that the ‘exposed’ fifth 
column extended to suspicious population groups. As Stalin’s response to the military 
‘conspiracy’ had been hesitant, last minute and reluctant, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the initiation of the mass operations stemmed from similar impulses, and perhaps 
even panic. In this way, the military purge transformed the scale and the targets of the 
Great Terror and it was the decisive factor in pushing the violence towards the Soviet 
population. Thus, this analysis of the military purge reaffirms that the political 
repression in the Bolshevik Party during 1936 was not a separate process to the mass 
operations. The Great Terror was a series of discrete, but still connected, waves of state 
violence. But importantly, while Stalin instigated the mass operations and was closely 
involved in their planning, these were not initiated from a position of strength. It is far 
more likely that the ‘exposure’ of the ‘military-fascist plot’ panicked Stalin about a 
possible fifth column existing also in wider society and he launched the mass operations 
in reaction to this. Rather than see the coming threat of war and take a considered 
decision to remove any potentially unreliable individuals from the population, as to not 
take any chances about a possible fifth column, the ‘military-fascist plot’ in the Red 
Army instead compelled Stalin to attack the Soviet population at the very last moment. 
Consequently, while the carefully planned mass operations do give every indication of a 
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high level of totalitarian control on the surface, they more represent the deep sense of 
vulnerability that existed within the Stalinist regime.9   
Finally, the examination of the military purge in this thesis suggests that to gain 
a fuller understanding of the broader processes that drove the Great Terror it is 
necessary to try and understand Stalin’s worldview and how he defined threats to his 
regime and his personal power. Most importantly, Stalin misperceived the international 
situation and he held an incorrect view of the reliability of his own key power bases 
such as the Red Army. Stalin expected an inevitable war but he did not fully trust his 
means of defence. He was plagued by doubts about the reliability of the army, from 
whether he could trust his most senior officers to how easily it seemed the ranks could 
be infiltrated by various ‘enemies’. However, these concerns were based on threats that 
could be exaggerated by a number of influences, including the methods used by the 
political police, the Bolsheviks’ distrust of standing armies, the particular composition 
of the army command and Stalin’s personal concerns about capitalist encirclement and 
subversion by foreign agents. Consequently, Stalin attacked the Red Army in reaction to 
imaginary threats such as the ‘military-fascist plot’. He acted from a position of 
weakness. As a dictator Stalin could build up the power of the Red Army to enormous 
levels to prepare for the inevitable war, but at the same time he easily undermined his 
own strength by lashing out at misperceived ‘conspiracies’ and ‘plots’ within the ranks. 
Stalin’s ability to build with one hand and destroy with the other defined the nature of 
his power.  
Thus exploring how Stalin perceived the world is central to understanding the 
use of state violence in the 1930s. Stalin’s misperception of threats led him to attack the 
military, the institution he needed the most in the build-up to war. While it is 
indisputable that Stalin wanted to retain his power, and this remains a key motivation 
behind the Terror, it is crucial to try and understand what Stalin believed put this at risk. 
Only examining the influences to Stalin’s worldview will do this. Finally, this analysis 
of the military purge demonstrates that to reach a better understanding of how Stalin 
perceived threats and why he used state violence so frequently, the Great Terror also has 
to seen more broadly than is usually the case in the literature. This thesis argues that the 
explosion in violence of the mid-1930s can be explained by seeing the Terror as the 
culmination of a long history of Stalin’s nagging doubts and suspicions about the 
                                                
9 For the argument that the mass operations are representative of a high level of totalitarian control, see 
Khlevniuk, Master of the House. 
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reliability of different groups and institutions in the Soviet system that date back to the 
Revolution, and which by 1937 had become too much to ignore when the regime 
experienced a period of extreme crisis. 
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